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Chapter I. 
Introduction 
1.1 Research question 
Jensen (1986) defines overinvestment as growing a business past its optimal size. 
Overinvestment can be understood as investing in, or stay invested in, value destroying 
projects. Empirical research on overinvestment focused on the verification of the existence of 
the phenomenon, on the presence or absence of certain corporate financial characteristics 
(such as high cash-flow and low investment opportunities), or various national institutions and 
corporate finance policies explaining the extent of the problem.  
In our view, the above factors determine the opportunity to overinvest, but do not explain why 
management decides to take advantage of that opportunity and engages in the act of 
overinvestment. The link is only automatic if management always takes every opportunity 
that presents itself to act opportunistically, which assumption is widespread in the field of 
agency theory. Literature identifies two behavior-related motivations driving overinvestment: 
agency conflict (Jensen, 1986) and overconfidence (Heaton, 2002). While overconfidence is 
extensively studied in literature, the underlying factors of human motivation inciting 
management to engage in agency motivated overinvestment have been largely ignored. We 
contribute to literature by seeking to better understand what induces management to take 
advantage of the opportunity and to commit resources to value-destroying investments.  
This dissertation investigates whether national culture influences management’s tendency to 
engage in overinvestment in capital expenditures. Based on literature we can establish that 
culture influences the opportunity to overinvest through the institutional environment in 
which the company operates, and the cultural influence on some of the techniques used to 
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mitigate overinvestment at the company level, such as corporate governance, leverage, cash 
holdings, and payment of dividends. Our research question is the following: is national 
cultural a fundamental determinant of management’s investment decisions resulting in 
overinvestment beyond culture’s impact on the opportunity for overinvestment?  
1.2 Theories and hypotheses 
1.2.1 Motivation for overinvestment 
As we are investigating the cultural determinants of overinvestment in capital expenditures, 
an explanation related to human behavior, it is necessary to briefly discuss the underlying 
motivations of overinvestment. The majority of researchers view overinvestment as an agency 
problem driven by the divergence of interest and asymmetric information between 
shareholders and management. The conflict of interest arises as management may obtain 
private benefits from the resources under their control (Jensen, 1986). Such benefits may 
include elevated reputation (Avery et al., 1998) from being a manager of a larger company, 
and increased monetary and non-monetary compensation (Stulz, 1990). Investments resulting 
in diversification may also serve the managers by increasing the stability of cash flows, 
therefore decreasing the likelihood of bankruptcy, thus loss of employment (Amihud and Lev, 
1981), and by safeguarding the independence of the firm (Harford, 1999). There is a vast 
empirical literature confirming overinvestment from the perspective of agency theory (see for 
example: Hwang and Kim, 2012) 
Another phenomenon that may lead to overinvestment is management overconfidence. 
Underlying reasons for managerial optimism, such as the better-than-average effect, the self-
attribution bias, and illusion of control are embedded in human psychology (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005). Overconfidence may induce management to underestimate the risks, and to 
overestimate the cash flows and/or its own ability to unlock value that is associated with 
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investments (Heaton, 2002). These factors then may prompt management to undertake 
investments, which are, in reality, value destroying. The link between overconfidence and 
overinvestment has been empirically supported in the literature (see for example Ferris et al., 
2013). Management can pursue such overinvestment fully intending to maximize shareholder 
value. In such cases, management, contrary to the agency problem motivation, does not make 
a conscious decision to overinvest, but miscalculates. 
Analyzing mergers and acquisitions of US companies, Malmendier and Tate (2008) estimate 
that overconfident managers are responsible for 44% of the value destruction as measured by 
the negative announcement effect. There are no similar calculations we know of neither for 
investment in capital expenditure, nor for countries other than the United States. Literature 
shows overconfidence to be related positively to the Individualism (Ferris et al., 2013; Chui et 
al., 2010), and negatively to the Long-Term Orientation (Ferris et al., 2013) cultural value 
dimensions of Hofstede. The US scores the highest among all countries on Individualism and 
in the lowest quartile on Long-Term Orientation. Therefore, it is expected, and empirically 
shown for optimism by Graham et al., (2013), that overconfidence is substantially stronger in 
the US compared to the an international sample. This leads us to expect, assuming the 
estimate is materially applicable to capital expenditures as well, that the proportion of value 
destroyed by overconfidence-driven overinvestment is probably significant, but substantially 
lower in an international sample than that motivated by agency problems. 
1.2.2 Culture and financial decision making 
1.2.2.1 Culture’s influence on behavior - mechanism 
House et al. (2004) define culture as: “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and 
interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of 
members of collectives that are transmitted across generations” (House et al., 2004, p. 15).  
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Culture is a complex phenomenon, and it influences economic behavior through multiple 
channels. Williamson (2000) differentiates four social levels with higher levels affecting and 
constraining lower ones. Culture, in level one, influences the structure and functioning of 
other institutions of society such as the formal institutional environment, governance, and 
resource allocation, which are located at lower levels. Influential cross-cultural authors 
including Hofstede and Schwartz posit that the fundamental components of culture are values. 
Based on arguments put forth by Schwartz, Licht (2001), and Licht et al., (2007) describe the 
mechanism through which values exert a direct influence on behavior. They explain that 
cultural values determine what is seen as good, bad, acceptable or unacceptable in a society. 
Values not only influence people’s perceptions and desires; thus, their goals and preferences, 
but also what they are willing to do to achieve them. Through shaping norms, perceptions, 
desires, and evaluations, values shape the decisions people make, and the actions they take. 
This model is similar to the Values, Attitudes, Behavior Hierarchy model developed by 
Homer and Kahle (1988) stating that values influence attitudes, which in turn influence 
behavior. 
1.2.2.2 Culture’s influence on overinvestment-related financial decision-making – empirical 
evidence 
Researchers found empirical support that culture plays a role in several areas of financial 
decision- making including asset management, corporate governance, and corporate finance. 
Techniques to mitigate overinvestment aim either to improve control of managerial decision 
making or to limit resources available to management to “waste” (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, 
we focus on evidence related to such techniques. Control of managerial decision making is 
generally achieved through national-, and company-level corporate governance, and the 
market for corporate control. New Institutional Economics posits (eg: North, 1990; 
Williamson, 2000), that national legal-, economic-, and financial institutions are embedded in 
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culture within a society. This is confirmed by empirical research showing that both national 
corporate governance regimes (Licht, 2001, Licht et al., 2005, 2007), the occurrence of 
corporate takeovers (Licht, 2001), and company-level arrangements, such as board structure 
(Li and Harrsion, 2008) are influenced by national culture. It has been also established that 
national culture contributes to the determination of corporate financial policies that can be 
applied to limit resources available to management. Such relationships has been shown 
between national culture and capital structure (eg: Wang and Esqueda 2014; Zheng et al., 
2012), dividend payments (eg: Breuer et al., 2014; Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010), and cash 
holdings (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009; Ramirez and Tadesse, 2009). 
1.2.3 Culture’s dual influence on overinvestment 
Culture’s exerts a dual influence on overinvestment. Potential overinvestor companies share 
certain characteristics, such as low-quality investment opportunities, and access to resources 
to invest. This is because when management has value-increasing projects to pursue, it likely 
chooses those over value-decreasing ones, and when it does not have access to resources to 
commit, it cannot overinvest. The aforementioned financial characteristics, and the presence 
or absence of control mechanisms together shape whether management has the opportunity to 
overinvest. As we have discussed, national legal, economic, and financial institutions are 
embedded in culture within a society. It has been also demonstrated in literature that each 
major mechanism at the company level applied to mitigate overinvestment is related to 
culture. Taken together, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the opportunity for 
management to overinvest is clearly influenced by culture.  
With a notable exception of overconfidence related overinvestment, extant literature tends to 
study financial characteristics and control mechanisms to explain overinvestment. However 
such factors influence the act of overinvestment only indirectly through affecting the 
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opportunity to overinvest. The majority of empirical research could be viewed as directly 
studying the phenomenon of overinvestment exclusively, if one assumed management always 
overinvests if there is an opportunity to do so. We hypothesize that this is not the case. We 
posit that culture exerts a more direct influence on overinvestment in affecting management’s 
decisions to move from the opportunity to the act of overinvestment.  
Similar to Jensen (1986), the majority of researchers view overinvestment as an agency 
problem. In traditional agency literature the agent is assumed to act opportunistically to 
maximize its own utility capitalizing on information asymmetries. Several studies criticize the 
underlying assumption prevalent in agency theory concerning unconditionally opportunistic 
behavior without taking into account any environmental effects (eg: Lubatkin et al., 2007; 
Ekanayeke, 2004; Johnson and Droege, 2004). Licht et al., (2007) posit that while it is 
asymmetric information and incomplete contracting that give power to parties to a contract to 
further their own interests at the expense of one another, societal norms regarding the use of 
power determine whether, or the extent to which, they take advantage of it. Following the 
mechanism describing how values impact behavior briefly explained in the previous section, 
it seems important to take into account the cultural environment when examining 
management’s decision to engage in overinvestment.  
Besides agency problems, managerial overconfidence may also lead to overinvestment. 
Literature showed that there are international variations in people’s tendency to be 
overconfident, and have demonstrated that at least some of this variation can be attributed to 
national culture (Ferris et al., 2013; Chui et al., 2010). Putting it all together, an influence of 
culture on managerial decisions leading to overinvestment, thorough overconfidence, has 
been established. However, culture’s influence on managerial opportunism driven 
overinvestment has never been studied. As the underlying values leading to managerial 
overconfidence and opportunism are very different from one another, we argue that in order to 
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better understand the overall link between culture and overinvestment, it is important to study 
the combined effects of both motivations. Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that 
through underlying societal values influencing norms, perceptions, evaluations and desires, 
national culture is a fundamental determinant in management’s decision to take advantage of 
opportunities to overinvest.  
1.2.4 Quantifying culture 
Culture is an abstract phenomenon, which cannot be directly observed. Therefore, to be able 
to empirically test our theory presented above, we need a quantitative indicator for culture. 
Three models providing quantified indicators for national culture dominate cross-cultural 
finance literature. These were developed by Hofstede, Schwartz, and the GLOBE project. 
Each of these three models is designed to quantitatively approximate national culture. They 
argue that all societies face similar basic challenges, but their response varies with 
fundamental values shared by their members (House et al., 2004; Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 
1994). All three models identify, measure, and group values, and compare them between 
cultures. Based on extensive international surveys, they aggregate their data at the national 
level and extract a set of cultural value dimensions representing societal stances (House et al., 
2004; Hofstede, 2010; Schwartz, 1994). National cultures are described by the combination of 
the dimensions of the given cultural model. To approximate national culture, similar to the 
approach taken by for example Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014) and Wang and Esqueda 
(2014), we have decided to employ Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions, as these are the 
most widely used in literature. However, to better capture diverse aspects of culture, which 
are represented differently by each cultural model, relevant dimensions of the most recent 
dimensionalist model, that of GLOBE, will also be applied as a test of robustness of our 
results. Simultaneous use of the most applied and most recent cultural models offers an 
opportunity to study the problem from a richer perspective and ensure that our results are not 
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biased by the specificities of any single cultural model. It is important to note, that while the 
validity of the dimensionalist framework may be debated by some, the underlying proposition 
of this dissertation, that culture directly influences the decision of management leading to 
overinvestment is independent of the framework used. 
1.2.5 Hypotheses 
Based on literature from the field of cross-cultural psychology documenting a relationship 
between culture and economic behavior, we have developed testable hypotheses for four of 
the six Hofstede dimensions. We have not formulated hypotheses neither for the Long Term 
Orientation nor for the Indulgence Versus Restraint dimensions. We believe the theoretical 
direction of the relationship between Long Term Orientation and overinvestment is unclear. 
For Indulgence Versus Restraint, we found no direct theoretical link between the values 
characterizing this dimension and overinvestment. 
High Masculinity is associated with assertiveness, competitiveness, valuing wealth and 
recognition, and preference for larger organizations. In our opinion these values are highly 
consistent with management’s tendency to act opportunistically. Masculinity has also been 
associated to higher overconfidence in literature (Barber and Odean, 2001). Overall, we 
believe that Masculinity is positively related to both opportunism and overconfidence. 
Hypothesis 1: High Masculinity leads to more overinvestment 
High Power Distance is associated with highly valuing power and status as well as with a 
belief that those in power are entitled to privileges. Those with power are expected to use it to 
increase their wealth and status. This cultural orientation could encourage opportunistic 
behavior. We expect it to also positively contribute to overconfidence, as individuals have a 
tendency to believe themselves superior if treated as such by others.  
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Hypothesis 2: High Power Distance leads to more overinvestment.     
In individualistic cultures, members tend to focus more on self-interest, enter into 
“calculative” relationships, and aggressiveness is perceived as a positive trait. Several authors 
examining the relationship between national culture and agency problems argue that high 
Individualism is in line with the underlying assumptions about self-serving agent behavior of 
agency theory (eg: Fridrmuc and Jacob, 2010). Individualism is also positively related to 
overconfidence, while its opposite pole, Collectivism, is theorized to lower agency problems 
(Chui et al., 2010; Ferris et al. 2013), which could mitigate overinvestment.    
Hypothesis 3: High Individualism leads to more overinvestment. 
Members of high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures tend to prefer stable, large organizations. 
Potential motivations for overinvestment are related to avoiding management’s loss of 
employment (Amihud and le problème d’agence Lev, 1981; Harford, 1999). Such motivation 
should be viewed as a form of opportunism. We expect societies putting emphasis on values 
related to avoiding ambiguity to exhibit less overconfidence, as the better-than-average effect, 
illusion of control and the undervaluation of risk are all connected to the willingness to 
confront ambiguity. As we see opportunism as accounting for a larger portion of 
overinvestment than overconfidence, we predict an overall positive relationship between 
Uncertainty Avoidance and overinvestment. 
Hypothesis 4: High Uncertainty Avoidance leads to more overinvestment. 
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1.3 Data and methodology 
1.3.1 Research philosophy and approach 
Overall, our position of reality not being knowable with absolute certainty, accepting 
unobservable phenomena as real, viewing research as value-bound, and focusing on the need 
to study phenomena in context places us firmly in the post-positivist tradition. According to 
Bisman (2010), post-positivism offers a position, which “retains elements of scientific rigour, 
and yet acknowledge the value of richness and context, as well as the importance of 
generalisability” (Bisman 2010, p. 7). Bisman (2010) actually writes about Critical Realism, but 
based on our review of the literature the statement quoted is consistent with the underlying 
assumptions of the other post-positivist paradigm discussed above, Scientific Realism, as well. We 
believe the philosophical assumptions underlying our work are represented by those of the 
Scientific Realist epistemological paradigm.    
We have followed a research approach that is specifically referred to as hypothetico-deductive 
(see for example Godfrey-Smith, 2003). We have started from the existing theories of Agency 
Theory, and postulations of Cross-Cultural Philosophy also supported by New Institutional 
Economics, and combining them we have developed a theoretical argument that national 
culture influences management’s propensity to make decisions leading to overinvestment. 
This step was followed by the formulation of testable hypotheses, which in turn were tested 
on empirical data.  
1.3.2 Initial sample 
Firm-level data was collected from the Factset database for all quoted firms for the period 
between 2001 and 2011 from countries for which the cultural dimension scores of Hofstede 
are available. Following the literature, companies in the financial sector, and those with 
missing values of basic financial data such as missing, zero or negative total assets and 
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revenues-, and with missing cash and short term investments, net property plant and 
equipment, long-term debt, total equity, common equity, net income, EBITDA, dividends, 
operating cash flow, and Capital expenditures, were excluded from the sample. Firms from 
countries with a resulting initial sample of less than twenty companies were also dropped. The 
resulting initial sample includes 7,338 firms from 36 countries. 
1.3.3 Detecting potential overinvestors 
As overinvestment is not directly observable, it is necessary to use an indicator to detect it. 
The task of constructing an indicator is further complicated by the fact that several countries 
included in the sample have less than ideal disclosure regimes, and excluding those countries 
would materially reduce the cultural diversity that is the subject of the analysis. Thus, any 
indicator used must rely only on basic accounting information. Based on this requirement and 
on the fact that it is extensively used in the literature (eg.: Francis et al., 2013; Xu, 2013), we 
employ investment - cash flow sensitivity for firms with high cash flow and poor-quality 
investment opportunity sets as indicator for overinvestment.  
The argument underlying this method is based on the original proposition of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), according to which the investment and financing decisions are separate. Jensen 
(1986) notes that when investments are self-serving, it is easier for management to finance 
them from internal funds than from capital markets. Thus, investments of overinvestor firms 
are expected to be sensitive to their internal resources approximated by their cash flow. 
Theories of underinvestment make the same prediction (Stein, 2003). Vogt (1994) established 
theoretically and showed empirically that both over- and underinvestment are occurring, but 
at different firms. Therefore, both behaviors contribute to overall investment - cash flow 
sensitivity that is documented in the literature. However, under- and overinvestor firms have 
very different characteristics. According to Vogt (1994), one can differentiate between the 
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two sets of firms based on their investment opportunities and amount of free cash flow, an 
approach that is widely followed in literature. The quality of the investment opportunity set of 
a firm, however, is not observable. The most widespread indicator used in corporate 
investment literature is Tobin’s Q, often further approximated by the company’s Market to 
Book ratio. The assumption behind using Q as an indicator for the quality of investment 
opportunities is that the stock market appropriately values the future prospects of the given 
firm. A similar approach was followed by Wang and Esqueda (2014) and Xu (2013). 
1.3.4 Base model 
Adapted from the model used by Attig et al., (2012), who studied the influence of investment 
horizon on investment-cash flow sensitivity using an interaction term as main variable of 
interest, the following reduced form Q investment model with an interaction term was 
applied: 
(I/K)i,t = β0+ β1(MBi,t-1)+ β2(CF/K) i,t+ β3(CF/Ki,t *CVD)+ β4(X i,t)+ε  
where I stands for capital expenditures, K for capital approximated by Total Assets, MB for 
Market to Book ratio, CF for Free Cash Flow, CVD is the cultural value dimension variable, 
X stands for control variables, and ε is the error term. As we are using Market to Book ratio 
lagged one year in our model, the effective period for the sample is 2002 to 2011. To 
accommodate our aim of studying the effect of time-invariant culture on time-variant 
investment – cash flow sensitivity, the dynamic nature of several of our variables, and likely 
endogeneity problems, we have applied a one-step system General Method of Moments 
dynamic panel data estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991).   
Based on literature, we have included a number of firm-level control variables, which are 
expected to influence the level of overinvestment. These are: 
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 FIRM SIZE is often associated with a higher level of agency costs (see for example: 
Kadapakkam et al., 1998); thus, it can be expected that investment - cash flow sensitivity 
increases with firm size. 
 LEVERAGE is viewed as a mechanism to control agency costs of free cash flow (see for 
example: Stulz, 1990); therefore, we expect that investment - cash flow sensitivity 
decreases with leverage. 
 DIVIDENDS are also regarded as a tool to decrease the agency cost of free cash flow (see 
for example: Easterbrook, 1984). As such, investment - cash flow sensitivity is expected 
to decrease with dividends. 
 CASH LEVEL is positively related to the agency cost of free cash flow (see for example: 
Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). However, management can engage in overinvestment spending 
cash already held by the firm, which, in turn, should lower the dependence on cash flow 
for financing value- destroying investments. Overall, we expect investment - cash flow 
sensitivity to decrease with cash held by the firm. 
 PRIMARY ACTIVITY of each firm is included to account for potentially differing 
opportunities and control of overinvestment by sector.  
To better isolate national culture’s effect from that of other country level differences in the 
sample we have included the following country-level control variables: 
 ANTI-SELF-DEALING INDEX is widely used in the literature to indicate the quality of the 
country- level corporate governance regime (eg.: Breuer et al., 2014; Wang and Esquada, 
2014). Efficient corporate governance lowers agency costs arising from management 
opportunism (see for example: Hart, 1995); thus, we anticipate a negative relationship 
between the Anti-Self-Dealing Index and investment - cash flow sensitivity.  
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 SIZE OF STOCK MARKET and AVAILABLE CREDIT are employed as indicators for financial 
constraints, which can be related to underinvestment driven investment - cash flow 
sensitivity (see for example Stein, 2003). If easier access to financing increases (reduces) 
investment - cash flow sensitivity, it could be interpreted as a signal that overinvestment 
(underinvestment) is the dominant underlying cause of that sensitivity in the sample.   
 GDP was included in the model to control for any possible systematic differences that 
may arise due to the wealth of the countries.  
1.3.5 Limitations 
Our results need to be interpreted by taking note of the following limitations. (i) We were 
obliged to use indicators to identify overinvestment and to quantify national culture that are 
less than perfect measures of these directly unobservable phenomena. Our methodology 
follows prior literature both in the construction of the indicators and in robustness tests in 
order to address this problem and minimize its effect. (ii) A further limitation is imposed by 
the lack of firm-level corporate governance control variables. As literature indicates firm-
level corporate governance can substitute for country-level governance systems in case the 
latter is of lower quality (see for example Francis et al., 2013), it would be informative to 
control for firm-level corporate governance. However, we were unable to find such data for 
the sample period without needing to significantly lower the number of countries in our 
sample, which, in turn, would have diminished the cultural variation that is needed for a 
meaningful analysis of national cultural effects. (iii) Our assumption that the location of a 
company’s headquarters determines its nationality is a potential oversimplification, as 
decision makers may not be of the same nationality; thus, they may be influenced by different 
cultural values, and some investment decisions may be decided by local management. Such 
simplification is necessary when conducting large-scale empirical analysis and is dominantly 
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used in the literature (see for example Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014; Wang and Esqueda, 
2014), and both Hofstede (2010) and House et al. (2004) identify several forces that result in 
significant influence of headquarters in corporate investment behavior. (iv) It is possible that 
some firms in our sample have a particularly strong organizational culture that may influence 
the propensity of management to engage in overinvestment in a direction markedly different 
from the influence of national culture. We believe this not to be a significant problem 
following the arguments of Hofstede (2010), House et al. (2004), and Adler (1997) 
emphasizing that organizational culture itself is influenced and dominated by national culture.  
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
As a first step of the analysis we have constructed our final sample of potential overinvestor 
firms following the process outlined above. Of the overall sample, there are 1,550 companies 
falling into the Low Market to Book and High Free Cash Flow to Total Assets quadrant of 
companies resulting in 17,050 firm-year observations, with companies from all 36 countries 
of the original sample. 
With regards to the geographical constitution of our sample, we notice that while all 
continents are represented, the majority of companies are from Asia (47%), North America 
(27%), and Europe (18%). In our final sample, the country with most companies is the United 
States with 24% of firms with developing countries accounting for only 17%. This distortion 
is a consequence of the differing degree to which the quoted company as an institution is 
established in various regions and of the quality of data available for such companies.  
The makeup of the initial and final samples are very similar. As the final sample includes 
firms exclusively with average sample period cash flows above, and at the same time, average 
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period Market to Book values below the median in their countries, these are companies where 
the market assigns a relatively low valuation to the company’s assets despite relatively strong 
cash flows. Assuming that companies with these characteristics are indeed potential 
overinvestors, the similar makeup shows that such companies are present to a comparable 
extent across regions in our sample.              
It is notable that the median Market to Book value is only slightly less than 1. According to 
the theoretical arguments put forward by Lang and Litzenberger (1989), a Tobin’s Q of less 
than 1 signals overinvestment. While this raises the question whether sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow in our sample is driven by underinvestment to a large degree, multivariate results 
from an alternative specification strongly suggest that the dominant source is indeed 
overinvestment. 
1.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
1.4.2.1 Base model 
We analyze five base models, where in the first four we apply separately the Hofstede 
dimensions with a hypothesized relationship to overinvestment, and the fifth model includes 
all the cultural dimensions of Hofstede in one regression. It is important to note that the 
dependent variable is the amount invested in capital investments divided by total assets, and 
not our indicator of overinvestment. Therefore, the coefficients show the effects of the 
regressors directly on capital expenditure, and not on overinvestment. Overinvestment is 
captured by the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. A statistically significant coefficient of 
the interaction variable between the cultural value dimension and cash-flow indicates whether 
national culture influences this sensitivity, thus overinvestment. These interaction terms are 
the main variables of interest in the models as they directly address our hypotheses. 
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Our base results confirm Hypotheses 1 and 4 showing a positive and statistically highly 
significant relationship between the Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance dimensions of 
Hofstede and investment - cash flow sensitivity. With regards to Power Distance and 
Individualism, our Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not supported. Models where these variables 
were included separately, showed statistically insignificant negative coefficients for the 
interaction term. In the model combining all of Hofstede’s dimensions, while the coefficient is 
similar for Power Distance, it is negative and weakly significant for Individualism. The latter 
is somewhat disturbing, as this cultural dimension has been widely associated with both 
opportunistic behavior and overconfidence in the literature. This result, along with those 
relating to the other models, are further verified through a series of robustness checks we 
carried out.  
1.4.2.2 Robustness tests 
It could be raised as a concern concerning our interpretation of the results that the direction of 
causality is difficult to clearly establish. However, as similarly argued throughout the culture 
and finance literature, we draw attention to the fact that culture changes very slowly with 
estimations reaching several decades or even centuries (eg.: Inglehart and Baker, 2000). It is 
very difficult to contend that a relatively small group’s (management) very specific behavior 
(overinvestment) would feed back into cultural transmission through family and educational 
institutions in society fundamentally altering cultural values. While our statistical analysis 
does not empirically prove causality, theoretical arguments strongly suggest it.  
a. Cultural constructs 
An important question regarding the validity of our results is if they are primarily driven by 
our choice of model to quantify culture. To address the above concern we apply the GLOBE 
dimensionalist model as an alternative specification. With regards to Hofstede’s Masculinity 
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dimension, the values driving our hypothesized relationship to overinvestment are grouped in 
the Assertiveness dimension by GLOBE; therefore, we tested our hypothesis replacing 
Masculinity by Assertiveness. GLOBE separated Hofstede’s Individualism/Collectivism 
dimension into two related dimensions: Institutional Collectivism, and In-group Collectivism. 
We included both in separate models. Overall, we analyzed five new regressions where 
Hofstede’s dimensions were replaced with those conceptually most related by GLOBE. 
The results corroborate our earlier finding lending strong support to our Hypothesis 1 that 
higher Masculinity (Assertiveness) leads to more overinvestment. Similar to results obtained 
using the Hofstede framework, our Hypothesis 2 on the positive relationship between Power 
Distance and overinvestment is not confirmed.  
Results using the GLOBE dimensions are not consistent with those applying the Hofstede 
scores for Individualism. As we pointed out above, the sign of the coefficient of interest was 
negative, the opposite we predicted, for the Hofstede dimension, while coefficients for the 
two related GLOBE dimensions both show the expected sign and are highly significant. The 
complete opposing and significant results between the Hofstede and the related GLOBE 
dimensions leads us to tentatively hypothesize that the driver or drivers of the influence of this 
cultural attribute on overinvestment are likely to be captured differently in the two 
frameworks, leaving us unable to confirm our Hypothesis 3. 
With regards to Uncertainty Avoidance, while the sign of the coefficient of the interaction 
variable is the same as the Hofstede dimension, it is not statistically significant. This disparity 
is most likely driven by the different conceptualization, sample, and methodology of Hofstede 
and the GLOBE project.  
  
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 29. 
 
b. Interaction models 
Our underlying assumption in our empiric analysis is that the investment - cash flow 
sensitivity in our final sample is an appropriate indicator of overinvestment. To verify this 
assumption we have run extended regressions with additional interaction variables between 
free cash flow and the control variables representing overinvestment mitigating 
characteristics. Specifically, the interaction between cash flow and the following variables 
have been added: (i) firm size, (ii) leverage, (iii) dividends, (iv) cash level, (v) Anti-Self-
Dealing Index, (vi) size of the stock market to GDP, and (vii) available credit to GDP. The 
coefficients of these interaction variables show the effect of these variables on cash flow 
sensitivity; thus, on our indicator of overinvestment. Results with regards to the quality of 
corporate governance and availability of financing, strongly support that investment - cash 
flow sensitivity is dominantly motivated by over-, and not underinvestment in our sample. 
Cash flow interactions of control variables with statistical significance show the expected 
signs. More specifically, where firm size enters with significance, it is with positive 
coefficients, and cash held is negative and highly significant in all regressions. Coefficients 
for leverage and dividends paid are not significant in any of the models.  
Looking at the interaction variables between cash flow and the cultural dimensions, 
coefficients are materially similar for Masculinity/Assertiveness, and both Hofstede’s and 
GLOBE’s Uncertainty Avoidance constructs confirming hypotheses 1 and lending support to 
4, and also for GLOBE’s Collectivism dimensions. However, the coefficients are inconsistent 
with the base model with changing signs and/or significance for Power Distance (both 
constructs) and Individualism. Consequently, with regards to Power Distance (Hypothesis 2), 
and Individualism (Hypothesis 3) we are unable to conclude whether there is a direct 
influence on overinvestment beyond those captured by our control variables.  
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c. Further robustness tests 
To further confirm that investment-cash flow sensitivity in our sample is an appropriate 
indicator of overinvestment and does not reflect information about future cash flows as 
proposed by Cleary (2006), we included the volatility of cash flow over the entire sample 
period for each firm as an additional control variable. We also verified whether our choice of 
the indicator for the quality of national corporate governance has a material impact on our 
conclusions. To this end we replaced our indicator in the base model, Anti Self-Dealing Index 
(Djankov et al., 2008), with Concentration of Ownership (Djankov et al., 2008), Rule of Law 
(World Bank), and Common Law Origin (La Porta et al., 1998) in separate regressions. In 
order to ensure that results are not driven by specific sample characteristics, further tests 
included the eliminations of 2008 and 2009 from the period to account for potential distortion 
of the financial crisis, excluding US companies from the sample, and separately eliminating 
outliers based on firm size, free cash flow, and capital expenditures. None of the robustness 
tests significantly affected our results concerning the confirmation of Hypotheses 1 and strong 
support for Hypothesis 4. 
1.5 Implications 
We believe that our results offer value to academia, policy makers, managers and investors. 
Extending the analysis of overinvestment by adding previously ignored determinants of 
management’s tendency to make decisions leading to overinvestment contributes to the 
theoretical foundations of the phenomenon. This allows researchers to improve the 
specification of their models in international samples, as well as increases our overall 
understanding of culture’s impact on corporate finance. Furthermore, our results also lend 
some support to those who question the cross-cultural transferability of Agency Theory. 
Better understanding the cultural foundations of overinvestment will aid policy makers in 
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projects requiring international cooperation, and also assist them at national level to avoid the 
adaptation of international governance rules and regulations destined to mitigate 
overinvestment that may prove inefficient in the local cultural context. Our findings are also 
relevant for practicing managers, as it helps them to achieve better results leading culturally 
diverse workforce, as well as in various cross-border activities. Furthermore, our conclusions 
highlight the need for investors to consider the adaptation of specific mechanisms for 
international companies intending to control such behavior at their foreign operations when 
selecting or monitoring their portfolios. 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized into seven sections: Chapter 1 is a summary. Chapter 2 briefly 
describes literature relating to cross-cultural psychology with an emphasis on the relationship 
between culture and management, institutions and corporate finance, and literature on 
overinvestment including its human motivations, and mechanisms to mitigate it. Chapter 3 
describes the dimensionalist approach to quantifying culture. In Chapter 4 we present our 
theoretical reasoning behind our assertion that national culture influences management’s 
tendency to make decisions leading to overinvestment, and develop empirically testable 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 explains our research philosophy and empirical methodology. We 
present and discuss our empirical results in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 we briefly review the 
implications of our results including some promising areas of future research.    
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Chapter II. 
Review of Culture and Overinvestment Literature 
Our research question exploring national culture’s influence on overinvestment requires a 
review including contributions from the literature in cross-cultural psychology, New 
Institutional Economics, Agency Theory, and corporate finance. For the clarity of our 
arguments, we do not intend to provide an exhaustive review of literature of these areas of 
research; rather we concentrate on the theoretical foundations and empirical results most 
relevant to our research question, to our theoretical argumentation, and to the empirical 
method we apply. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first, we aim to specify a definition of 
culture suitable for our research question, and to briefly introduce the foundations of cross-
cultural psychology, a field in which our arguments presented in chapter IV are rooted. We 
link culture to decision making relevant to the overinvestment problem, namely to 
management, economic performance, institutions, and corporate finance. The strong 
theoretical and empirical support for culture’s influence in these areas provides a compelling 
rationale for pursuing the research question of our dissertation. While dimensionalism is part 
of cross-cultural psychology, due to its central position in our argumentation and 
methodology, it will be reviewed in a separate chapter. 
In the second section we introduce the overinvestment problem separately discussing its two 
fundamental motivations: agency conflict and overconfidence. We present basic theoretical 
models and empirical analysis to conclude that overinvestment is an existing problem 
destroying value, which provides strong motivation for this dissertation aimed to advance our 
understanding of its fundamental determinants. In this section we also discuss mechanisms 
identified in literature to mitigate overinvestment, such as leverage, disbursements to 
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shareholders, the market for corporate control, and corporate governance. We link each of 
these proposed control mechanisms to culture establishing an indirect link between culture 
and overinvestment in chapter IV.  
2.1 Culture 
2.1.1 Definition of culture 
There is no consensus on a single definition of culture widely applied in literature. Culture is a 
very complex, multi-faceted phenomenon affecting a lot of, if not most, aspects of human 
lives. Culture operates at several levels further complicating attempts to find a comprehensive 
definition. Throughout the cross-cultural literature cultural effects are hypothesized at both 
the individual level and at group levels, where group can refer to a vast variety of set of 
individuals including people sharing common characteristics based on, among others, 
professions, demographics, socio-economics, belonging to a common society, or citizenship.  
Reflecting this complexity, the seminal work of Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) includes 251 
different definitions of culture. Additionally, in a more recent review of the literature of 
culture’s influence in finance, Reuter (2011) lists 35 different contemporary definitions from 
the disciplines of economics, finance, international management, cross-cultural psychology, 
political sciences and sociology. Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) divide the definitions in six 
categories whether they focus on (1) the facets of life influenced by culture, (2) longevity of 
culture through intergenerational transmission, (3) norms, (4) psychological traits, (5) the 
systemic nature of culture, and (6) its origin. Reuter (2011) identifies the reference to 
longevity/stability of culture, to culture as separating groups from one another, and a focus on 
values as fundamental in motivation as frequent elements in definitions. Underlying all the 
definitions, and the very concept of culture, is the sharedness aspect. While culture is argued 
to influence individual as well as group behavior, Berry et al. (1992) explicitly notes, that 
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“cultural phenomena are collective phenomena … it is carried by the collectivity” (Berry et 
al., 1992, p. 167). Another distinctive feature of culture is that it is an entirely human made 
phenomenon (Hofstede, 2010).  
Reuter (2011) claims that the use of a multitude of different definitions, even within the same 
disciplines, is the result of scholars looking for definitions to fit their objectives. In his 
opinion, culture is too complex for any single definition, thus any definition applied should 
“emerge” from the phenomenon being studied to better focus on the theoretical link between 
the object of the research and relevant aspects of culture. 
In our empirical approach we follow the dimensionalist method as operationalization of 
culture. Dimensionalism will be briefly introduced separately in chapter III. This approach fits 
our research question as its various frameworks rest upon the Value-Belief Theory of culture 
which also underlies our own theoretical reasoning, and it quantifies certain aspects of culture 
facilitating large scale cross-cultural empirical studies. Therefore, we have decided to adopt 
the definition developed as part of the most recent dimensionalist model, that of the GLOBE 
project. In this study, we define culture as: “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and 
interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of 
members of collectives that are transmitted across generations” (House et al., 2004, p. 15).  
2.1.2 Objective of cross-cultural psychology 
Many sciences study culture, with each focusing on a slightly different aspect aiming to 
understand culture and its place in science through its own set of tools and epistemological 
lenses. The field with particular relevance to our research question is cross-cultural 
psychology. Berry et al. (1992) defines cross-cultural psychology as “the scientific study of 
human behavior and its transmission, taking into account the ways in which behaviors are 
shaped and influenced by social and cultural forces” (Berry et al., 1992, p.1), and later adding 
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that it is “the study of similarities and differences in individual psychological functioning in 
various cultural and ethnic groups; of the relationships  between psychological variables and 
sociocultural, ecological, and biological variables; and of current changes in these variables” 
(Berry et al., 1992, p.2).  
Cross-cultural psychology is related to, and has its roots in, several other disciplines, such as 
ecology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, biology, and psychology. The subject of cross-
cultural psychology is how “social context” influences certain characteristics and the behavior 
of the “population”, which, according to Berry et al. 1992, positions it between psychology 
studying the individual and anthropology studying the “social context” (Berry et al., 1992, p. 
191).  
At the center of the discipline of cross-culture psychology, and illustrated as the square shape 
to the extreme right in Figure 2.1., is the notion that culture influences social behavior. Berry 
et al. (1992) states that “the field of cross-cultural psychology has established fairly solid 
linkages between how individuals act (including thoughts, feelings, and motives) and the 
culture that nurtured them” (Berry et al., 1992, p. 281). This assertion translates to the 
proposition that a better understanding of the influence of culture on behavior could lead to a 
better explanation of human behavior in many areas. Understanding which cultural aspects 
influence what type of behavior through which mechanisms are areas of interests in cross-
cultural psychology. Our dissertation corresponds to this line of inquiry as we attempt to 
address whether national culture influences management’s tendency to make decisions 
leading to overinvestment in capital expenditures. 
Hofstede (2001) places culture between human nature, which is common to all people to one 
extreme, and personality, which is unique to the individual on the other. Kluckhohn and 
Murray (1948) remarked that “Every man is in certain respects: (a) like all other men; (b) like 
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some other men; (c) like no other man” (Kluckhohn and Murray, 1948, p. 35). Positioning 
cross-cultural psychology in this sentence, Berry et al. (1992) point out that the discipline 
studies shared characteristics of members of a culture differentiating them from other groups 
of people (point b from the quote), while attempting to uncover “cultural universals” (Berry et 
al., 1992, p. 170), characteristics and/or behaviors that are shared across cultures (point a). 
The very assumption of the existence of such “universals”, along with a focus on empirical 
testing, places the discipline epistemologically towards positivism. At the same time, it 
explicitly recognizes that most facets of life, and indeed of social science, are culture bound; 
that is its validity or its applicability is influenced by the cultural environment. Echoing this 
argument, House et al. (2004) also differentiates “culturally generalizable” and “culture 
specific” elements of culture (House et al., 2004, p. 19), with the former referring to the 
“universals” of Berry et al. (1992), and the latter to those unique to some cultures. 
Figure 2.1. Flow of causality from environment to social behavior  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Berry et al. 1992, figure 1-3 p. 12.  
As we pointed out above, cultural stability is one of the overarching themes in the definitions 
of culture. Consequently, cross-cultural psychology also studies the longevity of culture, and 
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(1992) specifies the flow of causality originating from environmental context affecting 
culture, which through inter-generational transmission influences the social behavior of 
members of the given culture extending it across generations. Culture is transferred from one 
generation to the next and to other new members (eg.: migrants) via transmission (illustrated 
by the shaded area on Figure 2.1.). The mechanism of transmission is cultural absorption by 
the new members, which may originate from members of previous generations (eg: family), 
peers (eg: friends, classmates, colleagues), and institutions (eg: school, workplace). Such 
transmission, termed socialization by Hofstede (2001), is only partly conscious, partly it 
happens subconsciously simply by being immersed in the culture. Cross-cultural psychology 
posits that cultural transmission explains the development and persistence of intra-cultural 
similarities and inter-cultural differences of behavior (Berry et al., 1992).     
Hofstede (2001) describes in detail the process by which culture stays stable over extremely 
long periods of time. Social institutions, such as the family and education, play a dominant 
role in socialization. The overwhelming majority of new members in a culture are the children 
born in it. They acquire their culture, in other words they are being socialized in their culture, 
through social institutions such as their families and the education system. Such institutions 
are deeply rooted in the culture of the society of which they are part of; therefore, the 
knowledge, values, and norms they transmit reflect that culture. Socialization happens early in 
people’s lives, when it becomes deeply ingrained and forms a foundation and a point of view 
for all other knowledge and experiences that accumulate during their lives. As adults, 
members of the culture operate the same social institutions responsible for the socialization of 
the then new members in the culture. Culture perpetuates itself. Scholars such as Inglehart and 
Baker (2000) stated that transmission is never full, cultures do change. While the exact speed 
of change rests indeterminable, thus debatable, barring major external shocks, among others 
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Inglehart and Baker (2000), Hofstede (2001) and Williamson (2000) argue that meaningful 
cultural change takes centuries if not millennia.   
2.1.3 Relationship between culture and management 
Examining the relationship between culture and management is important to address our 
research question. If culture can be accepted to influence managerial decision making, it 
provides reasonable grounds to presume such a relationship extends to other if not all, areas of 
economic behavior and organizational life. Moreover, corporate financial policy, of which 
investment in capital expenditures is a part of, is itself a form of managerial decision making.  
Theories differ in their views as to the impact of national culture on management, and how 
this relationship is likely to change in the future. An influential theory is the Universality 
Hypothesis, which is based on the work of Mintzberg (1973), who observed the work of 
managers in private and public organizations in the US, and integrated his findings with other 
studies carried out on the work of managers in some Western European countries. His 
analysis led him to conclude that all managerial work can be classified into three categories 
(interpersonal, informational, decisional) indifferent of the context (Mintzberg, 1973). 
Accordingly, the Universality hypothesis states that management theories are generally valid, 
and neither industry, sector, nor culture influences practice. Such an approach is termed 
“Culture Free” approach to management (House et al., 2004).  
Al-Yahya (2009) describes two empirical studies sponsored by international organizations 
carried out in ten African countries to assess management work with the ultimate aim to aid 
training and development. These studies largely confirmed the Universality Hypothesis. 
Lubatkin et al. (1997) analyzed the work of managers in Hungary and Senegal and compared 
their results with data from the above mentioned African studies. Similarly, they find 
evidence supporting the Universality hypothesis.  
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Part of the Universality research strand, Convergence Theory argues that the impact of culture 
on the nature of managerial work is a function of economic development. As economic 
development occurs, culture’s impact diminishes; thus, the nature of managerial work 
converges (Al-Yahya, 2009; Lubatkin et al., 1997). Ronen (1986) posits that optimal 
management practices are related to the economic, technological, and political environment of 
the organization. According to him, adaptation of a given technology will have the same 
structural consequences in all national settings. With regards to convergence, Berry et al. 
(1992) expresses a view that “while convergence may occur at the organizational structure 
and technology (macro-level variables), individual attitudes and values (micro-level variables) 
will remain culturally distinct.” (Berry et al., 1992, p. 320) 
Related to the notion of convergence is another sub-theory of the Universality Hypothesis 
called the Situational Theory. It argues that in addition to the differing level of economic 
development between countries, the nature of managerial work within a given country is 
influenced by other factors such as the sector, size, technology, resources, and the position of 
the manager within the corporate hierarchy. Different management theories yield optimal 
behavior in each situation defined by such situational variables (Lubatkin et al., 1997).  
Both the Convergence- and Situational theories are compatible with the Universality 
Hypothesis with regards to culture as in that the former predicts cultural differences to 
diminish and ultimately vanish in the fullness of time, and the latter believes optimal 
management theories and practice are determined by the given situation and are applicable 
across cultures. These theories deny lasting cultural influence.  
We would like to note that the situational theory can only be seen as completely “culture-free” 
if one assumes the economic and institutional environment within a country is itself culture 
free. We shall see in the following subsections and in the chapter on dimensionalism that 
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there are strong arguments and empirical support that refutes that assumption. Consequently, 
even loyal supporters of the situational theory should accept that at least in an indirect 
manner, culture influences management and leadership.       
A theory predicting the moderation but not the disappearance of cultural differences is the 
Crossvergence Theory as described by Ralston et al. (1997). The theory states that both 
national culture and economic ideology influence individual’s values. Therefore, as cultures 
adopt economic models their values change to resemble those of other countries following the 
same economic ideology. Nevertheless, as the original culture also influences the new values, 
cultures will never be identical. Each country will adapt the ideology and create its own 
version. The authors highlight that even if convergence is indeed occurring, such process will 
take decades or even longer, and while the process is under way, the state of the world is 
described by crossvergence (Ralston et al., 1997).  
The Crossvergence Theory could be applied to, for example, the adoption of capitalism, 
which, with the fall of the Soviet type socialist economic model has been spreading in the 
world. At the same time, it is difficult to argue with the assertion that most recently 
transformed economies developed numerous variations of the capitalist system across the 
world. Moreover, even in countries where the process of adopting capitalism has started much 
earlier, for example Continental Western-Europe, there are notable differences how those 
principles are applied. The fundamental difference between convergence and crossvergence is 
that the former assumes that all cultural differences will disappear in the fullness of time, 
while the latter only predicts universal economic models nevertheless shaded by lasting 
cultural differences.   
On the other end of the spectrum regarding the impact of culture on management from the 
Universality Hypothesis is the Divergence Theory (see Figure 2.2.), which is specified by Al-
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Yahya (2009) as “Culture Specific Theory of Management”. Addressing the question whether 
globalization and modernization will lead to a global convergence of management and 
leadership, House et al. (2004) advance that while some convergence in management is 
inevitable, the stability of the cultural context makes the extent of such a process limited.  
Figure 2.2. Comparing the influence of culture on management under major theories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possibly the most well-known advocate of Divergence Theory is Hofstede, who claims that 
each person is guided by his/her “mental programming”. He argues that organizational 
behavior; thus management and leadership as well, is informed by basic assumptions and 
underlying values; therefore, it cannot be assumed universal (Hofsete, 1980). This is true for 
managers and subordinates, influencing management practice, as well as for scholars in turn 
influencing the theories they develop.  He notes that management as a discipline is dominated 
by theories of US and, to a much smaller extent, other Western scholars, who in turn 
influenced by their own “mental programming”. He explains that the US culture values 
Universalist hypothesis 
Divergence theory 
Crossvergence 
theory Pure 
Situational 
theory 
Convergence 
theory 
Impact of culture on management 
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promoting individual interests over those of the group, encourages assertiveness and 
achievement and discourages shying away from uncertainty. Such characteristics are 
consistent with the popularity of achievement as a major motivational tool. However, other 
cultures, for example those more focused on relationship and nurturing and/or less willing to 
embrace uncertainty, would not likely to be overly concerned with achievement, rather with 
“quality of life plus security” (Hofstede, 1980 p. 54.). In such cultures, he asserts, policies 
overly focused on achievement may be counterproductive. Thus, as a motivational tool, 
achievement and meritocracy are not equally applicable in different cultural settings. 
Hofstede’s arguments form one of the key theoretical foundation of this dissertation, and his 
model is used extensively in our empirical analysis. His work, along with two other influential 
dimensionalist frameworks, will be discussed in more detail in the separate chapter on 
dimensionalism. 
House et al. (2004) point out that there is a wide variation of effective leadership across 
countries. While this does not mean that all facets of management and leadership are culture 
specific, enough is leading them to argue that management practice should be adapted to 
reflect these differences. Culture specific aspects of management include “privileges, power, 
and influence granted to leaders”, ”degree to which leadership roles are filled by ascription or 
achievement”, “modal leader behavior patterns”, “preferences for and expectations of 
leaders”, “dominant norms [of leadership]” (House et al., 2004, p. 66). Based on literature and 
their own empirical findings, they posit that culture affects, among others, leader behavior, 
organizational structure and behavior, societal behavior, economic success, and individual 
well-being. While stating forcefully that culture matters for management, they emphasize that 
“[w]e are just beginning to understand how culture influences leadership and organizational 
processes” (House et al., 2004, p. 9). 
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Having established logically and empirically that culture matters for management, based on 
existing theoretical frameworks, House et al. (2004) propose four theoretical foundations with 
the following explanations for the phenomenon.  
a. Cultural immersion theory 
As entrepreneurs, shareholders, managers, and employees are all socialized in the culture of 
the particular society, the organizations they create will “reflect” the fundamental values of 
that culture. Such values will influence, among others, what is accepted or not tolerated, 
viewed as good or bad, and individuals’ objectives. This influence is often at the subconscious 
level creating strong barriers against change (House et al., 2004). 
b. Social network theory 
“Organizations are influenced by the social networks in which they are embedded” (House et 
al., 2004, p. 79). Thus, existing institutions and other organizations in a society, themselves 
influenced by and part of the culture of that society, influence how an organization is 
structured or functions.  This influence is exerted through the interaction within the network 
through collective pressure (House et al., 2004).  
c. Resource dependency theory 
This theory implies that organizations will obey local norms in order to get or keep access to 
the resources they need to survive and prosper. While this explanation may seem more fitted 
for manufacturing firms this is not the case. The term “resources” can be applied to human 
resources or even to access to market (customers). Thus, the theory implies that in order to 
keep access to resources, an organization need to keep its “legitimacy” in society. One 
important factor to do so is not to violate its fundamental cultural norms (House et al., 2004).  
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d. Institutional theory 
House at al. (2004) point out that organizations need to be able to function within their 
institutional environment without extensive friction. This argument is very similar to that of 
resource dependence, in that it suggests that organizations need legitimacy in order to survive 
and prosper. House et al. (2004) argues that institutions affect behavior both through informal 
pressure and formal rules. They explain that besides forcing compliance, institutions may also 
influence through providing model behavior which others willingly copy as “best practice” or 
simply the “right thing to do”. Cultural values and norms acquired by individuals, who then 
become shareholders, managers and employees, through their socialization are also a form of 
institutional influence. House et al. (2004) clarify that the sources of cultural influence as 
described by these four theories should not be viewed as competing hypotheses, rather taken 
together to describe how culture impacts organizational behavior, management and 
leadership. This is reflected by the advances of scholars such as North (1990), Williamson 
(2000), and Roland (2004) of New Institutional Economics. Elements of each of these 
theories can be found in the concept of systemic consistency of New Institutional Economics 
emphasizing the need for social institutions and organizations to be coherent as not to cause 
friction that can harm society (House et al., 2004). 
An influential empirical study in support of divergence theory and reaching the same 
conclusion as House et al. (2004) several years preceding it, is that of Newman and Nollen 
(1996). They analyzed units of a multinational company in Europe and Asia, finding that 
management practices that fit the national culture of the given country were positively related 
to performance, thus rejecting the Universalist Hypothesis. According to Newman and Nollen 
(1996), forming policies and making decisions that take national culture into account yield 
economic benefit. Their argument is similar to that of Hofstede (1980b, 2001) and House et 
al. (2004) in stating that national culture affects people’s expectations of-, and attitudes to 
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work; therefore, it affects their work behavior. This is true for workers and managers alike. 
Practices that are conflicting with these expectations and attitudes create friction, thereby they 
lower performance. Therefore, there is no universal best management theory or practice as 
claimed by the Universalist Hypothesis, rather management and leadership need to fit-, or be 
adapted to the prevailing culture (Newman and Nollen, 1996).  
Further empirical support for divergence theory is extensive in the literature. Some of the 
empirical research on the relationship between national culture and economic development, 
corporate governance, and corporate finance most relevant to our own work, will be discussed 
in the following subsections. As we argue for a relationship between culture and corporate 
investment policy, our stance is based on the divergence theory. 
2.1.4 Relationship between national culture and economic performance, relevant 
institutions, and corporate finance 
2.1.4.1 Economic performance and culture 
A critical factor in determining overall economic behavior, strategy and other corporate 
decisions are the goals of the individual making those decisions. Hofstede et al. (2002) 
surveyed 1,800 MBA students in fifteen different countries collecting data on their perception 
of the goals successful business people pursue in their own countries. The authors found that 
students’ scores were more related to their nationality than to the university they attended, 
indicating the strength of national culture’s influence. Based on the responses, countries could 
be classified into seven clusters yielding seven types of leaders. For example the US type 
leader was perceived to believe in values such as getting bigger is getting better, one must 
focus on bottom line, and that wealth is a prime measure of human worth, while leaders in 
Continental Europe were characterized more by values such as social responsibility, and focus 
on continuity. Clusters identified were significantly correlated with country’s value 
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orientations as measured by Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture. The most relevant 
values related to societal values emphasizing the individual versus the collective, acceptance 
of power inequality, and focus on the long-term versus the short-term. (Hofstede et al., 2002) 
Guiso et al. (2006) advises studying culture to advance the explanation of the behavior of 
economic agents. They point out that culture having an effect on economic outcomes is not a 
recent concept, as it was already formulated and applied by economists such as Adam Smith 
and John Stuart Mill.  
Franke et al. (1991) argue that economic organization and behavior are fundamentally 
determined by national culture; thus culture has a significant impact on economic growth. In 
their opinion culture is a fundamental origin of nations’ competitive advantages. Studying the 
economic performance and national culture of twenty countries, they find empirical evidence 
that cultural values are systematically related to economic performance.  
Knack and Keefer (1997) find that determinants of social capital such as trust and cooperation 
are related to economic success. The authors also state that “Economic activities that require 
some agents to rely on future actions of others are accomplished at lower cost in higher trust 
environments” (Knack and Keefer, 1997, p. 1252.). Their argument suggests that certain 
cultural values can lower certain agency costs, most likely such as the costs associated with 
monitoring and enforcement. Studying regions of Europe, Tabellini (2010) also concludes that 
aspects of culture such as trust and respect are positively correlated to economic development 
in the long-term.  
Johnson and Lenartowicz (1998) also conjuncture that national culture influences a country’s 
economic system. The authors use the dimensionalist frameworks of both Hofstede and 
Schwartz to better explain and describe the mechanisms how culture affects economic growth. 
They found a strong relationship between economic growth and the willingness to assume 
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uncertainty, and values putting the interests of the individual in front of those of the collective 
(Johnson and Lenartowicz, 1998).  
2.1.4.2 Institutions and culture  
In New Institutional Economics, Williamson (2000) in his discussion of social institutions 
differentiates four social levels with higher levels affecting and constraining lower ones. He 
identifies level one (highest), as “embeddedness […] where the norms, customs, mores, 
traditions, etc. are located” (Williamson, 2000, p. 596), and levels two, three and four as the 
formal institutional environment, governance, and resource allocation respectively. Roland 
(2004) notes that to be able to serve their purpose, social institutions must have “systemic 
consistency”, that is they must be “compatible” and “complementary”, emphasizing 
Williamson’s model. Culture, in level one, influences the structure and functioning of other 
institutions of society located at lower levels. Williamson’s model is illustrated on Figure 2.3. 
The direction of the main influence is shown by the large empty arrows, while the thinner 
black arrow on the right represents the lower levels asserting a significantly smaller influence 
on the higher ones similar to a feedback loop. While this effect establishes a two-way causal 
direction between culture and institutions, Williamson (2000) hypothesized that any 
meaningful cultural change takes centuries or more making the causal direction flowing from 
culture to institutions for any practical consideration. Combining the insights of New 
Institutional Economics with those of cross-cultural psychology, researchers found empirical 
support for culture influencing formal institutions.  
The relationship between culture and institutions is described by Hofstede et al. (2002) as: 
“The unique traditions of each country have been maintained in their institutions like families, 
schools and forms of government”. Later they add: “Institutions are the crystallizations of 
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culture, and culture is the substratum of institutional arrangements” (Hofstede et al., 2002 p. 
800.). One cannot understand local institutions and behavior through one’s own rationality.  
   Figure 2.3. Williamson’s model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Williamson (2000), figure 1, p. 597 
2.1.4.2.1 Economic development as context for institutional development 
As we have seen in the previous subsection Tabellini (2010), Johnson and Lenartowicz 
(1998), Knack and Keefer, 1997, and Franke et al. (1991) found that culture is related to 
economic development. The level of economic development is an important determinant of 
the institutional environment. Consequently, culture’s indirect influence on the latter can be 
logically inferred. 
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2.1.4.2.2 Financial system 
In a recent article, Aggarwal and Goodell (2014) studied cross-country disparities in access to 
financing. They found that that values consistent with minimizing uncertainty and holding 
accomplishment and assertiveness in high esteem is negatively correlated with access to 
capital. Researchers have attempted to identify causes of long-term differences among the 
development of stock markets-, and the orientation towards bank- or market-based capital 
market in various countries. Controlling for several economic and financial factors, Aggarwal 
and Goodell (2009), Breuer and Salzman (2009), Kwok and Tadesse (2006), and De Jong and 
Semenov (2002) find that aspects of national culture are important in explaining these 
financial institutions.  
2.1.4.2.3 Corporate governance 
Licht et al. (2005) analyze the relationship between shareholder and creditor rights in 49 
countries and national culture applying both Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s dimensionalist 
frameworks. The authors claim that laws reflect underlying values, norms, and symbols of 
society, thus they reflect culture, which provides motivation, justification as well as 
constraints for formal institutions, and for behavior. These findings indicate that legal 
institutions in a country are rooted in the culture of that society. It has been long argued by the 
Law and Finance research strand initiated by La Porta et al. (1998) that the given corporate 
governance regime and its effectiveness is strongly influenced by the legal environment. 
Adding their own findings to this argument Licht et al. (2005) conclude that culture, through 
its influence on legal environment, is a major determinant of the corporate governance 
institutions of a given country. They claim that legal reforms do not eliminate differences 
arising from culture, demonstrating that the success of reform depends on its compatibility 
with culture. As an example they point to East-Asian countries, where common law was 
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introduced during colonial rule, effectively imposed on society from the outside. The authors 
propose that common law in those countries does not provide the same effective protection as 
common law where it naturally evolved. The difference, they argue, may be explained by the 
fit of the legal system with national culture: “In the long-term formal institutions should be 
consistent with the informal cultural environment” (Licht et al., 2005, p. 250.) 
Coffee (2001) also draws attention to the limitation of relying solely on the Law and Finance 
approach to explain efficiency of the legal institutions of a country. Coffee (2001) notes that 
while private benefits of control are statistically related to legal families of countries as shown 
by Nenova (2003), significant similarities across-, and differences within legal families exist. 
To explain the latter, he advances the same argument as Licht et al. (2005) explaining that 
while South Korea adopted the legal framework from Germany, thus they both fall in the 
same legal family, such a framework operates markedly differently in the very different 
cultural background in Korea.  
Licht (2001) cites several documents from institutions such as the OECD, IMF, the World 
Bank, and the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Unites States of America explicitly 
stating that while establishing a high standard of corporate governance is important for 
economic development, what these standards are, and their implementation, is influenced by 
the cultural within the given countries (for quotes and references see Licht, 2001. p. 154-157). 
He views culture as a source of path dependency that has a fundamental influence on the 
development and functioning of institutions such as corporate governance, and theoretically 
establishes a link between cultural value orientations and ownership structure, regulation on 
self-dealing, on insider trading, and on disclosure, executive compensation, and the market for 
corporate control.       
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In a related article, Licht et al. 2007 finds evidence that aspects of national culture, such as 
values related to defining self as an individual or based on group membership, are 
systematically related to “social norms of governance” (Licht et al., 2007, p. 659.) of rule of 
law, corruption, and democratic accountability, all indicators chosen by the authors as they 
are connected to exercising power (Licht et al., 2007). This finding supports the views of 
Williamson (2000) in highlighting how higher level institutions affect lower level ones: 
culture provides both motivation and it also constrains what is valued and accepted behavior 
in a society. Breuer and Salzman, (2009) conclude that as generally there are lower costs 
associated with of establishing and operating governance systems compatible with the cultural 
orientation of society, meaningful worldwide convergence of corporate governance is unlikely 
due to persisting cultural differences.  
Analyzing data from 27 countries, Chakrabarty (2009) found significant relationship between 
the extent of family ownership among large public companies, the dominance of such 
companies of the local stock markets, and aspects of national culture, as measured by 
Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions reflecting cultural orientation towards status, hierarchy 
and privileges, and society’s cultural stance towards the individual versus the collective. 
While this relationship is moderated by institutional voids in a way that the existence and 
extent of institutional voids (agency contracting, credit availability) intensify cultural effects, 
the existence of these institutions does not cancel the relationship. 
Based on a study encompassing fifteen countries, Li and Harrison (2008) showed that national 
culture influences corporate board structures, as defined by percentage of outside directors 
and the separation of CEO and Chairman roles. The authors point out to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), who put forward that prevailing ownership structure in a given country tends to 
impact board structures in a way that if ownership is concentrated, non-executive directors 
tend to be representatives of large owners and stakeholders, if it is broad-based, they tend to 
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be more independent with minimal interest in corporation and its activities. Li and Harrison 
(2008) were attempting to find evidence whether national cultural norms also influence such 
structures. As corporation exists within society, societal norms affect its organization and 
functioning. Therefore, they posit, the organizational structures of institutions tend to reflect 
national culture. Li and Harrison (2008) claims that ”[i]nstitutional logic extends the extant of 
corporate governance research, and challenges the predominant agency theory logic for 
corporate governance.” (Li and Harrison, 2008, p. 381.) While we agree with the cross-
cultural and institutional logic underlying their arguments, we disagree with the very last 
point. We posit that the agency logic of corporate governance is only challenged by their 
findings if one assumes that agency problems are to the large extent uniform across cultures. 
We believe what needs to be studied and better understood, is how national culture as a 
context influences the principal-agent relationship. In other words, how agency is moderated 
by national culture. As we discuss in chapter IV of this dissertation, several scholars (see for 
example: Lubatkin et al. (2007), Ekanayake (2004), Johnson and Droege (2004), proposed 
that agency theory is not fully culturally transferable, that is agency theory is not a cultural 
universal. Our hypotheses and empirical findings, lend some support to this assertion. 
2.1.4.3 Corporate finance and culture 
2.1.4.3.1 Capital structure 
Applying the dimensionalist model of Schwarz and analyzing data from 5,591 firms from 22 
countries for 1996, Chui et al. (2002) find a statistically significant relationship between the 
use of debt and cultural values associated with a focus on the individual alone versus 
embededness and with the importance attached to hierarchy. The result remained robust after 
controlling for the level of economic and financial institution development, legal environment 
and firm level determinants of capital structure. They posit “Culture does matter because 
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culture affects management’s perception of the cost and risk related to debt finance, and 
agency problems in each country”. (Chui et al., 2002 p. 100)  
Wang and Esqueda (2014) analyze the capital structure of American Depository Receipts of 
emerging market companies and find that cultural orientations as indicated by the cultural 
value dimensions of Hofstede influence leverage decisions in their sample. They find 
significant relationship between leverage and each of the six value dimensions of the Hofstede 
framework. The direction of the relationships, for the dimensions shared by both studies, 
confirms the results of Chui et al. 2002.        
Antonczyk and Salzmann (2014) is on the other hand studies the effect of a specific 
behavioral bias, overconfidence, which has been linked to national culture in literature (see 
more on overconfidence in section 2.3 of this review). Based on this link, they use the cultural 
value dimension of House et al. (2004) related to society’s stance on individualism versus 
collectivism as the indicator of overconfidence at the societal level. Their results show that 
values consistent with a focus on the individual ahead of the collective tend to induce 
managers to use higher leverage in corporate capital structures. While the authors interpret 
this result as supporting their hypothesis on the effect of overconfidence on leverage, we 
would like to draw attention to the fact that their proxy for overconfidence is a value 
dimension, which has been shown to be related to a wide range of behaviors. Indeed, 
according to Kirkman et al. (2006) it is the most studied and applied value dimension of all. 
Consequently, we read their analysis as further support for the proposition that culture 
influences capital structure, with one facet of the very complex mechanism at play potentially 
being overconfidence.    
Zheng, et al. (2012) confirm that leverage and cultural value orientations are related. Going 
further they also show that debt maturity is negatively related to the same value dimensions, 
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as well as to society’s reluctance to embrace uncertainty and its acceptance of unequal 
distribution of power. Studying the same question, Chang et al. (2012) arrives to a similar 
conclusion in that cross-country variation in debt maturity can partially be explained by 
national cultural differences. More specifically they link debt maturity to a society’s aversion 
towards uncertainty, to values connected to assertiveness, and an orientation to the long-term, 
all with a negative sign. The first two sets of values match the result of Zheng et al. (2012), 
while the last cultural aspect is in addition to their findings.    
2.1.4.3.2 Corporate cash holdings 
Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009), applying Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and using a similar 
argument to Chui et al. (2002) documents that national culture influences corporate cash 
holdings beyond the influence of corporate governance regime and financial institutional 
environment. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) showed that internationally the level of cash 
holding is negatively related to the level of shareholder protection, concluding that prevailing 
corporate governance and legal systems in a country influence cash holdings. Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2009) argues that national culture in turn influences these institutions. Their 
logic mirrors the argument put forward by Licht et al. (2005) we introduced above. Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2009) further advances that national culture affects the perceptions of 
management and shareholders on the agency costs of holding cash relative to the benefit of 
added financial flexibility, and of the risks associated with leverage. They find that a cultural 
orientation toward avoiding uncertainty, favoring assertiveness and achievement, and toward 
the long-term are associated with higher cash holdings.  
Assembling a very large database covering 49 countries for the period of 1990-2004 resulting 
in over 120,000 firm-years, Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) study the influence of national 
culture on cash holding while expressly examining whether the effect of cultural orientation is 
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different for local and multinational firms. For the cultural variables, their results show a 
similar relationship between uncertainty avoidance and cash holdings. They find that the 
cultural effects are lower, but still present for multinational firms.  
In a very recent paper examining corporate cash holdings, Chen et al. (2015) also confirms the 
positive relationship to the societal desire to minimizing uncertainty and cash holdings. 
Furthermore, in addition to the link with uncertainty avoidance, their results indicate a 
negative relationship with cultural values placing the individual ahead of the collective. 
2.1.4.3.3 Disbursements to shareholders 
Four recent empirical studies demonstrated that cultural values contribute to cross-country 
variance in dividend policies. Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) find that values promoting individual 
interests over those of the group are positively-, while acceptance of power inequality and 
shying away from uncertainty are negatively related to dividends. Shao et al. (2010) show that 
dividends are negatively related to values of control and assertiveness, and positively to those 
of individuals’ embeddedness within groups. This later finding contradicts the positive 
relationship between dividends and emphasis of individual interests of Fidrmuc and Jacob 
(2010). Explaining this inconsistency, Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) posit that it is due to their 
larger sample, 41 countries opposed to 21 in the other paper, more effectively capturing 
cultural variation. Nevertheless, the disagreement highlights that some ambiguity remain with 
regards to culture’s connection with dividend payments.  
None of the two later studies, that of Bae et al. (2012) and Breuer et al. (2014) test the 
relationship between individualism and dividend policy; therefore, this debate rests 
unresolved for the time being. Bae et al. (2012) hypothesize and empirically confirm the 
finding of Saho et al. (2010) that dividend policy is negatively related to the value orientation 
favoring assertiveness and achievement, and further show that cultural values associated with 
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uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation also influence it. In a different approach, 
Breuer et al. (2014) examines the behavioral foundations of dividend policy. The authors 
obtain national behavioral pattern information from the International Test of Risk Attitudes 
Survey collected from university students in 46 countries, and find loss aversion, ambiguity 
aversion, and patience to be significant determinants.  
2.1.4.3.4 Other 
There are numerous other studies available on the relationship between national culture and 
different aspects of corporate finance behavior ranging from hedging (Lievenbruck and 
Schmid, 2014), to IPO underpricing (eg.: Costa et al., 2013), international mergers and 
acquisitions and overconfidence (Ferris et al., 2013), joint ventures (eg.: see for example 
Kogut and Singh, 1988, and Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997) and earnings management (Han 
et al., 2010). However, extending the review to those areas would not add further value to this 
dissertation, as the topics covered are less related to overinvestment. Furthermore, we firmly 
believe that the literature described above already strongly established that there is a 
relationship between national culture and certain aspects of economic behavior with a direct 
bearing on overinvestment, such as corporate governance and corporate finance.  
Based on our review we can summarize the underlying reasons for culture’s influence as 
proposed in literature along three broad arguments. First, there is widespread agreement in the 
applicability of the arguments on systemic consistency from New Institutional Economics 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 2000; Roland, 2004). Second, culture affects investors’ perceptions 
of the gravity of agency problems, thus affecting the response of employing mechanisms to 
mitigate it (eg: Shao, et al., 2010). Third, cultural values actually influence the gravity of 
agency problems (eg: Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010). Several articles apply more than one of these 
simultaneously. In our view all three are valid arguments and contribute to understanding of 
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cross-country differences in financial policies. In this dissertation, similar to Bae et al. (2012) 
we lean on all three in our argumentation. In the next section we move to describe the 
overinvestment problem through a brief review of related literature. 
2.2 Overinvestment 
2.2.1 Agency conflicts distorting corporate investment 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show theoretically that assuming perfect capital markets, 
corporate investment policy is determined solely based on investment opportunities 
independent of financing and dividend policies. Since the publication of their seminal article, 
a burgeoning literature has both theoretically established and empirically showed that there 
are numerous imperfections that distort corporate investment behavior. Reviewing related 
literature in-depth, Stein (2003) concludes that asymmetric information and related agency 
problems between principal actors are identified as primary factors behind such distortions 
(Stein, 2003). Resulting agency conflicts may results in sub-optimal investment.  
 There are several types of agency conflicts potentially affecting investment decisions as 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. The fact that upside profit potential beyond a cap is captured by 
equity holders while losses are shared with creditors creates a conflict of interest between the 
two classes of investors. This conflict of interest coupled with the lack of information of 
creditors with regards to investment opportunities leads to agency problems between 
shareholders and creditors. Agency problems potentially leading to underinvestment include 
asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), moral hazard (Myers, 1977) and adverse 
selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As creditors are aware of this problem they raise the cost 
of debt capital or ration credit, both of which can result in less than optimal level of 
investment. The agency conflict between current-, and potential shareholders can also lead to 
inefficient investment through adverse selection, as outside investors lack information to 
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differentiate between good and bad firms raising the cost of equity capital (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). What is common in both of these types of agency conflicts is that they lead to lower 
levels of corporate investment than optimal. This agency problem is called underinvestment, 
and it occurs when value creating investment projects are not undertaken by firms. For 
examples of theoretical and empirical research regarding the problem of underinvestment 
among others see Bebchuk and Stole (1993), Klock and Thies (1995), Morgado and Pindado 
(2003), Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Stein (2003), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and 
Stulz (1990). 
Figure 2.4. Agency problems affecting corporate investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Morgado and Pindado, 2005, p. 165 
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2.2.2 Agency cost of free cash flow  
2.2.2.1 Agency cost of free cash flow models, organic investment 
In addition to the above agency problems, Jensen and Meckling (1976) draws attention to the 
agency conflict between shareholders and management arising from the separation of 
ownership and control. This conflict is highlighted by the shaded oval on Figure 2.4. Jensen 
(1986) argues that managers receive private benefits from the resources under their control; 
therefore, it is in their interest to grow such resources even when it does not serve the interest 
of shareholders to do so leading to overinvestment. Jensen (1986) in his influential article 
defines overinvestment as growing a business past its optimal size. Overinvestment can be 
understood as investing in, or stay invested in, value destroying projects.  
Overinvestment can take many forms. Management may pursue self-serving investment in 
capital expenditures, carrying out value-destroying acquisitions, or engaging in 
diversification. There is a rich literature analyzing each type of overinvestment. 
Overinvestment through acquisition and diversification, while theoretically could be considered 
separately (e.g. it is possible and firms do diversify through organic growth) is often discussed 
together. Studies among others include Hwang and Kim (2012) for capital expenditures, 
Harford et al. (2008) for acquisitions, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) for diversification, and 
Morck et al. (1990) for diversifying acquisitions.  
The literature identifies diverse private benefits management obtains from the resources under 
their control. These range from elevated reputation (Avery et al., 1998) from being a manager 
of a larger company, to increased monetary and non-monetary compensation (Stulz, 1990), as 
compensation is often tied to some performance measure contingent on growth. Investments 
resulting in diversification may also serve the managers by increasing the stability of cash 
flows, therefore decreasing the likelihood of bankruptcy, thus loss of employment (Amihud 
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and Lev, 1981), and by safeguarding the independence of the firm (Harford, 1999). 
Management may use corporate investments to improve their job security by making manager 
specific investments, where the manager’s personal skills or capabilities make him or her 
more valuable for shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
When investments are self-serving, that is they do not increase the value of the firm, it is 
easier for management to finance them from internal funds than from capital markets (Jensen, 
1986). This is because, he argues, capital markets perform a valuable monitoring function that 
may deny funding, or send other signals that draw attention to the self-dealing nature of the 
proposed transaction. Free cash flow, defined by Jensen as cash flow after all value increasing 
projects have been funded, creates an agency problem, as managers have an interest to spend 
it on private benefit generating investments even if they are value destroying. Jensen (1986) 
predicts that the higher the free cash flow generated by the company, and the lower quality is 
its investment opportunity set, the stronger the agency problem is. Jensen’s proposition is 
called the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis.  
Stulz (1990) constructed a theoretical model allowing both under-, and overinvestment 
assuming dispersed ownership and information asymmetries, whereby free cash flow and 
investments are unobservable by shareholders. Similar to Jensen, Stulz also argued that 
management enjoyed private benefits from investments; therefore, it is in management’s best 
interest to maximize investment. Stulz posits that shareholders are aware of managements 
desire to maximize resources for overinvestments. Therefore, management cannot credibly 
claim that more cash is needed for value increasing (positive net present value) projects. 
Where cash flow is not sufficient to fund all such projects, this will lead to underinvestment, 
while if there are surplus resources management will overinvest (Stulz, 1990). Miguel and 
Pindado (2001) adopt the Stulz model hypothesizing that investment is linked to companies’ 
cash flow and leverage. 
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The theoretical model of Bebchuk and Stole (1993) demonstrates that short-term management 
incentives and information asymmetry may indeed lead to a non-optimal level of investment. 
They show that when the level of investment in long-term projects is unobservable by the 
market (hidden action), managers tend to underinvest; whereas when the productivity of long-
term investment is unknown (hidden information), they tend to overinvest. Their argument is 
that management signals to the market the financial position and strong future outlook of the 
firm through high level of long-term investment, which the market perceives, regardless of the 
predicted productivity of such projects, which the market cannot observe. This may lead to 
underinvestment in unobservable assets such as research, human resources, and to shirking (as 
Investment of time and effort is unobservable), and to overinvestment in observable assets such 
as sales and capital assets both organically and through acquisitions (Bebchuk and Stole, 
1993).  
In an empirical study analyzing information pertaining to 135 Spanish companies for 1990 to 
1999, Morgado and Pindado (2003) show that relationship between firm value and investment 
is positive (underinvestment occurs) up to an optimal level of investment, and turns negative 
(overinvestment occurs) thereafter. This finding supports Jensen’s Agency Cost of Free Cash 
Flow Hypothesis. They also conclude that the optimal level of investment is positively related 
to Tobin’s Q, which they employ to indicate corporate investment opportunities. In separate 
influential studies, among others, Bates (2005), Hennessy and Levy (2002), Hwang and Kim 
(2012), Richardson (2006) found support for the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis and the 
existence of overinvestment as an agency problem.  
2.2.2.2 Not abandoning value destroying projects and escalation  
A form of agency induced overinvestment arises from management’s reluctance to abandon 
projects or shrink the company (Jensen, 1986) when it would be optimal to do so, or even 
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escalate investment in the hope that capital infusion can save ailing projects (McDaniel, 
1995). In such a situation overinvestment may occur without positive net investment in a 
given year or for a period of time. Non-abandonment and escalation should be classified as 
overinvestment, as their effect is staying invested in or sinking further funds in value 
destroying projects. 
McDaniel (1995) found four main reasons behind non-abandonment and escalation. The first 
reason is managers’ motivation, which include (i) human psychology: it is human nature not 
liking to accept that the endeavor undertaken failed, and also a tendency to overestimate 
extent of control over events leading to a belief that the investment can still be turned around, 
(ii) incentives that may penalize project failure while still yielding monetary rewards based on 
size or accounting measures unrelated to long-term value creation, and (iii) consideration for 
others who may face large costs if investment abandoned (e.g. employees who would lose 
their jobs). Secondly, McDaniel (1995) point out, managers face corporate social pressures, 
which also include (i) psychological factors, such as a desire to be admired by colleagues, and 
(ii) the general tendency of corporate culture that respects perseverance in the face of 
difficulty. The third factor he identifies is the possible presence of organizational rigidities, 
processes that make it easier to continue with the project, or even to commit further capital, 
than to get approval for abandoning it. Finally, he concludes, the project itself may have 
characteristics that make the decision to abandon difficult.  
McDaniel (1995) also emphasized the role of lack of information for those responsible for 
monitoring. The necessary information may not be available due to inappropriate information 
systems, it may be concealed deliberately by management, or management, due to its non-
objectivity, may inadvertently filter the information (McDaniel, 1995). This factor deepens to 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, which, along with conflict of 
interest and incomplete contracting are responsible for the agency problem.  
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Kanodia, et al. (1989) presents the escalation problem as a manager receiving the private 
benefit of protecting his or her reputation by not abandoning. His formulation of the agency 
conflict was supported by the findings of experiments conducted by Harrison and Harrell 
(1993) and Harrell and Harrison (1994) among students from the United States of America.  
2.2.2.3 External growth: investment in acquisitions, diversification discount  
Among others, Berger and Ofek (1995) identify the main benefits of diversification as 
potential operating synergies, larger debt capacity, potential tax savings through profits in one 
business being offset by losses in another, and an internal capital market, which does not 
suffer from the asymmetric information that characterizes external capital markets. The latter 
argument supporting the efficiency of the internal capital market was proposed by, among 
others, Stein (1997). Taking another approach, Stulz (1990) points to another possible 
advantage of careful diversification. In his model diversification that decreases the variability 
of cash flow decreases both the under- and overinvestment problems. Stable cash flow allows 
better targeting of cash left under the discretion of management through debt service allowing 
optimal investment. He argues that with stable cash flows higher leverage can be supported by 
the company with increased debt service requirements imposing a discipline, thereby 
controlling management’s propensity to overinvest. Thus in Stulz’s model, diversification, 
insofar as it results in more stable cash flow, may increase shareholder value. Although not 
stated, this benefit of diversification arising from more stable cash flows may be offset by the 
costs associated with diversification.  
Berger and Ofek (1995) also discuss potential costs of diversification. First, they claim, 
diversification gives management access to more capital (e.g. through increased debt 
capacity) to undertake value destroying investments. Second, it may enable cross-
subsidization, which occurs when poorly performing businesses (or ones with a lower quality 
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investment opportunity set) are allocated resources at the expense of better performing ones 
via the internal capital market. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) characterizes cross-subsidization 
of the poor performer by draining resources from surplus generating segments as a form of 
“socialism”. Berger and Ofek (1995) point out that cross-subsidization is contradictory to the 
efficient internal markets argument. Due to cross-subsidization, a segment that would go 
bankrupt (thus having zero value) as a stand-alone entity, may actually have a negative value 
for the diversified firm if it is kept in business by subsidies through the internal capital 
market. Third, management may not have the experience or skills necessary to manage the 
portfolio of unrelated businesses (Berger and Ofek, 1995), which may exasperate agency 
problems as an additional source of asymmetric information. (Scharfstein and Stein (2000) 
add that diversification also introduces another layer of agency problems between top- and 
business segment management. 
Jensen (1986) believes diversifying acquisitions are generally driven by the agency problem 
and result in overinvestment and shareholder value destruction. Morck et al. (1990) agree that, 
in line with predictions of agency theory, certain types of acquisitions are pursued by 
management to gain personal benefits as opposed to value maximization. Based on a sample 
of 326 acquisitions announced between 1975 and 1987, they identify those aimed at 
diversification and acquiring growth as generally value destructive (thus following Jensen’s 
definition of overinvestment). Morck et al. (1990) argue that this can be explained by private 
benefits to management. Similar to diversification, acquisitions of growth may also be driven 
by private benefits such as managerial incentives rewarding growth and/or size, prestige, and 
added possibilities to reward preferred subordinate managers with promotions as growth 
creates managerial positions. With regards to diversifying acquisitions, besides obtaining the 
same advantages related to size, management may acquire unrelated businesses to benefit 
from greater diversification of its human capital, thus to decrease personal risk. Managers 
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whose performance is weak may also choose to diversify into other lines of businesses in the 
hope that, personally, they can perform better in the new business (Morck et al., 1990).  
In an empirical study on efficiency of the internal capital markets as a potential source of the 
diversification discount, Shin and Stulz (1998) showed that the level of segment investment 
was positively correlated with the cash flows of other segments of diversified companies, and 
less so with their own cash flows than in single-segment entities. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence that the rank order of the quality of the investment opportunity set of a given 
segment within a diversified firm influenced this sensitivity. This finding points to cross-
subsidization, and suggests that internal capital markets are inefficient (Shin and Stulz, 1998). 
In further support of the inefficient market hypothesis, Lamont and Polk (2001) found data 
confirming that investment across business segments within a diversified firm is “smoothed” 
when compared to stand-alone focused companies.  
Other influential studies attempting to explain the documented inefficiency of internal capital 
markets, among others, include Rajan et al. (2000), and Scharfstein and Stein (2000). The 
former attributes inefficiency to cross-subsidization incentivizing divisional management not 
to generate surplus resources, which would be used to subsidize deficit generating segments. 
Therefore, according to Rajan et al. (2000) investment inefficiency of a diversified firm is 
positively related to the diversity of the resources and the investment opportunity sets of its 
segments. An interesting interpretation of the proposition of Rajan et al. (2000) is that cross-
subsidization may lead to overinvestment in the inefficient business segments while at the 
same time underinvestment in the efficient ones. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argues that 
inefficiency is driven by the combined agency problems between top management and 
investors (which exists for focused firms as well) and between top management and segment 
management (result of diversification), where top management may find it advantageous to 
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pay compensation to segment management in the form of allocating additional resources to 
their businesses (Scharfstein and Stein 2000).  
If diversification destroys value, capital markets should realize this and reflect it in the 
valuation of diversified firms. There are several studies attempting to find such an effect and 
to quantify it. Lang and Stulz (1994), examining diversification and firm value document a 
significant negative relationship. In their seminal article, Berger and Ofek (1995) also found 
that the market value of diversified firms are significantly under to firm value estimated 
through a sum-of-the-parts valuation based on segment data. The sum-of-the-parts valuation 
methodology attempts to value the segments of a company as stand-alone entities, and adding 
these values it derives an estimate of the value for the total firm. If such estimate is below the 
observed market value of the firm one could deduce the presence of synergies or other 
operational, strategic or financial benefits arising from the portfolio of businesses or its 
management. If the estimated value is above the market valuation of the company, it gives a 
strong signal for the presence of a diversification discount.  They estimated the diversification 
discount to be in the range of 13-15%. Similar conclusion is reached by Comment and Jarrell 
(1994), who find evidence that share performance declines as a result of diversification. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) also showed that the magnitude of the discount is positively related to 
the “unrelatedness”, as diversification into businesses within the same two-digit SIC code as 
the firm does not trigger a significant discount, and to the number of business segments. 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), examining diversification decisions, conclude that such are 
mainly driven by managerial private benefits. Similar to Berger and Ofek (1995), the authors 
also find evidence for the diversification discount as in their sample the number of segments 
is negatively related to Tobin’s Q.  
Studying both tangible asset-, and goodwill write-offs in a sample of 16,195 firm years 
between 2001 and 2006, Sadka and Zhang (2009) conclude that there is a higher probability 
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that diversified firms overinvest than single segment companies. The finding that diversified 
firms have a higher probability of writing-off assets as well as writing-off higher amounts is 
an ex-post indicator of overinvestment that does not depend on efficient market reaction as 
opposed to studies measuring effects of diversification on Tobin’s Q or on firm value. Their 
results indicate the existence of a diversification discount, which is related to future write-
offs; thus, to inefficient investment. Sadka and Zhang (2009) conjecture that the 
diversification discount is explained by the market correctly anticipating larger future write-
offs of diversified firms. 
McCabe and Yook (1997) test the agency cost of Free Cash Flow Hypothesis regarding the 
impact of acquisitions financed by cash on the value of a firm with high cash flow, high cash 
flow reinvestment rate, and low quality investment opportunity set. As several other studies, 
many of which referenced in this dissertation, McCabe and Yook use Tobin’s Q as the 
indicator for the quality of a firm’s investment opportunity set.  In line with the predictions of 
the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, the authors find that such acquisitions create value in 
decreasing the cash under the discretion of management, an effect that may partially or fully 
offset any value destroyed as a result of the acquisition, while returns to other types of bidders 
are negative (McCabe and Yook, 1997). For further research finding empirical support for the 
existence of diversification discount please see for example Hoechle et al. (2009), and Yore 
(2007). 
Harford (1999) examines acquisition behavior of cash-rich firms versus a general sample. A 
major difference between this study and that of McCabe and York (1997) is that Harford 
studies firms with a high cash balance regardless of cash flow. He finds that, as predicted by 
Jensen (1986) and others, such firms indeed are more likely to make acquisitions that have a 
negative impact on firm value.  
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Harford et al. (2008) study the relationship between cash holdings of a firm and the quality of 
its corporate governance in a sample of US firms. Their results show that the quality of 
corporate governance is positively related to the level of cash holdings. This suggests that 
companies with weaker governance invest free cash flow quickly in order to avoid high levels 
of cash. The authors explain this finding by the fact that large cash balances are observable by 
the market as opposed to the quality of investments, which normally becomes observable with 
a substantial time-lag. Therefore, high cash levels may invite disciplinary action from 
investors, while that risk is much lower for investments, even if they are value destroying. 
Harford et al., (2008) document that such companies spend their cash largely on acquisitions, 
which tend to lower firm value. The authors point out that their results contrast with 
international work on the relationship between cash levels and corporate governance (e.g. 
Pinkowitz et al., 2006). They argue that this is explained by the strong investor protection in 
the Unites States of America, which make investors less nervous about large cash holdings of 
well governed companies. 
There are studies, who attempt to give alternative explanations to the diversification discount 
found by other researchers, arguing that it is not due to diversification per se. For example 
Graham et al., (2002) argue that it is lower quality firms who are acquired, while Chevalier 
(2004) posits that is the diversifiers who are weaker; thus, it is the value of the firms that 
make up the diversified company that are discounted, not diversification itself. Both studies 
are based on the argument that diversification is an endogenous decision; therefore, it is 
possible that companies with certain characteristics choose to diversify. Villalonga (2004) and 
Whited (2001) point to data and measurement errors that affect the calculations. They state 
that correcting for such errors the observable discount is reduced. While the debate is clearly 
still open, the majority of the literature finds both theoretical and empirical support for the 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 69. 
 
diversification discount, and most research challenging it contends that its effect is less 
significant than previously argued, not that it does not exist. 
In an innovative study, Lamont and Polk (2002) solve the endogeneity problem by using the 
diversity of investment opportunities for business segments as the measure of firm diversity. 
They estimate investment opportunities by examining changes in the industry median Tobin’s 
Q for each segment of the company based on data from matching focused firms. As the 
authors point out, such changes in the industry investment opportunity set are exogenous. 
Analyzing a sample of data pertaining to 1,987 companies for the period between 1980 and 
1997, results show that decreasing (increasing) diversity of investment opportunity sets of 
business segment is positively (negatively) related to firm value, thus, documenting an 
exogenous diversity discount. 
2.2.2.4 Mechanisms to mitigate the agency cost of overinvestment 
Agency theory proposes two main approaches to lower agency costs: effective monitoring, 
and aligning the interests of principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). With regards to 
overinvestment, monitoring is addressed both internally through firm-level corporate 
governance, which also serves to align interests between parties through for example 
managerial compensation, and externally through country-level corporate governance and the 
market for corporate control. Another method is to limit resources under the control of 
management decreasing its ability to engage in overinvestment. Such mechanisms include the 
use of leverage and cash disbursements to shareholders. 
2.2.2.4.1 Leverage 
Jensen (1986) proposes taking on leverage as a tool to mitigate the agency problem of free 
cash flow. By taking on debt, he points out management credibly commits to pay out future 
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cash flow as debt service, thereby limiting future resources under its control. Further, leverage 
puts pressure on the organization and its management to strive for efficiency as it increases 
the probability of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy, in turn, is very costly for management as it usually 
involves the loss of employment and reputation, thus having a significant negative impact on 
the value of their human capital. Jensen points to leveraged buyouts as transactions often 
targeting companies with an overinvestment problem, and employing high leverage to control 
such problems going forward. 
The model of Stulz (1990) also proposes the use of debt as a form of pre-commitment of free 
cash flows to decrease overinvestment arising from management’s discretion. He warns that 
while mitigating the cost of overinvestment, increasing debt may result in underinvestment, 
when the cash flow after debt service is not sufficient to cover all value increasing 
investments. According to Klock and Thies (1995), to pre-commit expected cash flow implies 
that it is unexpected cash flow that will exhibit the strongest correlation with investment. 
They posit that this effect should be more pronounced for firms with a lower value investment 
opportunity set, which the authors estimate as companies with low Tobin’s Q. A major 
underlying assumption is that overall Q is a suitable proxy for marginal Q. This assumption is 
debated, as it was confirmed empirically by Gordon and Myers (1998) while challenged by 
Whited (2001). Despite this debate Tobin Q is widely used in the literature as an indicator for 
the market’s valuation of a company’s investment opportunities. Using panel data for ten 
periods covering between five and seven years between 1926 and 1983 for 37 to 100 firms per 
period, Klock and Thies (1995) confirm both predictions of Stulz’s hypothesis. Stulz’s model 
is also confirmed empirically by Berkovitch and Kim (1990), who found evidence that 
increasing debt seniority (thus stronger credibility of pre-commitment) is related negatively to 
overinvestment and positively to underinvestment.  
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The use of leverage, as proposed in many studies, to control and mitigate investment agency 
problems creates effectively an interaction between financing and investment decisions and 
points at the existence of an optimal capital structure. According to Jensen (1986), optimal 
leverage can be determined based on the trade-off between the costs of debt and its agency 
benefits. Stulz (1990) also proposes an optimal capital structure taking into account the 
company’s probability distribution of future cash flow, its investment opportunity set and 
trades-off the cost of debt against the cost of underinvestment due to lack of funds (high debt 
service), and the cost of overinvestment due to excessive funds (low debt service).  
Hart and Moore (1995) also developed a theoretical model describing how debt mitigates 
overinvestment. They argue that in the absence of agency problems, management should be 
allowed to issue “soft”, that is subordinated, debt that can be rescheduled. This would allow 
the company to take advantage of the tax shield and would permit management to finance the 
investments it selects without additional bankruptcy risk. However, if one assumes 
management pursues private benefits of investment, they posit, the optimal solution is to issue 
long-term “hard”, that is senior, debt. They argue that long-term hard debt decreases the cash 
flow under the control of management through debt service, but also through increasing the 
cost of raising additional debt in the future based on future cash flows, as new claims would 
have to be subordinated, thus, more costly. Senior debt is also superior to subordinated debt in 
that it motivates management to improve efficiency within the organization to avoid 
bankruptcy. Similar to Stulz’s conclusion, they posit that an optimal capital structure trades-
off controlling overinvestment and inducing underinvestment. Hart and Moore (1995) 
conclude that if less than optimal long-term debt is issued, management can issue further debt 
based on future cash flows resulting in overinvestment, whereas if more than optimal long-
term debt issued, management will not be able to finance even value creating investments 
through the issuance of further debt leading to underinvestment. Finding it costly or 
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impossible to issue further that as a result of already high leverage is often referred to as “debt 
overhang” in the literature. Hart and Moore (1995) predict that the lower the profitability of 
its investment opportunity set, and the higher the profitability of its assets in place, the higher 
is a company’s optimal long-term leverage. 
Lang et al. (1996) using a sample of 640 firms confirmed empirically the role of debt for 
mitigating overinvestment for the period between 1970 and 1989. They analyzed the effect of 
the quality of the investment opportunity set, also using Tobin’s Q as indicator, on the 
negative relationship between leverage and growth. They found that this relationship is 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q. They concluded that while leverage indeed mitigates 
overinvestment, leverage induced underinvestment is not a serious problem for firms with 
valuable investment opportunities.  
The disciplining power of debt is also empirically supported by D’Mello and Miranda (2010). 
They study the cash holding and investment behavior of 366 companies before-, and after 
they issued debt. All of these firms were unlevered before the transaction. They found that 
prior to issuing debt cash holding was significantly higher than industry average for such 
companies, decreasing to-, or below industry average following the transaction and improving 
market valuations. These effects were more significant for companies with lower industry 
adjusted Market to Book ratios (assumed to have lower quality investment opportunity set). 
The authors further found that where overinvestment in capital expenditures was a problem, 
debt had a mitigating effect, while the elimination of debt had the opposite consequence. 
Studying the relationship between capital structure and valuation, the results of Harvey et al. 
(2004) further support the role of leverage in controlling overinvestment. The authors showed 
that leverage has a more positive effect on the value of firms where agency costs are expected 
to be highest.  
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Zweibel (1996) highlights that in the models of Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), and Hart and 
Moore (1995), debt is imposed on management ex-ante based on, among other, assumptions 
on future cash flows and investment opportunities, to constrain management’s ex-post 
behavior. However, Zweibel argues, normally altering leverage is within management 
discretion. He posits that it is optimal for management themselves to issue debt credibly 
controlling overinvestment to avoid potential loss of employment through shareholder action 
or a takeover. This can be viewed as a classical Agency Theory argument, where such actions 
and associated costs are referred to as the agency costs of bonding (see for example Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In Zwzibel’s model management dynamically adjust leverage and 
dividends to constrain overinvestment. Consequently underinvestment is not a problem, and 
the disciplining power is debt is only negated when bankruptcy or a takeover is imminent, 
thus it no longer is an outcome which could be avoided through self-constraining behavior by 
management (Zweibel, 1996). In a related article, Prezas (2009) proposes that investment in 
assets that generate cash flow only in the long-term, such as research and development, in 
combination with the use of debt reinforces the latter’s use to control overinvestment. 
2.2.2.4.2 Disbursements to shareholders 
Dividends to shareholders also reduce resources under management’s control alleviating 
related agency problems (Easterbrook, 1984). This role of dividends is widely studied in 
literature. In a seminal article, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) finds that markets react more 
positively to dividend increases by firms with poorer investment opportunities indicating that 
dividends are more valuable where there is more risk of overinvestment. While some later 
studies, such as Yoon and Starks (1995), found no such relationship, in a recent article Officer 
(2011) confirms the Lang and Litzenberger (1989) results for firms with simultaneously low 
quality investment opportunity sets and high levels of free cash flow, a category closely fitting 
types of firms identified by Jensen (1986). Both Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) contend that 
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dividends lack the credibility of leverage in mitigating the agency problem of free cash flow, 
as management has discretion over dividends, consequently, declaring dividends represent 
less of a commitment with regards to future cash flows than leverage. Other distributions, 
such as share buybacks, are viewed as even more discretionary, thus even less effective as 
control mechanism. This is indicated for example by Haw et al. (2011), who find that in 
countries with weak investor protection investors attach significantly less value to share 
repurchases than to dividends. 
2.2.2.4.3 Market for corporate control 
The market for corporate control is also a mechanism to mitigate overinvestment by 
representing a credible threat to management engaged in value destroying behavior. If agency 
costs exceed a threshold, the company may become a takeover target as a bidder could buy 
the company and create value by more effectively controlling agency costs. A bidder could 
buy the company and lower agency costs to create value. Jensen (1986) points to leveraged 
buyout transactions as falling into this category with high leverage mitigating overinvestment. 
This assessment is supported by Kaplan (1989), who, in a sample of 76 buyouts, finds that 
performance increases, while capital expenditure decreases following the transaction. 
Hendershott (1996) also finds evidence that takeovers are effective in mitigating 
overinvestment. Studying 231 takeover attempts (both successful and defeated) in the period 
between 1985 and 1990, he found that while targets’ investment levels before the attempt 
exceed industry average, after the transaction was completed or the attempt defeated 
investment levels decrease. Further, the fall in investment was positively related to the excess 
investment prior to the attempt. In a recent study, using a quasi-natural experiment, Hwang 
and Kim (2012) find evidence suggesting overinvestment for companies adapting anti-
takeover provisions in South-Korea. 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 75. 
 
2.2.2.4.4 Corporate governance 
As Hart (1995) observes, the role of corporate governance is to restrain agency problems. 
There are various corporate governance measures that may have a direct impact on 
overinvestment. An aspect of corporate governance frequently included in corporate 
investment literature, and closely related to our discussion of the disciplining role of the 
market of corporate control, is the presence of various anti-takeover provisions. To facilitate 
empirical studies, anti-takeover provisions are often aggregated into indices, such as the G-
index or the E-index. The G-index was developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and measures the 
presence of 24 anti-takeover provisions. The E-index is a simplified version of the G-index 
including six of the provisions deemed most influential (poison pills, golden parachutes, 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for 
merger transactions and for charter amendments). The E-index was created by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). Further elements of corporate governance in investment related empirical studies are 
institutional block ownership, ownership concentration, insider ownership, sensitivity of 
management’s compensation of company’s performance, board composition (presence and 
proportion of independent directors on the board), board size, and separation of Chairman and 
CEO roles. 
There are several studies demonstrating a link between corporate governance and firm value, 
investments, and mechanisms to control agency problems. For example, Chi and Lee (2010) 
find that corporate governance contributes significantly to the value of firms, but only to those 
with high levels of free cash flow. The authors interpret their result as investors assigning a 
higher value to corporate governance as a control mechanism when the potential to incur 
agency costs of overinvestment is higher. Billett et al. (2011) apply a hazard model and 
demonstrate that firms with weaker corporate governance are more prone to engage in 
overinvestment. Officer (2011) demonstrates that returns for dividend initiation 
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announcements are negatively related to the quality of their governance, suggesting that 
reducing resources under management’s control is more beneficial for firms with weaker 
governance.   
The literature, both theoretical (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) 
and empirical (see below), on the use of incentives to control agency problems is extremely 
rich. Aggarwal and Samwick (2002) argue that leverage and dividend policy, and even more 
so takeovers, are costly and cannot be continuously optimized. However, adjusting incentives 
is relatively easy and low cost, and incentives can be tailored to specific managers. Based on 
these attributes, the authors argue, establishing and adjusting appropriate incentives is the 
most efficient tool in controlling sub-optimal investment. Broussard et al. (2004) studied data 
for 382 non-manufacturing firms from 1993 to 1997, and showed that pay performance 
sensitivity, defined as change in top manager wealth per change in shareholder wealth by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), is negatively related to the strength of the relationship between 
investment and cash flow for firms with low Tobin’s Q (used to indicate low quality 
investment opportunity set). As theoretically investment should not be driven by availability 
of internal resources, but by the quality of the available investment opportunities, such lower 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow indicate lower agency cost of overinvestment. Agrawal 
and Mandelker (1987) empirically demonstrates a link between the use of stock options and 
equity ownership of management, and investments and financing of 209 acquiring and 
divesting companies demonstrating the beneficial effects of equity related incentives. Similar 
conclusion is reached by Hadlock (1998) concerning the relationship between incentives and 
investments, and Lewellen et al. (1985) with regards to management equity ownership and 
value destroying acquisitions. 
In addition to the literature studying the impact of firm-level corporate governance, 
researchers, such as but not limited to scholars contributing to the Law and Finance research 
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strand following the influential work of La Porta et al. (1998), also noted a large variation 
among country-level corporate governance institutions. Elements of country-level corporate 
governance widely applied include legal origin, several indices such as the anti-self-dealing 
index, anti-director rights index, judiciary efficiency index, corruption index, and the 
development of capital markets. Recent empirical evidence includes for example the study of 
Haw et al. (2011), who indicate that in countries with weaker county-level corporate 
governance investors have a stronger preference for dividends over share repurchases, 
suggesting that country-level governance influences the effectiveness of other agency 
problem mitigating mechanisms.  
Empirical research found that investors assign lower value to cash held by entrenched 
management in countries with weaker country-level governance (e.g: Kalcheva and Lins, 
2007). This may indicate that as weaker regimes are generally less efficient in keeping down 
agency costs, investors see an elevated risk of cash being wasted in value destroying projects 
or being expropriated by management or controlling shareholders.  
Studying the effect of weaker external governance regimes on the efficiency of investment in 
Central-Eastern Europe, Mueller and Peev (2007) conclude that they intensify both the under-
, and overinvestment problems. Miguel et al. (2004), analyzing Spanish data, refer to country-
level corporate governance environment in explaining contradictory results in literature as to 
the relationship between firm value and ownership structure; thus, linking the interaction of 
the two to explain their overall effect.      
2.2.3 Optimism and overconfidence related overinvestment 
While most researchers view overinvestment as an agency problem, there is a growing strand 
in the literature that looks for behavioral motivation other than self-interest that may cause 
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managers to overinvest. These scholars argue that besides self-interest, managerial optimism, 
or overconfidence, may also lead to overinvestment.  
2.2.3.1 Definition – hubris, optimism, overconfidence 
There are three related terms used in the literature to describe another, non-agency cost 
related, behavioral characteristic of management that is also an important driver of investment 
distortions: (1) hubris, (ii) optimism, and (iii) overconfidence. While their meaning is not 
identical, the literature tends to employ them to examine the same question: the link between 
management’s excessive belief in its own abilities and/or in external positive outcomes, and 
their tendency to overvalue investment opportunities.  
The seminal article of the literature on overconfidence and finance is that of Roll (1986), who 
advanced his “hubris hypothesis”. By “hubris”, he describes management’s belief that their 
ability to value target companies is superior to that of financial markets. Building on and 
expanding Roll (1986)’s work, Heaton (2002) studied the effect of managerial optimism on 
corporate investment decisions. He defines managers as “optimistic, when they systematically 
overestimate the probability of good firm performance and underestimate the probability of 
bad firm performance” (Heaton, 2002, p. 33). Malmendier and Tate (2008) specifies the 
distinction between optimism and overconfidence as the former referring to “overestimation 
of exogenous outcomes” and the latter to overestimation of “own abilities” (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008, p. 22). As they have the same effect on capital expenditure and financing 
decisions, we will discuss both optimism and overconfidence together as important 
mechanisms bridging the gap between an opportunity to overinvest and the act of 
overinvestment. 
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2.2.3.2 Roots of overconfidence 
The underlying reasons for managerial optimism, such as a tendency to overestimate one’s 
control and being more optimistic when dedicated to a task, are embedded in human 
psychology. Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Doukas and Petmezas (2007) relate 
overconfidence primarily to specific psychological biases: (1) the better-than-average effect, 
the (2) self-attribution bias, and (3) illusion of control. The better-than-average effect refers to 
people’s tendencies to overvalue their own abilities and competencies. Discussing it, Lerwood 
and Whittaker (1977) point out the potential impact of overestimating one’s own abilities on 
planning. In an experiment they find that both university students and company presidents 
rate their abilities and future personal expectations disproportionately highly, and that such 
tendencies are also affect their sales forecasts for a hypothetical business they were to 
manage. Better-than-average effect induced overconfidence is also demonstrated by the well 
documented fact, as shown by Svenson (1981), that the majority of drivers believe they are 
better skilled than the average, a result that is clearly impossible in reality. Swenson (1981) 
replicates this experiment using two separate samples: university students from the US, and 
from Sweden. While overconfidence is evident in both groups, it is interesting to see, that 
results are stronger for the US sample, which may be viewed as an indication supporting 
international differences in overconfidence.  
The self-attribution bias, namely the tendency to believe that good results are due to one’s 
own actions while bad ones are due to circumstances, are extensively discussed, and related 
psychology literature is reviewed, for example by Doukas and Petmezas (2007). Analyzing 
decision biases with regards to acquisitions, the authors explain the link between self-
attribution and overconfidence as individuals prone to this bias take any positive result as 
encouragement for further investment, while disregarding any negative one dismissing it as 
due to external influences. Thus, over time even if negative results outweigh positive ones, 
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they gain in confidence that they are making the right decisions, and will keep committing the 
same errors. As the authors point out, the self-attribution bias is related to the better-than-
average effect, since the higher individuals rate their own abilities, the more likely they see 
their successes as their own doing and their failures as not their fault. Both the better-than-
average effect and the self-attribution bias are directly related to another behavioral bias, 
illusion of control. Illusion of control refers to the people’s inclination of believing even 
chance outcomes are in fact influenced by their actions. In a much cited article Langer (1975) 
showed that people have a propensity to believe they have a higher chance of winning the 
lottery with numbers they choose than with random selected ones. Starting with Heaton 
(2002), the literature unequivocally links illusions of control to overconfidence. 
All three biases are aggravated in situations where the individual is strongly committed to the 
outcome (Weinstein, 1980; Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Related to 
overinvestment, Malmendier and Tate (2005) point out that these conditions apply to 
investment decisions, as firstly management is highly committed to the success of the firm as 
its reputation and compensation depends on it.     
2.2.3.3 Overconfidence and overinvestment 
Roll (1986) argued that acquirer companies overpay for their targets in transactions as their 
management is driven by their “hubris”. Namely, such a manager “may convince himself” 
that he or she is better at valuing the target than financial markets are. The result is value 
destroyed, thus, overinvestment. He specifically distinguishes “hubris” from opportunistic 
managerial behavior specifying, that management may believe to fully serve the interests of 
shareholders will engage in value destroying acquisitions driven by their “hubris”.  
Heaton (2002) theoretically demonstrated that managerial optimism may result both in 
underinvestment and overinvestment depending on the investment opportunity set of the 
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company and availability of internal resources. Optimism may cause management to perceive 
that capital markets undervalue the firm and its securities, leading them to conclude that the 
cost of external capital too high. In that case, management may over rely on internal financing 
to fund investments deciding to forego value increasing investments, resulting in 
underinvestment. Optimism may also lead management to underestimate the risks, or to 
overestimate the cash flows or their ability to unlock vale associated with investments. This 
may induce management to undertake investments, which are, in reality, value destroying. 
From our own corporate finance professional experience valuing investment projects and 
companies, we saw how easy it is to fall into the trap of deciding to “adjust” the underlying 
assumptions or find additional real options to arrive to a positive net present value if the 
analyst (or management) believes in the project. The result of such behavior is 
overinvestment. Optimism related overinvestment, similar to empire building, is also 
positively related to the availability of free cash flow to “waste”; therefore, it may also be 
viewed as a cost of free cash flow. If internal resources exceed the level needed to finance 
truly value creating projects such sensitivity leads to overinvestment. If the resources needed 
to fund such projects are not available internally, the sensitivity results in underinvestment 
(Heaton, 2002).  
In a related article Van den Steen (2004) explains that individuals who overrate their own 
abilities, tend to be also overly confident in their estimations. This is directly relevant to the 
argument of Heaton (2002) with regards to overconfidence induced overinvestment, as 
management’s estimations of benefits and risks drive their overvaluation of projects. In so far 
as they feel self-assured about such estimations, they will be more confident that they are 
“right”, and the market or other external individuals are “wrong” in the determination whether 
the project is likely to create or destroy value.  
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March and Shapira (1987) studied the perceptions of risk as it enters in managerial decision 
making. They find that risk is generally not treated mathematically and fully rationally by 
managers. Rather, (1) falling under the illusion of control, management acknowledges it as 
something they can avoid by action even when in reality it depends on factors external to their 
control, (2) may see it as immaterially small, or (3) acknowledging it with a “refusal to 
associate that reality with one’s self” (March and Shapira, 1987, p. 1406). The latter is 
equivalent to seeing the risk, but believing that the “this will not happen to us”. This form of 
overconfidence, again related to the proposition of Heaton (2002), may result in 
underestimating risks associated with an investment, which in turn leads to an overestimation 
of the project’s value, thus to potential overinvestment. By claiming a link between estimated 
risk levels and value assigned to an investment opportunity, we assume that rational 
discounted cash flow or other models including the riskiness of the proposed project are 
employed when making the investment decision. 
The theoretical predictions proposed by Heaton (2002) were empirically confirmed by 
establishing links between overconfidence and both underinvestment and overinvestment in 
the literature following his work. While some authors (for example Malmendier and Tate, 2008) 
note the difference, the empirical literature tends to use the term overconfidence with little distinction 
between optimism and overconfidence. As their effect on overinvestment is the same we will follow 
this practice. Researchers studying managerial overconfidence face the problem that the 
phenomenon is not directly observable. As interest in the subject increased, a number of 
methods to operationalize it were developed and applied in empirical studies. Table 2.1. 
below lists some examples. 
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Table 2.1. Operationalization of managerial optimism/overconfidence 
Operationalization Examples from literature 
CEO ownerships of company options Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) 
Media coverage Malmendier and Tate (2008), Jin and Kothari 
(2008), Ferris et al. (2013) 
Forecast earnings bias Lin et al. (2005), Huang et al. (2011), Li and 
Tang (2010) 
Frequency of M&A initiated by CEO Malmendier and Tate (2008), Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) 
CEO salary relative to management Huang et al. (2011) 
Individualism cultural dimension Antonczyk and Salzmann (2014) 
Source: Adapted from Huang et al. (2011) p. 263 
Lin et al. (2005) empirically confirmed the theoretical prediction of Heaton (2002) that 
overconfident managers will tend to underinvest if they do not have access to sufficient 
internal resources. For firms quoted on the stock exchange in Taiwan between 1985 and 2002, 
they find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for financially constrained firms with 
optimistic managers than for those whose managers do not fall in this category. 
In a widely quoted article, Malmendier and Tate (2005) developed a mathematical model 
describing the mechanism through which overconfidence affects both underinvestment and 
overinvestment. They empirically confirmed the hypothesis of Heaton (2002) for capital 
expenditures in their sample of 477 US firms from the Forbes 500 list for the period between 
1984 and 1994, showing overconfidence to be positively related to investment - cash flow 
sensitivity. As a separate finding they highlight that such sensitivity is strongest for firms who 
do not have enough cash on hand or debt capacity to fund investments. As the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow is reduced by lower financial constraints as evidenced by its negative 
additional debt capacity, this result suggests that underinvestment is a key driver of such 
sensitivity in their sample (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  
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Heaton (2002)’s proposition that optimism can lead to overinvestment are supported by a 
series of further studies, such as Malmendier and Tate (2008), Huang et al. (2011) and Ferris 
et al. (2013). Focusing on merger and acquisition activity, Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
hypothesize and empirically show for 394 quoted firms from the United States of America 
between 1980 and 1994 that overconfident managers have a higher probability to engage in 
mergers and acquisitions, to overpay for target companies, and to carry out diversifying 
acquisitions. As literature shows that diversifying mergers tend to be value destroying as 
briefly discussed in above, we interpret this result as already a strong indication of the 
positive link between overconfidence and overinvestment. Going further, Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) also empirically established that financial markets react significantly more 
negatively to transactions carried out by overconfident management than to those executed by 
management not qualified overconfident, suggesting that markets perceive the former as more 
value destroying.  
Ferris et al. (2013) expand the United States of America based study of Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) analyzing whether overconfidence influences mergers and acquisition internationally 
as well. For non-financial Fortune 500 firms for the period of 2000 to 2006, their study 
confirmed that the findings of Malmendier and Tate (2008) are also valid internationally. This 
confirms the authors’ hypothesis that overconfidence is an “international phenomenon”.  
Huang et al. (2011) also used a non-US sample, that of Taiwanese quoted companies, to study 
the relationship between overconfidence and investment in capital expenditures. According to 
the authors, monitoring is widely identified as a problem in companies with state-ownership, 
which also “often pursue politically motivated goals” (Huang et al., 2011 p. 262). These can 
be expected to contribute to less than efficient investment practices potentially leading to 
overinvestment. The authors contrast such practices to ”market-oriented” non-state-owned 
listed companies. They point to the coexistence of these two types of quoted companies on 
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Chinese stock exchanges as a “natural experiment” to examine the combined effect of agency 
problems and overconfidence on corporate investment behavior. Using 2,234 firm-years of 
Chinese quoted companies from the period between 2002 and 2005, they find that 
overconfidence is positively related to investment - cash flow sensitivity, and that this 
relationship is not-significant for non-state-owned firms. As they show a negative relationship 
between the sensitivity of investment to cash flow and monitoring, they conclude that 
effective monitoring is mitigating both agency -, and overconfidence related overinvestment.   
It may be worthwhile to note, that while overconfidence related overinvestment is not driven 
by opportunistic behavior, several of the mechanisms designed to control the latter will also 
lessen the former. More specifically, all mechanisms resulting in management to pre-commit 
or disgorge free cash flow will naturally lower the internal resources available for any kind of 
overinvestment. As Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) pointed out, due to their 
tendency to overvalue their own firms, overconfident managers tend not to turn to financial 
markets for additional financing. Faced with insufficient internal resources such managers 
will choose not to invest. Therefore, tools lowering internal resources are effective in reducing 
overconfidence driven overinvestment (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). However, there is a 
danger in artificially introducing financial constraints, as if internal resources become 
insufficient to cover funding needs even for value creating projects, overconfident managers 
may start to underinvest. This is clearly not a significant danger for management who 
overinvest because of opportunistic motivations. Additionally, being submitted to the market 
for corporate control, as well as having an efficient board with independent board members 
allow people external to the management team to evaluate investment practices, and to 
potentially spot systematic overconfidence. The beneficial effect of monitoring to diminish 
overconfidence related overinvestment is empirically confirmed by the results of Huang et al. 
(2011). 
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Based on the still evolving theoretical and empirical literature on overconfidence induced 
investment inefficiencies, it is reasonable to assume that overconfidence is a significant driver 
of overinvestment. To better understand the underlying drivers of overinvestment, asking 
which, if any, of the agency-, or overconfidence behavioral motivations dominate is a 
pertinent question. Analyzing mergers and acquisitions of companies from the United States 
of America, Malmendier and Tate (2008) estimate that overconfident managers are 
responsible for 44% of the value destruction as measured by the negative announcement 
effect. There are no similar calculations we know of neither for investment in capital 
expenditure, nor for countries other than the United States. Since the authors use a US sample, 
their estimation is based on the effect of overconfidence in US firms. Literature showed that 
overconfidence to be positively related to Individualism (Ferris et al., 2013; and Chui et al., 
2010), and negatively related to Long-Term Orientation (Ferris et al., 2013) cultural value 
dimensions of Hofstede. The US scores the highest on Individualism and in the lowest 
quartile on Long-Term Orientation. Therefore, it is expected, and empirically shown for 
optimism by Graham et al. (2013), that overconfidence is substantially stronger in the US 
compared to the rest of our sample. This leads us to posit, assuming the estimate is applicable 
to capital expenditures as well, that the proportion of value destroyed by overconfidence 
driven overinvestment is probably significant, but lower in our overall sample than the 44% 
estimated by Malmendier and Tate (2008).  
2.2.3.4 Overconfidence and culture 
There is strong support in the literature that at least certain dimensions of national culture 
influence people’s tendencies to be overconfident. Ferris et al. (2013) find that among the 
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies overconfidence varies between countries. Further, they show 
that in addition to the individual-level characteristics of age, gender and education of CEOs, 
country-level variables contribute to explaining the fraction of overconfident CEOs in a given 
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country. Examining a variety of factors, such as legal system’s origin, language, religion, and 
national culture, their results show that religion and national culture have a significant 
influence on the tendency of CEOs to be overconfident. CEOs of companies in countries 
where the principal religion is Catholic tend to be more overconfident. With regards to 
national culture, Ferris et al. (2013) applied Hofstede’s dimensionalist model as indicator of 
national culture. They showed that overconfidence is positively related to cultural value 
orientations linked to placing the individual ahead the collective, and negatively related to 
having a long-term orientation.  
Another study making a specific link between national culture and overconfidence is Chui et 
al. (2010). Based on psychology literature they argue, and empirically confirm, that 
individualism, as measured by Hofstede’s cultural value dimension, is positively related to 
overconfidence, which in turn helps explaining international variation in the success of 
momentum investment strategies. They link individualism to overconfidence based on 
psychology literature and the work of, among others, Markus and Kitayama (1991) and Heine 
et al. (1999), who describe how individualistic cultures tend to encourage a strong belief in 
one’s ability from early childhood, where children are encouraged to regard themselves as 
“winners” and  “above average” (Chui et al., 2010, p. 364). This belief carries over to 
adulthood causing individuals to overrate their own abilities, and contributing to the 
development of self-attribution bias, both important origins of overconfidence. By contrast, 
they refer to Nurmi (1992) and Church et al. (2006), who found that collectivist cultures put 
emphasis on “self-monitoring”, a trait that have a negative effect on overconfidence (Chui et 
al., 2010). 
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Chapter III. 
Dimensionalism 
Dimensionalism is an approach that quantifies aspects of culture to facilitate empirical studies 
researching the many ways culture influences various outcomes. It is based on the identifying, 
measuring, and grouping values to characterize cultures, and comparing them across nations. 
Literature on culture and finance is dominated by three models, that of Hofstede, Schwartz, 
and the GLOBE Project.  
Reuter (2011) makes it very clear, that he views the study of culture’s influence in finance an 
area with strong potential to become an established research field of its own in the future. To 
realize this potential, he calls for alternative operationalizations of culture, where he urges 
researchers to use other variables besides cultural value dimensions. Reviewing extant 
literature he highlights the successful use of trust, religious affiliation and religiosity as 
promising cultural indicators. In our opinion there is undoubtedly merit in Reuter (2011)’s 
call as it would allow a more multi-faceted examination of culture. Nevertheless, we believe, 
there is an advantage of dimensions over several of the examples cited by Reuter (2011). 
Namely, such indicators avoid some of the limitations coming from the artificial constructs 
used in the dimensionalist models, and they indeed confirm that culture matters; however, 
they do not shed light on how. Dimensionalist, through sorting fundamental characteristics of 
culture into the constructs they label cultural value dimensions advance our understanding of 
what aspects of culture influence most certain type of outcomes, and of the mechanisms at 
work. 
Despite of his evident dislike of the dimensionalist approach, Reuter (2011) concedes that 
there is a place for dimensionalist research in finance on the condition that the mechanisms 
linking the dimensions included to the phenomenon studied are identified and supported. In 
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that he echoes the arguments of Kirkman et al. (2006) and Vas et al. (2010) for a focus on the 
mechanism through which culture exerts its influence, and for avoiding using culture as a 
“catch all” category to capture diverse effects without a theoretical understanding and 
justification. 
In this chapter we briefly review the fundamental characteristics of dimensionalist approach 
in general and of the three models, followed by the most relevant criticisms of 
dimensionalism together with some proposed answers to these arguments. We conclude that 
while that dimensionalism has several limitations which have to be taken into account when 
interpreting result, there is strong conceptual and empirical support for its application.  
3.1 The dimensionalist approach 
Numerous scholars within cross-cultural psychology attempted to describe and quantitatively 
approximate culture allowing comparing the characteristics of one culture with another in a 
systematic manner, and facilitating studies researching the interaction between cultural 
variables and other outcomes. This approach is called dimensionalism.  
Licht (2001) explained that creating a dimensionalist model generally involves three steps. 
The first step is to identify the fundamental aspects that can consistently represent cultures. 
Corresponding to this step, Vinken et al. (2004) summarized the objective of dimensionalism 
as identifying the “most meaningful basic set of axes, with which to explain the broad range 
of attitudes, beliefs, life styles and the diversity of practices among large populations” 
(Vinken et al., 2004, p. 8).  
The primary assumption underlying dimensionalism first proposed by Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck (1961) is that all societies face similar basic challenges, but their response varies 
with fundamental values shared by their members. For example the most widely quoted 
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dimensionalist model, that of Hofstede, originally identified inequality, association between 
individual and group, gender differences, and uncertainty as fundamental problems 
confronted by each society (Hofstede, 2001). Hofstede repeatedly warned that dimensionalist 
models must focus on societal-level problems, which are challenges societies need to address 
and overcome (Hofstede, 2001, 2010). These, he emphasized, are conceptually different from 
the individual-level as the solutions serve the survival and prosperity of society not of any of 
its specific individual member. 
The second step in developing a dimensionalist model is to categorize the types of responses 
given by societies to these problems (Licht, 2001). This step involves the creation of 
constructs called cultural dimensions, which represent the identified responses. Hofstede 
(2001) stressed that cultural dimensions are constructs. As such, he continued, they are 
consciously developed by scholars with the objective to summarize complex facets of culture. 
Necessarily, they provide a simplified description of culture, but nevertheless they are useful 
tools to break this immensely complex phenomenon down to its fundamental components. 
Cultural dimensions thus assist us to better understand culture as a whole, and the 
mechanisms through which it affects human behavior. Cultural dimensions represent how a 
given society deals with basic problems and creates cohesive societies from human beings; 
therefore such dimensions form the base on which society builds its institutions (Schwartz, 
1994). As House et al. (2004) advanced the same notion: culture is what makes individuals 
into a society. Hofstede (2001) claims that dimensions allow the comparative study of culture 
as they represent strong tendencies within society while significantly differentiating cultures 
from one another. The difference between the problems identified in step one, and the types of 
societal solutions in step two, is that societal problems are cultural universals (shared across 
cultures), while responses are culturally specific (different across cultures).  
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The final, third, step listed by Licht (2001) is to create quantitative indicators of societal 
stances on each of the identified dimensions. This is done based on extensive international 
surveys on selected samples through self-response questionnaires, sometimes complemented 
by interviews. This approach to culture is based on Segall et al. (1998), who claim that to 
study culture, one must study how members of a culture interpret it. Individual data obtained 
thus is aggregated at the country level (House et al. 2004). The appropriateness of studying 
culture at the national level is debated by critiques of the dimensionalist approach. The 
arguments against and in favor will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter 
together with other criticisms leveled at dimensionalism in general, and the models of 
Hofstede and the GLOBE Project specifically.  
To confirm the validity of the constructs empirical techniques are used to verify whether 
dimensions theorized during the second step are indeed corroborated by the data collected, 
and that they allow cultures to be systematically distinguished from one another. Based on the 
aggregated data scores are assigned for each dimension to all the cultures from the sample. In 
a dimensionalist framework each culture is then described by the combination of its scores on 
all the dimensions of the specific model (House et al., 2004; Hofstede, 2001). 
Licht et al. (2007), discussing the Hofstede and Schwartz frameworks, advanced that the 
dimensional models map societal stances internally comprehensively, and consistently for 
each culture, and House et al. (2004) made a similar claim for the GLOBE Project. 
Consequently, each of these models can be viewed as a complete whole describing culture in 
a comprehensive manner. The resulting dimension scores can be used in empirical studies 
examining culture’s behavior in various outcomes as cultural indicators. Hofstede (2001) 
warns however, that cultural dimension scores for a society should not be taken as absolute 
indication of how individual members of the given society behave. Such scores indicate 
societal preferences. He explains that there is always a wide range of goals, attitudes and 
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behaviors enacted by individuals within the same society. Whenever studying culture’s effect 
on an outcome, it is essential to not lose sight that while culture may be a fundamental 
determinant, there are other influences as well which may moderate the outcome, or indeed it 
may culture which moderates the impact of other factors. He states, that dimensions express 
propensities not absolute laws (Hofstede, 2001).  
3.2 Underlying cultural dimensions: values 
Cultural values are defined by Kluckhohn (1951) as “a conception held by an individual, or 
collectively by members of a group, of that which is desirable and which influences the 
selection of both means  and ends of action from among available alternatives” (Kluckhohn, 
1951, p. 395). Berry et al. (1992) places values between attitudes and ideologies as being 
more general than attitudes but less general than ideologies. Focusing on similar 
characteristics of values but putting it more directly, for Hofstede (2010) “values are broad 
tendencies to prefer certain states of affair over others. Values are feelings with an added 
arrow indicating a plus or a minus side” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 9).  
We have described that cultural dimensions are constructed from data collected from 
international surveys. To be more precise, cultural dimensions are based on identifying, 
measuring, and grouping values, and comparing them between cultures. This approach is 
common because, as researchers postulate, values are the basic components of culture through 
which it exerts influence over the behavior of members of a society, as well as over the 
structure and functioning of its institutions (House et al. 2004; Hofstede, 2001). House et al. 
(2004) refers to this view as Value-Belief Theory of culture, and is forcefully propagated by 
influential scholars of cross-cultural psychology such as Hofstede, Schwartz, and Triandis. 
This model can in fact be viewed as another formulation, or an explanation, of the Values, Attitudes, 
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Behavior Hierarchy model developed by Homer and Kahle (1988) stating that values influence 
attitudes, which in turn influence behavior.  
Explaining the mechanism, through which values influence behavior, Licht (2001) describes 
the fundamental characteristics of values as follows: (i) “values refer to desirable goals”, (ii) 
“and to the modes of conduct that promotes those goals”, (iii) “they serve as standards to 
guide the selection and evaluation of behavior, people, and events”, (iv) “values transcend 
specific actions and situations”, and (v) “values are ordered by importance relative to one 
another” (Licht 2001, p. 151). Taken together characteristics (i) to (iv), they show that values 
are determinants of individuals’ objectives, what actions are seen as acceptable to achieve 
these objectives, how is one’s behavior to be viewed or judged by members of the same 
society or how one judges the behaviors of others, and that they are used as yardsticks applied 
to behavior in general regardless of the context. Referring the influence of values Hofstede 
(2010) writes “culture is heavy with values, and values imply judgment” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 
158). The fifth characteristic identified by Licht (2001) makes the dimensionalist approach 
possible, as it is precisely this relative order that is identified and used to quantitatively 
characterize a culture through cultural dimension scores.  
Another explanation of the central nature of values is the “onion” model of Hofstede shown in 
Figure 3.1. Hofstede (2010) describes culture comprising of cultural values and practices. 
Practices, which he categorizes into symbols, heroes, and rituals are observable 
manifestations of culture. He defines symbols as “words, gestures, pictures, or objects that 
carry a particular meaning that is recognized as such only by those who share the culture” 
(Hofstede, 2010, p. 8). Symbols change relatively easily and such change occurs frequently as 
symbols are transferred between cultures. He points to fashion or works of art as examples of 
such symbols. Heroes, an important element of cultural practices, “are persons, alive or dead, 
real or imaginary, who possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture and thus 
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serve as models of behavior” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 8). Finally he describes rituals as “collective 
activities that are technically superfluous to reach desired ends but that, within a culture, are 
considered socially essential. “ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 9). Rituals, he explains, are present in most 
aspects of life from private life, such as greetings and celebrations, to organizational life, 
where business meetings and certain elements of budgeting and accounting have such 
ritualistic elements. The common thread in rituals is that its purpose is to reaffirm 
membership in common culture and to provide psychological comfort. While cultural 
practices are observable, to comprehend their full meaning one must be a member, or have a 
deep understanding, of the given culture (Hofstede, 2010). 
Observable cultural practices making up the outer layers of the “onion” are rooted in values, 
which are fundamental determinants of practices, located at the center (see Figure 3.1). 
Cultural values cannot be directly observed. Furthermore, Hofstede (2010) highlighted that 
while they influence behavior, they often are not consciously articulated by the people whose 
very actions they impact. As Hofstede (2010) explained practices are visible manifestations of 
values, thus these latter can be inferred from preferences and behavior of members of a 
society. Therefore to identify and categorize unobservable values, scholars analyze cultural 
practices.  
The location of the layers also represents their speed and ease of change, with the outermost 
layer being the most superficial, thus, least stable (Hofstede, 2010). An explanation offered by 
Hofstede (2010) is that values are dominantly learned in childhood. He referred to 
psychological findings that such learning tends to be most intense up to twelve years of age, 
while practices are learned throughout one’s life. Hofstede (2010) conjectures that aspects 
acquired earlier are more ingrained and more resistant to change than those learned later in 
life. The fact that cultural values are stable while practices change more frequently serves as 
another reason for scholars to focus on values if they wish to study culture (Hofstede, 2010).   
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Figure 3.1. Relationship between cultural values and practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hofstede (2010), figure 1-2, p. 8.  
3.3 Dimensionalist models 
Several dimensionalist models have been developed in the literature starting with the seminal 
work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). Table 3.1, adapted from Warner-Soderholm 
(2012), shows the publication of the most well-known models along with the dimensions of 
the particular frameworks. While a number of these have been applied alone or in 
combination, the literature on culture and finance, most relevant to our research question, is 
dominated by three dimensionalist models, that of Hofstede (1980a, 1988, 2010), Schwartz 
(1994), and House et al. (2004). There are several similarities between the three frameworks, 
but they differ in fundamental aspects and form theoretically and methodologically separate 
tools. In the following subsections we will briefly introduce these models.  
Values 
Rituals 
Heroes 
Symbols 
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As the use of dimensionalism expanded rapidly in numerous research fields since the 
publication of Hofstede’s (1980a) framework, there were a number of criticisms levelled 
against this approach. Some of the critique targeted the work of Hofstede specifically, while 
others the dimensionalist method altogether. As many of the arguments pertain to each or 
most models, for better clarity, we will present the main critiques of the three frameworks and 
the authors’ responses together in a separate subsection at the end of the chapter.    
Table 3.1. Main dimensionalist models in literature 
Study Dimensions 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
(1961) 
1. Time orientation 
2. Relationship to nature 
3. Basic human nature 
4. Activity orientation 
5. Relationship to people 
Hofstede (1980a, 1988, 2010) 1. Individualism 
2. Power Distance 
3. Masculinity/Femininity 
4. Uncertainty Avoidance 
5. Long-Term Orientation 
6. Indulgence versus Restraint 
Schwartz (1994) 1. Conservatism / Embededness 
2. Intellectual Autonomy 
3. Affective Autonomy 
4. Egalitarian Commitment 
5. Mastery 
6. Hierarchy 
7. Harmony 
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Trompenaars (1996) 1. Universalism versus Particularism 
2. Individualism versus Collectivism 
3. Neutral versus Emotional 
4. Inner-, versus Outer-directed 
5. Specific versus Diffuse 
6. Achievement-status versus Ascriptive-
status 
7. Linear-, versus Cyclical attitude to time 
Inglehart et al. (2004) 1. Traditional, secular-rational 
2. Survival-self expression 
House et al. (2004) 1. Assertiveness* 
2. Gender Orientation* 
3. Institutional Collectivism* 
4. In-group Collectivism* 
5. Power Distance* 
6. Uncertainty Avoidance* 
7. Performance Orientation* 
8. Future Orientation* 
9. Humane Orientation* 
* Each dimension measured as cultural values 
and cultural practices both at the societal-, and 
organizational culture level. 
Source: Warner-Soderholm, H. (2012), figure 1, p. 76-77. 
3.3.1 Hofstede’s model 
Hofstede’s study was conducted between 1967 and 1973. He collected 116,000 questionnaires 
across international subsidiaries of IBM in 40 countries as part of an internal corporate survey 
(Hosftede 1980a). He defined culture as “the collective mental programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from the others” (Hofstede, 
2010, p. 6), and described it as “patterns of thinking, feeling and potential acting” (Hofstede, 
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2010, p. 4). Mirroring the propositions of Berry et al. (1992), he postulated that culture is 
learned through socialization with much of the learning happening in early childhood. 
Throughout his work he explains the how culture influences social institutions, and how, in 
turn, such institutions as the family, education system, and workplace are engaged in the 
transmission of culture ensuring its long-term stability.  
Cultural diversity is an irrefutable fact that can be observed in the world. Besides, similar to 
Berry et al. (1992), referring to the physical environment, such as climate and geography, and 
the basic economic orientation of a society to explain cultural diversity, Hofstede (2010) also 
points to the markedly different historical experiences of societies as underlying forces 
shaping  culture. Hofstede (2010) argues that culture is a matter of survival for society: to 
survive, societies need to act in a cohesive manner. Those societies which failed to do so were 
typically not able to compete with those who could, and disappeared. For cohesion, societies 
need shared values. In his view, it is culture that makes a society out of individuals. He 
presents culture as a source of path dependency with roots centuries or millennia ago, an 
argument echoed by Licht (2001) going as far as calling it “the mother of all path 
dependencies”. This path dependency, besides contributing to current cultural differences, 
implies that such diversity remains even in the long term supporting contentions of the 
divergence theory.  
3.3.1.1 Dimensions 
From the data obtained from the survey at IBM he developed four cultural dimensions: 
Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance Index, Masculinity/Femininity, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance. The first three were created using factor analysis of 32 work-related questions 
from the survey, and Uncertainty Avoidance emerged from theoretical explanation of strong 
intro-cultural correlation to three questions relating to stress, rule abidance, and desire for 
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long-term job stability (Hofstede, 2001). The Power Distance Index and 
Individualism/Collectivism dimensions are significantly correlated. Hofstede decided to 
separate them into two dimensions because they relate to conceptually very different 
concepts: the individual’s role and equality. Furthermore, Hofstede (2001) points out that 
once the effect of national wealth is controlled, the correlation substantially diminishes. The 
four dimensions thus established correspond to the four fundamental societal challenges 
identified by Hofstede: inequality, association between individual and group, gender 
differences, and uncertainty as fundamental problems as discussed above. 
As the original study was conceived by a US multinational company, despite conscious 
efforts to achieve cultural neutrality through the involvement of local partners, it is 
conceivable that it was culturally biased towards Western values. To address this concern 
another instrument called the Chinese Value Survey, tailored towards oriental culture, was 
developed by oriental scholars coordinated by Bond, and a survey was carried out in the late 
1980s in 23 Asian cultures. The data confirmed three out of the four original dimensions with 
Uncertainty Avoidance not found in this sample. Further, a new, fifth, dimension emerged 
from the survey reflecting an orientation toward the long-, versus the short-term (Hofstede 
and Bond, 1988). This dimension was labelled Long-Term Orientation. 
Analyzing data from the periodic World Values Survey coordinated by Inglehart, Minkov 
(2007) identified three value dimensions, two of which related to Individualism/Collectivism 
and Long-Term Orientation. The third dimension however represented a value orientation 
both conceptually and empirically missing from the Hofstede framework. In Hofstede (2010) 
this dimension termed Indulgence versus Restraint was added to the Hofstede model arriving 
to the current six dimensions in the framework. The current model is illustrated in figure 3.2, 
followed by Hofstede’s definitions of the dimensions.  
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Figure 3.2. Hofstede’s model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hofstede (2010) 
Individualism/Collectivism: “Individualism implies a loosely knit social framework in which 
people are supposed to take care of themselves and of their immediate families only, while 
collectivism is characterized by a tight social framework in which people distinguish between 
in-groups and out-groups; they expect the in-group […] to look after them, and in exchange 
for that they feel they owe absolute loyalty to it” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 45.)  
Masculinity/Femininity: “the extent to which the dominant values in society are ‘masculine’ – 
that is assertiveness, the acquisition of money and things, and not caring for others, the quality 
of life or people” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 46.).  
Power Distance Index: “indicates the extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in 
institutions and organizations is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 45.).  
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Uncertainty Avoidance: “indicates the extent to which a society feels threatened by uncertain 
and ambiguous situations and tries to avoid these situations by providing greater stability” 
(Hofstede, 1980, p. 45.). 
Long-Term Orientation: “Long-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues oriented 
toward future rewards – in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term 
orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present – in particular, 
respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’, and fulfilling social obligations” (Hofstede, 2010, 
p. 239.) 
Indulgence versus Restraint: “tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and 
natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun.”, while Restraint refers to “a 
conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms” 
(Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 281).    
Hofstede claims his dimension index scores reflect broad underlying dimensions of culture 
with values in cultural dimensions are continuous ranging approximately from 0 to 110 
(Hofstede, 2010). National cultures are described by the combination of these dimensions 
(Hofstede 2001). He cautions that dimensions may moderate one another, with the given 
national culture determined by their interplay. Thus, different combinations may explain 
different results from countries with similar scores on some dimensions. Such explanation 
may remain undiscovered if a study does not cover all dimensions, a criticism of Kirkman et 
al. (2006) formulated about extant research. We will discuss values and behaviors associated 
with Hofstede’s cultural dimensions relevant to overinvestment in chapter IV of this 
dissertation. 
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3.3.1.2 Validation 
In terms of the shared fundamental societal challenges he empirically found emerging from 
the IBM data, Hofstede (2001) points to the work of Inkeles and Levinson (1969), who based 
on literature theoretically identified the same set of societal problems before his study. He 
views the fact that his empirical analysis revealed dimensions, which corroborate ex-post 
theoretical work preceding it, a very strong validation of his framework.  
Hofstede’s model is extensively further validated through replications and theoretically 
grounded correlations to independent variables by Hofstede himself and by other researchers 
relying on his dimensions in empirical studies. Hofstede (2010) lists six comprehensive 
replication studies with samples exceeding 10 countries each as shown in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Major replications of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
Publication Sample Number of 
countries 
Dimensions confirmed 
Hoppe (1990) Social elites 18 Power Distance Index 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Masculinity 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Shane (1995) Employees of six 
multinational 
corporations 
28 Power Distance Index 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Merritt (2000) Commercial pilots 19 Power Distance Index 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Masculinity 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
De Mooij (2004) Consumers 15 Individualism/Collectivism 
Masculinity 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
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Mouritzen and Svara 
(2002) 
Municipal 
employees 
14 Power Distance Index 
Masculinity 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
Van Nimwegen (2002) Employees of one 
international banks 
19 Power Distance Index 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Masculinity 
Source: Adapted from Hofstede (2010), table 2.1, p. 35. 
These studies provide compelling support for Hofstede’s dimensions. First, two of the six 
studies confirmed each of the four original dimensions, while all the remaining four 
confirmed three out of four. Of the four dimensions studied, each has been confirmed in five 
of the six replications. Second, these results are even more convincing if one takes into 
account that the samples were very different from the original IBM study, and that the surveys 
were carried out between 20 to 30 years after Hofstede’s. Taken together, this suggests 
Hofstede’s results are valid across different samples and time periods (Hofstede, 2010). Based 
on 19 smaller scale replications, Sondergaard (1994) concluded that taken together they 
further corroborated the original four dimensions.   
Another form of validation extensively referred to by Hofstede (2001, 2010) is correlating the 
dimensional scores to numerous independent variables, where such a relationship is 
theoretically warranted, from many different domains of human behavior across decades and 
different samples from several continents. Thus the hundreds of empirical studies showing 
evidence of hypothesized relationships between one or more of the Hofstede dimensions and 
independent variables from several disciplines and research fields provide further validation. 
Our dissertation can also be taken as one more such confirmation. Vas et al. (2010) perform a 
meta-analysis of 598 papers applying Hofstede’s framework. Based on their results, while 
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they also recommend expanding empirical analysis besides dimensionalism, they find 
Hofstede’s dimensions are still relevant and they recommend their use.   
3.3.2 Schwartz’s model 
Schwartz’s framework is more recent than that of Hofstede; therefore, built on, and expanded 
the cross-cultural paradigm started by the work of Hofstede. Schwartz, similar to Hofstede, 
looked at values to study the dimensions of culture. According to him values are “desirable 
goals, varying in importance, that serve as a guiding principle in people’s lives”. (Schwartz 
1994, p. 88.) As Hofstede, Schwartz also focuses on countries as units of national culture. 
Schwartz surveyed middle school teachers between 1988 and 1992 in the countries included 
in his sample assuming such a group to be representative of cultural values, partly as the 
group is actively involved in the transmission of culture within society. Surveying a closely 
matched group allowed him to assume that value differences represented differences in 
national culture. According to Licht et al. (2007), Schwartz’s framework is more advanced 
than that of Hofstede, as cross-cultural meaning equivalence of the survey used to measure 
values was deliberately assured, whereas in Hofstede’s work there has been no attempt to 
ensure such equivalence. Schwartz identified six main value types at the cultural level, 
condensed into two overall dimensions (Licht et al., 2005).  Figure 3.3. shows the value types 
defined by Schwartz as well as the relationship between them.  
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Figure 3.3. Schwartz’s value types and dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chui et al. (2002)  
 
Schwartz’s six value types are: Autonomy, Conservatism, Hierarchy, Egalitarian 
Commitment, Mastery, Harmony with Nature. He further divided the Autonomy value type 
into two subcategories, which are Intellectual Autonomy described by values such as “curious 
and creative” and Affective Autonomy which is related to “enjoying life”. The value types are 
arranged along two dimensions representing opposing orientations: Autonomy opposes 
Conservatism and Hierarchy and Mastery opposed Egalitarian Commitment and Harmony 
(Schwartz, 1994, Johnson and Lenartowicz, 1998). 
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Some of the more relevant values associated with each dimension are the followings: 
Embededness values: interests of individual are not seen as separate from interests of the 
group. Important values are: security, conformity, social order, respect for tradition. 
Membership is part of an individual’s meaning (Chui et al. 2002; Licht et al., 2005,2007).  
Harmony values: no conflict, no use of power to acquire private benefit, world of beauty, 
unity with nature, stability (Chui et al. 2002; Licht et al., 2005,2007) 
Hierarchy values: legitimacy and importance of hierarchy and privileges, wealth, social 
power, authority, influence (Chui et al. 2002; Licht et al., 2005,2007) 
Autonomy values: individual pursues his/her own interests. Important values are self- 
direction, stimulation, enjoyment, and freedom. (Chui et al. 2002; Licht et al., 2005,2007) 
Egalitarian values: social justice, equality, concern for welfare of others, responsibility (Chui 
et al. 2002; Licht et al., 2005,2007) 
Mastery values: self-assertion, active control, competition, independence, being successful, 
and legitimizes self-promotion even at expense of others (Chui et al. 2002; Licht et al., 
2005,2007) 
Autonomy and Conservatism are similar to Hofstede’s Individualism and Collectivism, but 
while Hofstede determines his values based on individuals’ goals, Schwartz emphasizes 
individuals’ role in the society, and goals are included in the Mastery and Harmony pole 
(Licht et al., 2005, 2007). Hierarchy reflects the values “social power”, “wealth” and “authority” 
and emphasizes the legitimacy of social roles and resource allocation; it differs from 
Conservatism in that it is concerned with the use of power to promote individual versus group 
interests. “Taken together as one pole on the culture-level dimension, Mastery and Hierarchy 
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reflect a concern for individual self-enhancement through the pursuit of individual goals. In 
contrast group goals are reflected by the Egalitarian Commitment and Harmony with Nature value 
types.” (Johnson and Lenartowicz, 1998, p. 335-336.)  
Schwartz’s Autonomy and Egalitarianism (consequently the other poles, Conservatism, 
Hierarchy as well) value types and Hofstede’s Individualism and Power Distance dimensions 
are correlated with coefficients between 0.38 and 0.63 (Johnson and Lenartowicz, 1998; 
Schwartz, 2006). According to Johnson and Lenartowicz (1998) Schwartz’s values form a 
valid alternative approach to Hofstede’s seminal work. They praise Schwartz for explicitly 
separating individuals’ goals and role in society, which is bundled together in the single 
individualism and collectivism dimension of Hofstede.  
3.3.3 The GLOBE Project 
GLOBE is an acronym, which stands for “Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness Research Program” (House et al., 2004). House et al. (2004) stresses that 
culture exerts its influence both directly on several levels (eg: conscious, unconscious) on 
most human activities, and indirectly as a moderator of other relationships. Despite a long and 
a prolific research tradition, the authors claim “we are just beginning to understand how 
culture influences leadership and organizational processes” (House et al. 2004, p. 9.). The 
GLOBE study, defined as objective to further the understanding of how, and if at all, national 
culture, organizational culture, and leadership are interconnected (House et al., 2004). 
The project started in 1991 and was designed in several phases. The two of the latest phases 
culminated in the publications of two volumes studying the overall interconnectedness of 
national culture, organizational culture, and leadership in 62 societies, and a detailed study 
and in-depth description of leadership in 25 societies: House et al. (2004), and Chokar et al. 
(2007) respectively. Final data was gathered in 1997, by a team of 172 researchers from a 
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sample of 17.300 middle managers working in 951 local companies in 62 societies (House et 
al. 2004). Both data collection and statistical analysis was theory driven, and similar to 
Schwartz, cross-cultural meaning equivalence was deliberately ensured, thus overcoming 
some of the shortcomings often cited against the Hofstede model. By using middle managers, 
the GLOBE study achieved closely matched samples across societies. As we have described 
above, Schwartz used middle school teachers to achieve the same objective, and Hofstede 
argued that his sample of IBM workers in each country also fulfills this criteria. While middle 
managers are arguably less representative members of societies than school teachers used by 
Schwartz, as we are attempting to understand culture’s possible influence on managerial 
decision making, the sample seems relevant to our research question.  
3.3.3.1 Contributions 
GLOBE defined culture as “shared motives, values, believes, identities, and interpretations or 
meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of 
collectives that are transmitted across generations” (House et al., 2004, p. 15). The central 
elements of being shared, enduring nature, focus on values, believes and interpretations are 
similar to the definitions used by Hofstede and Schwartz. Despite this similarity, the 
contributions of GLOBE to existing literature are extensive. First, the project theoretically 
argued and empirically documented the relationship between national culture, organizational 
culture and leadership (House et al., 2004). House et al. (2004) eloquently states that 
“management is not “culture free”, it is “culture specific”, claiming that “leadership is 
culturally contingent” (House et al., 2004, p. 5). Second, they constructed a new 
comprehensive dimensionalist model with nine separate dimensions. Finally their dimensions 
are based on relatively recent survey data, especially compared to that of Hofstede. 
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3.3.3.2 Dimensions 
The GLOBE team also created a new dimensional structure. A problem well-known in cross-
cultural psychology about collecting data on cultural values is that individuals responding to 
surveys may communicate what they believe they should want or prefer, and not what they do 
want or prefer. This problem was also addressed by Hofstede (2001), who warns that survey 
instruments should be constructed and results interpreted by researchers to capture the 
“desired” and not the “desirable”. House et al. (2004) intended to measure both, thus they 
developed two separate sets of dimensions it called Cultural Values and Cultural Practices. 
They explain Cultural Values as “What should be”, and Cultural Practices as “What is” 
(House et al, 2004, p. 16). Furthermore, the GLOBE team designed their survey to directly 
examine the relationship between societal-, and organizational cultural values and practices. 
To collect the necessary data, they included each question in four versions separately referring 
to Cultural Values, Cultural Practices, Organizational Values, and Organizational Practices. 
Their empirical results confirmed the contention of Cross-Cultural Psychology and New 
Institutional Economics that organizational values and practices are nested in, and influenced 
by societal values and practices.   
Based on their surveys, House et al. (2004) constructed a model consisting of nine dimensions 
each with separate Cultural Value and Cultural Practice scores. GLOBE based the theoretical 
foundations of its framework in existing cultural models. Several of its dimensions had their 
roots in, or were intended to replicate, Hofstede’s work (House et al. 2004). House et al. 
(2004) separated Hofstede’s Masculinity/Femininity and Individualism/Collectivism 
dimensions into Assertiveness and Gender Egalitarianism for the former, and Institutional-, 
and In-group Collectivism for the latter as he argued Hofstede’s dimensions included 
theoretically separate concepts. Figure 3.4 shows the nine dimensions, and the theoretical, and 
originally envisaged, relationship between the GLOBE and Hofstede’s dimensions.  
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A list of these dimensions and their brief definitions is the following: 
1) Power distance – “degree to which members of a collective expect power to be 
distributed equally” (House et al., 2004, p. 30)  
2) Uncertainty avoidance – “the extent to which a society, organization, or group relies 
on social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate unpredictability of future events.” 
(House et al., 2004, p. 30)  
3) Humane Orientation – “is the degree to which a collective encourages and rewards 
individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others” (House et al., 
2004, p. 30) 
4) Institutional collectivism – “degree to which organizational or societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective 
action” (House et al., 2004, p. 30) 
5) In-Group Collectivism – “the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and 
cohesiveness in their organizations or families” (House et al., 2004, p. 30).  
6) Assertiveness – “is the degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and 
aggressive in their relationships with others” (House et al., 2004, p. 30) 
7) Gender Egalitarianism – “is the degree to which a collective minimizes gender 
inequality”. (House et al., 2004, p. 30) 
8) Future Orientation – “the extent to which individuals engage in future-oriented 
behaviors such as delaying gratification, planning, and investing in the future.” (House 
et al., 2004, p. 30) 
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9) Performance Orientation – “is the degree to which a collective encourages and 
rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence” (House et al., 
2004, p. 30) 
Figure 3.4. Theoretical relationship between the GLOBE and the Hofstede cultural 
dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from House et al., 2004 
An unexpected characteristic of the GLOBE dimensions is that there is a negative correlation 
between Cultural Values and Cultural Practices for seven out of the nine dimensions. 
Specifically, such negative correlation is observed for Power Distance, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Humane Orientation, In-group Collectivism, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, 
and Performance Orientation.  
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Such a relationship is puzzling, and there are various attempts in the literature trying to 
explain it. Possible reasons advanced among others include the formulation of the questions 
not being appropriate to capture cultural values or practices (Hofstede et al. ,2006; Vas et al., 
2010b), diminishing utility of practices implying that the more of a certain practice a society 
has, the less it values it on the margin (Maseland and von Hoorn, 2009), anchoring effect of 
posing questions of practices first followed by values (Vas et al., 2010b), or that people who 
actually want more of a given value perceive the related practices wanting and vice versa 
(Hofstede, 2006, 2010). This last argument was also proposed by House et al. (2004) 
themselves. To us, this explanations proposed by the GLOBE team weaken the applicability 
of their structure of the separation of values from practices. If they are right in assuming that 
those who want more of something perceive having less of it, it implies their results on 
cultural practices are subjective and contingent on the cultural value orientations. In other 
words, their measure of Cultural Practices do not indicate what actual practices are, rather 
how members of society view such practices compared to their Cultural Values. If that is true, 
in our opinion, starting from dimensions measuring cultural value orientations is more 
informative. Further, House et al. (2004) posits that “people may hold views on what should 
be based on what they observe in action” (House at al., 2004, p. 732). This can be interpreted 
as it is Cultural Practices which drive Cultural Values. Such a view presents a structure 
opposite to the predictions of the Value-Belief Theory underlying much of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, also identified as one of the theories underlying the GLOBE Project itself, and 
supported by an extensive empirical literature. This aspect of GLOBE’s results is one of the 
most questioned, and the related debate is still ongoing.    
3.3.3.3 Validation 
The primary validation to the GLOBE model is the fact that is based on extensive theoretical 
research. The instrument used for data collection and the constructs themselves are all 
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grounded in theory. In addition, House et al. (2004) refers to an extensive list of empirical 
correlation between GLOBE dimensions and numerous independent variables such as the 
United Nations’ Human Development Index, Global Competitiveness Rankings, and data 
from the World Values Survey among other independent multi-national databases in ways 
that confirm theoretically established relationships. In an approach similar to that of Hofstede, 
GLOBE views this as external validation of their results. What makes the support provided by 
these results somewhat less strong is the fact that some of the correlations are established to 
Cultural Values, while others to Cultural Practices, and it is not always evident why one or the 
other should be related to the given variable. In empirical literature researching culture’s 
influence on a wide range of outcomes, besides Hofstede’s model, which is applied the most 
by far (Warner-Soderholm, 2012; Vas et al., 2010), the GLOBE dimensions represent the 
latest comprehensive dimenionsalist model, and are also used extensively (Dorfman, et al., 
2012). Although House et al. (2004) referring to their theoretical foundations and statistical 
methods repeatedly claims that the GLOBE model is methodologically more advanced than 
that of Hofstede, Vas et al. (2010) claiming that both modes have their strengths and 
weaknesses, were not able to substantiate that claim. 
3.4 Criticisms 
While extensively applied in literature, several criticisms have been leveled against the 
approach in general, as well as the Hofstede and GLOBE models specifically. As 
dimensionalism is so much dominated by the Hofstede framework, much of the criticism 
aimed at Hofstede is actually targeting elements shared by the other models as well. Below 
we summarize the most relevant contentions raised as well as some related responses.  
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3.4.1 Criticisms of dimensionalism 
Level of analysis: Among others McSwweney (2002) and Bakerswille (2003) contend that the 
nation is not an appropriate level of cultural analysis. Two fundamental arguments are 
presented against the concept of “national culture” (Reuter, 2011). First, culture is a societal 
phenomenon, and national borders often do not reflect societal ones. Second, cultures are not 
homogenous, and national-level aggregation ignores existing subcultures, or layers of culture. 
Reuter (2011) highlights that within-nation cultural variations could be substantial, which is 
completely ignored by “national culture”. Hofstede (2010) himself accepts the existence of 
subcultures. He identifies regions, religions, and ethnicity as significant drivers of cultural 
differences within a nation. Reuter (2011) goes further proposing several other types of 
cultural layers related to activity, such as “corporate culture”, “civil service culture”, “public 
fund culture”, “business culture”, and “finance culture” (Reuter et al., 2011 p. 118-127).  
Hofstede (2010) agrees that differences arising from subcultures should be studied and that 
they provide interesting venues for further research. However, most of the data required for 
validation of the results of large scale international studies is only available for nations, as 
many independent socio-, economic-, and demographic variables are aggregated at this level. 
Moreover, he points to national institutions such as “common language, mass media, 
educational system, army, political system, sports, national markets for certain products, 
services” as “forces for cultural integration” resulting in the emergence of a dominant culture 
within a country (Hofstede, 2010, p. 20).  
Discussing intra-nation cultural variability, Smith and Schwartz (1997) point out that “within-
nation” variability has been shown to be much lower than “between-nation” variability. 
Lawler et al. (2008) note that several layers of cultures co-exist. They specifically mention 
company-, organizational-, and professional cultures as examples, influencing behavior. 
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Nevertheless, they find national culture to be the most relevant layer to international human 
resource management. The extensive validation of the dimensionalist models through 
established relationship between existing national cultural value dimensions and independent 
variables provide further support for “national culture”. 
Dimensions are oversimplifications and overly broad constructs: McSweeney (2002) qualifies 
dimensionalism as oversimplification ignoring the multi-aspect nature of culture. Bakerswille 
(2003) adds that culture is a complex phenomenon, which should not be decomposed into its 
components questioning the feasibility of meaningfully quantifying culture. Another often 
repeated criticism is that cultural dimensions are formulated to reflect orientations much 
broader than could be justified by the survey items from which they were constructed (Reuter, 
2011).  
Breuer et al. (2014) also conjectures that cultural value dimensions are too broad to be useful 
as predictors of specific behavior. They call for researchers to narrow down the mechanisms 
through which culture exerts its influence, and to identify behavioral variables closely 
connected to those mechanisms. Studying the cultural influence on dividend policy, they 
successfully link it to the behavioral traits of loss aversion, ambiguity aversion and patience. 
When included in their model together with related cultural dimensions, their results show 
that the behavioral traits are more significantly related to dividend policy in their sample than 
the dimension scores. However, they note that cultural value dimensions still retain 
significance suggesting a relationship going beyond the traits identified by the authors. 
Hofstede (2010) and House et al. (2004) rely on extensive references from literature providing 
strong theoretical and conceptual rationale behind dimensions. Further, explaining the 
constructs, Hofstede (2010) states that dimensions may combine values which are not 
logically related, but they “empirically found to occur in combination” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 
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31). Thus, dimensions group values which may be connected by the fact that societies 
showing preference (or dislike) for some have a strong tendency to do so for the others as 
well.   
As we have already described in the preceding subsection, both Hofstede (2010) and House et 
al. (2004) refer to the several empirical studies successfully linking cultural dimensions to 
various variables as validation of the constructs. Kirkman et al. (2006) echoes this argument 
writing that Hofstede’s dimensions “are related to the aggregate management practices and 
beliefs of nations” (Kirkman et al., 2006, p. 302). Examining the usefulness of Hofstede’s 
dimensions based on a meta-analysis of 598 papers relying on his framework, Vas et al. 
(2010) find that while personality traits and some demographic variables are somewhat better 
predictors for certain behavioral outcomes than cultural value dimensions, overall they have 
comparable predictive power. They assert that cultural value dimensions are “most strongly 
related to emotions, followed by attitudes, then behaviors” (Vas et al., 2010, p. 405). In our 
opinion it is worth noting how this order is exactly the same as predicted by the Values, 
Attitudes, Behavior Hierarchy model of Homer and Kahle (1988), and closely related to the 
Value-Belief Theory underlying dimensionalism. For predicting behaviors, their results show 
that cultural value dimensions perform better than personality and demographic variables with 
only mental ability exceeding their predictive power. They conclude that values are 
fundamental elements of culture. Nevertheless, it is important to note, that both Vas et al. 
(2010) and Reuter (2011) believe that scholars should explore other aspects of culture as well.    
Values do not always determine practices: Attempting to explain the negative correlation 
between GLOBE’s Cultural Values and Cultural Practices, Vas et al. (2010b) argues that 
cultural values may not always determine cultural practices. They hypothesize that such is 
possible when cultural values are not yet “internalized” by individuals closely following 
“dramatic cultural shifts” (Vas et al., 2010b, p. 1333). Successfully questioning the Value-
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Belief Theory would in effect weaken the dimensionalist approach considerably, as it is based 
on the identification and grouping of values with the assumption that they are the fundamental 
determinants of behavior. If that is not the case, conclusion drawn based on value differences 
would have to be questioned as well. However, in our view the proposition of Vas et al. 
(2010b) does not question the causal hierarchy proposed by the Value-Belief Theory as 
explained by Hofstede (2001) and House at. (2004). It merely presents a situation, which by 
virtue of the extreme stability of cultural values, is overwhelmingly the exception and not the 
rule. 
Self-report surveys: McSweeney (2002) advanced that relying on self-report surveys may bias 
results. Such a bias could be introduced as answers respondents give on a survey may not be 
honest, or answers on a survey may fall closer to the “desirable” as respondents wish to give 
the “right” answers, while real-life actions will be guided by the “desired”. As we have 
already described above, both Hofstede and the GLOBE team are aware of this problem, and 
they both addressed it in a different manner. GLOBE attempted to measure the “desirable” 
separate from the “desired” to identify Cultural Values and Practices respectively. Whether 
they succeeded is open to debate. Hofstede focuses on specifying the survey instrument to 
minimize such a bias although he warns that it cannot be completely removed. Accordingly, 
in his response to McSweeny, Hofstede (2002) points out that while self-response surveys are 
useful in collecting cultural data, culture should be studied applying other methods as well.  
3.4.2 Criticisms of Hofstede’s model 
Old data: The data used for three cultural frameworks briefly introduced above were collected 
in subsequent time periods. Hofstede’s data dates back over 40 years, and among others 
question whether the data is still valid (Kirkman et al., 2006). While to our knowledge this 
criticism has only been leveled at Hofstede, it will be clearly relevant for dimensionalism as 
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whole with the passage of time. The data of Schwartz is dated approximately 20-25 years, and 
the GLOBE data was collected 18 years ago.  
According to Hofstede (2001) meaningful changes in culture occur in centuries. This is due to 
culture being shared by people in their “mental programming”, and to its transmission across 
the generation through societal institutions, whereby societal institutions represent and protect 
societal values in which they are rooted. As proposed by for example Berry et al. 1992, 
national culture is so ingrained in the day to day lives of people, it is very resistant to change.  
Williamson (2000) in his discussion of social institutions describes a model where culture 
influences all other aspects of society. This opinion is echoed as expressed by Hofstede et al. 
(2002) as quoted in the previous chapter of this dissertation. Williamson posits, that at the 
level of “embededness”, that of culture, changes happen in every 100 to a 1000 years 
supporting Hofstede’s position. Inglehart and Baker (2000) argue that changes in national 
cultures are path dependent and not guided by convergence. They claim that although scores 
of cultural dimensions may have changed since they were first identified, baring extreme 
events affecting certain societies, their positions relative to each other remain fairly stable. It 
is the relative cultural scores, as opposed to the absolute values, that are used in cross-cultural 
analysis (Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Licht et al. (2005) agrees with the path 
dependence view of culture proposed by Inglehart and Baker (2000).  
Hofstede (2010) notes “there is no evidence that the values of present-day generations from 
different cultures are converging” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 19). The results of Schwartz et al. 
(2000) lend support to this argument. Studying cultural values in Eastern Europe following 
the fall of the Soviet bloc, the authors found no major cultural changes despite fundamental 
changes in political and economic system and the accompanying economic struggles. 
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One could argue that the influence of globalization could have affected countries to a different 
degree; thus, lowering the validity of Hofstede’s country scores. Guillén (2001) defines 
globalization “as a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual awareness 
(reflexivity) among economic, political, and social units in the world, and among actors in 
general” (Guillén, 2001, p. 236.). Reviewing various strands of literature concerning the 
effects of globalization, Guillén (2001) finds that while the evidence supports the existence of 
globalization, national, political, cultural and organizational diversity is resilient to its effects. 
He adds that globalization may even push certain aspects of national cultures further apart in a 
response to perceived threat to national identity. 
Through a review of hundreds of studies, specifically addressing whether Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension scores should still be applied by researchers both Kirkman et al. (2006) and Vas et 
al. (2010), recommend their continued application. The continued validity of the dimensions 
is further supported by numerous recent empirical studies, some of which are extensively 
referenced in this dissertation, linking behavior from the years 2000s and 2010s to Hofstede’s 
dimensional scores.    
Wrong sample: Hofstede if often criticized (Reuter, 2011, McSweeney, 2002) for having 
collected his data from subsidiaries of one multinational company (IBM.) His critics claim 
that employees of IBM cannot be viewed as fully representative of their societies; thus, 
contrasting his sample with that of Schwartz (middle-school teachers across cultures), and that 
of the GLOBE Project (managers across over 900 local organizations), they conjecture that 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions may not be generalizable. Hofstede (2002, 2010) argues that 
his sample is ideally suited for measuring cultural differences. Surveying employees of the 
same organization working in similar professions creates a well-matched sample controlling 
for organizational-, industry-, and occupational differences, so more of the differences found 
in value orientation can be attributed to culture. He also points to the successful replications 
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of his dimensions discussed earlier this chapter, as well as the established empirical 
relationships to various outcomes as indications of the validity of his data (Hofstede, 2010).   
Not enough cultural value dimensions: Critics, such as McSweeney (2002) assert that 
Hofstede’s model is attempting to portray an overly simplistic view of culture distilling it 
down to a very restricted number of orientations. Schwartz (1994) also speculated that 
Hofstede may have not examined all the relevant aspects of culture. Hofstede (2001, 2010) 
does not claim with absolute certainty that his model can be regarded as a complete portrayal 
of culture. He specifies that any cultural dimensions added need to represent a fundamental 
societal challenge not included in the present model, thus it needs to be conceptually new, and 
it should be statistically independent of existing dimensions. For a new dimension to be added 
it also has to be useful for analysis (Hofstede, 2010). The fact that his original four dimension 
model from 1980 has been expanded to five in 1988 and to six in 2010 evidences his 
continued effort to improve the framework, while that it took 30 years to add two dimensions 
indicates the complexity of the endeavor.     
As we have described in the corresponding section, the GLOBE model decomposes culture 
into nine dimensions all separately measured for Cultural Values and Cultural Practices 
resulting in 18 scores for each culture. Based on factor analysis of the resulting 18 
dimensions, Hofstede identified five factors, all of which were either “significantly 
correlated” with one of his dimensions (Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Long-Term Orientation), with national wealth, or related to elements 
of his Masculinity/Femininity dimension (Hofstede, 2010). Therefore, he claims, the GLOBE 
dimensions do not represent significantly new aspects of culture. Triandis (2004) lends 
support to Hofstede’s model. He expresses an opinion that it is comprehensive in 
characterizing values, stating that “each of the important dimensions of cultural variables have 
been uncovered by Hofstede” (Triandis, 2004, p. 93). Such a statement is quite powerful after 
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the main results and 18 dimensions of the GLOBE Project have already been published. 
While we appreciate Hofstede’s analysis of the relationship between his dimensions and those 
of GLOBE, in our opinion these results should not be interpreted as the GLOBE dimensions 
not contributing to a better understanding of culture. One must not forget that both models 
attempt to characterize the same phenomenon. It may just mean they describe the same 
culture along a different perspective, which may be useful to study relationships where 
culture’s influence corresponds better to that structure.  
Methodology: Hofstede’s study was opportunistic in the sense that he took advantage of data 
available from an internal corporate survey. Hofstede’s dimensions emerged from the data 
and not first theorized followed by empirical testing. MsCweeney (2002), House et al. (2004), 
and Javiadan et al. (2006) claim that neither the underlying constructs not the instrument used 
for data collection were not theory driven especially developed to study cultural differences. 
This is in sharp contrast with the Schwartz and GLBOE models, where the constructs were 
first identified based on theory, the instruments were specifically designed to verify those 
constructs. Undoubtedly, due to the opportunistic nature and the fact that it was breaking new 
ground, Hofstede’s methodology is less sophisticated than that of Schwartz and GLOBE. 
Nevertheless, Kirkman et al. (2006) ask: “Perhaps the most pertinent question we should ask 
after conducting a comprehensive review is: should Hofstede’s cultural values framework 
continue to be used for cross-cultural research in the 21st century?”, and they conclude 
“overall, Hofstede’s values are clearly relevant for additional cross-cultural research” 
(Kirkman et al, 2006, p. 307-308), a conclusion shared by Vas, et al (2010).  
3.4.3 Criticisms of the GLOBE model 
The GLOBE project is the most recent, and structurally the most complex of the 
dimensionalist models. As such, building on the major frameworks predating it, it is 
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theoretically well-founded and is applying sophisticated statistical techniques for empirical 
analysis (House et al. 2004). After the model’s publication a major debate started between the 
GLOBE team and Hofstede with scholars supporting one or the other joining in. The debate, 
reviewed in a very concise manner by Shi and Wang (2011) and Warner-Soderholm (2012), is 
not closed yet although its intensity is much abated.  
Too complex questions: Hofstede (2006) claims that the questions of the GLOBE survey were 
too complex, and too abstract. They often referred to complex and general concepts that 
possibly caused respondents to not fully understand what they were asked to evaluate. He 
argues that the questions reflected the GLOBE team’s concepts and constructs and not those 
of the respondents. This, he continues, resulted in respondents’ answers not being 
representative of their own value orientations biasing results. Smith (2006) also highlights that 
while Hofstede was asking respondents about themselves, the GLOBE team asked them about 
how they perceive practices and values of others. This assumes, agrees Vas et al. (2010), that 
they are well informed on the subject, and their answers may be biased by their individual 
motives and “subjective references”. 
Too complex model: As part of the debate between Hofstede and the GLOBE team, Smith 
(2006) argues that the GLOBE model with its 18 dimensions (including Cultural Practices and 
Values) is too complex to be useful. As a counterargument, partisans of the GLOBE 
framework claim that the Hofstede model is too simplistic to be useful. Hofstede (2010) 
emphasizes that dimensions are constructs with the objective of helping researchers and 
practitioners better grasp and study culture, which itself is immensely complicated and 
multifaceted. Thus, dimensions are there to simplify it. If a framework becomes too complex 
it loses usefulness. The arguments presented here are the same as we already discussed when 
reviewing the criticism of Hofstede for having too few dimensions. In a related subject, 
Hofstede also criticizes House at al. (2004) for using the same survey items to measure 
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societal culture and organizational culture. Referring to the findings of Hofstede et al. (1990), 
he states that organizational culture is a completely different phenomenon with unalike 
characteristics, which cannot be understood through the same model as societal culture.  
US centered instrument: Hofstede (2010) criticize the GLOBE survey as being US centered. 
Graen (2006) also claims that the survey design, despite contrary claims of House et al. 
(2004) is not culturally decentered. It is worthwhile to note that the same criticism is also 
levelled at Hofstede’s survey instrument by McSweeney (2002), who points to the fact that it 
was developed by IBM, a US multinational company. Both Hofstede and the GLOBE team 
strongly defend their own instruments claiming their methodology removed such cultural 
biases; nevertheless, one can safely conclude that it is impossible to fully remove cultural bias 
from surveys. 
3.4.4 Criticisms - conclusion 
Based on our brief review we can draw some general conclusions. First, dimensionalism has 
numerous limitations resulting from the basic assumptions and methods of the approach. 
These limitations have to be taken into account when interpreting dimensionalist results. 
Second, none of the models are without fault, and as Warner-Soderholm (2012) emphasizes 
the Hofstede/GLOBE debate highlighted that there is no clearly superior model of culture, 
each have their advantages and weaknesses. Relatedly, Minkov (2011) suggests none can be 
viewed as absolute measures of national culture. Third, whenever applying cultural value 
dimensions, it is important for the researchers to establish the theoretical relationships 
between specific aspects of culture and the outcome studied including specific 
mechanisms at work. This is necessary to avoid simply finding possibly meaningless 
correlations, as Zingales (2015) warned against most recently. While dimensionalism should 
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not be the only operationalization of culture in future financial research, it is a valid approach 
that contributes to further understanding the influence of culture in financial decision making.  
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Chapter IV. 
Overinvestment and Culture 
In chapter II, we have described the central view of cross-cultural psychology on values being 
the fundamental components of culture that determine human behavior. In this chapter we 
present how this is relevant to overinvestment, arguing that cultural values affect both human 
motivations: agency conflicts and overconfidence. First, we point out that as culture’s 
influence on tools used to mitigate overinvestment has been already ascertained, an indirect 
influence, through affecting the opportunity for management to overinvest, on overinvestment 
can be established. Second, we identify a gap in literature, as it focuses on factors that 
determine the opportunity to engage in agency motivated overinvestment while not examining 
determinants of the managerial decision. Third, referring to the Value-Belief Theory, we 
explain how value orientations specifically determine management’s decision leading to 
overinvestment. Finally, we propose empirically testable hypotheses relying on the 
dimensionalist framework we have introduced in chapter III, to verify our theoretical 
reasoning.   
4.1 Culture influences opportunity to overinvest – indirect cultural influence of 
overinvestment 
Culture’s dual influence on overinvestment is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Potential overinvestor 
companies share certain characteristics, such as low-quality investment opportunities, and 
access to resources to invest. This is because when management has value-increasing projects 
to pursue it likely chooses those over value-decreasing ones, and when it does not have access 
to resources to commit it cannot overinvest. The aforementioned financial characteristics, 
together with the presence or absence of control mechanisms to mitigate overinvestment, 
shape whether management has the opportunity to overinvest. Control mechanisms include 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 126. 
 
the institutional environment in which companies operate in a given country (such as the legal 
system, market for corporate control, and corporate governance regime), and corporate 
financial policies determining a company’s capital structure and disbursements to 
shareholders. As we have already shown in chapter II of this dissertation, national legal, 
economic, and financial institutions are embedded in culture within a society, and that there is 
strong evidence in literature that each of the company-level control mechanisms are 
influenced by culture. Table 4.1 shows some recent empirical papers demonstrating these 
relationships together with the cultural model used, and the cultural dimensions that were 
found to have a significant effect.  
Table 4.1 Empirical literature supporting culture’s influence on mechanisms used to mitigate 
overinvestment 
Study Cultural model Area of financial 
decision making 
Confirmed 
relationships 
Aggarwal and Goodell 
(2014) 
Hofstede Capital markets - 
access to capital 
UAI, MAS 
Aggarwal and Goodell 
(2009) 
Hofstede Capital markets – 
stock vs. bank based 
financial system 
UAI 
Chakrabarty (2009) Hofstede Corporate governance 
- Ownership structure 
IDV, PDI 
Li and Harrison (2008) Hofstede Corporate governance 
- Structure of boards 
IDV, PDI , UAI, 
MAS  
Licht et al. (2005) Hofstede, 
Schwartz 
 
 
Corporate governance 
– investor protection 
Mastery, IDV, UAI 
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Breuer et al. (2014) Data from 
INTRA survey, 
GLOBE, 
Hofstede, 
Schwartz 
Dividend policy MAS, LTO  
Behavioral trait 
variables 
Bae et al. (2012) 
 
Hofstede Dividend policy UAI, MAS, LTO 
 
Fidrmuc and Jacob 
(2010) 
Hofstede, 
Schwartz 
Dividend policy IDV, PDI, UAI, 
Autonomy, 
Hierarchy 
Shao et al. (2010) Schwartz Dividend policy Conservatism, 
Mastery 
Wang and Esqueda 
(2014) 
Hofstede Capital structure – 
leverage 
IDV, PDI, UAI, 
MAS, LTO, IVR 
Antonczyk and 
Salzmann (2014) 
GLOBE Capital structure – 
leverage 
COL1 
Zheng et al. (2012) Hofstede, 
Schwartz 
Capital structure – 
debt maturity 
IDV, PDI, UAI, 
MAS, 
Conservatism, 
Hierarchy 
Chang et al. (2012) Hofstede Capital structure – 
debt maturity 
 
UAI, MAS, LTO 
Chui et al. (2002) Schwartz Capital structure – 
leverage 
Conservatism, 
Mastery 
Chen, Y., et al. (2015) Hofstede, 
GLOBE 
Corporate cash 
holding 
IDV, UAI, COL1, 
UAIN 
Ramirez and Tadesse 
(2009) 
Hofstede, 
GLOBE 
Corporate cash 
holding 
UAI 
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Chang and Noorbakhsh 
(2009) 
Hofstede Corporate cash 
holding 
UAI, MAS, LTO 
 
 
 
Ferris et al. (2013) Hofstede Overconfidence, 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
IDV, LTO 
UAI – Uncertainty Avoidance index (Hofstede), PDI – Power Distance (Hofstede), IDV –
(Individualism/Collectivism (Hofstede), MAS – Masculinity/Femininity (Hofstede), LTO – 
Long-Term Orientation (Hofstede), COL1 – Institutional Collectivism (GLOBE), COL2 – In-
group Collectivism (GLOBE) 
Taken together, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the opportunity for management to 
overinvest is clearly influenced by culture. Thus we can infer that an indirect influence of 
culture on overinvestment can already be established. This link is illustrated by the oval shape 
in the top left corner of Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Culture’s influence on overinvestment 
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4.2 Culture influences decision leading to overinvestment – direct cultural influence on 
overinvestment 
4.2.1 A gap in extant literature 
Two behavioral motivations have been identified for overinvestment: agency conflict and 
overconfidence. While the literature on overconfidence and overinvestment studies one of 
these motivations, with regards to agency related overinvestment, extant literature tends to 
focus on financial characteristics and control mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. 
However, such factors influence the act of overinvestment only indirectly through affecting 
the opportunity to overinvest. The majority of empirical research could be viewed as directly 
studying the phenomenon of overinvestment exclusively, if one assumed management always 
overinvests if there is an opportunity to do so. We hypothesize that this is not the case. As 
suggested, among others, by Zheng et al. (2012), in addition to the indirect influence through 
molding the institutional environment, culture also has a direct impact on the behavior of 
economic actors. We posit that culture exerts a more direct influence on overinvestment in 
affecting management’s decisions to move from the opportunity to the act of overinvestment. 
This is illustrated by the oval towards the middle in Figure 4.1.  
4.2.2 The mechanism of cultural influence 
Kirkman et al. (2006), Vas et al. (2010), and Reuter (2011) all call for any assertion of a 
relationship between culture and another phenomenon to identify and explain the theoretical 
rationale and mechanisms through which culture exercises the hypothesized influence. This 
dissertation relies on the Vale-Belief Theory, describing the impact of values on behavior, to 
posit a link between specific national cultural orientations and management’s tendency to 
make decisions leading to overinvestment. As we have presented in chapter III,, Licht (2001) 
expresses the fundamental role played by values: values “are beliefs […] infused with 
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feelings”, “refer to desirable goals […] and modes of conduct that promote these goals“, 
“transcend specific actions and situations”, “serve as standards to guide the selection or 
evaluation of behavior, people, events” (p. 168-169). Summarizing, Licht et al. (2005) state 
that cultural values determine what is seen as good, bad, acceptable or unacceptable in a 
society. Hofstede et al. (2002) claim in a similar argument, that ethics is a question of culture. 
These characteristics of cultural values directly apply to the management’s decision leading to 
overinvest. Values determine, for example, whether management’s personal and professional 
objectives are compatible with overinvestment, whether overinvesting is seen by others as a 
legitimate mean to pursue these objectives, the likely outcome if management is noted to 
engage in overinvestment, and whether management is willing to risk that outcome.  Culture 
provides both motivation, and also constrains through what is respected and accepted 
behavior in a society.  
Licht (2001, 2008) and Licht et al. (2005) describe the mechanism through which values exert 
a direct influence on behavior. Through shaping norms, perceptions, desires, and evaluations, 
values in effect shape the decisions people make; thus, eventually the actions they take. This 
hierarchy is depicted in Figure 4.2, from which we ascertain, that the cultural value 
orientation of a society influences management’s decision leading to overinvestment, thus to 
engage in overinvestment if the opportunity exists. They have this effect through impacting 
the both tendency of management to act opportunistically as well as to be overconfident. 
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Figure 4.2. Value based mechanism of culture’s direct influence on behavior  
 
 
 
 
Source. Adapted from Licht et al. (2005) 
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norm of law abidance, also draws attention to the power of non-legal sanctions for breaking 
social norms.  
Besides several authors in cross-cultural psychology, the role of culture in acting as a lens 
through which information is received by people influencing how they perceive the external 
world, thereby affecting their behavior, is also conjectured in New Institutional Economics by 
North (1990). Once we accept that both norms and perceptions, thus individuals’ evaluations 
and judgements, are influenced by cultural values it logically follows that they impact 
people’s desires and objectives as well. This was empirically confirmed by Hofstede et al. 
(2002), who surveyed 1,800 MBA students from 15 countries in 1995 about business goals. 
His results showed that relative importance of business goals including growth, long-, versus 
short-term profits, and staying within the law, are related to national culture.  
Licht (2001) claims that culture’s impact on finance logically follows from behavioral 
finance, in that once we accept that psychological factors may systematically affect decision 
making, the pertinent question to pose is what affects behavior. He also argues that while 
departing from behavior predicted by the rationalist theories of Neo-Classical Economics is 
often viewed as irrational, it is not necessarily the case when studying cultural influences. He 
argues that culture, through desires and evaluations, influences one’s personal utility curve. 
Hence, the actions of a rational individual aimed at maximizing his/her own utility would be 
influenced by culture. Please note, that the underlying assumption is still rationality, but a 
culturally-bounded rationality. As Hofstede et al. (2002) succinctly put: “nationality 
constraints rationality” (Hofstede et al., 2002 p. 800.). Licht (2001) conjecture that 
Individualism/Collectivism (eg.: leadership), Power Distance (eg.: hierarchy), and 
Uncertainty Avoidance (eg.: structure) are the most relevant dimensions for corporate 
decision making. We add Masculinity/Femininity to this list. Our addition is driven by 
Masculinity’s conceptually strong relationship to motivation. 
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4.2.3 Culturally bounded Agency Theory 
Similar to Jensen (1986), the majority of researchers view overinvestment as an agency 
problem caused by management’s opportunistic behavior. Applying the logic of the Value-
Belief Theory on Agency Theory we find support for culture’s influence on the 
overinvestment agency problem. Several authors (eg: Lubatkin et al., 2007; Ekanayeke, 2004; 
Johnson and Droege, 2004) contend that Agency Theory is culturally contingent, as it was 
developed in the United States of America, and its underlying assumptions on human nature 
and behavior reflect US cultural values. Agency problems are caused by self-interested 
opportunistic behavior in the simultaneous presence of conflict of interest, asymmetric 
information and incomplete contracting. Of these, incomplete contracting and asymmetric 
information are organizational realities irrespective of culture, but both conflict of interest and 
opportunistic behavior can be influenced through the mechanism illustrated in Figure 4.2 
(Johnson and Droege, 2004).  
We have already showed that values influence desires and objectives. As such, they have an 
impact on the extent of any conflict of interests between, to name principals and agents 
relevant for overinvestment, shareholders and managers. The value orientation of 
Individualism/Collectivism has been identified both by Ekanayake (2004) and Johnson and 
Droege (2004) to affect such conflict of interest. The universal assumption of opportunistic 
behavior, unanimously criticized by all three of the above named authors, ignores the impact 
of social values and norms on behavior. Based on the Value-Belief Theory it is 
comprehensible that in certain cultures such behavior is more tolerated, accepted or even 
encouraged, while in others it is abhorred. Licht et al. (2007) posit that while it is asymmetric 
information and incomplete contracting that give power to parties to a contract to further their 
own interests at the expense of one another, societal norms regarding the use of power 
determine whether, or the extent to which, they take advantage of it. Thus, they conclude, 
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culture affects the severity of the agency problem. Referring to the same concept as the 
internally enforced norms of Licht (2008), Ekanayake (2004) speaks of “social control” as 
norms reinforcing, substituting, or weakening and supplanting formal control mechanisms. 
Such “social control” is determined by the cultural value orientations of the given society. 
This social context is ignored in traditional Agency Theory (Lubatkin et al., 2007) resulting in 
an “undersocialized view” of behavior.  
Some authors such as Bae et al. 2012 and Zheng et al. 2012 explain some of their results by 
the fact that agency problems are perceived differently between cultures. Value-Belief 
Theory, and the authors referenced earlier in this subsection, go further in asserting that it is 
not only perceptions of the problems but their actual the nature and magnitude is culturally 
contingent. Hofstede (2010) posits that “agency theories are based on implicit assumptions 
about societal order, contractual relationships, and motivation. Such assumptions are bounded 
by national borders” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 327). If we accept that Agency Theory is indeed 
culture-bound, we can infer that management’s decisions leading to overinvestment resulting 
from the agency cost of free cash flow as posited by Jensen (1986) is influenced by culture. 
4.2.4 Culture and overconfidence induced overinvestment 
The arguments of Roll (1986) and Heaton (2002) showing that besides, agency problems, 
managerial overconfidence may also lead to overinvestment have a profound impact on the 
theoretical model we develop in this dissertation. They identify another personal characteristic 
completely unrelated to managerial opportunism that may push management to overinvest. 
Optimism and overconfidence constitute another explanation to how management in 
circumstances where the opportunity for overinvestment exists based on a high level of 
internal resources, a lack of institutional and firm level mitigating tools, and a low quality 
investment opportunity set, actually engages in overinvestment. It is important to emphasize, 
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that management can pursue such overinvestment fully intending to maximize shareholder 
value. In such cases management does not make a conscious decision to overinvest, but rather 
makes a miscalculation that results in overinvestment. While the end-result is the same, the 
motivation; thus, culture’s impact, is very different. Therefore, in addition to “decision to 
overinvest”, or in other words a decision to act opportunistically, another link between the 
opportunity to overinvest and the actual act of overinvestment has been added to our 
theoretical model (see Figure 4.1) to reflect overconfidence/optimism.  
As we have discussed in chapter II of this dissertation, literature showed that there are 
international variations in people’s tendency to be overconfident, and have demonstrated that 
at least some of this variation can be attributed to national culture (Ferris et al., 2013; Chui et 
al., 2010). As culture has been shown to affect overconfidence, and overconfidence has been 
linked to overinvestment, a direct behavioral influence of culture on overinvestment has been 
established in the literature. However, culture’s influence on managerial opportunism, thus 
agency conflict, driven overinvestment has never been studied. As the underlying values 
leading to managerial overconfidence and opportunism are very different from one another, 
we argue that in order to better understand the overall link between culture and 
overinvestment, it is important to study the combined effects of both motivations.  
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that through underlying societal values 
influencing norms, perceptions, evaluations and desires, national culture is a fundamental 
determinant in management’s decision, impacted both by opportunism and overconfidence, to 
take advantage of opportunities to overinvest. In the following section, we develop 
empirically testable hypotheses to confirm our conjecture. For the empirical tests we rely on 
the dimensionalist approach we briefly reviewed in chapter III. It is important to note, that 
while the validity of the dimensionalist framework may be debated by some, the underlying 
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proposition of this dissertation, that culture directly influences the decision of management 
leading to overinvestment is independent of the framework used 
4.3 Hypotheses 
Based on literature from the field of cross-cultural psychology documenting a relationship 
between culture and economic behavior, and descriptions of underlying values, norms, and 
associated behaviors, we have developed testable hypotheses for four of the six Hofstede 
dimensions. We have not formulated hypotheses neither for the Long-Term Orientation nor 
for the Indulgence Versus Restraint dimensions. While we believe there is a relationship 
between Long-Term Orientation and overinvestment, the theoretical direction is unclear. This 
is the case, because Long-Term Orientation is positively linked to overconfidence (Ferris et 
al., 2013) and it may instigate management to justify investments with elusive future benefits 
(both encourage overinvestment), but, thrift and the shunning of short-term benefits at the 
detriment of long-term value creation (both discourage overinvestment) are also central to this 
cultural dimension. For Indulgence Versus Restraint, we found no direct theoretical link 
between the values characterizing this dimension and overinvestment. 
We propose the following hypotheses: 
4.3.1 Masculinity 
High Masculinity (MAS) is associated with assertiveness, competitiveness, valuing wealth 
and recognition, and preference for larger organizations. In our opinion these values are 
highly consistent with management’s tendency to act opportunistically.  
Barber and Odean (2001) show that men trade their stocks more in their portfolio realizing a 
lower return. Confirming the results of Lewellen et al. (1977) that men trade more, have a 
higher tendency to base their decisions on their own judgment disregarding external advice, 
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and view such investments as less risky, they interpret this result as supporting earlier 
assertions from the psychology literature that men are more overconfident than women. As 
Hofstede’s Masculinity dimension captures the extent to which gender roles are polarized and 
magnified, we expect that in countries where masculine values are emphasized management 
will have a tendency to be more overconfident. This assertion is somewhat supported by the 
empirical finding of Ferris et al., (2013), who show a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, 
relationship between Hofstede’s Masculinity cultural dimension and management 
overconfidence. Therefore, overall we expect that Masculinity is positively related to both 
opportunism and overconfidence making the expected positive relationship very strong. 
Further indirect empirical support for our assertion that Masculinity is overall positively 
related to overinvestment comes from Zheng et al. (2012) and Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009). 
These articles lend only indirect support, as none of them relate national culture to a direct 
indicator of overinvestment, such as we do. Instead, Zheng et al. (2012) finds relationship 
between culture and debt maturity, and as capital structure can be used as a mitigating tool for 
overinvestment, they infer that such a relationship may be explained by differences in 
management’s tendency to overinvest. Similarly, Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) explain the 
relationship they find between culture and cash holdings by assuming it reflects an inclination 
to overinvest. Therefore, both articles presume that a connection between national culture and 
a financial variable that is shown to be connected to, among other things, overinvestment, 
may be viewed as an indication of a relationship between the two. None of the articles try 
neither to theoretically explain nor empirically confirm the relationship between national 
culture and overinvestment. 
Hypothesis 1: Higher Masculinity leads to more overinvestment. 
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4.3.2 Power Distance 
High PDI is associated with highly valuing power and status as well as with a belief that those 
in power are entitled to privileges. Those with power are expected to use it to increase their 
wealth and status. This cultural orientation could encourage opportunistic behavior. We 
expect this to also positively contribute to overconfidence, as individuals have a tendency to 
believe themselves superior if treated as such by others. Ferris et al., (2013) also show a 
positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between Hofstede’s Power Distance Index 
in line with our expectation. As both opportunistic behavior and overconfidence is expected to 
be positively related to PDI, we predict a positive relationship between PDI and 
overinvestment.   
Hypothesis 2: Higher Power Distance leads to more overinvestment.     
4.3.3 Individualism 
In individualistic cultures, members tend to focus more on self-interest, enter into 
“calculative” relationships, and aggressiveness is perceived as a positive trait. Several authors 
examining the relationship between national culture and agency problems argue that high IDV 
is in line with the underlying assumptions about self-serving agent behavior of agency theory 
(eg: Ekanayake, 2004; Johnos and Droege, 2004; Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010). Johnson and 
Droege (2004) formulate this idea as “collectivism aligns the organizational and individual 
objectives and bases the employment relationship more upon social exchange than market 
exchange” (Johnson and Droege, 2004 p. 328). Therefore, they claim moral hazard in 
societies characterized by high collectivism is lower. The notion that collectivism reduces 
certain agency costs is also put forward by Chakrabarty (2009) and Knack et al. (1997). 
Further, Chui et al., (2010), Markus and Kitayama (1991) and Heine et al., (1999) relates 
individualism to overconfidence by showing that individualism may be linked to a strong 
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belief in one’s ability encouraged from early childhood, and relatedly a stronger tendency of 
the development of both better-than-average-, and self-attribution biases. By contrast, 
collectivist societies exhibit a disposition for “self-monitoring”, which mitigates 
overinvestment (Chui et al., 2010). Ferris et al. (2013) empirically demonstrates this positive 
relationship.    
Taken as a whole, as we expect individualism to be positively related to both opportunistic 
behavior and overconfidence, we expect a strong positive relationship between IDV and 
overinvestment.    
Hypothesis 3: Higher Individualism leads to more overinvestment.     
4.3.4 Uncertainty Avoidance 
Members of high UAI cultures tend to prefer stable, large organizations. Potential motivations 
for overinvestment include decreasing the probability of bankruptcy and safeguarding the 
independence of the firm, both related to avoiding management’s loss of employment 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981; Harford, 1999). Thus, it can be expected that management will have 
a tendency to engage in overinvestment to increase the firm’s diversification and its size to 
lessen perceived risks of the company’s future. Such motivation should be viewed as a form 
of opportunism, as such growth tends to be value destroying as indicated by the literature 
briefly reviewed in chapter II.  
We expect societies putting emphasis on values related to avoiding ambiguity to exhibit less 
overconfidence, as drivers of overconfidence such as the better-than-average effect, illusion of 
control and somewhat related the undervaluation of risk are all consistent with a willingness 
to confront ambiguity. Ferris et al., (2013) lend weak support to this argument by showing a 
statistically insignificant but negative relationship between UAI and overconfidence. 
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Therefore, we expect UAI to be positively related to opportunism driven-, and negatively 
related to overconfidence induced overinvestment. Overall, as we see opportunism as 
accounting for a larger portion of overinvestment than overconfidence, as we posited in 
chapter II based on the empirical results of Malmendier and Tate (2008) and characteristics of 
their sample, we predict a weaker but positive relationship between UAI and overinvestment. 
H4: Higher Uncertainty Avoidance leads to more overinvestment.     
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Chapter V. 
Methodology 
In this chapter first we present our research philosophical orientation. After reviewing the 
main epistemological paradigms and research approaches, we argue that our personal beliefs 
and views are closest to the post-positivist stance of Scientific Realism, and that our research 
has been carried out following a hypothetico-deductive approach. In the second section we 
describe our empirical methodology. We collect data resulting in an initial sample of 7,338 
quoted non-financial firms from 36 countries for the period of 2001-2011. As we investigate 
the relationship between national culture and overinvestment, neither of which are directly 
observable, we employ indicators for both phenomena. For national culture, we use 
Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions as our base specification. We apply investment - cash 
flow sensitivity as indicator of overinvestment. To identify firms who have the highest 
potential to overinvest in our initial sample, we assemble our final sample from firms with 
high free cash flow and low Market to Book value (used to indicate investment opportunities). 
We apply a reduced form Q investment equation using a one-step system General Method of 
Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data estimator to analyze our data. 
5.1 Research philosophical orientation 
5.1.1 What is epistemological stance of research? 
The objective of a dissertation in specific - and all research in general - is to produce new 
knowledge. While “produce” is an awkward word, possibly conjuring images of a factory-
type automatized activity, we intentionally avoided using words such as “to create”, “to 
construct”, or “to discover”, as they would already carry serious implications of our 
epistemological stance. To be able to produce new knowledge, one has to agree what 
constitutes acceptable knowledge, and how is it produced. However, to be able to answer 
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these fundamental questions we soon find it is necessary to look deeper, and confront our 
assumptions about reality itself. What is reality? What can be known? What is acceptable 
knowledge? How do we come to know? These are all fundamental questions researchers need 
to address, and they are important elements of the epistemological stance of their research. 
Piaget (1967) defines epistemology as the study of the establishment of valid knowledge. For 
Plato, knowledge is “justified true belief” (Ryan et al. 2002, p. 11), a definition broadly relied 
upon in science (Ryan et al., 2002). Epistemology is a branch of philosophy with roots in 
antiquity and is sometimes also referred to as the philosophy of science (Gavard-Perret et al., 
2012). To answer the questions posed in the paragraph above one needs to go beyond 
epistemology. When explaining the philosophical underpinnings of research, Saunders et al 
(2012) write about research philosophies, while other authors such as Gavard-Perret et al. 
(2012) refer to epistemological paradigms. They all point out, that to create a solid 
philosophical base for one’s research, a complex philosophical stance need to be assumed. 
Thus, whether we call it our research philosophy or epistemological paradigm, we have to 
formulate our posture with foundations in ontology,” the study of existence” (Ryan et al. 2002 
p. 13) studying what is real, in epistemology, and in axiology, which studies “judgments 
about value” (Saunders et al 2012. p. 137). We have decided to apply the terminology of 
Gavard-Perret et al. (2012) in the present work referring to our philosophical background as 
epistemological paradigm. With regards to this terminology it is important to note that while 
they are called “epistemological”, such paradigms also include well defined founding 
hypotheses specifying their ontological and axiological postures. Indeed when this is not the 
case, the very fact of not having a specific assumption is a characteristic stance differentiating 
certain paradigm from others.  
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In the present section we briefly discuss the role of epistemological paradigms in research, 
introduce the major paradigms, the posture and approach adopted by us, and our specific 
research design.  
5.1.2 Role of epistemological stance in research 
Epistemological stance affects both the acceptable object of research as well as applicable 
research methods to produce and justify knowledge (Gavard-Perret et al. 2012).  Every 
researcher has an epistemological stance. By the very act of doing research, he or she chooses 
a research question, adopts a methodology, and justifies his or her results. This stance is often 
not made explicit to the readers, which is problematic according to Gavard-Perret et al. 2012, 
and Ryan et al. 2002, as without laying out the underlying assumptions on what knowledge is, 
any attempt to justify it is questionable. Defining one’s epistemological stance is critical. It 
must be emphasized: just because one does not specify the fundamental philosophical 
assumptions of research they are being made, often unconsciously, with very real 
consequences on the process and results of research. By not stating them explicitly, 
researchers expose themselves to the risk of relying on a set of inconsistent assumptions, 
significantly reducing or even invalidating the scientific value of their work (Gavard-Perret et 
al., 2012, Ryan et al,. 2002). 
Understanding and stating the epistemological stance of a given research requires the 
researcher to study the main epistemological paradigms (if need be, also the numerous 
alternatives different from each other on one or more aspects nevertheless often characterized 
as falling into the same overall approach), to familiarize himself or herself with their 
“founding hypotheses” (Gavard-Perret et al. 2012), and more importantly with their 
implications as to, among others, what is knowable, how it is knowable, how it should be 
justified to be accepted as knowledge, and the relationship between researcher and subject 
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(Saunders et al. 2012). While at first glance this may appear a formal process, in our opinion 
it is a deeply personal choice, as it reflects the personal values held by the researcher, the 
“assumptions about the way you view the world” (Saunders et al. 2012. p. 128).  
Bisman (2010) suggests that epistemological stance adopted by the researcher should be 
driven by the research question. Going further, Saunders et al. (2012) presents Pragmatism as 
a research philosophy, whereby ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions can 
be independently made to suit the purpose of the research. We disagree with both assertions. 
We believe research philosophy reflects one’s core individual beliefs among other things on 
reality and on one’s own role in the research process. It is hard to imagine such fundamental 
beliefs of a person changing from one research project to another.  
To illustrate that one’s research philosophy has a critical effect on his or her research, it is 
enough to consider that the first step, defining one’s research question, is already profoundly 
anchored in one’s epistemological stance. What is real? What is knowable? What is worth 
knowing? These questions determine what is deemed as interesting and what can be pursued 
as valid research questions. This relationship also underlines one of the fundamental 
theoretical arguments on which this dissertation rests, namely that one’s values affect one’s 
perceptions and actions (here applied to values and world views influencing epistemological 
stance in turn affecting research question and process, elsewhere in the dissertation it is 
cultural values affecting corporate investment decision-making behavior). 
5.1.3 Main epistemological paradigms 
For Gavard-Perret et al. 2012 empirical paradigms are ”concepts of knowledge shared by a 
community, based on a coherent system of founding hypotheses relative to the questions 
studied by epistemology” (our translation from Gavard-Perret et al. 2012. p. 23). They add 
that most paradigms also include ontological assumptions. (The authors highlight that there 
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are numerous epistemological paradigms established or debated in the literature. This is also 
apparent from the review of research philosophical postures in Saunders et al. (2012), and 
Ryan et al. (2002), especially taking into account the variations and different formulations of 
similar concepts. Saunders et al. (2012) also draws attention to the fact that such stances have 
axiological aspects as well.      
According to a current philosophical view, “it is more appropriate for the researcher 
undertaking a particular study to think of the philosophy adopted as a multi-dimensional set of 
continua rather than set of provisions” (Saunders et al. 2012. p. 129). Such continua are:  
- “What is the nature of reality?” with continuum from “reality is external to the 
individual” in one extreme to “reality is socially constructed” on the other, or 
alternatively with reality is “objective” in one end to it is “subjective” on the other 
(Saunders et al. 2012. p. 129). 
- “What is considered acceptable knowledge?” with continua from “observable 
phenomena” to “subjective meanings”, and from “law-like generalizations” to “details 
of specifics”  (Saunders et al. 2012. p. 129). 
- “What is the role of values?” with research being “value free” on one end of the 
continuum to it being “value bound” (Saunders et al. 2012. p. 129).  
The above questions correspond to the researcher’s views on Ontology, Epistemology, and 
Axiology, highlighting once again that epistemological paradigms are addressing questions 
going beyond epistemology and are multidimensional in nature.  
While being able to pick and choose one’s position along the above continua seems inherently 
tempting, researchers must be cognizant of the need for developing a research philosophy 
which is consistent in all its fundamental ontological, epistemological, and axiological 
assumptions. Defining such philosophical foundations is immensely complex, which is 
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demonstrated by the decades-long ongoing debate in the literature surrounding the appropriate 
formulation of certain epistemological paradigms. Taking into account the position of Sanders 
et al. (2012) about the less than rigid boundaries surrounding such philosophical stances, we 
nevertheless attempt to position our work in one of the more traditional, consistent, well-
applied paradigms in the literature.     
In the following paragraphs we will briefly present the epistemological paradigms Gavard-
Perret et al. (2012) describe as most influential in management science: (i) Logical positivism, 
two forms of post-positivism: (ii) Scientific realism, (iii) Critical realism, (iv) Constructivism, 
and (v) Interpretivism. Gavard-Perret et al. (2012) describe two distinct forms of 
constructivism: (a) Pragmatic Constructivism, and (b) Constructivism following Guba and 
Lincoln. As the epistemological stance we adopt does not fall under the constructivist 
classification, we deliberately present only the main points of the two together without 
including much detail on the different sub-categories. 
5.1.3.1 Logical Positivism (Gavard-Perret et al., 2012 p. 26-27) 
Originating from the work of Comte, Gavard-Perret et al. (2012) summarizes the underlying 
assumptions of the positivist paradigm as follows: 
- Objective reality exists independent of perceiver.  
- Only what is observable is real. The source of knowledge is observation. 
- Reality is knowable.  
- The objective is to discover the cause of observable phenomena, to discover law-type 
generalizations describing the relationship between observations. It firmly rests on the 
assumption that everything has a cause and therefore can be explained.  
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- There is no interaction between the researcher and the subject of his study, the 
research is considered objective, value free. This implies that there is no interaction 
between the researcher and the subject of his or her study. 
- It prefers to break down phenomena into building blocks, which are studied in 
separation without taking into account their context. 
5.1.3.2 Post-Positivism (Gavard-Perret et al., 2012 p. 28-31) 
Several Philosophers questioned the validity of the above assumptions, some rejecting 
positivism completely, while others elaborating related paradigms. Post-positivism arose from 
these criticisms addressing some, while keeping certain assumptions unchanged. Below we 
briefly turn to two strands of post-positivism: scientific realism and critical realism.   
5.1.3.2.1 Scientific Realism (Gavard-Perret et al., 2012 p. 31-32) 
Traced back to the writings of Hunt, the main assumptions of Scientific Realism are the 
followings: 
- Reality exists independently of perception. 
- The objective of science is to know reality. However, such knowledge can never be 
certain because perceptions may be inaccurate; thus, they may vary between 
perceivers. This contradicts the assumptions of logical positivism. 
- Since knowledge is not certain, acquired knowledge should be constantly tested as 
new elements are discovered. Knowledge proven to inaccurate should be discarded. 
Bisman (2010) explains this view by asserting that “any single research method is equally 
limited” resulting in post-positivist position of apply research with the objective to “capturing 
as much of reality as possible” (Bisman, 2010, p. 12), but without being able to fully describe 
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it. Science progresses toward a better understanding of the world (although complete 
understanding will never be achieved). 
- While knowledge should explain observable phenomena, such explanation may build 
on unobservable concepts. This would not be accepted under logical positivism. 
- As an addition to the above assumptions listed by Gavard-Perret et al. (2012), 
Saunders et al. (2012) adds that Scientific Realism’s axiological stance is that of 
“value laden” research. In other words research is not fully objective, the values of the 
researcher influences the process and results of the research. As previously described, 
this view is echoed by Hofstede (1980), and is widely accepted in the cross-cultural 
literature. 
- Underlining the scientific realist position is that although theories can only be 
approximately true (see above), the fact that they have predictive power is evidence of 
them being approximately true (Leplin, 1984). Underlying this argument is the question: 
If theories would not be approximately true, how could they have predictive power? 
5.1.3.2.2 Critical Realism (Gavard-Perret et al. 2012, p. 32-35) 
Referring to Bhaskar as founder of this post-positivist paradigm, Gavard-Perret et al. (2012) 
defines the following founding hypotheses, different from those of Scientific Realism, of 
Critical Realism: 
- Reality exists on three levels: empirical, actual, deep. The empirical level is that of 
phenomena as being observed distorted by the senses and other filters of the perceiver. 
What really happens (free of distortion) is at the actual level, and is driven, or caused, 
by what is called unobservable rules or laws making up the level of deep reality.  
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- The objective of science is to understand the rules and laws driving phenomena at the 
deep reality as much as possible. 
As opposed to logical positivism, neither Scientific-, nor Critical Realism attempt to study the 
observations in isolation, rather they explicitly take into account context (Saunders et al., 
2012).  
5.1.3.3 Constructivism (Gavard-Perret et al. 2012, p. 35-37, 39-40) 
Traced back to von Glasersveld (pragmatic constructivism), and Guba and Lincoln 
(constructivism following Guba and Lincoln), Gavard-Perret et al. (2012) highlights the 
following assumptions characteristic to constructivism:  
- (a) While not denying the existence of objective reality, the only thing that is 
knowable is the human experience of the phenomena (pragmatic constructivism), or 
(b) There is no objective reality, as reality is “socially constructed” through 
experiences by participants (constructivism following Guba and Lincoln). In either 
formulations, there is no single knowable reality. 
- The objective of science is to understand and to be able to affect the human experience 
related to the phenomena. 
- Research is not objective, as the researcher influences the subject of his or her study. 
All research is “value laden”. 
5.1.3.4 Interpretivism (Gavard-Perret et al. 2012, p. 37-39) 
With origins in the philosophy of Heidegger the following underlying postulations of 
interpretivism are discussed by Gavard-Perret et al. (2012):  
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- Only human experience of phenomena is knowable. What is real is the common 
experience of participants in a given phenomenon. 
- Both the researcher and the specific situation have an impact on the results of research; 
thus, research is not objective. 
- The objective of science is to understand how participants interpret a situation.  
5.1.4 Research approaches 
There are three fundamental research approaches: induction, deduction, abduction (Saunders 
et al., 2012). Figure 5.1. graphically present how these approaches relate observations and 
theory development. 
- In applying an inductive approach, the researcher starts with observing the 
phenomena, and formulates theory based on his or her observations. This is illustrated 
by the right side of the figure.  
- Following a deductive approach, the researcher takes a theory as a first step, which is 
followed by testing it using observations. This approach is illustrated by the right side 
of the figure. 
- The abductive approach merges induction and deduction through a process of 
iteration, whereby the researcher could start with observation leading to theory 
development followed by additional testing to improve generalizability of the theory 
established. This process is represented by following the arrows around the full circle.   
While certain epistemological paradigms favor the use of one over the other, Gavard-Perret et 
al. (2012) points out forcefully that it is a mistake to assume research philosophy 
automatically determines the methodology researchers are obliged to follow.   
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 151. 
 
Figure 5.1 The wheel of science 
 
Source: Gavard-Perret et al., 2012, p. 73.  
5.1.5 Epistemological paradigm and research approach adopted by Dissertation 
5.1.5.1 Epistemological paradigm 
Based on our personal values and view on the world, we reject Logical Positivism due to its 
denial of the reality of unobservable phenomenon, its focus on studying phenomena isolated 
from their context, as well as due to its assertion that research is value-free. The arguments 
proposed in this dissertations call attention to the importance of the social and cultural context 
of human behavior. As such, denying the reality of unobservable phenomena and the 
exclusion of context in the analysis contradict our position in this regard. 
Constructivism and Interpretivism we also reject due to their denial of the existence of 
objective reality independent of the perceiver. We believe that while there is an objective 
reality, individuals may perceive it differently as their perception of it filters through their 
senses. It is the perception that is subjective, not reality itself. In addition to physical filters, 
we believe it is important not to overlook that there are psychological filters some of which 
are rooted in cultural values. Indeed, cultural values’ acting as such filters is even a central 
argument this dissertation is built on.  
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Our proposition, which this dissertation explores, is that national culture effects 
management’s propensity to make decisions leading to in overinvestment. We believe 
unobservable culture, and its effect on individuals, is real and objective. We view the 
multifaceted nature of culture and its influence on human action as immensely complex and 
prone to the moderating effect of countless other elements inherent in the context of the social 
arena where human behavior is enacted. Culture and its relation to human behavior is directly 
not observable, and measurement or study of such phenomena with absolute certainty as 
impossible. Nevertheless, we feel that our task as scientists is to advance knowledge to 
improve our understanding and ability to explain differences in behavior, as much as our 
observations and theoretical reasoning allows. Further, studying the influence of cultural 
values on behavior, we agree with Hofstede (1980) that the values of researchers affect their 
work from selecting the object, methodology, to interpreting the results.  
Overall, our position of reality not being knowable with absolute certainty, accepting 
unobservable phenomena as real, viewing research as value-bound, and focusing on the need 
to study phenomena in context places us firmly in the post-positivist tradition. According to 
Bisman (2010), post-positivism offers a position, which “retains elements of scientific rigour, 
and yet acknowledge the value of richness and context, as well as the importance of 
generalisability” (Bisman 2010, p. 7). Bisman (2010) actually writes about critical realism, but 
based on our review of the literature the statement quoted is consistent with the underlying 
assumptions of the other post-positivist paradigm discussed above, Scientific Realism, as well. We 
believe the philosophical assumptions underlying our work are represented by those of 
Scientific Realist epistemological paradigm.    
It needs to be emphasized that research philosophy is personal. We make no claim that our 
stance is “the” right stance, nor that it should be adopted by other researchers as well. All we 
claim is that it is consistent with our world view, and more importantly we argue that it is also 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 153. 
 
consistent with the subject of this research, namely the effect of unobservable (nevertheless in 
our opinion real) culture on corporate investment behavior. 
5.1.5.2  Research approach 
We have followed a research approach that is specifically referred to as hypothetico-deductive 
(see for example Godfrey-Smith, 2003). We have started from the existing theories of Agency 
Theory, and postulations of Cross-Cultural Philosophy also supported by New Institutional 
Economics, and combining them we have developed a theoretical argument that national 
culture influences management’s propensity to make decisions leading to overinvestment. 
This step was followed by the formulation of testable hypotheses, which in turn were tested 
on empirical data. Our research approach is illustrated by Figure 5.2, where by placing 
research philosophy in the outside box we intended to emphasize our view that 
epistemological paradigm influences every step of the research process. 
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Figure 5.2. Our research approach 
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5.2.1 Sample 
Firm level data was collected from the Factset database for all quoted firms for the period 
between 2001 and 2011 from countries for which the cultural dimension scores of Hofstede 
are available. Following the literature, companies in the financial sector, and those where 
basic financial data was not available were excluded. More specifically, companies with 
missing, zero or negative total assets and revenues-, and with missing cash and short term 
investments, net property plant and equipment, long-term debt, total equity, common equity, 
net income, earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), 
dividends, operating cash flow, and capital expenditures (CAPEX) were excluded from the 
sample. Firms from countries with a resulting sample of less than twenty companies were also 
dropped. The resulting initial sample includes 7,338 firms from 36 countries. Hofstede (2001) 
calls on researchers applying his framework to base any empirical study on samples of least 
10 cultures. Our sample largely exceeds this methodological requirement.  
5.2.2 Empirical model 
The dissertation proposes to relate national culture to overinvestment. As neither of these is 
directly observable, it is necessary to use indicators to estimate them.  
5.2.2.1 Indicator for national culture 
To approximate national culture, the dissertation applies the dimensionalist method. The base 
model will employ Hofstede’s dimensions, as they are the most widely used the literature, and 
their interpretation is the most intuitive (Warner-Soderholm, 2012, Kirkman et al., 2006). The 
use of Hofstede’s framework is further supported by the findings of both Kirkman et al. 
(2006) and Vas et al. (2010), who, studying extensively Hofstede’s work and related 
empirical literature, conjectured that the other dimensionalist models are fundamentally very 
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close to Hofstede’s. As we will describe more in detail in the following chapter on results and 
discussion, as a robustness check, we recalculate our basic models by replacing Hofstede’s 
dimensions with the related GLOBE constructs to ensure our results are not primarily driven 
by any specificity of the cultural framework we apply. 
We calculate separate models for the four dimensions (Masculinty/Femininity, Power 
Distance, Individualism/Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance) for which we have 
advanced hypotheses is chapter IV. By analyzing models with all the dimensions that have a 
hypothesized effect and excluding those which have none, we follow the methodological 
advice of Kirkman et al. (2006) and Reuter (2011).  
Triandis (1996) highlights the fact that culture’s influence on behavior is complex. Values do 
not impact actors in a vacuum, but they are interrelated, and exert their influence on actors at 
the same time. He identifies cultural syndromes as “multifaceted patterns of shared values, 
beliefs, and attitudes around a particular theme” (Triandis, 1996, p. 407.) While this definition 
loosely fits the way both Hosftede’s and the GLOBE’s value dimensions are constructed, it 
can also be viewed as referring to the way actors are influenced by all the value dimensions at 
the same time. Looking at how each alone is related to behavior may not be representative of 
their impact on actual behavior. To address this concern, in addition to the four base models, 
another model including all six of Hofstede’s value dimensions will be analyzed following 
Kirkman et al. (2006), who recommended including all dimensions simultaneously 
specifically for this effect. As this regression includes all the value effects captured by the 
cultural model, it allows for the interaction between and combined effect of cultural 
dimensions. This approach to separately test for individual dimension effects followed by a 
model including all dimensions using Hofstede’s framework was also applied by Aggarwal 
and Goodell (2009). 
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5.2.2.2 Indicator for overinvestment 
The task of constructing an indicator is further complicated by the fact that of the countries 
included in the sample, several have less than ideal disclosure regimes, and excluding those 
countries would materially reduce the cultural diversity that is the object of the analysis. Thus, 
any indicators used must rely only on basic accounting information.  
5.2.2.2.1 Indicators in literature 
Studies examining some aspect of overinvestment aim to identify some market reaction (firm 
valuation, event study) or the persistence of some corporate behavior (e.g: diversification, 
acquisitions, relationship between investment and cash flow) among a group of firms having 
some characteristics (e.g.: low q, high cash flow) in common. These studies examine whether 
the behavior or market valuation of a group of firms confirm the predictions of the Free Cash 
Flow Hypothesis of Jensen (1986).  
Several approaches have been used to detect or infer overinvestment. Authors such as 
McCabe and Yook (1997), and Vogt (1997) apply some combination of cash flow, an 
indicator for the investment opportunity set of the firm, and a measure of discretionary 
investment to detect overinvestment. Among others Officer (2011) and Balachandran et al. 
(2009) used event studies analyzing changes in dividend payment. The underlying logic here 
is that dividends reduce resources under the control of management mitigating the agency 
problem of free cash flow; thus, reaction to dividend initiations or increases should be more 
favorable for overinvestor or potentially overinvestor firms. Others attempted to infer 
overinvestment by analyzing changes in investment behavior following significant changes in 
leverage (D’Mello and Miranda, 2010) or ownership structure (e.g.: Helay et al., 1992; 
Bhagat et al., 1990). Other notable indicators used to study overinvestment are studying write-
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off behavior (Sadka and Zhang, 2009), and international expansion/changes in voluntary 
disclosure (Hope and Thomas, 2008).  
Richardson (2006) developed a model estimating overinvestment based on an expectation 
model used to predict expected investment. If firm investment exceeds that predicted by his 
expectation model, he assumes the firm is overinvesting. His model uses firm financial 
information, market information, a discount rate and an earnings persistence rate to predict 
investment. The last two variables are assumed to be constant across all firms in his sample of 
over 58,053 firm years (all from the United States) for the period of 1988 – 2002. Taking into 
account that his expectation model has an R
2
 of approximately 33%, assuming that it indicates 
the optimal investment level and any variation from it is overinvestment (if negative: 
underinvestment) seems to result in a proxy not necessary more accurate than the ones used 
by other researchers.  
Our review of the relevant literature have not yielded neither a dominant nor a clearly superior 
overinvestment indicator. Based on this fact and on the requirement of relying exclusively on 
basic accounting information arising from the international nature of our sample, and on its 
extensive use in the literature (see for example: Firth et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2011; and 
Crespi and Scellato, 2010), we have decided to apply investment - cash flow sensitivity for 
firms with poor quality investment sets as indicator for overinvestment. 
5.2.2.2.2 Our indicator: Investment - cash flow sensitivity 
The argument underlying this method is based on the original proposition of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), namely that the investment and financing decisions are separate. In such a case 
the availability of cash flow should not have any impact on the level of investment carried out 
by a company. If its investment opportunities are good and cash flow is lacking, a firm could 
access external sources of capital to finance value creating (positive NPV) projects. On the 
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other hands, if available investment opportunities are bad a firm should not make the 
investments even if it has the cash flow to do so. In  conclusion, if cash flow has a significant 
impact on investments, it is likely that the level of investment is not chosen by taking all value 
creating (positive NPV) projects and rejecting all value destroying (negative NPV) ones, but 
rather on the availability of internal financing, thus a departure from Modigiliani and Miller, 
(1958).  
Jensen (1986) notes, that when investments are self-serving it is easier for management to 
finance them from internal funds than from capital markets. Thus, investments of overinvestor 
firms are expected to be sensitive to their internal resources, approximated by their cash flow. 
Theories of underinvestment make the same prediction (Stein, 2003). Consequently, 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow conforms with the predictions of two hypotheses related 
to agency theory: financial constraints related underinvestment (Myers and Majluf, 1984), and 
overinvestment (Jensen 1986). The former is based on information asymmetry between 
shareholders of the company and capital markets, whereby capital markets do not realize the 
full potential of the company, underpricing its securities making obtaining external financing 
too expensive. Thus, not all positive NPV projects are invested in. Whereas, overinvestment 
implies that even negative NPV projects are pursued for management’s private benefits. 
There is a vast literature relating to investment - cash flow sensitivity following the seminal 
work of Fazzari et al. (1988) who proposed investment - cash flow sensitivity as a measure of 
financial constraints (thus focusing on the underinvestment explanation of the behavior). As a 
consequence, a large part of the literature concentrates on the underinvestment explanation 
debating whether investment - cash flow sensitivity is a reliable measure of financial 
constraints or using it as such measure investigating the impact of other variables on financial 
constraints. Although the sensitivity is confirmed by the overwhelming majority of the 
literature using samples from various countries, the fact whether it is caused by managers’ 
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behavior or is simply a result of methodological errors in the studies confirming it as 
advanced by Erisckson and Whited (2012) is also debated. While this debate is still open, 
researchers continue to successfully apply the methodology in empirical research studying 
corporate investment distortions, of which some recent examples include Francis et al. (2013), 
Xu (2013); Attig et al. (2012); and Firth et al. (2012).  
Several authors investigated whether company’s investment decision is effected by under-, or 
overinvestment. They attempted to find empirical evidence of one or the other effect 
dominating (eg.: Agca and Mozumdar 2008; Saiyid and Mozumdar, 2007; Hadlock, 1998). 
Vogt (1994) however established theoretically and showed empirically that both behaviors 
can be occurring at the same time by different firms. Therefore, both behaviors contribute to 
overall cash flow-investment sensitivity documented in the literature. Since then several other 
articles (eg.: Franzoni, 2009; Morgado and Pindado; 2003) confirmed the simultaneous 
existence of both behaviors. The theoretical work of Heaton (2002) also predicted, and 
following empirical analysis (eg.: Ferris et al., 2013.; Hunag et al., 2013; and Lin et al., 2005) 
confirmed that managerial overconfidence driven overinvestment and underinvestment both 
result in increased sensitivity of investment to cash flow. However, firms whose behavior can 
be explained by one of the above theories, have very different characteristics. According to 
Vogt (1994) one can differentiate between the two sets of firms based their investment 
opportunities and amount of free cash flow, an approach widely followed in the literature.  
a. Quality of investment opportunities 
As the quality of the investment opportunity set of the firm is not directly observable, an 
indicator has to be employed. The most widespread indicator used in the corporate investment 
literature is Tobin’s Q, or the company’s Market to Book ratio. Recent papers using Q as a 
proxy of investment opportunities include Francis et al. (2013) and Attig et al. (2012), while 
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for example Wang and Esqueda (2014) and Xu (2013) also applied the Q model of investment 
and relied on Market to Book ratio as a proxy of Q, used in turn as an indicator for investment 
opportunities. The main assumption behind using Q as a proxy for the quality of investment 
opportunities is that the stock market appropriately values the future prospects of the given 
firm. Q represents the relationship between the replacement value of a company’s assets and 
its market value. If the market values a company’s assets higher than the replacement value of 
its assets (Q>1), it implies that there is value generated by future growth, by its investment 
opportunities. If, on the other hand, the company’s Q is below one, it implies the market 
judges the investment opportunity set of the company to be of very poor quality. Tobin’s 
theory (Tobin, 1969) states that companies invest until the marginal value of the investment 
equals its replacement value. Until this point is reached, additional investment would increase 
the market value of the firm, beyond it, it would decrease it. If investment is not distorted, 
investment thus should be explained by the quality of investment opportunities (as proxied by 
Q or Market to Book ratio) and the relationship to internal resources such as cash flow, should 
not be significant. A point to note is that this theory uses marginal Q, while due to the 
difficulty of obtaining necessary data the literature overwhelmingly uses average Q. Average 
Q equals marginal Q only under very restrictive assumptions. This introduces a measurement 
error into the equation, a point of contention for those who believe the investment - cash flow 
relationship being a result from methodological and statistical errors and not a true 
phenomenon (Erickson and Whited, 2012).  
b. Finding a sample of potential overinvestors 
As it was noted above, higher investment - cash flow sensitivity can be explained by both 
under-, or overinvestors. Since this dissertation intends to study overinvestment, it is 
necessary to select a sample consisting of firms more likely to overinvest than to suffer from 
financial constraints. Applying the logic of Vogt (1994), the overall sample is split into 
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High/Low Investment Opportunity-, and High/Low Free Cash Flow firms. In effect, the 
sample is split into four quadrants: High Market to Book and High Free Cash Flow, High 
Market to Book and Low Free Cash Flow, Low Market to Book and Low Free Cash Flow, 
and Low Market to Book and High Free Cash Flow. It can be argued that Low Investment 
Opportunity / High Cash Flow firms correspond to the description of Jensen (1986): 
“....substantial free cash flow (low growth prospects and high potential for generating cash 
flows) - situations where agency costs of free cash flow are likely to be high” (Jensen, 1986, 
p. 325). Therefore, firms with low quality investment opportunities but disposing of high free 
cash flow are most prone to the overinvestment agency problem, as these firms have high free 
cash flow but have no valuable investment projects available to invest it.  
Based on the above, we use Market to Book value to indicate the quality of the firm’s 
investment opportunities, while Free Cash Flow is estimated as net cash flow from activities 
less income taxes and interest expense. Similar to Broussard et al. (2004), the average Market 
to Book and Free Cash Flow to Total Assets ratios of each firm over the sample period are 
calculated, and those firms with values above (below) the median period country sample 
average values are classified as high (low) in the respective categories. Executing the cutoff 
by country allows filtering out the effect of large differences in general valuation levels 
accorded to national capital markets. The final sample will include those firms, who fall into 
the Low Market to Book and High Free Cash Flow to Total Assets quadrant.  
5.2.2.3 Regression Model 
Following the burgeoning literature on investment - cash flow sensitivity started with the 
seminal work on financial constraints by Fazzari et al. (1988), the following reduced form Q 
investment model equation will be applied to the above described balanced panel data set: 
(I/K)i,t = β0+ β1(Qi,t-1)+ β2(CF/K) i,t+ β3(CF/Ki,t * CVD)+ β4(X i,t)+ε  
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 163. 
 
where I stands for capital expenditures, K for capital approximated by Total Assets, Q for 
Tobin’s Q simplified by Market to Book ratio, CF is cash flow, CVD is the cultural value 
dimension variable, X stands for control variables, and ε is the error term.  
The use of an interaction variable between cash flow and another independent variable is 
based on Attig et al. (2012), who study the impact of investment horizon of institutional 
shareholders on firms’ investment - cash flow sensitivity. As our empirical test attempts to 
investigate the influence of aspects of culture on investment - cash flow sensitivity, we have 
replaced the institutional investment horizon variable in their model by the relevant cultural 
value dimension in the regression model. 
5.2.2.3.1 Control variables 
a. Firm-level controls 
Based on literature, we have included a number of firm-level control variables, which are 
expected to influence the level of overinvestment. These are: 
 FIRM SIZE is often associated with a higher level of agency costs (see for example: 
Kadapakkam et al., 1998); thus, it can be expected that investment - cash flow sensitivity 
increases with firm size. As the sample includes companies with very large differences in 
size, this variable controls for differences in investment pattern that may be related to size. 
 LEVERAGE is viewed as a mechanism to control agency costs of free cash flow (see for 
example: Stulz, 1990); therefore, we expect that investment - cash flow sensitivity 
decreases with leverage. 
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 DIVIDENDS are also regarded as a tool to decrease the agency cost of free cash flow (see 
for example: Easterbrook, 1984). As such, investment - cash flow sensitivity is expected 
to decrease with dividends. 
 CASH LEVEL is positively related to the agency cost of free cash flow (see for example: 
Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). However, management can engage in overinvestment spending 
cash already held by the firm, which, in turn, should lower the dependence on cash flow 
for financing value-destroying investments. Overall, we expect investment - cash flow 
sensitivity to decrease with cash held by the firm. 
 PRIMARY ACTIVITY of each firm is included to account for industry-related differences in 
investment behavior and potentially differing opportunities and control of overinvestment 
by sector.  
b. Country-level controls 
To better isolate national culture’s effect from that of other country level differences in the 
sample we have included the following country-level control variables: 
 ANTI-SELF-DEALING INDEX is widely used in the literature to indicate the quality of the 
country- level corporate governance regime (eg.: for example Breuer et al., 2014; Wang 
and Esquada, 2014). Efficient corporate governance lowers agency costs arising from 
management opportunism (eg.: Hart, 1995); thus, we anticipate a negative relationship 
between the Anti-Self-Dealing Index and investment - cash flow sensitivity.  
 SIZE OF STOCK MARKET and AVAILABLE CREDIT are employed as indicators for financial 
constraints, which can be related to underinvestment driven investment - cash flow 
sensitivity (see for example Stein, 2003). If easier access to financing increases (reduces) 
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investment-cash flow sensitivity, it could be interpreted as a signal that overinvestment 
(underinvestment) is the dominant underlying cause of that sensitivity in the sample.   
 GDP was included in the model to control for any possible systematic differences that 
may arise due to the wealth of the countries. Hofstede (2001) highlights the importance of 
always controlling for national wealth when studying national culture’s influence on 
behavior.  
The definition and source of the firm and country level financial and economic variables 
employed are shown in Table 5.1. Cultural variables are not included in Table 5.1, as they 
have been defined and briefly described in chapter III of this dissertation.    
Table 5.1 Definition and source of variables in regression models 
Variable Definition Source 
Firm-level variables   
CAPEX_TA Capital expenditures for purchasing 
Fixed assets divided by Total assets  
Factset 
MV_BV Share price divided by Book value per 
share as of the last trading day of the 
period 
Factset 
FCF_TA Free Cash Flow is approximated by Net 
cash flow from operating activities less 
Interest paid on debt less Total income 
taxes. To calculate the variable Free Cash 
Flow is divided by Total assets. 
Factset 
Ln_TA Normal logarithm of Total assets Factset 
Leverage Long-term debt (obligations with 
maturity exceeding one year) divided by 
Total Assets 
Factset 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 166. 
 
DIV_FCF Cash dividends paid to shareholders 
divided by Free Cash Flow 
Factset 
Cash_TA Cash and short term investments held 
divided by Total Assets 
Factset 
SIC2 The first two digits of the four digit 
primary (largest portion of revenue 
earned) Standard Industrial Classification 
code of the company.  
Factset 
Country-level 
variables 
 
 
 
Log_GDP_Capita Normal logarithm of annual GDP per 
capita 
WDI data, World Bank 
Credit_GDP Domestic credit to private sector as a 
percentage of GDP 
WDI data, World Bank 
Stock_mkt_GDP Market capitalization of listed companies 
as a percentage of GDP 
WDI data, World Bank 
Anti_Self_Dealing The index is based on county-level data 
on aspects of both ex-ante-, and ex-post 
private control of self-dealing by 
controlling shareholders. Elements 
include disclosure, independent review, 
ease of proving wrongdoing, and public 
enforcement.  
Djankov et al., (2008) 
“_t1” at the end of the variable indicates it is as of the beginning of the period. 
5.2.2.4 Statistical technique 
The choice of statistical technique to be applied is driven by several factors. Firstly, our aim 
of studying the effect of time-invariant culture on time-variant investment - cash flow 
sensitivity necessitates the adoption of one of a few specific panel data methods. Secondly, 
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several of the variables used in the regression are dynamic in nature. Roodman (2009) defines 
dynamic variable as one which is “depending on its own past realizations” (Roodman, 2009 p. 86). 
This is true in fact for most variables in corporate finance, as, for example, it is hard to argue 
that actual values of capital expenditures, firm size, leverage, dividends, and cash level at the 
firm-level, or the quality of corporate governance system, GDP per capita, the size of credit or 
the stock market to GDP at the country-level are independent of their previous values. It is a 
well-known fact that most of these variables tend to be “sticky” in time. Thirdly, as it is often 
the case with any analysis in corporate finance, the underlying assumption of traditional panel 
data regressions that independent variables are exogenous is likely to be violated potentially 
introducing significant bias in traditional panel analysis. This inherent endogeneity problem is 
well recognized and discussed in the literature (see for example: Roberts and Whited, 2013).    
To address the potential complications arising from the factors listed above, we have applied a 
one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). It is the extension of a model that has fixed and 
random effects, and transforms independent variables through differencing, applying the 
GMM statistical technique rooted in the work of Hansen (1982).  Such estimators are suited 
for statistical analysis when there are: 
 “(1) few time periods and many individuals;  
   (2) a linear functional relationship; 
   (3) one left-handed side relationship is dynamic; […]  
   (4) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous; […] 
   (5) fixed individual effects;  
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   (6) heteroskedacity and autocorrelation within individuals but not across individuals” 
(Roodman, 2009, p. 86).  
According to Roodman (2009), the system GMM panel data estimator is useful in situations 
where it is not feasible to find true external instruments, as GMM generates valid instruments 
through differencing using lags of the variables.  This is the case in our research. The use of 
GMM to address endogeneity is prevalent in the literature. Interested readers are referred to, 
among others, Crespi, F., Scellato, G., (2010), Firth et al. (2012), Pindado et al., (2011), and 
Roberts and Whited (2013) for a review of treating endogeneity on corporate finance 
empirical research.  
We have also considered replacing the GMM dynamic panel data estimator by using 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), a form of multi-level modeling. A multi-level approach 
seems warranted by the fact that the database uses variables from different levels of 
aggregation. Namely, the main variable of interest, investment-cash flow sensitivity, as well 
as several control variables, for example firm size, leverage, dividends, and so forth, are at the 
firm-level, while other variables, such as culture, corporate governance, economic 
development and financial development, are at the country-level. In such a situation, the firms 
can be viewed as being nested in the countries, where country-level variables influence all 
firms from the specific country. Snijders and Bosker (1999) warns against ignoring this effect 
and advise to apply HLM to analyze problems multi-level in nature. While it introduces an 
added level of complexity taking into account the interaction between the different levels, 
HLM is in essence a random effects panel data model. Applying it would allow us to better 
address the potential effects arising from the nestedness of countries; however, it would 
expose us to obtaining biased results due to the endogeneity of the regressors.  
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Endogeneity needs to be addressed not only due to the fact that corporate finance variables are 
likely endogenous, but also because our analysis includes culture, which has been showed in 
the literature to be related to several of our other variables such as leverage, cash level, 
dividends, and corporate governance (eg.: Breuer et al., 2014; Wang and Esqueda, 2014; Bae 
et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2012; Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010; Shao et al., 2010; Chang and 
Noorbakhsh, 2009; Ramirez and Tadesse, 2009; Li and  Harrison, 2008; Licht et al., 2007; 
Licht, 2001). This is likely the reason why out of the various articles we have reviewed 
studying the relationship between culture and financial decision making only one, Griffin et 
al. (2012), make use of a multi-level model, while the others apply some form of GMM panel 
data analysis. Following literature and the reasoning briefly outlined above, we have chosen 
the GMM dynamic panel data estimator over a HLM model. Overall, we believe this 
technique fits well our sample allowing us to draw meaningful conclusions from our analysis. 
5.2.2.5 Limitations 
Our results need to be interpreted by taking note of the following limitations.  
(i) We were obliged to use indicators to identify overinvestment and to quantify 
national culture that are less than perfect measures of these directly unobservable 
phenomena. Our methodology follows prior literature both in the construction of 
the indicators and in robustness tests in order to address this problem and minimize 
its effect. 
(ii) A further limitation is imposed by the lack of firm-level corporate governance 
control variables. As literature indicates firm-level corporate governance can 
substitute for country-level governance systems in case the latter is of lower 
quality (see for example Francis et al., 2013), it would be informative to control 
for firm-level corporate governance. However, we were unable to find such data 
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for the sample period without needing to significantly lower the number of 
countries in our sample, which, in turn, would have diminished the cultural 
variation that is needed for a meaningful analysis of national cultural effects.  
(iii) Our assumption that the location of a company’s headquarters determines its 
nationality is a potential oversimplification for multinational companies, as 
decision makers may not be of the same nationality; thus, they may be influenced 
by different cultural values. In addition, some investment decisions may be 
decided by local management. Such simplification is necessary when conducting 
large-scale empirical analysis and is dominantly used in the literature (see for 
example Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014; Wang and Esqueda, 2014).  
Furthermore, there are certain forces that result in significant influence of 
headquarters in corporate investment behavior. First, Hofstede (2010) point out 
that control and planning systems are heavily impacted by the nationality of 
corporate headquarters. This is due to legal and accounting reasons for 
consolidation among other things, but also as control and budgeting is an area of 
administration particularly open to cultural influence (Hofstede, 2010). Second, he 
also notes that “the basic values of multinational business organizations are 
determined by the nationality and personality of its founder(s) and later significant 
leaders … in multinational business organizations the values and beliefs of the 
home culture are taken for granted and serve as a frame of reference at the head 
office” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 402). House et al. (2004) explains as well that founders 
are influenced by their national culture to establish the acceptable management 
style and behavior at their organizations. As founders hire their successors, the 
same values tend to be propagated in a form of cultural transmission across 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 171. 
 
generations of top leaders. House et al. (2004) refers to this model of cultural 
transmission as Attraction-Selection-Attrition (House et al. 2004, p. 78).  
(iv) It is possible that some firms in our sample have a particularly strong 
organizational culture that may influence the propensity of management to engage 
in overinvestment in a direction markedly different from the influence of national 
culture. Should this be the case for a substantial portion of our sample firms, our 
results may be biased. We believe this not to be a significant problem for two 
reasons. First, both Hofstede (2010) and House et al. (2004) emphasize the nested 
nature of organizations within society contending that organizational culture itself 
is influenced by national culture. Thus, any such influence is likely to reinforce the 
cultural influence of the headquarters’ nationality as explained above. Second, 
discussing the impact of organizational culture on behavior, Adler (1997) notes 
that corporate culture moderates but do not dominate the influence of national 
culture.       
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Chapter VI. 
Results and Discussion 
In chapter VI we present and interpret the results of our empirical analysis. Besides the 
models including the individual cultural dimensions of Hofstede identified in our hypotheses, 
we also analyze a model with all six Hofstede dimensions simultaneously included to 
investigate their combined influence on overinvestment. We confirm the robustness of our 
results carrying out numerous tests by replacing the cultural model used and the indicator of 
country-level corporate governance, by rejecting that our indicator of overinvestment is a 
reflection of cash flow volatility or that it is dominated by underinvestment in our sample, and 
by verifying that results are not primarily driven by specific characteristics of our sample. 
Overall we find that our proposition that national culture influences overinvestment beyond 
its indirect influence on the opportunity to overinvest is corroborated. More specifically we 
find strong support for Hypothesis 1 and moderate support for Hypothesis 4, namely that 
overinvestment is positively related to Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance respectively. 
Based on our results, we were unable to establish a consistent and significant relationship 
between the cultural dimensions of Individualism and Power Distance and overinvestment, 
thus failing to confirm our Hypotheses 2 and 3.      
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
As a first step of the analysis we have constructed our final sample of potential overinvestor 
firms following the process outlined in the previous chapter. Of the overall sample, there are 
1,550 companies falling into the Low Market to Book and High Free Cash Flow to Total 
Assets quadrant companies resulting in 17,050 firm-year observations, with companies from 
all 36 countries of the original sample. The list of countries included in the sample and the 
corresponding number of companies are shown in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1. Initial and final sample firms by country  
Country Initial sample Low M/B High CF/TA  
01-11 
Australia                        217                                          52    
Austria                          26                                             6    
Belgium                          27                                             4    
Brazil                          61                                          13    
Canada                        195                                          44    
Chile                          59                                          11    
China                          54                                          16    
Denmark                          51                                             9    
Finland                          58                                          13    
France                        227                                          57    
Germany                        176                                          36    
Hong kong                        300                                          72    
India                        165                                          28    
Indonesia                        130                                          32    
Ireland                          20                                             7    
Israel                          33                                             4    
Italy                          63                                          16    
Japan                    1 857                                        356    
Malaysia                        302                                          79    
Mexico                          37                                             8    
Netherlands                          57                                          11    
New Zealand                          32                                             5    
Norway                          34                                             6    
Peru                          22                                             3    
Philippines                          55                                             9    
Poland                          22                                             6    
Portugal                          21                                             3    
Singapore                        157                                          35    
South Africa                          94                                          16    
Spain                          25                                             5    
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Sweden                          75                                          15    
Switzerland                          90                                          16    
Taiwan                        356                                          61    
Thailand                        177                                          41    
UK                        387                                          75    
US                    1 676                                        380    
TOTAL                    7 338                  1 550    
 
Table 6.2 Breakdown of initial and final sample firms by geographical region and level of 
development 
Region Number of 
countries in 
sample 
Initial 
sample: 
Number of 
firms 
Initial 
sample: 
% of Total 
Final 
sample: 
Number of 
firms 
Final 
sample:    
% of Total 
Africa and 
Middle East 
2 127 2% 20 1% 
Asia 10 3,553 48% 729 47% 
Australia and 
New Zealand 
2 249 3% 57 4% 
Europe 16 1,359 19% 285 18% 
North 
America 
2 1,871 25% 424 27% 
South- and 
Central 
America 
4 179 2% 35 2% 
Total 36 7,338 100% 1,550 100% 
      
Classification
*
      
Developed 25 6,182 84% 1,294 83% 
Developing 11 1,156 16% 256 17% 
Total 36 7,338 100% 1,550 100% 
* as classified by the OECD 
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Table 6.2 shows the geographical constitution of the initial and final samples. While all 
continents are represented in our final sample, the majority of companies are from Asia 
(47%), North America (27%), and Europe (18%), with only the remaining 7% representing 
Australia and New Zealand, Central-, and South America, and Africa and the Middle East. In 
our final sample, the country with most companies is the United States with 24% of firms 
with developing countries accounting for only 17%. Whereas this is bound to reduce the 
cultural richness of our sample potentially underrepresenting managerial behavior from those 
regions, it is a consequence of the differing degree to which the quoted company as an 
institution is established in various regions and of the quality of data available for such 
companies.  
The makeup of the initial and final samples are very similar. As the final sample includes 
firms exclusively with average sample period Cash Flows to Total Assets above, and at the 
same time, average period Market to Book values below the median in their countries, these 
are companies where the market assigns a relatively low valuation to the company’s assets 
despite relatively strong cash flows. Assuming that companies with these characteristics are 
indeed potential overinvestors, the similar makeup shows that such companies are present to a 
comparable extent across regions in our sample. This suggests that any variation we observe 
in overinvestment cannot be primarily attributed to differences in economic factors relating to 
companies having the opportunity to overinvest. 
Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in our final sample. It is notable that 
the median market to book value is only slightly less than 1. According to the theoretical 
arguments put forward by Lang and Litzenberger (1989) a Tobin’s Q of less than 1 signals 
overinvestment. In our sample almost 50% of the companies have Market to Book values 
above unity. This raises the question whether we were successful in assembling a sample 
where sensitivity of investment to cash flow is driven by overinvestment, or underinvestment 
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is also a significant cause. As we later describe, multivariate results from an alternative 
specification strongly suggest that the dominant source of such sensitivity is indeed 
overinvestment.  
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics of variables in final sample 
Variable Mean STD Smallest Median Largest 
CAPEX_TA 0.06 0.61 0 0.04 75.31 
MV_BV_t1 1.15 0.72 0 0.96 6.74 
FCF_TA 0.07 0.20 -0.45 0.06 23.17 
Ln.TA 5.90 1.82 0.12 5.76 12.75 
Leverage 0.12 0.12 0 0.08 0.89 
DIV_FCF 0.38 20.09 -244.51 0.12 2,328.23 
CASH_TA 0.13 0.12 0 0.09 0.94 
Ln.GDP_Capita 10.12 0.75 7.51 10.35 10.89 
Credit_GDP 150.24 48.52 15.21 171.64 234.54 
Stock_mkt_GDP 113.94 83.54 13.97 103.60 606.00 
Anti_Self_Dealing 0.63 0.20 0.18 0.65 1.00 
“_t1” at the end of the variable indicates it is as of the beginning of the period. 
6.2 Multivariate results 
6.2.1 Initial results 
Results from our base models are shown in Table 6.4. Models 1 to 4 apply separately the 
Hofstede dimensions with a hypothesized relationship to overinvestment. Model 5 includes all 
the cultural dimensions of Hofstede in one regression. For all models, including those that 
will be described later as robustness tests, we carried out a series of statistical tests to confirm 
the validity of the empirical technique we chose. For this reason we verified the Wald Chi 
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score for each regression for overall significance, the autocorrelation for first-, and second-
order were tested to verify that the model fulfills the underlying assumptions of the system 
GMM technique, and we carried out the Sargan-Hansen tests of overidentification.  
Table 6.4 Regression results – base models 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
 
MAS PDI IDV UAI Hofstede6 
CAPEX_TA_t1 0.00451** 0.00119 0.00122 0.00361 0.00466** 
 
(2.04) (0.18) (0.19) (1.12) (2.44) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00823** 0.00780 0.00927 0.00679 0.0112*** 
 
(2.36) (0.75) (0.89) (1.32) (3.63) 
FCF_TA -2.768*** 1.332* 1.257*** -0.684*** -2.197*** 
 
(-10.68) (1.82) (2.68) (-3.23) (-2.95) 
Ln_TA_t1 -0.000305 0.00332 0.00480 -0.00102 -0.000654 
 
(-0.09) (0.33) (0.49) (-0.20) (-0.23) 
Leverage 0.156*** 0.195** 0.197** 0.220*** 0.149*** 
 
(4.74) (1.99) (2.06) (4.58) (5.38) 
DIV_FCF -0.0000494 0.0000481 0.000513 0.00000574 0.0000723 
 
(-0.07) (0.03) (0.28) (0.01) (0.23) 
Cash_TA_t1 0.0979** 0.114 0.117 0.0992 0.0782** 
 
(2.32) (0.91) (0.95) (1.60) (2.34) 
MAS -0.00304***    -0.00224*** 
 
(-11.21)    (-6.29) 
PDI  0.00108   0.000250 
  (1.27)   (0.60) 
IDV   -0.000175  0.000337 
   (-0.30)  (0.86) 
UAI    -0.00123*** -0.000259 
    (-4.46) (-1.06) 
LTO     -0.000490 
     (-1.53) 
IVR     -0.000473 
     (-1.26) 
MAS_FCF 0.0557***    0.0380*** 
 
(15.08)    (7.68) 
PDI_FCF  -0.00769   -0.00436 
  (-0.60)   (-0.70) 
IDV_FCF   -0.00624  -0.00926* 
   (-0.84)  (-1.72) 
UAI_FCF    0.0307*** 0.00971*** 
    (9.03) (3.35) 
LTO_FCF     0.00901** 
     (2.19) 
IVR_FCF     0.00489 
     (0.90) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0111*** -0.0104 -0.00553 -0.00687 -0.00185 
 
(-3.39) (-1.03) (-0.52) (-1.43) (-0.56) 
Credit_GDP 0.00000414 0.000196 0.000201 0.0000707 0.0000830* 
 
(0.08) (1.39) (1.52) (1.05) (1.73) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.00000852 0.0000208 -0.0000160 0.0000402 -0.0000317 
 
(0.33) (0.27) (-0.20) (1.04) (-1.10) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0205* -0.0290 -0.0101 0.0303 0.0134 
 
(-1.71) (-0.82) (-0.29) (1.43) (1.00) 
_cons 0.289*** -0.0319 -0.0171 0.0683 0.156** 
 
(6.13) (-0.21) (-0.12) (0.99) (2.30) 
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Observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 13815 
Each model is a one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. While corresponding 
coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC codes, and variables representing 
the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the appendix. For the model 
including all six Hofstede cultural dimensions, Israel was excluded from the sample as its IVR score 
was not available. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   
It is important to note that the dependent variable is the amount invested in capital 
investments divided by total assets and not our indicator of overinvestment. Therefore, the 
coefficients show the effects of the regressors directly on capital expenditure and not on 
overinvestment. Overinvestment is captured by the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. A 
statistically significant coefficient of the interaction variable between the cultural value 
dimension and cash-flow (MAS_FCF, PDI_FCF, IDV_FCF, UAI_FCF) indicates whether 
national culture influences this sensitivity, thus overinvestment. These interaction terms are 
the main variables of interest in the models as they directly address our hypotheses. 
Looking at the interaction terms in models 1 to 4, we can see that Hypotheses 1 and 4 have 
been confirmed. Namely, results show a positive and statistically highly significant 
relationship between Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance dimensions of Hofstede and 
investment - cash flow sensitivity as predicted. Model 5, checking for the combined effect of 
cultural dimensions on individual behavior corresponding to the argument of Triandis (1996) 
described in chapter V, confirms both of these relationships.  
With regards to Power Distance and Individualism, our Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not 
supported. Models 2 and 3, where these variables were included separately, showed negative 
coefficients for the interaction term, a direction opposite to that hypothesized, but both were 
statistically insignificant. In the model combining all of Hofstede’s dimensions, while the 
coefficient is still negative and not significant for Power Distance, it turns weakly significant 
(at the 10% level) for Individualism. The statistical significance, albeit weak, of the negative 
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coefficient of Individualism is somewhat disturbing, as this cultural dimension has been 
widely associated with both opportunistic behavior and overconfidence in the literature. This 
result, along with those relating to the other models, will be further verified through a series 
of robustness checks we carried out.  
Before discussing those tests and their results, it may be interesting to examine the 
coefficients for the interaction terms for the two cultural dimensions regarding which we have 
not advanced any hypotheses. Model 5 shows that, when the combined effect of all the 
cultural dimensions are considered, the interaction variable with Long-Term Orientation has a 
statistically significant and positive coefficient. This may be tentatively interpreted that the 
positive relationship with overconfidence and the values encouraging investing in projects 
with elusive future benefits outweigh those related to thrift. The insignificant coefficient of 
the interaction term of the Indulgence versus Restraint dimension reinforces our assertion of 
no theoretical relationship between this dimension and investment - cash flow sensitivity.  
6.2.2 Robustness tests 
We interpret our initial results as confirming our hypotheses that higher Masculinity and 
Uncertainty Avoidance lead to more overinvestment. It could be raised as a concern that the 
direction of causality is difficult to clearly establish. However, as similarly argued throughout 
the culture and finance literature, among many others recently by Lievenbruck and Schmid 
(2014), we draw attention to the fact that culture changes very slowly with estimations 
reaching several decades or even centuries (eg.: Inglehart and Baker, 2000, Williamson 
(2000). Hofstede (2001) illustrates how cultural values are propagated from generation to 
generation, to a large extent, through socialization in the family and at school. It is very 
difficult to contend that a relatively small group’s (management) very specific behavior 
(overinvestment) would feed back into family and educational institutions in society, 
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fundamentally altering cultural values. While our statistical analysis does not empirically 
prove causality, theoretical arguments strongly suggest it. Therefore, we believe for 
interpreting our results reverse causality is not a theoretical concern.  
6.2.2.1 Cultural constructs 
An important question concerning the validity of our results is if they are primarily driven by 
our choice of model to quantify culture. To address some of the concerns raised by critics of 
Hofstede’s model briefly explained in chapter III, and to test that our results are not driven by 
specificities of the Hofstede framework, we also applied the GLOBE dimensionalist model as 
an alternative specification. The constructs, data gathering and statistical analysis of the 
GLOBE project is well grounded in theory and build on the other dimensionalist models 
preceding it.   
Hofstede’s model is the most applied in literature (Warner-Soderholm, 2012), while that of 
GLOBE is the most recent. There are theoretically identifiable links between the two sets of 
dimensions (House et al., 2004); nevertheless, the GLOBE study uses a sample, time period, 
and statistical technique completely different from Hofstede’s, and they develop substantially 
different constructs. Comparing the two models, Vas et al. (2010) concluded that none could 
be considered as superior in every aspect. Warner-Soderholm (2012) agrees and calls for 
future research to apply components of both models as best fitting the phenomenon 
researched. Besides heeding this advice, given that the two models capture diverse aspects of 
culture and represent them differently, we feel that using dimensions from both models offers 
an opportunity to study the problem from a richer perspective as well as avoid having results 
being biased by characteristics of any of the two frameworks.  
In keeping with the Value - Belief theory focusing on values as fundamental drivers of 
attitudes, preferences and behavior underlying our work, we have applied GLOBE’s Cultural 
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Value dimensions most related to the Hofstede dimensions for which we have advanced our 
hypotheses presented in chapter IV. As we have already noted, the dimensions do not always 
have their exact equivalent in both models (see Table 3.4). GLOBE argued that Hofstede’s 
Masculinity/Femininity dimension includes diverse and unrelated values; therefore, they have 
created two separate dimensions: Assertiveness (ASSE), and Gender Egalitarianism. The 
values driving our hypothesized relationship between Masculinity and overinvestment are 
grouped in the Assertiveness dimension by GLOBE; therefore, we tested our hypothesis 
replacing Masculinity by Assertiveness not including Gender Egalitarianism in our analysis. 
GLOBE also separated Hofstede’s Individualism/Collectivism dimension into two related 
dimensions: Institutional Collectivism (COL1), and In-group Collectivism (COL2). Thus, we 
analyzed five new regressions where Masculinity (MAS) was replaced by Assertiveness 
(ASSE), Power Distance (PDI) by GLOBE’s Power Distance (PDIN), Individualism by 
Institutional Collectivism (COL1) and In-group Collectivism (COL2) in two separate 
regressions, and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) by GLOBE’s Uncertainty Avoidance (UAIN). 
We analyzed the GLOBE dimensions in regressions separate from those based on the 
Hofstede framework. We believe including dimensions from different cultural conceptual 
models in the same regression would be a mistake, as both Hofstede and the GLOBE study 
have developed their models to be conceptually whole and consistent capturing the underlying 
cultural values influencing outcomes in a society. Moreover, several of their dimensions, quite 
intentionally, overlap. Therefore, mixing dimensions from different cultural models in the 
same regressions would be both theoretically wrong and empirically difficult, if not 
impossible, to interpret.  
The results of the regressions using the GLOBE dimensions, models 6 to 10, are shown in 
Table 6.5. The highly significant and positive coefficient of the Assertiveness interaction term 
in model 6 corroborates our earlier results lending strong support to our Hypothesis 1, namely 
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that higher Masculinity leads to more overinvestment. Similar to the results obtained using the 
Hofstede framework (model 2), Model 7 does not confirm our Hypothesis 2 on the positive 
relationship between Power Distance and overinvestment.  
Results using the GLOBE dimensions are not consistent with those obtained from applying 
the Hofstede scores for Individualism. As we pointed out above, the sign of the coefficient of 
interest was negative, the opposite we predicted, for the Hofstede dimension, with statistical 
significance only in the model including all Hofstede dimensions simultaneously (model 5).  
Model 9 and 10, including Institutional Collectivism (COL1) and In-group Collectivism 
(COL2) respectively, both show the expected, statistically highly significant, positive 
coefficient for the interaction term. To interpret the GLOBE coefficients in models 7 and 8, 
one has to keep in mind that GLOBE measures collectivism, which is the opposite pole to 
individualism. Therefore, the negative coefficients of interaction variables COL1_FCF and 
COL2_FCF signify a positive relationship between individualism and investment - cash flow 
sensitivity. The complete opposing and significant results between the Hofstede and the 
related GLOBE dimensions leads us to tentatively hypothesize that the driver or drivers of the 
influence of this cultural attribute on overinvestment is more complex than the one 
incorporated by the cultural dimension constructs we have employed. The specific root or 
roots of this influence are likely to be captured differently in the two frameworks leaving us 
unable to confirm our Hypothesis 3. 
With regards to Uncertainty Avoidance, while the sign of the coefficient of the interaction 
variable in model 8 is also positive, thus the same as for model 4 including Hofstede’s 
dimension, it is not statistically significant when Hofstede’s dimension (UAI) is replaced by 
the corresponding GLOBE dimension (UAIN). This disparity is most likely driven by the 
different conceptualization, sample, and methodology of Hofstede and the GLOBE project. 
Attempting to measure the same or related fundamental concepts, they capture somewhat 
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different aspects of the underlying phenomenon. Thus, while our Hypothesis 4 is supported by 
the Hofstede model, it is not corroborated by the GLOBE results.   
Table 6.5 Regression results – GLOBE cultural value dimension models 
 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
 
ASSE PDIN COL1 COL2 UAIN 
CAPEX_TA_t1 0.00430 0.00147 0.00307 0.00247 0.00136 
 
(1.64) (0.22) (0.72) (0.54) (0.20) 
MV_BV_t1 0.0104** 0.00624 0.00783 0.0121 0.00722 
 
(2.40) (0.57) (1.15) (1.62) (0.66) 
FCF_TA -5.833*** 2.950 12.26*** 17.36*** -0.576 
 
(-10.36) (0.85) (6.39) (5.40) (-0.23) 
Ln_TA_t1 -0.000619 0.00119 0.00226 0.000780 0.00262 
 
(-0.15) (0.12) (0.33) (0.11) (0.26) 
Leverage 0.178*** 0.205** 0.160** 0.174** 0.195* 
 
(4.48) (2.03) (2.44) (2.50) (1.93) 
DIV_FCF 0.000615 0.000240 0.000216 0.000631 0.000161 
 
(0.75) (0.12) (0.17) (0.46) (0.08) 
Cash_TA_t1 0.108** 0.112 0.114 0.0729 0.127 
 
(2.13) (0.89) (1.36) (0.83) (0.99) 
ASSE -0.0784***     
 (-9.20)     
PDIN  0.0759    
  (0.82)    
COL1   0.139***   
   (4.49)   
COL2    0.150***  
    (3.66)  
UAIN     -0.00166 
     (-0.03) 
ASSE_FCF 1.484***     
 (12.24)     
PDIN_FCF  -0.685    
  (-0.57)    
COL1_FCF   -2.619***   
   (-5.90)   
COL2_FCF    -2.976***  
    (-5.10)  
UAIN_FCF     0.358 
     (0.63) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0130*** -0.0138 -0.0223*** -0.0116* -0.00431 
 
(-3.32) (-1.35) (-3.28) (-1.67) (-0.29) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000249 0.000102 0.0000233 0.000179* 0.000130 
 
(0.41) (0.68) (0.22) (1.84) (0.93) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000212 0.0000228 0.0000389 -0.0000638 0.0000375 
 
(0.67) (0.27) (0.75) (-1.00) (0.46) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0359** -0.0323 -0.0226 0.0325 -0.0331 
 
(-2.38) (-0.80) (-0.91) (1.05) (-0.83) 
_cons 0.483*** -0.117 -0.433** -0.795*** 0.000116 
 
(7.02) (-0.39) (-2.56) (-3.22) (0.00) 
Observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. While corresponding 
coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC codes, and variables representing 
the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the appendix. The number of 
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observations reflect that fact that GLOBE cultural scores were unavailable for Belgium, Chile, 
Norway, Peru, and the United Kingdom. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively.   
6.2.2.2 Underlying cause of investment - cash flow sensitivity - Interaction model 
When interpreting our results, it is important to recall that investment - cash flow sensitivity 
can be driven by both over-, and underinvestment. As we intend to confirm our hypotheses 
linking cultural variables to overinvestment through an empirical relationship between these 
variables and cash - flow sensitivity, we need to first establish that such sensitivity in our 
sample is dominated by overinvestment. In other worlds, we need to confirm our underlying 
assumption of our empiric analysis that the investment - cash flow sensitivity is an 
appropriate indicator of overinvestment in our final sample. To verify this assumption we 
have run extended regressions for each of the 10 models discussed above with additional 
interaction variables between free cash flow and the control variables representing 
overinvestment mitigating characteristics. Specifically, the interaction between cash flow and 
the following variables have been added: (i) firm size, (ii) leverage, (iii) dividends, (iv) cash 
level, (v) Anti-Self-Dealing Index, (vi) size of the stock market to GDP, and (vii) available 
credit to GDP. The coefficients of these interaction variables show the effect of these 
variables on cash flow sensitivity; thus, on our indicator of overinvestment. Results with 
regards to the quality of corporate governance and availability of financing, shown in Table 
6.6, strongly support that investment-cash flow sensitivity is dominantly motivated by over-, 
and not underinvestment in our sample. Below is a brief discussion of this assertion.    
If sensitivity of investment to cash flow is driven by overinvestment, better controls on 
management through high quality corporate governance decreases it; thus, we expect a 
negative coefficient of the interaction term of cash flow and Anti-Self-Dealing Index. The 
prediction is just the opposite if the sensitivity signals underinvestment. The coefficient is 
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negative in each of the seven out of the ten models where it has statistical significance. The 
interaction coefficients of the Credit to GDP variable and cash flow also lend support to our 
argument that the investment-cash flow sensitivity indicates overinvestment in our sample. 
Table 6.6 reveals that when it enters with statistical significance, seven out of ten models, its 
coefficient is always positive. This result is not consistent with a situation where investment-
cash flow sensitivity is caused by financial constraints, the alternative well-documented 
source of underinvestment. The Stock market to GDP interaction variable is only significant 
in one regression out of the ten, where its coefficient is negative. While this may be 
suggestive of financial constraints, the fact that it enters significantly in only one model, and 
that there is a possible link between stronger firm-level governance demanded by equity 
investors than by creditors, lower the weight of this result than that of the availability of credit 
in our opinion.  
Cash flow interactions of control variables, where they enter with statistical significance, 
show the expected signs as described in the section on control variables in chapter V. More 
specifically, where firm size enters with significance, it is with positive coefficients, and cash 
held is negative and highly significant in all regressions. Coefficients for leverage and 
dividends paid are not significant in any of the models.  
Looking at the interaction variables between cash flow and the cultural dimensions, we see in 
Table 6.6 that the basic results are materially similar for Masculinity (MAS), Assertiveness 
(ASSE), Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI and UAIN), further fully confirming Hypothesis 1 and 
partially supporting Hypothesis 4, and for the GLOBE dimensions corresponding to 
Individualism (COL1 and COL2). However, the coefficients are inconsistent with the base 
model with changing signs and/or significance for Power Distance (PDI, PDIN), and IDV. 
Thus, with regards to PDI (Hypothesis 2), based on our base- and interaction models, we are 
unable to say whether there is a direct influence on overinvestment beyond those captured by 
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our control variables. For IDV (Hypothesis 3), results for the interaction specification largely 
reflect those of the base model yielding opposite significant coefficients with opposing signs 
between the Hofstede (opposite to predicted) and GLOBE (as predicted) constructs, thus 
reinforcing our conclusion that Hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed. It is also interesting to note 
that the relationship between Long-Term Orientation to cash-flow sensitivity, while still 
positive, lost its significance.  
Table 6.6 Regression results – interaction specification models 
 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 
 
MAS PDI IDV UAI ASSE PDIN COL1 COL2 UAIN Hofstede6 
CAPEX_TA_t1 0.00439* 0.00336 0.00365 0.00362 0.00444* 0.00324 0.00358 0.00362 0.00309 0.00462** 
 
(1.75) (0.85) (1.07) (1.08) (1.70) (0.75) (0.92) (1.03) (0.69) (2.33) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00700* 0.00345 0.00767 0.00792 0.00655 0.00384 0.00396 0.00773 0.00424 0.0110*** 
 
(1.77) (0.55) (1.37) (1.48) (1.52) (0.54) (0.64) (1.33) (0.58) (3.38) 
FCF_TA -1.621*** -0.740 1.520** -2.158** -2.852*** -2.196 7.572*** 12.36*** -0.375 -2.762*** 
 
(-3.03) (-0.76) (2.54) (-2.45) (-4.33) (-1.01) (3.31) (4.93) (-0.22) (-3.09) 
Ln_TA_t1 -0.00598 -0.00376 -0.00187 -0.00764 -0.00212 -0.00185 -0.00477 0.00213 -0.00444 -0.00587* 
 
(-1.31) (-0.52) (-0.30) (-1.24) (-0.43) (-0.23) (-0.65) (0.32) (-0.53) (-1.68) 
Leverage 0.178*** 0.236*** 0.219*** 0.171** 0.229*** 0.252*** 0.254*** 0.192** 0.237** 0.141*** 
 
(3.25) (2.80) (3.06) (2.32) (4.07) (2.72) (3.03) (2.51) (2.50) (3.46) 
DIV_FCF 0.000135 -0.00000895 0.0000546 0.000139 -0.0000369 0.0000928 0.0000262 0.000102 0.0000565 0.0000525 
 
(0.25) (-0.01) (0.08) (0.19) (-0.07) (0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.06) (0.18) 
Cash_TA_t1 0.158*** 0.172** 0.123* 0.183*** 0.151*** 0.213** 0.215*** 0.151** 0.213** 0.0891** 
 
(3.20) (2.22) (1.80) (2.78) (2.90) (2.52) (2.79) (2.13) (2.45) (2.39) 
MAS -0.00212***         -0.00161*** 
 
(-6.00)         (-4.65) 
PDI  -0.00109**        -0.000116 
  (-1.87)        (-0.29) 
IDV   0.000793**       0.000533 
   (2.49)       (1.39) 
UAI    -0.00127***      -0.000338 
    (-2.78)      (-1.12) 
LTO          -0.000259 
          (-0.86) 
IVR          -0.000648 
          (-1.53) 
ASSE     -0.0422***      
     (-5.32)      
PDIN      -0.0626     
      (-0.96)     
COL1       0.0565*    
       (1.81)    
COL2        0.0925***   
        (2.88)   
UAIN         0.0124  
         (0.47)  
MAS_FCF 0.0426***         0.0294*** 
 
(8.81)         (6.06) 
PDI_FCF  0.0257***        0.00229 
  (2.87)        (0.39) 
IDV_FCF   -0.0216***       -0.0119** 
   (-4.94)       (-2.27) 
UAI_FCF    0.0306***      0.0108*** 
    (5.09)      (2.77) 
LTO_FCF          0.00554 
          (1.41) 
IVR_FCF          0.00780 
          (1.27) 
ASSE_FCF     0.937***      
     (8.26)      
PDIN_FCF      1.398     
      (1.61)     
COL1_FCF       -1.325***    
       (-3.02)    
COL2_FCF        -2.105***   
        (-4.64)   
UAIN_FCF         0.278  
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         (0.94)  
Size_FCF 0.0712* 0.0471 0.0485 0.0928 0.0292 0.0338 0.0605 -0.0149 0.0670 0.0618* 
 (1.65) (0.70) (0.83) (1.60) (0.64) (0.44) (0.89) (-0.24) (0.86) (1.90) 
Leverage_FCF -0.270 -0.745 -0.557 0.409 -0.815 -1.166 -1.184 -0.408 -0.850 0.205 
 (-0.44) (-0.78) (-0.69) (0.48) (-1.26) (-1.08) (-1.23) (-0.46) (-0.77) (0.44) 
DIVfcf_FCF 0.253 0.257 0.216 0.213 0.242 0.280 0.222 0.296 0.292 0.182 
 (1.54) (0.98) (0.96) (0.96) (1.40) (0.97) (0.85) (1.26) (0.98) (1.49) 
Cash_FCF -1.565*** -1.607*** -0.983* -1.931*** -1.253*** -2.325*** -2.243*** -1.703*** -2.372*** -0.720** 
 (-3.99) (-2.58) (-1.75) (-3.75) (-3.01) (-3.57) (-3.81) (-3.09) (-3.55) (-2.36) 
Anti_FCF -0.926** -2.204*** -2.012*** 0.608 -1.261*** -2.376*** -1.742*** -0.476 -1.790** -0.212 
 (-2.23) (-3.58) (-3.80) (0.81) (-2.90) (-3.16) (-2.80) (-0.72) (-2.50) (-0.45) 
Stock_FCF 0.000661 -0.000449 -0.00160 0.00124 -0.00104 -0.000370 0.000297 -0.00288** 0.000236 -0.000248 
 (0.89) (-0.36) (-1.45) (1.25) (-1.26) (-0.26) (0.25) (-2.22) (0.18) (-0.33) 
Credit_FCF -0.0000894 0.0112*** 0.0129*** 0.00265 0.00328** 0.00547** 0.00103 0.00733*** 0.00755*** 0.00517*** 
 (-0.06) (4.05) (5.81) (1.40) (2.21) (2.21) (0.36) (3.81) (3.01) (3.64) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0105*** -0.00628 0.000454 -0.00719 -0.0102*** -0.0108 -0.0184*** -0.00968* 0.00471 -0.00123 
 
(-2.90) (-1.05) (0.08) (-1.48) (-2.63) (-1.63) (-3.02) (-1.83) (0.47) (-0.36) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000184 -0.00054*** -0.00066*** -0.0000926 -0.000208* -0.000262 -0.0000368 -0.000337** -0.000384* -0.000267** 
 
(0.15) (-2.63) (-3.96) (-0.60) (-1.70) (-1.29) (-0.16) (-2.16) (-1.92) (-2.41) 
Stock_mkt_GDP -0.0000288 0.0000295 0.0000718 -0.0000268 0.0000830 0.0000399 0.0000100 0.000127 0.00000625 -0.00000266 
 
(-0.48) (0.30) (0.83) (-0.33) (1.27) (0.35) (0.11) (1.26) (0.06) (-0.04) 
Anti_Self_Dealing 0.0428 0.119** 0.117*** -0.0189 0.0501 0.120** 0.0923* 0.0563 0.0775 0.0243 
 
(1.32) (2.46) (2.83) (-0.32) (1.48) (2.10) (1.89) (1.12) (1.40) (0.67) 
_cons 0.212*** 0.0994 -0.0698 0.185** 0.251*** 0.201 -0.145 -0.479** -0.120 0.194*** 
 
(3.44) (0.95) (-0.87) (1.99) (3.53) (1.05) (-0.79) (-2.49) (-0.58) (2.61) 
Observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 13059 13059 13059 13059 13059 13815 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. While corresponding 
coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC codes, and variables representing 
the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the appendix. The number of 
observations is lower for models applying GLOBE cultural dimensions, as cultural data was missing 
for Belgium, Chile, Norway, Peru, and the United Kingdom. For the model including all six Hofstede 
cultural dimensions, Israel was excluded from the sample as its IVR score was not available. ***,**, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
6.2.2.3 Volatility of cash flow 
Another concern about our use of investment - cash flow sensitivity as indicator of 
overinvestment is the argument presented by Cleary (2006). He found that investment is 
sensitive to cash flow not as a result of inefficient investment, but because the volatility of 
cash flow is informative about future cash flows. To examine whether this is the case in our 
sample, we reran each regression with the individual cultural dimensions; thus four models 
with the Hofstede-, and five models with the GLOBE scores, with the volatility of cash flow 
over the entire sample period for each firm included as an additional control variable. We 
report the result of this robustness test in the last column of Tables 6.7 to 6.15 separately for 
each cultural dimension. The tables show that the coefficients of this variable were not 
significant in any of the regressions. Further, the coefficients of the cash flow - cultural value 
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dimension interaction variables did not materially change. This suggests that information 
about cash-flow volatility is not the source of investment-cash flow sensitivity in our sample.  
6.2.2.4 Corporate Governance 
We verified whether our results were distorted by our choice of the indicator for the quality of 
the national corporate governance regime. We replaced our indicator in the base model, Anti 
Self-Dealing Index (Djankov et al., 2008), with Concentration of Ownership (Djankov et al., 
2008), Rule of Law (World Bank), and Common Law Origin (La Porta et al., 1998) in 
separate regressions. These choices were motivated by the following considerations:  
(i) Ownership concentration may be viewed as a form of corporate governance 
system substituting efficient rule based governance (La Porta et al., 1998);  
(ii) Strong enforcement may have a significant effect on managerial opportunism 
improving corporate governance;  
(iii) Starting with La Porta et al.’s seminal “Law and Finance” article published in 
1998, researchers found that common law origins tend to result in stronger 
protection for capital providers.  
Results shown in the second, third and fourth columns of Tables 6.7 to 6.15 show that the 
application of each corporate governance indicator yielded materially the same results as the 
base models demonstrating that our results were not biased by the choice of the indicator for 
country-level corporate governance.  
6.2.2.5 Sample characteristics 
In order to ensure that results are not driven by specific sample characteristics, we carried out 
further tests of robustness. We eliminated the years 2008 and 2009 from the sample period to 
account for potential distortion of investment activity that may be caused by the financial 
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crisis. Following, Chen et al. (2015), we have eliminated the country with the largest number 
of firms (US with 24%) from our final sample. We have also separately eliminated outliers 
based on firm size, free cash flow, and capital expenditures. As indicated by results in 
columns five to six in Tables 6.7 to 6.15, none of these additional robustness tests 
significantly affected our results concerning the strong confirmation of Hypothesis 1 and the 
partial support of Hypothesis 4. The results for the GLOBE dimensions related to 
Individualism (COL1 and COL2) were also consistent in each test. With regards to Power 
Distance (PDI, PDIN) and Hofstede’s Individualism (IDV), similar to the interaction model, 
and we believe for the same reasons, some of the robustness tests returned inconsistent 
results. As discussed above we are unable to support Hypotheses 2 and 3.   
Table 6.7. Regression results – Masculinity (Hofstede) robustness checks  
 (1)                   
Base model 
(21) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(22)                     
Rule of Law 
(23)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(24)                        
ex USA 
(25)                       
ex Crisis 
(26)                     
Outliers - Size 
(27)                     
Outliers - 
Cash Flow 
(28)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(29)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
           L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00451** 0.00451** 0.00451** 0.00448** 0.00468** 0.00443** 0.00454** 0.00586*** 0.00603*** 0.00513** 
 
(2.04) (2.03) (2.03) (2.05) (2.52) (2.07) (2.11) (5.87) (5.78) (2.12) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00823** 0.00835** 0.00846** 0.00857** 0.0102*** 0.0144*** 0.00852** 0.00818*** 0.00745*** 0.00824** 
 
(2.36) (2.36) (2.39) (2.49) (2.74) (3.41) (2.44) (5.12) (4.42) (2.36) 
FCF_TA -2.768*** -2.767*** -2.758*** -2.766*** -2.782*** -2.930*** -2.748*** -3.426*** -3.604*** -2.769*** 
 
(-10.68) (-10.60) (-10.57) (-10.78) (-14.37) (-10.75) (-11.08) (-76.85) (-39.07) (-10.67) 
L.Ln_TA -0.000305 0.000871 0.00101 0.000377 -0.00214 0.000957 0.000445 -0.00388** -0.00689*** -0.000352 
 
(-0.09) (0.26) (0.30) (0.12) (-0.60) (0.26) (0.12) (-2.57) (-4.32) (-0.10) 
Leverage 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.143*** 0.149*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.156*** 
 
(4.74) (4.66) (4.65) (4.83) (5.06) (3.78) (4.54) (12.68) (11.25) (4.72) 
DIV_FCF -0.0000494 -0.0000123 -0.00000659 -0.0000532 -0.000277 0.000124 0.0000772 0.000140 -0.000116 -0.0000543 
 
(-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.08) (-0.51) (0.19) (0.12) (0.47) (-0.37) (-0.08) 
L.Cash_TA 0.0979** 0.102** 0.104** 0.0999** 0.0886** 0.0790* 0.0996** 0.0882*** 0.0867*** 0.0959** 
 
(2.32) (2.40) (2.46) (2.40) (2.39) (1.69) (2.35) (4.55) (4.38) (2.26) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000891 
          
(-0.64) 
MAS 
-
0.00304*** -0.00301*** -0.00299*** -0.00318*** -0.00340*** -0.00296*** -0.00304*** -0.00387*** -0.00409*** -0.00304*** 
 
(-11.21) (-11.08) (-11.09) (-11.73) (-16.88) (-10.87) (-11.69) (-65.49) (-46.80) (-11.19) 
MAS_FCF 0.0557*** 0.0557*** 0.0556*** 0.0558*** 0.0584*** 0.0587*** 0.0558*** 0.0693*** 0.0723*** 0.0558*** 
 
(15.08) (14.96) (14.92) (15.23) (22.62) (15.54) (15.83) (128.52) (72.85) (15.07) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0111*** -0.0103*** -0.00939* -0.0105*** -0.00799*** -0.0121*** -0.0107*** -0.00886*** -0.00824*** -0.0111*** 
 
(-3.39) (-3.04) (-1.93) (-3.17) (-2.87) (-3.43) (-3.38) (-5.98) (-5.31) (-3.39) 
Credit_GDP 0.00000414 -0.0000306 -0.0000181 0.0000489 0.000160*** -0.0000355 -0.0000105 -0.0000145 0.00000433 0.00000438 
 
(0.08) (-0.62) (-0.37) (0.97) (3.38) (-0.66) (-0.21) (-0.63) (0.18) (0.09) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.00000852 -0.00000923 -0.0000165 0.0000184 -0.0000154 0.0000207 0.00000389 6.31e-08 -0.00000113 0.00000884 
 
(0.33) (-0.40) (-0.75) (0.78) (-0.66) (0.68) (0.15) (0.01) (-0.09) (0.34) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0205* 
   
-0.0210** -0.0153 -0.0184 -0.0280*** -0.0390*** -0.0206* 
 
(-1.71) 
   
(-1.87) (-1.17) (-1.55) (-5.18) (-6.81) (-1.72) 
concentration 
 
-0.0108 
        
  
(-0.91) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.000886 
       
   
(-0.18) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.0179*** 
      
    
(-4.03) 
      _cons 0.289*** 0.265*** 0.250*** 0.279*** 0.274*** 0.289*** 0.280*** 0.352*** 0.378*** 0.290*** 
 
(6.13) (6.25) (5.06) (6.67) (6.28) (5.77) (5.95) (16.57) (17.27) (6.14) 
_observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13630 13668 13677 13950 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. While corresponding 
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coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC codes, and variables representing 
the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the appendix. ***,**, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6.8. Regression results – Power Distance (Hofstede) robustness checks  
 (2)                   
Base model 
(30)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(31)                     
Rule of Law 
(32)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(33)                        
ex USA 
(34)                       
ex Crisis 
(35)                     
Outliers - Size 
(36)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(37)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(38)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00119 0.00119 0.00122 0.00111 0.00159 0.00108 0.00112 0.00380 0.00546** 0.00151 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.26) (0.15) (0.17) (1.56) (2.08) (0.21) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00780 0.00784 0.00725 0.00853 0.00832 0.0118 0.00762 -0.00666* -0.0134*** 0.00780 
 
(0.75) (0.74) (0.69) (0.82) (0.67) (0.83) (0.71) (-1.70) (-3.22) (0.75) 
FCF_TA 1.332* 1.358* 1.321* 1.328* 2.794*** 1.711* 1.372* 7.958*** 3.488*** 1.332* 
 
(1.82) (1.84) (1.80) (1.82) (4.10) (1.87) (1.86) (48.64) (13.03) (1.82) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00332 0.00540 0.00519 0.00467 0.00306 0.00261 0.00540 -0.00908** -0.0185*** 0.00329 
 
(0.33) (0.53) (0.51) (0.48) (0.25) (0.21) (0.49) (-2.47) (-4.63) (0.32) 
Leverage 0.195** 0.191* 0.189* 0.197** 0.264** 0.224* 0.186* 0.407*** 0.551*** 0.195** 
 
(1.99) (1.95) (1.93) (2.02) (2.49) (1.80) (1.86) (11.78) (14.57) (1.99) 
DIV_FCF 0.0000481 0.0000816 0.0000891 0.0000539 -0.0000778 0.000212 0.000119 -0.000404 0.000714 0.0000463 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (-0.06) (0.13) (0.08) (-0.76) (1.25) (0.03) 
L.Cash_TA 0.114 0.122 0.123 0.116 0.0891 0.0882 0.127 0.178*** 0.141*** 0.113 
 
(0.91) (0.97) (0.98) (0.93) (0.74) (0.57) (0.98) (3.80) (2.86) (0.90) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000463 
          
(-0.11) 
PDI 0.00108 0.00119 0.000958 0.000992 0.00225*** 0.00150 0.00110 0.00705*** 0.00182*** 0.00108 
 
(1.27) (1.36) (1.12) (1.18) (2.89) (1.49) (1.28) (32.30) (5.58) (1.27) 
PDI_FCF -0.00769 -0.00826 -0.00760 -0.00747 -0.0256** -0.0115 -0.00806 -0.0997*** -0.00788 -0.00770 
 
(-0.60) (-0.63) (-0.59) (-0.58) (-2.23) (-0.72) (-0.62) (-36.89) (-1.59) (-0.60) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0104 -0.00958 -0.00651 -0.0105 -0.00755 -0.0104 -0.0105 0.00182 0.00454 -0.0104 
 
(-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.46) (-1.03) (-0.79) (-0.86) (-1.04) (0.49) (1.13) (-1.03) 
Credit_GDP 0.000196 0.000130 0.000167 0.000205 0.000337** 0.000243 0.000180 0.0000573 0.000288*** 0.000196 
 
(1.39) (0.91) (1.23) (1.48) (2.29) (1.48) (1.25) (1.10) (5.09) (1.40) 
           Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000208 0.00000556 -0.0000109 0.0000356 -0.000000168 0.0000311 0.0000158 0.0000137 -0.0000135 0.0000209 
 
(0.27) (0.08) (-0.16) (0.49) (-0.00) (0.31) (0.20) (0.47) (-0.43) (0.27) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0290 
   
-0.0225 -0.0370 -0.0258 -0.0703*** -0.0757*** -0.0291 
 
(-0.82) 
   
(-0.58) (-0.86) (-0.71) (-5.38) (-5.31) (-0.82) 
concentration 
 
-0.0387 
        
  
(-1.07) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.00521 
       
   
(-0.32) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.0202 
      
    
(-1.57) 
      _cons -0.0319 -0.0632 -0.0859 -0.0412 -0.166 -0.0575 -0.0473 -0.470*** -0.155*** -0.0316 
 
(-0.21) (-0.45) (-0.56) (-0.29) (-1.10) (-0.32) (-0.31) (-8.37) (-2.60) (-0.21) 
number of observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13680 13668 13677 13950 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. While corresponding 
coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC codes, and variables representing 
the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the appendix. ***,**, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6.9. Regression results – Individualism (Hofstede) robustness checks  
 
 (3)                   
Base model 
(39) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(40)                     
Rule of Law 
(41)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(42)                        
ex USA 
(43)                       
ex Crisis 
(44)                     
Outliers - Size 
(45)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(46)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(47)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00122 0.00120 0.00122 0.00122 0.00133 0.000975 0.00113 0.00300 0.00559** 0.00157 
 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (1.09) (2.01) (0.22) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00927 0.00922 0.00889 0.00913 0.00688 0.0127 0.00923 -0.00800* -0.00825* 0.00929 
 
(0.89) (0.88) (0.85) (0.88) (0.52) (0.88) (0.86) (-1.78) (-1.83) (0.89) 
FCF_TA 1.257*** 1.239*** 1.244*** 1.257*** 1.182*** 1.340** 1.271*** 0.316*** 4.590*** 1.256*** 
 
(2.68) (2.63) (2.65) (2.69) (2.74) (2.41) (2.74) (3.61) (33.09) (2.68) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00480 0.00656 0.00683 0.00500 0.00362 0.00536 0.00678 -0.00494 -0.0150*** 0.00476 
 
(0.49) (0.67) (0.71) (0.51) (0.29) (0.44) (0.63) (-1.20) (-3.59) (0.48) 
Leverage 0.197** 0.195** 0.193** 0.198** 0.274** 0.219* 0.188* 0.446*** 0.516*** 0.197** 
 
(2.06) (2.04) (2.02) (2.07) (2.45) (1.77) (1.92) (11.42) (12.97) (2.06) 
DIV_FCF 0.000513 0.000522 0.000524 0.000533 0.000523 0.000908 0.000596 0.000454 0.00229*** 0.000509 
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Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. While corresponding 
coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC codes, and variables representing 
the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the appendix. ***,**, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6.10. Regression results – Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede) robustness checks  
 (4)                   
Base model 
(48)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(49)                     
Rule of Law 
(50)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(51)                        
ex USA 
(52)                       
ex Crisis 
(53)                     
Outliers - Size 
(54)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(55)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(56)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
           L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00361 0.00362 0.00362 0.00362 0.00386 0.00354 0.00361 0.00569*** 0.00583*** 0.00424 
 
(1.12) (1.11) (1.11) (1.11) (1.37) (1.08) (1.13) (4.63) (4.66) (1.20) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00679 0.00587 0.00587 0.00565 0.00735 0.0115* 0.00725 0.00146 0.00285 0.00681 
 
(1.32) (1.14) (1.14) (1.11) (1.29) (1.76) (1.39) (0.74) (1.40) (1.33) 
FCF_TA -0.684*** -0.681*** -0.684*** -0.681*** -0.645*** -0.635*** -0.678*** -0.486*** -1.275*** -0.685*** 
 
(-3.23) (-3.18) (-3.20) (-3.18) (-3.73) (-2.76) (-3.24) (-16.38) (-17.20) (-3.23) 
L.Ln_TA -0.00102 -0.00145 -0.00141 -0.00153 -0.00597 -0.0000320 -0.000640 -0.00708*** -0.0116*** -0.00108 
 
(-0.20) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-1.05) (-0.01) (-0.12) (-3.72) (-5.90) (-0.21) 
Leverage 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.270*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.327*** 0.291*** 0.219*** 
 
(4.58) (4.55) (4.57) (4.55) (5.54) (3.78) (4.46) (18.63) (15.64) (4.56) 
DIV_FCF 0.00000574 0.000000582 0.00000604 0.0000161 -0.000524 0.000217 0.0000526 0.000351 -0.0000377 3.55e-08 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.65) (0.22) (0.06) (0.99) (-0.10) (0.00) 
L.Cash_TA 0.0992 0.102 0.105* 0.102 0.0776 0.0727 0.102 0.132*** 0.0926*** 0.0971 
 
(1.60) (1.64) (1.69) (1.64) (1.36) (1.01) (1.62) (5.55) (3.92) (1.56) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000896 
          
(-0.44) 
UAI -0.00123*** -0.00135*** -0.00140*** -0.00148*** -0.00167*** -0.00109*** -0.00123*** -0.00171*** -0.00244*** -0.00123*** 
 
(-4.46) (-5.24) (-5.49) (-5.16) (-7.47) (-3.64) (-4.55) (-26.37) (-29.43) (-4.46) 
UAI_FCF 0.0307*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.0305*** 0.0336*** 0.0317*** 0.0310*** 0.0394*** 0.0488*** 0.0307*** 
 
(9.03) (8.87) (8.91) (8.86) (13.47) (8.90) (9.32) (102.47) (59.31) (9.03) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.00687 -0.00828 -0.00277 -0.00872* -0.00409 -0.00793 -0.00667 -0.00163 -0.000678 -0.00686 
 
(-1.43) (-1.64) (-0.39) (-1.74) (-0.96) (-1.47) (-1.42) (-0.90) (-0.37) (-1.43) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000707 0.000112 0.000104 0.000116* 0.000203*** 0.0000634 0.0000615 0.0000374 0.0000881*** 0.0000713 
 
(1.05) (1.64) (1.62) (1.68) (2.98) (0.83) (0.91) (1.44) (3.33) (1.06) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000402 0.0000535 0.0000560 0.0000601 0.0000213 0.0000579 0.0000383 0.0000290* 0.0000266 0.0000406 
 
(1.04) (1.43) (1.54) (1.63) (0.59) (1.22) (0.99) (1.94) (1.75) (1.05) 
Anti_Self_Dealing 0.0303 
   
0.00957 0.0408* 0.0325 0.0216*** 0.00508 0.0302 
 
(1.43) 
   
(0.49) (1.65) (1.53) (2.66) (0.61) (1.42) 
concentration 
 
0.0119 
        
  
(0.68) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.00859 
       
   
(-1.20) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.00665 
      
    
(-0.78) 
      _cons 0.0683 0.105 0.0654 0.125** 0.0984 0.0579 0.0625 0.0792*** 0.143*** 0.0688 
 
(0.99) (1.81) (0.95) (2.08) (1.48) (0.74) (0.90) (2.92) (5.28) (1.00) 
_observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13680 13688 13677 13950 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.44) (0.32) (0.59) (2.98) (0.27) 
L.Cash_TA 0.117 0.123 0.129 0.119 0.106 0.0982 0.127 0.241*** 0.132** 0.116 
 
(0.95) (1.00) (1.05) (0.97) (0.84) (0.64) (1.00) (4.57) (2.54) (0.94) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000512 
          
(-0.12) 
IDV -0.000175 -0.000241 -0.000166 -0.0000762 -0.000539 -0.000407 -0.000189 -0.00358*** 0.00137*** -0.000177 
 
(-0.30) (-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.12) (-0.83) (-0.56) (-0.32) (-18.97) (5.84) (-0.31) 
IDV_FCF -0.00624 -0.00599 -0.00613 -0.00623 0.00254 -0.00529 -0.00615 0.0428*** -0.0325*** -0.00624 
 
(-0.84) (-0.80) (-0.82) (-0.84) (0.32) (-0.56) (-0.82) (21.66) (-11.23) (-0.84) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.00553 -0.00549 -0.000512 -0.00715 -0.00776 -0.00459 -0.00533 0.00791* 0.00371 -0.00551 
 
(-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.04) (-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.36) (-0.50) (1.75) (0.82) (-0.52) 
Credit_GDP 0.000201 0.000162 0.000194 0.000201 0.000296** 0.000234 0.000185 0.0000171 0.000290*** 0.000201 
 
(1.52) (1.18) (1.49) (1.54) (2.05) (1.48) (1.37) (0.30) (5.08) (1.53) 
           Stock_mkt_GDP -0.0000160 -0.0000156 -0.0000286 -0.00000125 -0.0000147 -0.0000139 -0.0000220 -0.0000563 -0.0000432 -0.0000159 
 
(-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.45) (-0.01) (-0.18) (-0.13) (-0.27) (-1.62) (-1.24) (-0.20) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0101 
   
-0.00488 -0.00943 -0.00678 -0.0269* -0.0393*** -0.0102 
 
(-0.29) 
   
(-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.19) (-1.84) (-2.64) (-0.30) 
Concentration 
 
-0.0253 
        
  
(-0.75) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.00777 
       
   
(-0.55) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.00855 
      
    
(-0.56) 
      _cons -0.0171 -0.0212 -0.0798 -0.00963 0.00814 -0.0250 -0.0328 0.0623 -0.122** -0.0168 
 
(-0.12) (-0.17) (-0.57) (-0.07) (0.05) (-0.15) (-0.23) (1.02) (-2.06) (-0.12) 
_observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13680 13668 13677 13950 
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Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. While corresponding 
coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC codes, and variables representing 
the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the appendix. ***,**, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6.11. Regression results – Assertiveness (GLOBE) robustness checks  
 (6)                   
Basic 
(57) 
Concentration 
(58)                     
Rule of Law 
(59)         
Common 
Legal Origin 
(60)                        
ex USA 
(61)                       
ex Crisis 
(62)                     
Outliers - 
Size 
(63)                     
Outliers - 
Cash Flow 
(64)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(65)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00430 0.00432* 0.00433* 0.00429* 0.00440* 0.00443* 0.00428 0.00571*** 0.00606*** 0.00487* 
 
(1.64) (1.64) (1.65) (1.66) (1.86) (1.85) (1.64) (4.49) (4.74) (1.70) 
MV_BV_t1 0.0104** 0.0110** 0.0110** 0.0111** 0.0139*** 0.0150*** 0.0107** 0.0154*** 0.00889*** 0.0104** 
 
(2.40) (2.49) (2.50) (2.60) (2.71) (3.03) (2.40) (7.24) (4.12) (2.40) 
FCF_TA -5.833*** -5.804*** -5.800*** -5.860*** -5.996*** -6.712*** -5.962*** -10.83*** -8.112*** -5.833*** 
 
(-10.36) (-10.28) (-10.27) (-10.56) (-13.49) (-11.58) (-10.58) (-82.77) (-42.95) (-10.35) 
L.Ln_TA -0.000619 0.000740 0.000944 0.000069 0.00302 -0.000793 0.000636 0.000670 -0.00761*** -0.000665 
 
(-0.15) (0.18) (0.23) (0.02) (0.65) (-0.19) (0.15) (0.34) (-3.83) (-0.16) 
Leverage 0.178*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.209*** 0.173*** 0.164*** 0.109*** 0.215*** 0.177*** 
 
(4.48) (4.41) (4.39) (4.59) (4.89) (4.05) (4.02) (5.79) (10.96) (4.46) 
DIV_FCF 0.000615 0.000616 0.000631 0.000626 0.000362 0.00101 0.000636 0.000888** 0.00119*** 0.000608 
 
(0.75) (0.75) (0.77) (0.78) (0.52) (1.31) (0.79) (2.28) (3.07) (0.74) 
L.Cash_TA 0.108** 0.111** 0.116** 0.107** 0.113** 0.110** 0.110** 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.106** 
 
(2.13) (2.17) (2.27) (2.15) (2.34) (2.08) (2.11) (4.08) (4.37) (2.08) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000825 
          
(-0.50) 
ASSE -0.0784*** -0.0780*** -0.0779*** -0.0823*** -0.0871*** -0.0854*** -0.0800*** -0.147*** -0.112*** -0.0783*** 
 
(-9.20) (-9.13) (-9.03) (-9.69) (-12.82) (-10.05) (-9.42) (-65.62) (-39.34) (-9.19) 
ASSE_FCF 1.484*** 1.478*** 1.477*** 1.491*** 1.554*** 1.677*** 1.508*** 2.505*** 2.047*** 1.484*** 
 
(12.24) (12.15) (12.14) (12.48) (17.03) (13.69) (12.53) (99.21) (59.35) (12.23) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0130*** -0.0109*** -0.0109* -0.0120*** -0.0124*** -0.0137*** -0.0131*** -0.0148*** -0.0112*** -0.0130*** 
 
(-3.32) (-2.70) (-1.88) (-3.07) (-3.42) (-3.45) (-3.35) (-7.72) (-5.80) (-3.31) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000249 0.0000020 0.0000045 0.0000614 0.000237*** 0.0000081 0.0000172 0.0000685** 0.0000162 0.0000253 
 
(0.41) (0.03) (0.07) (1.01) (3.75) (0.13) (0.28) (2.30) (0.54) (0.42) 
           Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000212 -0.0000228 -0.0000256 -0.0000237 -0.0000277 0.0000394 0.0000159 0.0000123 0.0000141 0.0000214 
 
(0.67) (-0.83) (-1.02) (0.84) (-0.89) (1.14) (0.50) (0.78) (0.89) (0.67) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0359** 
   
-0.00332 -0.0368** -0.0324** -0.0334*** -0.0569*** -0.0361** 
 
(-2.38) 
   
(-0.20) (-2.35) (-2.14) (-4.58) (-7.64) (-2.39) 
concentration 
 
-0.00299 
        
  
(-0.21) 
        rule_law 
  
0.000130 
       
   
(0.02) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.02032*** 
      
    
(-3.864) 
      _cons 0.483*** 0.430*** 0.427*** 0.47065*** 0.444*** 0.520*** 0.483*** 0.821*** 0.675*** 0.484*** 
 
(7.02) (6.84) (6.26) (7.41) (6.85) (7.54) (6.95) (27.62) (22.09) (7.02) 
_observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of 
observations is lower for models applying GLOBE cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede 
dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, Peru, and the United 
Kingdom. While corresponding coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC 
codes, and variables representing the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the 
appendix. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6.12. Regression results – Power Distance (GLOBE) robustness checks  
 (7)                   
Base model 
(66) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(67)                     
Rule of Law 
(68)         
Common 
Legal Origin 
(69)                        
ex USA 
(70)                       
ex Crisis 
(71)                     
Outliers - 
Size 
(72)                     
Outliers - 
Cash Flow 
(73)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(74)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00147 0.00150 0.00148 0.00140 0.00187 0.00140 0.00139 0.00376 0.00579** 0.00176 
 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.31) (0.20) (0.21) (1.50) (2.16) (0.24) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00624 0.00597 0.00582 0.00720 0.00654 0.00847 0.00583 -0.0117*** -0.0165*** 0.00623 
 
(0.57) (0.54) (0.53) (0.66) (0.49) (0.57) (0.52) (-2.81) (-3.71) (0.57) 
FCF_TA 2.950 2.929 2.849 3.003 5.937** 4.665 3.302 31.31*** 8.870*** 2.954 
 
(0.85) (0.84) (0.82) (0.87) (2.09) (1.09) (0.95) (37.61) (6.59) (0.85) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00119 0.00221 0.00284 0.00241 -0.00214 -0.0000353 0.00253 -0.0191*** -0.0192*** 0.00115 
 
(0.12) (0.21) (0.27) (0.24) (-0.17) (-0.00) (0.23) (-5.05) (-4.66) (0.11) 
Leverage 0.205** 0.200** 0.198** 0.207** 0.325*** 0.247* 0.198* 0.502*** 0.540*** 0.204** 
 
(2.03) (1.98) (1.96) (2.06) (2.95) (1.94) (1.92) (13.60) (13.56) (2.02) 
DIV_FCF 0.000240 0.000241 0.000220 0.000230 -0.000181 0.000694 0.000351 0.000812 0.00179** 0.000237 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (-0.10) (0.31) (0.18) (1.08) (2.25) (0.12) 
L.Cash_TA 0.112 0.116 0.125 0.113 0.0799 0.101 0.124 0.173*** 0.118** 0.111 
 
(0.89) (0.91) (0.99) (0.90) (0.65) (0.65) (0.95) (3.59) (2.35) (0.87) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000412 
          
(-0.10) 
PDIN 0.0759 0.0621 0.0624 0.0686 0.132* 0.123 0.0839 0.776*** 0.225*** 0.0761 
 
(0.82) (0.68) (0.69) (0.76) (1.67) (1.10) (0.91) (31.10) (6.20) (0.82) 
PDIN_FCF -0.685 -0.679 -0.652 -0.701 -1.548 -1.223 -0.797 -10.05*** -2.027*** -0.687 
 
(-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.59) (-1.57) (-0.83) (-0.66) (-35.19) (-4.31) (-0.57) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0138 -0.0134 -0.00212 -0.0135 -0.0102 -0.0151 -0.0137 0.00786** -0.00143 -0.0138 
 
(-1.35) (-1.28) (-0.14) (-1.30) (-1.07) (-1.23) (-1.35) (2.03) (-0.34) (-1.35) 
Credit_GDP 0.000102 0.0000841 0.000111 0.000128 0.000290* 0.000119 0.0000900 -0.000109* -0.00000028 0.000103 
 
(0.68) (0.52) (0.73) (0.84) (1.87) (0.67) (0.59) (-1.90) (-0.00) (0.69) 
           
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000228 0.00000560 -0.0000078 0.0000422 -0.0000184 0.0000247 0.0000176 
-
0.000109*** -0.0000328 0.0000230 
 
(0.27) (0.07) (-0.11) (0.52) (-0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (-3.42) (-0.96) (0.27) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0323 
   
-0.00944 -0.0394 -0.0302 -0.0745*** -0.0824*** -0.0324 
 
(-0.80) 
   
(-0.21) (-0.80) (-0.75) (-4.88) (-4.97) (-0.80) 
Concentration 
 
-0.0156 
        
  
(-0.44) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.0158 
       
   
(-1.05) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.0223* 
      
    
(-1.70) 
      _cons -0.117 -0.105 -0.214 -0.118 -0.338 -0.231 -0.151 -2.190*** -0.567*** -0.117 
 
(-0.39) (-0.35) (-0.66) (-0.39) (-1.31) (-0.63) (-0.50) (-24.17) (-4.75) (-0.39) 
_observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of 
observations is lower for models applying GLOBE cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede 
dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, Peru, and the United 
Kingdom. While corresponding coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC 
codes, and variables representing the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the 
appendix. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6.13. Regression results – Institutional Collectivism (GLOBE) robustness checks  
 (8)                   
Base model 
(75) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(76)                     
Rule of Law 
(77)         
Common 
Legal Origin 
(78)                        
ex USA 
(79)                       
ex Crisis 
(80)                     
Outliers - 
Size 
(81)                     
Outliers - 
Cash Flow 
(82)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(83)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00307 0.00310 0.00309 0.00300 0.00416 0.00322 0.00316 0.00552*** 0.00604*** 0.00352 
 
(0.72) (0.73) (0.73) (0.71) (1.51) (0.78) (0.77) (3.58) (3.76) (0.75) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00783 0.00807 0.00808 0.00868 0.0107* 0.0115 0.00762 0.00428* 0.00112 0.00782 
 
(1.15) (1.17) (1.17) (1.27) (1.81) (1.38) (1.12) (1.72) (0.43) (1.14) 
FCF_TA 12.26*** 12.33*** 12.27*** 12.28*** 16.21*** 14.43*** 12.66*** 23.83*** 21.38*** 12.26*** 
 
(6.39) (6.42) (6.41) (6.45) (15.65) (6.74) (6.89) (85.49) (47.77) (6.39) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00226 0.00331 0.00384 0.00336 0.00423 0.000759 0.00359 -0.000923 -0.00812*** 0.00222 
 
(0.33) (0.51) (0.59) (0.53) (0.72) (0.10) (0.51) (-0.38) (-3.17) (0.33) 
Leverage 0.160** 0.156** 0.157** 0.161** 0.172*** 0.173** 0.153** 0.173*** 0.256*** 0.159** 
 
(2.44) (2.40) (2.40) (2.49) (3.41) (2.29) (2.36) (7.60) (10.29) (2.43) 
DIV_FCF 0.000216 0.000208 0.000209 0.000212 -0.000205 0.000555 0.000324 0.000745* 0.000495 0.000212 
 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (-0.26) (0.43) (0.26) (1.66) (1.06) (0.16) 
L.Cash_TA 0.114 0.117 0.123 0.115 0.101* 0.0953 0.125 0.139*** 0.0995*** 0.113 
 
(1.36) (1.40) (1.48) (1.38) (1.74) (1.02) (1.50) (4.53) (3.20) (1.34) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000635 
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(-0.24) 
COL1 0.139*** 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 0.199*** 0.158*** 0.143*** 0.302*** 0.261*** 0.139*** 
 
(4.49) (4.50) (4.46) (4.65) (11.32) (4.75) (4.83) (49.24) (30.07) (4.49) 
COL1_FCF -2.619*** -2.635*** -2.621*** -2.621*** -3.432*** -3.102*** -2.702*** -5.212*** -4.553*** -2.619*** 
 
(-5.90) (-5.93) (-5.92) (-5.95) (-14.26) (-6.23) (-6.36) (-78.36) (-40.90) (-5.90) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0223*** -0.0215*** -0.0145 -0.0210*** -0.0180*** -0.0247*** -0.0227*** -0.0226*** -0.0195*** -0.0223*** 
 
(-3.28) (-3.11) (-1.52) (-3.06) (-4.07) (-3.34) (-3.48) (-9.09) (-7.53) (-3.28) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000233 -0.0000165 0.0000066 0.0000537 0.000261*** 0.0000269 0.00000968 0.00000623 0.0000247 0.0000238 
 
(0.22) (-0.16) (0.06) (0.51) (3.28) (0.23) (0.09) (0.16) (0.61) (0.22) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000389 0.0000247 0.0000106 0.0000572 -0.0000280 0.0000558 0.0000350 0.0000252 0.0000303 0.0000392 
 
(0.75) (0.56) (0.26) (1.25) (-0.76) (0.93) (0.69) (1.32) (1.52) (0.75) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0226 
   
0.00877 -0.0274 -0.0202 -0.0283*** -0.0478*** -0.0227 
 
(-0.91) 
   
(0.44) (-0.99) (-0.83) (-3.15) (-5.03) (-0.91) 
concentration 
 
-0.0220 
        
  
(-0.92) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.0103 
       
   
(-1.07) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.0209** 
      
    
(-2.42) 
      _cons -0.433** -0.463*** -0.517*** -0.476*** -0.818*** -0.478*** -0.458*** -1.136*** -0.943*** -0.432** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.77) (-3.04) (-2.88) (-7.50) (-2.62) (-2.77) (-24.32) (-17.34) (-2.55) 
_observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of 
observations is lower for models applying GLOBE cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede 
dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, Peru, and the United 
Kingdom. While corresponding coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC 
codes, and variables representing the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the 
appendix. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6.14. Regression results – In-group Collectivism (GLOBE) robustness checks  
 (9)                   
Base model 
(84) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(85)                     
Rule of Law 
(86)         
Common 
Legal Origin 
(87)                        
ex USA 
(88)                       
ex Crisis 
(89)                     
Outliers - 
Size 
(90)                     
Outliers - 
Cash Flow 
(91)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(92)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00247 0.00245 0.00246 0.00246 0.00257 0.00238 0.00245 0.00485*** 0.00535*** 0.00309 
 
(0.54) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53) (0.61) (0.50) (0.54) (2.69) (3.04) (0.62) 
MV_BV_t1 0.0121 0.0112 0.0112 0.0110 0.0153* 0.0191* 0.0123 0.0192*** 0.00809*** 0.0121 
 
(1.62) (1.50) (1.50) (1.47) (1.69) (1.93) (1.59) (6.43) (2.74) (1.61) 
FCF_TA 17.36*** 17.25*** 17.30*** 17.24*** 21.73*** 19.87*** 18.00*** 47.03*** 34.18*** 17.37*** 
 
(5.40) (5.34) (5.37) (5.33) (7.54) (5.31) (5.50) (63.52) (41.46) (5.40) 
L.Ln_TA 0.000780 -0.0000351 0.000538 0.000421 0.000883 0.00134 0.00292 -0.00396 -0.0104*** 0.000724 
 
(0.11) (-0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.38) (-1.44) (-3.81) (0.10) 
Leverage 0.174** 0.176** 0.175** 0.175** 0.226*** 0.179** 0.158** 0.0973*** 0.278*** 0.173** 
 
(2.50) (2.52) (2.51) (2.49) (2.92) (2.11) (2.19) (3.66) (10.35) (2.49) 
DIV_FCF 0.000631 0.000639 0.000619 0.000672 0.000150 0.00115 0.000661 0.000380 0.00140*** 0.000629 
 
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.48) (0.13) (0.78) (0.49) (0.73) (2.74) (0.46) 
L.Cash_TA 0.0729 0.0735 0.0797 0.0782 0.0815 0.0572 0.0824 0.0438 0.0615* 0.0709 
 
(0.83) (0.83) (0.91) (0.88) (0.95) (0.55) (0.91) (1.24) (1.84) (0.80) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000894 
          
(-0.31) 
COL2 0.150*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.170*** 0.231*** 0.162*** 0.156*** 0.502*** 0.326*** 0.150*** 
 
(3.66) (3.87) (3.85) (4.02) (5.72) (3.47) (3.74) (44.71) (26.66) (3.65) 
COL2_FCF -2.976*** -2.957*** -2.966*** -2.957*** -3.740*** -3.422*** -3.094*** -8.397*** -5.886*** -2.978*** 
 
(-5.10) (-5.05) (-5.08) (-5.04) (-7.04) (-5.01) (-5.20) (-60.79) (-37.74) (-5.10) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0116* -0.0144** -0.00167 -0.0141** -0.0114* -0.0130 -0.0113 -0.00629** -0.00553** -0.0116* 
 
(-1.67) (-2.04) (-0.17) (-2.01) (-1.72) (-1.62) (-1.64) (-2.29) (-2.06) (-1.67) 
Credit_GDP 0.000179* 0.000168 0.000204** 0.000209** 0.000416*** 0.000209* 0.000162 0.000260*** 0.000228*** 0.000179* 
 
(1.84) (1.62) (2.13) (2.12) (3.84) (1.88) (1.62) (6.70) (6.04) (1.84) 
Stock_mkt_GDP -0.0000638 -0.0000033 -0.0000186 0.00000822 -0.0000588 -0.0000649 -0.0000762 
-
0.000111*** 
-
0.000126*** -0.0000639 
 
(-1.00) (-0.07) (-0.42) (0.13) (-0.98) (-0.83) (-1.18) (-4.36) (-5.05) (-1.00) 
Anti_Self_Dealing 0.0325 
   
0.0334 0.0414 0.0389 0.0518*** 0.0381*** 0.0326 
 
(1.05) 
   
(1.11) (1.13) (1.24) (4.25) (3.14) (1.05) 
concentration 
 
-0.0198 
        
  
(-0.78) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.0179* 
       
   
(-1.69) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.00928 
      
    
(-0.74) 
      _cons -0.795*** -0.786*** -0.900*** -0.859*** -1.293*** -0.866*** -0.848*** -2.796*** -1.797*** -0.794*** 
 
(-3.22) (-3.18) (-3.62) (-3.41) (-5.04) (-3.06) (-3.36) (-39.20) (-23.82) (-3.21) 
_observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 
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Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of 
observations is lower for models applying GLOBE cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede 
dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, Peru, and the United 
Kingdom. While corresponding coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC 
codes, and variables representing the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the 
appendix. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6.15. Regression results – Uncertainty Avoidance (GLOBE) robustness checks  
 (10)                   
Base model 
(93) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(94)                     
Rule of Law 
(95)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(96)                        
ex USA 
(97)                       
ex Crisis 
(98)                     
Outliers - Size 
(99)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(100)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(101)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00136 0.00139 0.00140 0.00133 0.00169 0.00132 0.00133 0.00413 0.00559** 0.00161 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.27) (0.18) (0.20) (1.34) (2.01) (0.22) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00722 0.00691 0.00651 0.00812 0.00853 0.00952 0.00732 0.00345 -0.0151*** 0.00722 
 
(0.66) (0.62) (0.59) (0.74) (0.62) (0.64) (0.65) (0.68) (-3.31) (0.66) 
FCF_TA -0.576 -0.471 -0.522 -0.674 1.948 -1.414 -0.546 -12.14*** -0.967 -0.574 
 
(-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.28) (0.88) (-0.44) (-0.22) (-12.43) (-1.02) (-0.23) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00262 0.00470 0.00457 0.00377 0.00261 0.00236 0.00407 -0.00984** -0.0179*** 0.00259 
 
(0.26) (0.46) (0.45) (0.38) (0.21) (0.19) (0.37) (-2.16) (-4.28) (0.25) 
Leverage 0.195* 0.189* 0.189* 0.198** 0.289*** 0.236* 0.187* 0.380*** 0.533*** 0.195* 
 
(1.93) (1.86) (1.86) (1.97) (2.58) (1.85) (1.81) (8.51) (13.09) (1.93) 
DIV_FCF 0.000161 0.000173 0.000178 0.000149 0.0000270 0.000555 0.000261 0.000612 0.00145* 0.000158 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02) (0.25) (0.13) (0.68) (1.80) (0.08) 
L.Cash_TA 0.127 0.134 0.136 0.128 0.0970 0.128 0.134 0.198*** 0.131** 0.126 
 
(0.99) (1.04) (1.06) (1.01) (0.77) (0.81) (1.02) (3.36) (2.52) (0.98) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000349 
          
(-0.08) 
UAIN -0.00166 -0.00346 -0.0120 -0.0115 0.0325 -0.00905 -0.00194 -0.220*** -0.0260 -0.00157 
 
(-0.03) (-0.07) (-0.23) (-0.24) (0.72) (-0.15) (-0.04) (-11.06) (-1.35) (-0.03) 
UAIN_FCF 0.358 0.332 0.344 0.383 -0.111 0.593 0.358 3.300*** 0.933*** 0.357 
 
(0.63) (0.58) (0.60) (0.67) (-0.22) (0.80) (0.63) (14.54) (4.26) (0.63) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.00431 -0.00518 -0.00223 -0.00779 -0.000626 -0.00382 -0.00447 -0.00738 0.0107* -0.00428 
 
(-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.14) (-0.53) (-0.04) (-0.22) (-0.30) (-1.08) (1.72) (-0.29) 
Credit_GDP 0.000130 0.0000877 0.000126 0.000148 0.000317** 0.000162 0.000117 0.0000905 0.000112* 0.000130 
 
(0.93) (0.58) (0.90) (1.06) (2.14) (0.99) (0.82) (1.40) (1.92) (0.93) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000375 0.0000102 0.00000478 0.0000537 -0.0000101 0.0000686 0.0000335 0.0000853** 0.0000335 0.0000376 
 
(0.46) (0.15) (0.07) (0.72) (-0.12) (0.66) (0.41) (2.26) (0.99) (0.47) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0331 
   
-0.00398 -0.0425 -0.0305 -0.0627*** -0.0759*** -0.0332 
 
(-0.83) 
   
(-0.09) (-0.87) (-0.76) (-3.43) (-4.54) (-0.83) 
concentration 
 
-0.0182 
        
  
(-0.49) 
        rule_law 
  
-0.00984 
       
   
(-0.58) 
       common_legal 
   
-0.0217 
      
    
(-1.62) 
      _cons 0.000116 -0.0102 -0.000346 0.0598 -0.237 0.0235 -0.00822 1.084*** 0.0416 -0.000209 
 
(0.00) (-0.03) (-0.00) (0.18) (-0.79) (0.06) (-0.03) (7.74) (0.32) (-0.00) 
_observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data 
regression with capital expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of 
observations is lower for models applying GLOBE cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede 
dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, Peru, and the United 
Kingdom. While corresponding coefficients are not reported, we have included firm two-digit SIC 
codes, and variables representing the year in each regression. Full regression results are attached in the 
appendix. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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6.3 Conclusion: results 
In chapter IV we proposed national culture as a fundamental determinant in management’s 
decision to take advantage of opportunities to overinvest and move to the act of engaging in 
value destroying capital expenditures. Our empirical test employed the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow and cultural dimensions of Hofstede and GLOBE as indicators for 
overinvestment and national culture respectively. Following the description of Jensen (1986) 
for firms most exposed to the overinvestment agency problem, from an initial sample of 7,338 
non-financial quoted companies for the period of 2001-2011, we have selected companies 
with investment opportunities below-, and at the same time free cash flow above the median 
from their respective countries resulting in a final sample of 1,550 companies from 36 
countries.   
Confirming our theoretical proposition, we found compelling empirical evidence that culture 
influences overinvestment beyond its impact on the opportunity to overinvest. More 
specifically, our results show that more Masculinity (MAS) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) 
in a culture leads to more overinvestment even when controlling for the effect of financial 
characteristics, corporate financial policies and country-level institutions with a documented 
impact on the opportunity to overinvest. Despite our theoretical arguments, we detected no 
consistent influence on overinvestment by power distance (PDI). Furthermore, contradictory 
results for individualism (IDV) between regressions applying Hofstede’s cultural value 
dimension (IDV) and the GLOBE study’s related constructs, institutional-, and in-group 
collectivism (COL1, COL2) make us unable to verify its overall impact on overinvestment. 
We confirmed our results through several tests of robustness including verifying whether they 
are primarily driven by the framework chosen to quantify culture, by the information content 
of the volatility of cash flow invalidating the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as 
indicator of overinvestment, by the indicator of country-level corporate governance regime 
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applied, or by specific sample characteristics. We have also found strong indication that the 
underlying cause of investment - cash flow sensitivity in our sample is dominated by over-, 
and not underinvestment, thus, supporting our choice of indicator for overinvestment and of 
our final sample selection. 
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Chapter VII. 
Conclusion 
Overinvestment results in value destruction. Research undertaken to better understand it 
therefore offers value to academia, policy makers and practicing managers and investors.  
7.1 Note on ethics 
Before any of the implications of our result can be discussed we feel it is very important to 
emphasize the ethical dimension of our work. A danger of reflecting on cultural differences is 
that the author may make value judgment viewing certain cultures or cultural characteristics 
as inherently superior to others. Both Berry et al. (1992) and Hofstede (2001) repeatedly warn 
against such an ethnocentric approach. We recognize this ethical issue in our work, and we 
consciously strive to avoid such judgments. We have no intention, and our work should not be 
read nor presented in any such way, to portray any culture or cultural characteristic as inferior 
or superior to another. We seek to explore how certain aspects of national culture affect 
management’s tendency to make decisions leading to overinvestment in capital expenditures 
to further our understanding of overinvestment’s fundamental drivers, and potentially aid in 
the efforts to mitigate it.    
7.2 Advancing theoretical understanding 
7.2.1 Better understanding, better models 
This dissertation furthers the understanding of culture’s impact on finance and corporate 
governance. Our results confirm that national culture is a fundamental determinant of 
management’s tendency to make decisions leading to overinvestment. Extending the analysis 
of overinvestment by adding previously ignored factors that may influence management’s 
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relevant decisions advances the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon. Failure to include 
cultural effects in an analysis of economic behavior, where such relationship exists, may bias 
the results, and misleadingly attribute some of the explanatory value of culture to other 
variables (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). The confirmed link between national culture and 
management’s tendency to make decisions leading to overinvestment; thus, will allow 
researchers studying overinvestment to better specify their models. 
7.2.2 Some support for culturally-contingent view of Agency Theory 
As we have described, authors have questioned the full cultural transferability of Agency 
Theory (Lubatkin, 2007; Ekanayake, 2004, Johnson and Droege, 2004). Such scholars argue 
that its fundamental assumptions of conflict of interest between agents and principal and 
always opportunistic agent behavior are culturally contingent.  
Our theory laid out in chapter IV concurs with the culturally contingent view of Agency 
Theory, and we adopted such a position for the development of our hypotheses in chapter V. 
However, it is important to note that while we see our results as supportive of that assertion, 
they cannot be regarded as fully confirming it. This is because we cannot empirically separate 
overinvestment caused by opportunistic management behavior from overinvestment due to 
management being overconfident. Thus, theoretically, it is imaginable that the relationship we 
found are due to culture’s influence through overconfidence alone, and that opportunistic 
behavior, thus agency problem related, overinvestment is completely independent of national 
culture. While this cannot be theoretically rejected, it is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, 
as we have indicated in chapter II, we expect agency problems to weigh significantly more as 
a source of overinvestment in our sample than overconfidence. Second, while individualism 
has been both conceptually and empirically positively related to overconfidence throughout 
the literature (see chapter II), our results finding a statistically significant and consistent 
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relationship between individualism and overinvestment in our sample have been unsuccessful. 
Consequently, overall we interpret our results to lend some support to the view that Agency 
Theory is not fully cross-culturally transferable.      
7.3  Assisting policy makers to mitigate overinvestment 
7.3.1 Better cross-cultural cooperation 
Both House et al. (2004) and Hofstede (2010) point out increasing cross-cultural interaction 
brought about by globalization as a source of not only substantial benefits but also 
unavoidable conflict. Studying how culture influences behavior is beneficial, as a greater 
understanding may reinforce the first while minimize the latter. Hofstede (2010) cites a host 
of urgent and imminent problems such as climate change and epidemics (it is enough to think 
of the ebola outbreak of 2014/2015) that require international collaboration. The economic 
crises of 2008/2009 and the European sovereign debt crisis also necessitate that policy makers 
work together on a continental, or even on a global-level. One can argue that the 
fundamentally different approach taken by the Nordic countries and the southern member 
states of the Eurozone to the Euro-crisis also highlights cultural differences on what social 
and economic behavior is appropriate and “responsible”. In economic cooperation, for 
example in the designation and monitoring of the European Union structural funds, but also 
for any joint economic programs or international aid, an appreciation of the cultural 
determinants of overinvestment can serve to better anticipate and mitigate related problems.   
7.3.2 Better country-level policies 
Besides cooperation, creating effective and efficient country-level policies also requires an 
understanding of the cultural environment. Based on the arguments put forward in the field of 
New Institutional Economics, among others by North (1990), Williamson (2000), and Roland 
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(2004), operating formal institutions not compatible with informal institutions will create 
friction resulting in higher social costs, and may prove to be inefficient in performing their 
function. Lubatkin et al. (2007) posits that informal institutions can have a stronger effect 
influencing behavior than formal ones, which becomes evident when the two are in conflict. 
In such situations, while formal institutions may be in place and in effect, but they may not be 
applied, or applied in a way that is different from the intentions of the policy makers. 
Relatedly, both Licht (2008) and Coffee (2001) highlight that social norms, such as law 
abidance, have a significant influence on the effectiveness of the laws and the legal system.  
In a similar vein, as cultural values are fundamental parts of informal institutions, Licht et al. 
(2005, 2007) emphasize that writing and adopting corporate governance codes and laws to 
protect investor rights is not sufficient to guarantee effective governance protection. They 
point to the legal system imposed in East-Asian common law countries during colonial rule 
failing to provide the same effective protection as common law where it naturally evolved. 
Another example of ineffective formal institutions cited by Licht (2001) and Coffee (2001) is 
Eastern Europe, where after the fall of the communist political regimes laws and regulations 
were imported from the western market economies, but they failed to provide the full benefit 
expected due to their local application.   
Therefore, at the country-level, better understanding the cultural foundations of 
overinvestment will allow policy makers to avoid the adaptation of international governance 
rules aimed to mitigate overinvestment fit for a different cultural context with regards to 
cultural characteristics most relevant for overinvestment (masculinity/assertiveness and 
avoidance of uncertainty). Following the arguments discussed above such regulations without 
appropriate adaptation may prove inefficient in the local cultural environment.   
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7.4 Assisting practicing managers and investors 
Management and leadership is an international, consequently inter-cultural, activity as 
empirically demonstrated by the results of the GLOBE project. In multinational organizations, 
but increasingly even in local ones, it is the norm and not the exception for managers to be 
responsible for a culturally diverse workforce. In such situations, according to the view of 
Divergence Theory on management (see chapter II), appreciating and being sensitive to 
cultural influences on behavior improves performance. House et al. (2004) and Hofstede 
(2010) highlight the importance of cross-border business activity in today’s globalizing world. 
Obvious areas where a deeper understanding of cultural motivations for overinvestment is 
useful at the firm-level for practicing managers are cross-border negotiations, mergers and 
acquisitions, joint ventures, or investment projects. Findings of this dissertation may also be 
relevant to mechanisms applied by management and boards of multinational companies 
intending to control overinvestment behavior at their foreign operations.  
It is also advantageous for investors to be aware which aspects of national culture are most 
related to overinvestment in two ways. First, they can use this information to better screen for 
such value destroying corporate governance problem in their investment selection process. 
Second, they can apply this data to identify among their existing investments potential 
candidates for added monitoring.  
7.5 Future research 
With regards to the GLOBE project House et al. (2004) notes: “We are just beginning to 
understand how culture influences leadership and organizational processes” (House et al., 
2004, p. 9). We believe our dissertation adds a tiny piece to this puzzle advancing our 
knowledge with regards to the impact of culture on management in general, and corporate 
investment policy in specific. However, we do not provide all the answers with regards to the 
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relationship between culture and overinvestment. We have theorized, and empirically 
demonstrated, a link between certain aspects of national culture (masculinity/assertiveness 
and avoidance of uncertainty) and overinvestment, and contributed to the debate on the cross-
cultural transferability of Agency Theory.  
There is much work remaining for future research to better understand this relationship. 
Remaining with the conceptualization of culture at the national level, researchers could use 
other aspects of culture identified by different cultural models, such as those of Trompenaars 
and Inglehart and Baker, to uncover additional potentially useful cultural motivators which 
are not separately identified in the Hofstsde /GLOBE dimensional frameworks. A promising 
research project could involve examining whether this relationship exists for layers of culture 
other than national culture, or whether it is moderated by the influence of such layers. Further 
examples of related areas of future research include separately examining cultural effects on 
overconfidence and agency motivated overinvestment, and extending the analysis to mergers 
and acquisitions as well.  
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Appendix 
Full regression table
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Table A.1. Regression results - Masculinity dimension (Hofstede)  
 (1)                   
 Base model 
(21)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(22)                     
Rule of Law 
(23)         
 Common  
Legal Origin 
(24)                        
ex USA 
(25)                        
ex Crisis 
(26)                     
Outliers - Size 
(27)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(28)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(29)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(11)                     
Interaction 
            L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00451** 0.00451** 0.00451** 0.00448** 0.00468** 0.00443** 0.00454** 0.00586*** 0.00603*** 0.00513** 0.00439* 
 
(2.04) (2.03) (2.03) (2.05) (2.52) (2.07) (2.11) (5.87) (5.78) (2.12) (1.75) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00823** 0.00835** 0.00846** 0.00857** 0.0102*** 0.0144*** 0.00852** 0.00818*** 0.00745*** 0.00824** 0.00700* 
 
(2.36) (2.36) (2.39) (2.49) (2.74) (3.41) (2.44) (5.12) (4.42) (2.36) (1.77) 
FCF_TA -2.768*** -2.767*** -2.758*** -2.766*** -2.782*** -2.930*** -2.748*** -3.426*** -3.604*** -2.769*** -1.621*** 
 
(-10.68) (-10.60) (-10.57) (-10.78) (-14.37) (-10.75) (-11.08) (-76.85) (-39.07) (-10.67) (-3.03) 
L.Ln_TA -0.000305 0.000871 0.00101 0.000377 -0.00214 0.000957 0.000445 -0.00388** -0.00689*** -0.000352 -0.00598 
 
(-0.09) (0.26) (0.30) (0.12) (-0.60) (0.26) (0.12) (-2.57) (-4.32) (-0.10) (-1.31) 
Leverage 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.143*** 0.149*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.156*** 0.178*** 
 
(4.74) (4.66) (4.65) (4.83) (5.06) (3.78) (4.54) (12.68) (11.25) (4.72) (3.25) 
DIV_FCF -0.0000494 -0.0000123 -0.00000659 -0.0000532 -0.000277 0.000124 0.0000772 0.000140 -0.000116 -0.0000543 0.000135 
 
(-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.08) (-0.51) (0.19) (0.12) (0.47) (-0.37) (-0.08) (0.25) 
L.Cash_TA 0.0979** 0.102** 0.104** 0.0999** 0.0886** 0.0790* 0.0996** 0.0882*** 0.0867*** 0.0959** 0.158*** 
 
(2.32) (2.40) (2.46) (2.40) (2.39) (1.69) (2.35) (4.55) (4.38) (2.26) (3.20) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000891 
 
          
(-0.64) 
 MAS -0.00304*** -0.00301*** -0.00299*** -0.00318*** -0.00340*** -0.00296*** -0.00304*** -0.00387*** -0.00409*** -0.00304*** -0.00212*** 
 
(-11.21) (-11.08) (-11.09) (-11.73) (-16.88) (-10.87) (-11.69) (-65.49) (-46.80) (-11.19) (-6.00) 
MAS_FCF 0.0557*** 0.0557*** 0.0556*** 0.0558*** 0.0584*** 0.0587*** 0.0558*** 0.0693*** 0.0723*** 0.0558*** 0.0426*** 
 
(15.08) (14.96) (14.92) (15.23) (22.62) (15.54) (15.83) (128.52) (72.85) (15.07) (8.81) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0712* 
           
(1.65) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-0.270 
           
(-0.44) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.253 
           
(1.54) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-1.565*** 
           
(-3.99) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-0.926** 
           
(-2.23) 
Stock_FCF 
          
0.000661 
           
(0.89) 
Credit_FCF 
          
-0.0000894 
           
(-0.06) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0111*** -0.0103*** -0.00939* -0.0105*** -0.00799*** -0.0121*** -0.0107*** -0.00886*** -0.00824*** -0.0111*** -0.0105*** 
 
(-3.39) (-3.04) (-1.93) (-3.17) (-2.87) (-3.43) (-3.38) (-5.98) (-5.31) (-3.39) (-2.90) 
Credit_GDP 0.00000414 -0.0000306 -0.0000181 0.0000489 0.000160*** -0.0000355 -0.0000105 -0.0000145 0.00000433 0.00000438 0.0000184 
 
(0.08) (-0.62) (-0.37) (0.97) (3.38) (-0.66) (-0.21) (-0.63) (0.18) (0.09) (0.15) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.00000852 -0.00000923 -0.0000165 0.0000184 -0.0000154 0.0000207 0.00000389 6.31e-08 -0.00000113 0.00000884 -0.0000288 
 
(0.33) (-0.40) (-0.75) (0.78) (-0.66) (0.68) (0.15) (0.01) (-0.09) (0.34) (-0.48) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0205* 
   
-0.0210** -0.0153 -0.0184 -0.0280*** -0.0390*** -0.0206* 0.0428 
 
(-1.71) 
   
(-1.87) (-1.17) (-1.55) (-5.18) (-6.81) (-1.72) (1.32) 
concentration 
 
-0.0108 
         
  
(-0.91) 
         rule_law 
  
-0.000886 
        
   
(-0.18) 
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common_legal 
   
-0.0179*** 
       
    
(-4.03) 
       2.SIC2 -0.00855 -0.00261 -0.00353 -0.0102 0.00571 -0.0130 -0.00819 -0.0178 -0.0127 -0.00849 -0.0104 
 
(-0.23) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.28) (0.15) (-0.32) (-0.22) (-0.98) (-0.71) (-0.23) (-0.25) 
8.SIC2 0.0114 0.0158 0.0148 0.00740 -0.00446 -0.00112 0.0123 -0.00303 0.00185 0.0114 0.00591 
 
(0.31) (0.42) (0.39) (0.20) (-0.13) (-0.03) (0.34) (-0.17) (0.10) (0.30) (0.14) 
10.SIC2 0.0131 0.0137 0.0153 0.0148 0.0103 -0.000522 0.00954 -0.00168 0.00504 0.0131 0.0133 
 
(0.41) (0.42) (0.47) (0.47) (0.33) (-0.01) (0.30) (-0.11) (0.33) (0.41) (0.37) 
12.SIC2 0.0493 0.0536 0.0529 0.0473 0.0289 0.0481 0.0506 0.0234 0.0290 0.0493 0.0410 
 
(1.23) (1.34) (1.32) (1.19) (0.74) (1.10) (1.29) (1.22) (1.51) (1.23) (0.91) 
13.SIC2 0.0574* 0.0599** 0.0605** 0.0576** 0.0514* 0.0503 0.0604** 0.0383*** 0.0312** 0.0573* 0.0555* 
 
(1.94) (2.03) (2.04) (1.97) (1.72) (1.56) (2.10) (2.62) (2.22) (1.94) (1.67) 
14.SIC2 0.00546 0.00827 0.00919 0.00253 -0.00629 0.0114 0.00611 -0.00320 0.00408 0.00535 -0.00293 
 
(0.14) (0.21) (0.23) (0.07) (-0.17) (0.27) (0.16) (-0.17) (0.22) (0.14) (-0.07) 
15.SIC2 -0.0200 -0.0173 -0.0172 -0.0266 -0.0311 -0.0138 -0.0199 -0.0206 -0.0126 -0.0200 -0.0225 
 
(-0.62) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.83) (-1.03) (-0.39) (-0.64) (-1.28) (-0.79) (-0.62) (-0.62) 
16.SIC2 0.00301 0.00814 0.00768 -0.00169 -0.00910 0.000774 0.00416 -0.00534 0.00374 0.00299 0.000358 
 
(0.09) (0.25) (0.24) (-0.05) (-0.29) (0.02) (0.13) (-0.33) (0.24) (0.09) (0.01) 
17.SIC2 0.0123 0.0156 0.0161 0.0105 0.00731 0.0109 0.0197 0.00543 0.00963 0.0123 0.00393 
 
(0.37) (0.46) (0.48) (0.31) (0.20) (0.30) (0.59) (0.33) (0.60) (0.37) (0.10) 
20.SIC2 0.0129 0.0177 0.0175 0.00882 0.00120 0.00714 0.0133 0.00105 0.00774 0.0128 0.00895 
 
(0.45) (0.62) (0.61) (0.31) (0.04) (0.23) (0.47) (0.07) (0.57) (0.44) (0.28) 
22.SIC2 0.00574 0.0119 0.0118 0.000279 -0.000543 0.000604 0.00692 -0.00625 -0.00119 0.00563 0.00453 
 
(0.19) (0.41) (0.40) (0.01) (-0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (-0.42) (-0.09) (0.19) (0.14) 
23.SIC2 -0.00924 -0.00432 -0.00511 -0.0109 -0.0119 -0.0117 -0.00844 -0.0215 -0.0185 -0.00930 -0.00906 
 
(-0.30) (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.36) (-0.39) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-1.39) (-1.25) (-0.30) (-0.26) 
24.SIC2 0.00275 0.00601 0.00573 0.000743 0.000526 -0.000487 0.00236 -0.00885 -0.00741 0.00271 -0.00116 
 
(0.09) (0.19) (0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (-0.01) (0.08) (-0.57) (-0.49) (0.09) (-0.03) 
25.SIC2 -0.0165 -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0190 -0.0177 -0.0230 -0.0155 -0.0340** -0.0242 -0.0165 -0.0204 
 
(-0.53) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.67) (-0.51) (-2.18) (-1.62) (-0.53) (-0.58) 
26.SIC2 0.00407 0.00932 0.00897 -0.00214 -0.00486 -0.00256 0.00500 -0.00781 -0.00263 0.00400 0.00217 
 
(0.14) (0.32) (0.31) (-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.08) (0.18) (-0.54) (-0.19) (0.14) (0.07) 
27.SIC2 -0.00103 0.00302 0.00308 -0.00468 -0.00102 -0.00793 -0.000447 -0.0106 -0.00393 -0.00111 -0.00692 
 
(-0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (-0.16) (-0.04) (-0.24) (-0.02) (-0.72) (-0.28) (-0.04) (-0.21) 
28.SIC2 0.000101 0.00548 0.00540 -0.00359 -0.00414 -0.00250 0.000623 -0.0101 -0.00398 0.0000390 -0.00292 
 
(0.00) (0.19) (0.19) (-0.13) (-0.15) (-0.08) (0.02) (-0.71) (-0.29) (0.00) (-0.09) 
29.SIC2 0.0269 0.0265 0.0263 0.0235 0.0113 0.00702 0.0182 0.0227 0.0399** 0.0269 0.0269 
 
(0.83) (0.81) (0.80) (0.73) (0.33) (0.20) (0.56) (1.42) (2.58) (0.83) (0.73) 
30.SIC2 0.0140 0.0190 0.0187 0.00938 0.0104 0.0107 0.0148 0.00170 0.00712 0.0139 0.00918 
 
(0.48) (0.65) (0.64) (0.32) (0.37) (0.34) (0.52) (0.12) (0.51) (0.48) (0.28) 
31.SIC2 -0.0105 -0.00993 -0.00864 -0.00887 -0.0242 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0271 -0.0234 -0.0107 -0.0151 
 
(-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.57) (-0.20) (-0.22) (-1.20) (-1.03) (-0.22) (-0.28) 
32.SIC2 0.00679 0.0118 0.0111 0.00244 -0.00185 0.00102 0.00709 -0.00495 0.00192 0.00676 0.000775 
 
(0.23) (0.41) (0.38) (0.09) (-0.07) (0.03) (0.25) (-0.34) (0.14) (0.23) (0.02) 
33.SIC2 -0.00544 -0.000978 -0.00118 -0.00952 -0.0111 -0.0114 -0.00517 -0.0151 -0.00900 -0.00551 -0.00817 
 
(-0.19) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.33) (-0.40) (-0.36) (-0.18) (-1.04) (-0.66) (-0.19) (-0.25) 
34.SIC2 0.00139 0.00667 0.00659 -0.00340 -0.00794 -0.00254 0.00208 -0.00906 -0.00561 0.00132 -0.00301 
 
(0.05) (0.23) (0.23) (-0.12) (-0.28) (-0.08) (0.07) (-0.62) (-0.40) (0.05) (-0.09) 
35.SIC2 0.0255 0.0307 0.0306 0.0215 0.0210 0.0240 0.0260 -0.0129 -0.00612 0.0260 0.0275 
 
(0.87) (1.06) (1.05) (0.74) (0.74) (0.75) (0.91) (-0.89) (-0.45) (0.89) (0.84) 
36.SIC2 -0.00385 0.000802 0.000738 -0.00752 -0.000963 -0.00705 -0.00242 -0.0142 -0.00988 -0.00379 -0.00495 
 
(-0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (-0.27) (-0.03) (-0.23) (-0.09) (-0.99) (-0.73) (-0.13) (-0.15) 
37.SIC2 -0.00246 0.00210 0.00186 -0.00775 -0.0133 -0.00949 -0.00221 -0.0153 -0.00919 -0.00250 -0.00313 
 
(-0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (-0.27) (-0.48) (-0.30) (-0.08) (-1.07) (-0.68) (-0.09) (-0.10) 
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38.SIC2 -0.00902 -0.00394 -0.00388 -0.0112 -0.00988 -0.0164 -0.00559 -0.0210 -0.0191 -0.00903 -0.0131 
 
(-0.30) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.38) (-0.33) (-0.50) (-0.19) (-1.39) (-1.33) (-0.30) (-0.39) 
39.SIC2 -0.0174 -0.0124 -0.0126 -0.0192 -0.0152 -0.0224 -0.0169 -0.0346** -0.0277* -0.0173 -0.0210 
 
(-0.55) (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.62) (-0.47) (-0.64) (-0.55) (-2.21) (-1.84) (-0.55) (-0.59) 
40.SIC2 0.0622 0.0662 0.0631 0.0525 0.0587 -0.000613 0.0610 0.0557** 0.0216 0.0621 0.0670 
 
(1.30) (1.38) (1.31) (1.11) (1.39) (-0.01) (1.31) (2.47) (0.92) (1.30) (1.24) 
41.SIC2 0.0274 0.0339 0.0332 0.0197 0.0171 0.0259 0.0287 0.0129 0.0170 0.0273 0.0243 
 
(0.81) (1.01) (0.98) (0.59) (0.54) (0.70) (0.87) (0.78) (1.05) (0.81) (0.64) 
42.SIC2 0.0510* 0.0561* 0.0563* 0.0471 0.0185 0.0475 0.0545* 0.0391*** 0.0401*** 0.0508* 0.0417 
 
(1.71) (1.89) (1.89) (1.60) (0.64) (1.45) (1.86) (2.63) (2.82) (1.70) (1.24) 
44.SIC2 0.0280 0.0327 0.0325 0.0245 0.0200 0.0198 0.0290 0.0133 0.0139 0.0281 0.0254 
 
(0.94) (1.09) (1.08) (0.83) (0.68) (0.60) (0.99) (0.90) (0.98) (0.94) (0.76) 
45.SIC2 0.0115 0.0123 0.0117 0.00828 -0.00204 0.00285 0.0108 -0.00000143 0.0107 0.0117 0.0159 
 
(0.35) (0.38) (0.36) (0.26) (-0.06) (0.08) (0.34) (-0.00) (0.69) (0.36) (0.43) 
47.SIC2 0.0287 0.0319 0.0321 0.0228 -0.0291 0.0165 -0.00648 0.00738 -0.0245 0.0287 0.0358 
 
(0.90) (1.00) (1.01) (0.72) (-0.95) (0.47) (-0.21) (0.47) (-1.60) (0.90) (1.00) 
48.SIC2 0.00434 0.00747 0.00845 0.00171 0.00797 -0.00255 0.00699 -0.00604 0.00214 0.00433 -0.00801 
 
(0.15) (0.25) (0.28) (0.06) (0.28) (-0.08) (0.24) (-0.41) (0.15) (0.15) (-0.24) 
49.SIC2 -0.0137 -0.0104 -0.00978 -0.0173 -0.0294 -0.0231 -0.0134 -0.0298** -0.0219 -0.0137 -0.0151 
 
(-0.47) (-0.36) (-0.33) (-0.60) (-1.04) (-0.72) (-0.47) (-2.04) (-1.58) (-0.47) (-0.46) 
50.SIC2 -0.00254 0.00200 0.00203 -0.00683 -0.0103 -0.00568 -0.00155 -0.0108 -0.00748 -0.00256 -0.00749 
 
(-0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (-0.24) (-0.37) (-0.18) (-0.06) (-0.75) (-0.55) (-0.09) (-0.23) 
51.SIC2 0.00384 0.00822 0.00803 -0.00100 -0.000465 -0.00137 0.00457 -0.00569 -0.0000576 0.00380 0.000899 
 
(0.13) (0.28) (0.27) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.04) (0.16) (-0.39) (-0.00) (0.13) (0.03) 
52.SIC2 -0.0215 -0.0276 -0.0290 -0.0235 -0.00160 -0.0602 -0.0375 -0.0528 -0.00943 -0.0208 -0.0533 
 
(-0.21) (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.24) (-0.02) (-0.49) (-0.39) (-1.18) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.60) 
53.SIC2 -0.00942 -0.00685 -0.00734 -0.0140 -0.0137 -0.0110 -0.00945 -0.0174 -0.00758 -0.00943 -0.0104 
 
(-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.43) (-0.42) (-0.31) (-0.30) (-1.08) (-0.49) (-0.29) (-0.28) 
54.SIC2 0.0202 0.0242 0.0241 0.0151 0.0145 0.0100 0.0210 0.00783 0.0235 0.0202 0.0117 
 
(0.66) (0.79) (0.78) (0.50) (0.49) (0.30) (0.70) (0.51) (1.61) (0.66) (0.34) 
55.SIC2 0.00103 0.00514 0.00546 -0.00533 -0.0140 -0.0116 0.00124 -0.00892 0.00416 0.000963 0.00128 
 
(0.03) (0.15) (0.16) (-0.16) (-0.43) (-0.31) (0.04) (-0.53) (0.25) (0.03) (0.03) 
56.SIC2 0.00111 0.00608 0.00583 -0.00214 -0.0111 -0.00560 0.00131 -0.0123 -0.00716 0.00111 0.00113 
 
(0.04) (0.20) (0.19) (-0.07) (-0.37) (-0.17) (0.04) (-0.82) (-0.50) (0.04) (0.03) 
57.SIC2 -0.0133 -0.00966 -0.00937 -0.0147 -0.0299 -0.0148 -0.0130 -0.0311* -0.0284 -0.0132 -0.00585 
 
(-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.41) (-0.76) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-1.75) (-1.64) (-0.37) (-0.14) 
58.SIC2 -0.000620 0.00568 0.00543 -0.00189 -0.00864 -0.00993 0.000330 -0.0218 -0.0196 -0.000716 -0.00183 
 
(-0.02) (0.18) (0.17) (-0.06) (-0.26) (-0.28) (0.01) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-0.02) (-0.05) 
59.SIC2 -0.00733 -0.00409 -0.00393 -0.0105 -0.0169 -0.0151 -0.00720 -0.0196 -0.0130 -0.00740 -0.0119 
 
(-0.24) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.34) (-0.56) (-0.45) (-0.24) (-1.28) (-0.89) (-0.24) (-0.34) 
70.SIC2 0.0103 0.0125 0.0122 0.00861 -0.00345 0.00379 0.0111 -0.00480 0.00366 0.0102 0.00532 
 
(0.33) (0.40) (0.39) (0.28) (-0.12) (0.11) (0.36) (-0.31) (0.25) (0.33) (0.15) 
72.SIC2 -0.0152 -0.0127 -0.0124 -0.0174 -0.0133 -0.0259 -0.0141 -0.0328* -0.0246 -0.0152 -0.0180 
 
(-0.42) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.48) (-0.34) (-0.64) (-0.40) (-1.86) (-1.41) (-0.42) (-0.44) 
73.SIC2 -0.0189 -0.0147 -0.0144 -0.0218 -0.0375 -0.0234 -0.0186 -0.0311** -0.0333** -0.0188 -0.0174 
 
(-0.65) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.76) (-1.30) (-0.73) (-0.65) (-2.12) (-2.40) (-0.64) (-0.53) 
75.SIC2 0.0346 0.0375 0.0384 0.0340 0.0118 0.0285 0.0349 0.0159 0.0166 0.0345 0.0345 
 
(0.95) (1.03) (1.05) (0.94) (0.34) (0.71) (0.98) (0.90) (0.94) (0.95) (0.84) 
76.SIC2 0.00599 0.00750 0.00912 0.00413 -0.000566 0.00283 0.00720 0.00477 0.0101 0.00615 -0.00927 
 
(0.12) (0.16) (0.19) (0.09) (-0.01) (0.05) (0.15) (0.21) (0.44) (0.13) (-0.17) 
78.SIC2 0.0316 0.0369 0.0379 0.0295 0.00820 0.0308 0.0331 0.0298 0.0103 0.0314 0.0217 
 
(0.85) (1.00) (1.02) (0.80) (0.24) (0.75) (0.89) (1.63) (0.59) (0.84) (0.52) 
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79.SIC2 -0.0140 -0.00923 -0.00926 -0.0147 -0.0405 -0.0181 -0.0128 -0.0358** -0.0357** -0.0140 -0.0119 
 
(-0.44) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.47) (-1.26) (-0.52) (-0.41) (-2.28) (-2.36) (-0.44) (-0.34) 
80.SIC2 -0.0109 -0.00625 -0.00649 -0.0106 0.0128 -0.0131 -0.00477 -0.0318* -0.0150 -0.0109 -0.00848 
 
(-0.33) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.32) (0.33) (-0.36) (-0.15) (-1.95) (-0.95) (-0.33) (-0.23) 
82.SIC2 -0.00966 -0.00345 -0.00352 -0.0139 -0.0155 -0.0135 -0.00815 -0.0224 -0.0170 -0.00973 -0.0143 
 
(-0.24) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.36) (-0.40) (-0.31) (-0.21) (-1.18) (-0.90) (-0.25) (-0.32) 
87.SIC2 -0.0124 -0.00878 -0.00899 -0.0165 -0.0169 -0.0173 -0.0116 -0.0212 -0.0171 -0.0123 -0.0138 
 
(-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.52) (-0.39) (-1.40) (-1.18) (-0.41) (-0.40) 
96.SIC2 -0.0555 -0.0504 -0.0508 -0.0626 -0.0690 -0.0421 -0.0554 -0.0721** -0.0707** -0.0552 -0.0455 
 
(-0.89) (-0.80) (-0.81) (-1.01) (-1.27) (-0.62) (-0.91) (-2.47) (-2.38) (-0.88) (-0.65) 
2003.year -0.00295 -0.00189 -0.00140 -0.00213 -0.00116 -0.00161 -0.00228 -0.00551* -0.00935** -0.00305 -0.00577 
 
(-0.43) (-0.28) (-0.21) (-0.32) (-0.17) (-0.24) (-0.34) (-1.79) (-2.88) (-0.45) (-0.78) 
2004.year -0.00168 -0.000712 -0.000253 -0.00113 -0.00140 -0.00242 -0.00100 -0.00474 -0.00703** -0.00176 -0.00315 
 
(-0.25) (-0.11) (-0.04) (-0.17) (-0.21) (-0.37) (-0.15) (-1.57) (-2.23) (-0.27) (-0.43) 
2005.year 0.0189*** 0.0200*** 0.0204*** 0.0190*** 0.0187*** 0.0160** 0.0192*** 0.00567* 0.00377 0.0188*** 0.0173** 
 
(2.74) (2.92) (2.98) (2.80) (2.76) (2.34) (2.80) (1.88) (1.19) (2.72) (2.29) 
2006.year 0.0120* 0.0133** 0.0137** 0.0118* 0.0117* 0.0103 0.0124* 0.00999** 0.00870*** 0.0118* 0.00972 
 
(1.79) (2.01) (2.08) (1.80) (1.77) (1.54) (1.86) (3.25) (2.71) (1.76) (1.31) 
2007.year 0.00535 0.00674 0.00723 0.00498 0.00757 0.00323 0.00614 0.00410 0.00250 0.00524 0.00360 
 
(0.79) (1.02) (1.09) (0.75) (1.14) (0.48) (0.92) (1.33) (0.77) (0.78) (0.48) 
2008.year 0.00523 0.00540 0.00550 0.00546 0.00557 
 
0.00563 0.00269 0.00185 0.00516 0.00345 
 
(0.82) (0.84) (0.86) (0.87) (0.91) 
 
(0.90) (0.93) (0.61) (0.81) (0.49) 
2009.year -0.0195*** -0.0186*** -0.0184*** -0.0196*** -0.0222*** -0.0179*** -0.0202*** -0.0249*** -0.0249*** -0.0195*** -0.0224*** 
 
(-2.93) (-2.81) (-2.77) (-2.99) (-3.51) (-2.68) (-3.07) (-8.55) (-7.96) (-2.94) (-3.04) 
2010.year -0.0143** -0.0135** -0.0133** -0.0145** -0.0171*** -0.0138** -0.0145** -0.0181*** -0.0185*** -0.0143** -0.0136** 
 
(-2.32) (-2.20) (-2.16) (-2.38) (-2.89) (-2.32) (-2.39) (-6.44) (-6.31) (-2.32) (-1.97) 
_cons 0.289*** 0.265*** 0.250*** 0.279*** 0.274*** 0.289*** 0.280*** 0.352*** 0.378*** 0.290*** 0.212*** 
 
(6.13) (6.25) (5.06) (6.67) (6.28) (5.77) (5.95) (16.57) (17.27) (6.14) (3.44) 
number of observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13630 13668 13677 13950 13950 
          
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table A.2. Regression results – Power Distance dimension (Hofstede)  
 (2)                   Base model 
(30)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(31)                     
Rule of Law 
(32)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(33)                        
ex USA 
(34)                       
ex Crisis 
(35)                     
Outliers - Size 
(36)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(37)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(38)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(12)                     
Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00119 0.00119 0.00122 0.00111 0.00159 0.00108 0.00112 0.00380 0.00546** 0.00151 0.00336 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.26) (0.15) (0.17) (1.56) (2.08) (0.21) (0.85) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00780 0.00784 0.00725 0.00853 0.00832 0.0118 0.00762 -0.00666* -0.0134*** 0.00780 0.00345 
 
(0.75) (0.74) (0.69) (0.82) (0.67) (0.83) (0.71) (-1.70) (-3.22) (0.75) (0.55) 
FCF_TA 1.332* 1.358* 1.321* 1.328* 2.794*** 1.711* 1.372* 7.958*** 3.488*** 1.332* -0.740 
 
(1.82) (1.84) (1.80) (1.82) (4.10) (1.87) (1.86) (48.64) (13.03) (1.82) (-0.76) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00332 0.00540 0.00519 0.00467 0.00306 0.00261 0.00540 -0.00908** -0.0185*** 0.00329 -0.00376 
 
(0.33) (0.53) (0.51) (0.48) (0.25) (0.21) (0.49) (-2.47) (-4.63) (0.32) (-0.52) 
Leverage 0.195** 0.191* 0.189* 0.197** 0.264** 0.224* 0.186* 0.407*** 0.551*** 0.195** 0.236*** 
 
(1.99) (1.95) (1.93) (2.02) (2.49) (1.80) (1.86) (11.78) (14.57) (1.99) (2.80) 
DIV_FCF 0.0000481 0.0000816 0.0000891 0.0000539 -0.0000778 0.000212 0.000119 -0.000404 0.000714 0.0000463 -0.00000895 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (-0.06) (0.13) (0.08) (-0.76) (1.25) (0.03) (-0.01) 
L.Cash_TA 0.114 0.122 0.123 0.116 0.0891 0.0882 0.127 0.178*** 0.141*** 0.113 0.172** 
 
(0.91) (0.97) (0.98) (0.93) (0.74) (0.57) (0.98) (3.80) (2.86) (0.90) (2.22) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000463 
 
          
(-0.11) 
 PDI 0.00108 0.00119 0.000958 0.000992 0.00225*** 0.00150 0.00110 0.00705*** 0.00182*** 0.00108 -0.00109** 
 
(1.27) (1.36) (1.12) (1.18) (2.89) (1.49) (1.28) (32.30) (5.58) (1.27) (-1.87) 
PDI_FCF -0.00769 -0.00826 -0.00760 -0.00747 -0.0256** -0.0115 -0.00806 -0.0997*** -0.00788 -0.00770 0.0257*** 
 
(-0.60) (-0.63) (-0.59) (-0.58) (-2.23) (-0.72) (-0.62) (-36.89) (-1.59) (-0.60) (2.87) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0471 
           
(0.70) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-0.745 
           
(-0.78) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.257 
           
(0.98) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-1.607*** 
           
(-2.58) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-2.204*** 
           
(-3.58) 
Stock_FCF 
          
-0.000449 
           
(-0.36) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.0112*** 
           
(4.05) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0104 -0.00958 -0.00651 -0.0105 -0.00755 -0.0104 -0.0105 0.00182 0.00454 -0.0104 -0.00628 
 
(-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.46) (-1.03) (-0.79) (-0.86) (-1.04) (0.49) (1.13) (-1.03) (-1.05) 
Credit_GDP 0.000196 0.000130 0.000167 0.000205 0.000337** 0.000243 0.000180 0.0000573 0.000288*** 0.000196 -0.000538*** 
 
(1.39) (0.91) (1.23) (1.48) (2.29) (1.48) (1.25) (1.10) (5.09) (1.40) (-2.63) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000208 0.00000556 -0.0000109 0.0000356 -0.000000168 0.0000311 0.0000158 0.0000137 -0.0000135 0.0000209 0.0000295 
 
(0.27) (0.08) (-0.16) (0.49) (-0.00) (0.31) (0.20) (0.47) (-0.43) (0.27) (0.30) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0290 
   
-0.0225 -0.0370 -0.0258 -0.0703*** -0.0757*** -0.0291 0.119** 
 
(-0.82) 
   
(-0.58) (-0.86) (-0.71) (-5.38) (-5.31) (-0.82) (2.46) 
concentration 
 
-0.0387 
         
  
(-1.07) 
         rule_law 
  
-0.00521 
        
   
(-0.32) 
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common_legal 
   
-0.0202 
       
    
(-1.57) 
       2.SIC2 -0.0193 -0.00842 -0.0131 -0.0222 0.00351 -0.0298 -0.0182 -0.0197 -0.0660 -0.0192 -0.0152 
 
(-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.20) (0.03) (-0.22) (-0.16) (-0.45) (-1.49) (-0.17) (-0.23) 
8.SIC2 -0.00724 0.00121 -0.00191 -0.0101 -0.0283 -0.0410 -0.00425 -0.0666 -0.0697 -0.00729 -0.00748 
 
(-0.07) (0.01) (-0.02) (-0.09) (-0.24) (-0.30) (-0.04) (-1.52) (-1.56) (-0.07) (-0.11) 
10.SIC2 0.0134 0.0129 0.0160 0.0132 0.0132 -0.00690 0.00905 -0.00386 -0.0344 0.0134 0.0203 
 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (-0.06) (0.09) (-0.10) (-0.90) (0.14) (0.35) 
12.SIC2 0.0451 0.0558 0.0477 0.0419 0.0305 0.0379 0.0496 0.0360 -0.0704 0.0451 0.0407 
 
(0.38) (0.47) (0.40) (0.35) (0.24) (0.26) (0.41) (0.77) (-1.47) (0.38) (0.57) 
13.SIC2 0.0349 0.0384 0.0387 0.0347 0.0105 0.0155 0.0388 -0.0759** -0.124*** 0.0349 0.0460 
 
(0.40) (0.44) (0.44) (0.40) (0.11) (0.15) (0.44) (-2.15) (-3.57) (0.40) (0.88) 
14.SIC2 -0.00105 0.00312 0.00418 -0.00674 -0.0152 -0.00503 0.00123 0.0317 -0.0315 -0.00110 0.000928 
 
(-0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (-0.06) (-0.12) (-0.04) (0.01) (0.69) (-0.68) (-0.01) (0.01) 
15.SIC2 -0.0272 -0.0219 -0.0238 -0.0358 -0.0353 -0.0432 -0.0270 0.00707 -0.0426 -0.0272 -0.0271 
 
(-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.28) (0.18) (-1.07) (-0.28) (-0.47) 
16.SIC2 -0.00233 0.00753 0.00335 -0.00804 -0.00119 -0.0121 0.0000336 0.0307 -0.0354 -0.00233 -0.00472 
 
(-0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (-0.08) (-0.01) (-0.10) (0.00) (0.79) (-0.90) (-0.02) (-0.08) 
17.SIC2 0.00728 0.0130 0.0117 0.00579 0.00287 -0.000313 0.0144 0.0438 -0.0150 0.00729 -0.00401 
 
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.02) (-0.00) (0.14) (1.08) (-0.37) (0.07) (-0.07) 
20.SIC2 0.00328 0.0121 0.00902 -0.00158 -0.00628 -0.00615 0.00528 0.0115 -0.0438 0.00323 0.00244 
 
(0.04) (0.14) (0.11) (-0.02) (-0.07) (-0.06) (0.06) (0.33) (-1.28) (0.04) (0.05) 
22.SIC2 0.00101 0.0123 0.00789 -0.00483 0.00142 -0.00338 0.00411 0.0173 -0.0404 0.000946 -0.00338 
 
(0.01) (0.14) (0.09) (-0.06) (0.02) (-0.03) (0.05) (0.48) (-1.15) (0.01) (-0.06) 
23.SIC2 -0.00786 0.00230 -0.00341 -0.00964 -0.00738 -0.0150 -0.00546 -0.0108 -0.0543 -0.00789 -0.00433 
 
(-0.09) (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.29) (-1.48) (-0.09) (-0.08) 
24.SIC2 -0.00685 -0.000421 -0.00304 -0.00862 -0.00551 -0.0197 -0.00855 -0.0151 -0.0606 -0.00687 -0.0106 
 
(-0.07) (-0.00) (-0.03) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-0.17) (-0.09) (-0.40) (-1.61) (-0.07) (-0.19) 
25.SIC2 -0.0176 -0.0102 -0.0128 -0.0198 -0.00952 -0.0246 -0.0153 -0.0124 -0.0563 -0.0176 -0.0254 
 
(-0.19) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.21) (-0.09) (-0.22) (-0.16) (-0.33) (-1.51) (-0.19) (-0.45) 
26.SIC2 -0.000259 0.00940 0.00595 -0.00680 -0.00568 -0.0109 0.00204 0.0140 -0.0435 -0.000302 -0.00435 
 
(-0.00) (0.11) (0.07) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.10) (0.02) (0.40) (-1.26) (-0.00) (-0.08) 
27.SIC2 -0.0154 -0.00820 -0.0103 -0.0201 -0.0115 -0.0268 -0.0135 -0.0135 -0.0646* -0.0154 -0.0154 
 
(-0.17) (-0.09) (-0.12) (-0.23) (-0.12) (-0.25) (-0.15) (-0.38) (-1.83) (-0.17) (-0.29) 
28.SIC2 -0.0104 -0.000878 -0.00330 -0.0155 -0.0108 -0.0204 -0.00849 0.00851 -0.0609* -0.0105 -0.00703 
 
(-0.12) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.18) (-0.12) (-0.20) (-0.10) (0.24) (-1.79) (-0.12) (-0.14) 
29.SIC2 0.0149 0.0146 0.0126 0.00933 0.00956 -0.00228 0.00655 0.0714* 0.0412 0.0149 0.0238 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (-0.02) (0.07) (1.84) (1.07) (0.15) (0.41) 
30.SIC2 0.00477 0.0142 0.0108 -0.000999 0.00225 -0.00776 0.00747 0.00896 -0.0556 0.00471 0.00223 
 
(0.05) (0.16) (0.12) (-0.01) (0.02) (-0.07) (0.09) (0.25) (-1.61) (0.05) (0.04) 
31.SIC2 0.00165 0.00264 0.00118 0.00323 -0.00960 -0.00608 0.00408 -0.0117 -0.0552 0.00159 -0.00515 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.07) (-0.04) (0.03) (-0.21) (-0.97) (0.01) (-0.06) 
32.SIC2 -0.00283 0.00727 0.00267 -0.00896 -0.0104 -0.0147 -0.00141 0.0107 -0.0622* -0.00284 -0.00746 
 
(-0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (-0.10) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.02) (0.30) (-1.81) (-0.03) (-0.14) 
33.SIC2 -0.00671 0.00143 -0.00122 -0.0124 -0.00834 -0.0138 -0.00561 0.0190 -0.0348 -0.00674 -0.00714 
 
(-0.08) (0.02) (-0.01) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.07) (0.54) (-1.02) (-0.08) (-0.14) 
34.SIC2 -0.00353 0.00572 0.00331 -0.00948 -0.00828 -0.0120 -0.00133 0.0134 -0.0508 -0.00356 -0.00655 
 
(-0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.02) (0.38) (-1.46) (-0.04) (-0.13) 
35.SIC2 0.0763 0.0860 0.0829 0.0718 0.0868 0.0839 0.0799 0.0125 -0.0469 0.0766 0.0449 
 
(0.88) (1.00) (0.96) (0.83) (0.94) (0.80) (0.92) (0.35) (-1.36) (0.88) (0.86) 
36.SIC2 -0.0145 -0.00634 -0.00842 -0.0184 -0.00986 -0.0223 -0.0125 -0.00987 -0.0659* -0.0145 -0.0130 
 
(-0.17) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.22) (-0.11) (-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.28) (-1.94) (-0.17) (-0.26) 
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37.SIC2 0.00117 0.00938 0.00729 -0.00617 -0.0100 -0.0105 0.00313 0.0101 -0.0493 0.00116 -0.00173 
 
(0.01) (0.11) (0.09) (-0.07) (-0.11) (-0.10) (0.04) (0.29) (-1.45) (0.01) (-0.03) 
38.SIC2 -0.0105 -0.00133 -0.00400 -0.0131 -0.0108 -0.0226 -0.00622 0.00519 -0.0659* -0.0105 -0.0137 
 
(-0.12) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.15) (-0.11) (-0.21) (-0.07) (0.14) (-1.83) (-0.12) (-0.26) 
39.SIC2 -0.0227 -0.0133 -0.0171 -0.0243 -0.0151 -0.0344 -0.0203 -0.0259 -0.0995*** -0.0227 -0.0248 
 
(-0.24) (-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.26) (-0.14) (-0.30) (-0.21) (-0.68) (-2.65) (-0.24) (-0.44) 
40.SIC2 0.0641 0.0757 0.0628 0.0505 0.0672 0.00379 0.0621 0.123** 0.0153 0.0641 0.0637 
 
(0.45) (0.53) (0.44) (0.36) (0.49) (0.02) (0.44) (2.25) (0.26) (0.45) (0.74) 
41.SIC2 0.0373 0.0506 0.0440 0.0281 0.0285 0.0260 0.0411 0.0152 -0.0418 0.0372 0.0237 
 
(0.37) (0.50) (0.44) (0.28) (0.28) (0.21) (0.41) (0.38) (-1.03) (0.37) (0.39) 
42.SIC2 0.0290 0.0379 0.0363 0.0241 -0.00791 0.0180 0.0334 0.00131 -0.0508 0.0289 0.0285 
 
(0.33) (0.43) (0.41) (0.27) (-0.08) (0.17) (0.38) (0.04) (-1.44) (0.33) (0.54) 
44.SIC2 0.0119 0.0203 0.0181 0.00771 -0.000975 -0.00900 0.0141 -0.00628 -0.0981*** 0.0119 0.0169 
 
(0.13) (0.23) (0.20) (0.09) (-0.01) (-0.08) (0.16) (-0.17) (-2.76) (0.13) (0.32) 
45.SIC2 0.00816 0.0117 0.00679 0.00210 -0.00735 -0.00966 0.00614 -0.00690 -0.0411 0.00831 0.0208 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.02) (-0.07) (-0.08) (0.06) (-0.18) (-1.06) (0.09) (0.36) 
47.SIC2 0.0399 0.0460 0.0433 0.0330 -0.0199 0.0228 0.00997 -0.00289 -0.0883** 0.0399 0.0465 
 
(0.42) (0.49) (0.46) (0.35) (-0.20) (0.20) (0.10) (-0.08) (-2.32) (0.42) (0.82) 
48.SIC2 -0.0232 -0.0197 -0.0182 -0.0272 -0.0300 -0.0370 -0.0191 -0.0422 -0.113*** -0.0232 -0.0205 
 
(-0.26) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.22) (-1.19) (-3.25) (-0.26) (-0.39) 
49.SIC2 -0.0144 -0.00964 -0.00949 -0.0196 -0.0331 -0.0329 -0.0132 -0.0132 -0.0903*** -0.0145 -0.0187 
 
(-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.23) (-0.36) (-0.31) (-0.15) (-0.37) (-2.60) (-0.17) (-0.36) 
50.SIC2 -0.0128 -0.00457 -0.00711 -0.0182 -0.0183 -0.0172 -0.0111 0.0134 -0.0523 -0.0128 -0.0110 
 
(-0.15) (-0.05) (-0.08) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.17) (-0.13) (0.38) (-1.53) (-0.15) (-0.21) 
51.SIC2 -0.000616 0.00762 0.00492 -0.00649 0.00225 -0.0101 0.00158 0.0294 -0.0265 -0.000637 -0.00576 
 
(-0.01) (0.09) (0.06) (-0.07) (0.02) (-0.10) (0.02) (0.82) (-0.76) (-0.01) (-0.11) 
52.SIC2 -0.0327 -0.0374 -0.0401 -0.0371 -0.0315 -0.0740 -0.0415 0.0261 -0.0967 -0.0324 -0.0261 
 
(-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.23) (-0.18) (0.30) (-1.03) (-0.14) (-0.22) 
53.SIC2 -0.0137 -0.00820 -0.0120 -0.0206 -0.0149 -0.0188 -0.0139 0.00361 -0.0290 -0.0137 -0.0130 
 
(-0.14) (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.14) (0.09) (-0.75) (-0.14) (-0.22) 
54.SIC2 0.00683 0.0138 0.0124 -0.00100 0.00580 -0.00361 0.00821 0.0355 -0.0117 0.00683 0.00689 
 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.14) (-0.01) (0.06) (-0.03) (0.09) (0.96) (-0.32) (0.07) (0.13) 
55.SIC2 0.00124 0.00857 0.00601 -0.00659 -0.000834 -0.00752 0.00230 0.0378 -0.0150 0.00121 0.00115 
 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (-0.06) (-0.01) (-0.06) (0.02) (0.92) (-0.36) (0.01) (0.02) 
56.SIC2 -0.00853 0.000697 -0.00272 -0.0118 -0.0140 -0.0211 -0.00701 -0.0199 -0.0712** -0.00852 -0.00811 
 
(-0.09) (0.01) (-0.03) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.19) (-0.08) (-0.54) (-1.99) (-0.09) (-0.15) 
57.SIC2 -0.0243 -0.0180 -0.0193 -0.0264 -0.0523 -0.0323 -0.0226 -0.0601 -0.110** -0.0243 -0.00353 
 
(-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.25) (-0.41) (-0.25) (-0.21) (-1.40) (-2.55) (-0.23) (-0.05) 
58.SIC2 -0.00554 0.00575 0.00247 -0.00655 -0.00134 -0.0276 -0.00167 -0.0571 -0.127*** -0.00560 -0.0105 
 
(-0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (-0.07) (-0.01) (-0.24) (-0.02) (-1.49) (-3.34) (-0.06) (-0.18) 
59.SIC2 -0.0172 -0.0114 -0.0128 -0.0222 -0.0272 -0.0329 -0.0159 -0.0373 -0.0842** -0.0172 -0.0165 
 
(-0.19) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.17) (-1.01) (-2.31) (-0.19) (-0.30) 
70.SIC2 0.00285 0.00859 0.00473 0.000813 -0.0134 -0.0156 0.00593 -0.0161 -0.0756** 0.00281 -0.00194 
 
(0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.01) (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.06) (-0.43) (-2.04) (0.03) (-0.03) 
72.SIC2 -0.0303 -0.0252 -0.0269 -0.0341 -0.0569 -0.0555 -0.0274 -0.0918** -0.154*** -0.0303 -0.0130 
 
(-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.32) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.25) (-2.16) (-3.58) (-0.28) (-0.20) 
73.SIC2 -0.0237 -0.0164 -0.0181 -0.0271 -0.0456 -0.0369 -0.0207 -0.0375 -0.110*** -0.0237 -0.0218 
 
(-0.27) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.49) (-0.35) (-0.24) (-1.06) (-3.19) (-0.27) (-0.42) 
75.SIC2 0.0283 0.0328 0.0338 0.0253 -0.00999 0.0208 0.0303 -0.0573 -0.0955** 0.0283 0.0502 
 
(0.26) (0.30) (0.31) (0.24) (-0.09) (0.16) (0.28) (-1.35) (-2.17) (0.26) (0.77) 
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76.SIC2 -0.00732 -0.00630 -0.00328 -0.0119 0.00203 -0.00873 -0.00527 0.0491 -0.0117 -0.00721 -0.0181 
 
(-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.08) (0.01) (-0.05) (-0.04) (0.88) (-0.20) (-0.05) (-0.21) 
78.SIC2 0.0107 0.0192 0.0192 0.00826 -0.0347 -0.0162 0.0127 -0.0155 -0.165*** 0.0106 0.0149 
 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.18) (0.08) (-0.31) (-0.12) (0.11) (-0.35) (-3.79) (0.10) (0.22) 
79.SIC2 -0.00847 0.000385 -0.00220 -0.00894 -0.0380 -0.0286 -0.00448 -0.0603 -0.125*** -0.00852 -0.00443 
 
(-0.09) (0.00) (-0.02) (-0.10) (-0.36) (-0.25) (-0.05) (-1.59) (-3.32) (-0.09) (-0.08) 
80.SIC2 -0.0153 -0.00584 -0.0104 -0.0147 0.0241 -0.0312 -0.00539 -0.0289 -0.0798** -0.0154 -0.0150 
 
(-0.15) (-0.06) (-0.10) (-0.15) (0.19) (-0.26) (-0.05) (-0.73) (-2.02) (-0.16) (-0.25) 
82.SIC2 -0.00540 0.00567 0.00300 -0.0110 -0.00663 -0.0149 -0.00172 0.0105 -0.0505 -0.00543 -0.0151 
 
(-0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (-0.09) (-0.05) (-0.10) (-0.01) (0.23) (-1.06) (-0.05) (-0.21) 
87.SIC2 -0.0147 -0.00758 -0.0107 -0.0190 -0.0182 -0.0233 -0.0128 0.0183 -0.0400 -0.0147 -0.0190 
 
(-0.16) (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.14) (0.50) (-1.11) (-0.16) (-0.35) 
96.SIC2 -0.0340 -0.0255 -0.0270 -0.0439 -0.0403 -0.0338 -0.0343 -0.0435 -0.108 -0.0338 -0.0328 
 
(-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.15) (-0.18) (-0.62) (-1.45) (-0.18) (-0.29) 
2003.year -0.00512 -0.00368 -0.00303 -0.00431 -0.00911 -0.00690 -0.00364 -0.0335*** -0.0369*** -0.00517 -0.00601 
 
(-0.26) (-0.19) (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.43) (-0.31) (-0.18) (-4.54) (-4.63) (-0.26) (-0.51) 
2004.year 0.000222 0.00143 0.00225 0.000583 -0.00370 -0.00196 0.00183 -0.0185*** -0.0163** 0.000174 -0.000405 
 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (-0.18) (-0.09) (0.09) (-2.56) (-2.09) (0.01) (-0.04) 
2005.year 0.0380* 0.0394** 0.0401** 0.0379* 0.0348 0.0326 0.0396* -0.00860 -0.0156** 0.0379* 0.0241** 
 
(1.90) (1.99) (2.03) (1.91) (1.60) (1.48) (1.94) (-1.19) (-2.01) (1.90) (2.05) 
2006.year 0.0109 0.0125 0.0134 0.0106 0.00857 0.00902 0.0118 0.00431 0.0113 0.0108 0.0107 
 
(0.55) (0.65) (0.69) (0.55) (0.40) (0.42) (0.59) (0.59) (1.43) (0.55) (0.92) 
2007.year 0.00280 0.00440 0.00545 0.00218 0.00517 0.00000703 0.00414 -0.000827 -0.000615 0.00274 0.00128 
 
(0.14) (0.23) (0.28) (0.11) (0.24) (0.00) (0.21) (-0.11) (-0.08) (0.14) (0.11) 
2008.year 0.00132 0.00160 0.00190 0.00137 -0.00320 
 
0.00128 -0.0213*** -0.0216*** 0.00128 0.000723 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (-0.16) 
 
(0.07) (-3.07) (-2.90) (0.07) (0.07) 
2009.year -0.0273 -0.0261 -0.0260 -0.0272 -0.0367* -0.0308 -0.0281 -0.0744*** -0.0856*** -0.0273 -0.0327*** 
 
(-1.40) (-1.35) (-1.34) (-1.41) (-1.81) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-10.68) (-11.45) (-1.40) (-2.83) 
2010.year -0.0110 -0.0102 -0.00974 -0.0112 -0.0140 -0.0118 -0.0113 -0.0288*** -0.0262*** -0.0110 -0.0141 
 
(-0.61) (-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.62) (-0.73) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-4.28) (-3.60) (-0.61) (-1.30) 
_cons -0.0319 -0.0632 -0.0859 -0.0412 -0.166 -0.0575 -0.0473 -0.470*** -0.155*** -0.0316 0.0994 
 
(-0.21) (-0.45) (-0.56) (-0.29) (-1.10) (-0.32) (-0.31) (-8.37) (-2.60) (-0.21) (0.95) 
number of observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13680 13668 13677 13950 13950 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table A.3. Regression results – Individualism dimension (Hofstede)  
 (3)                   Base model 
(39)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(40)                     
Rule of Law 
(41)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(42)                        
ex USA 
(43)                       
ex Crisis 
(44)                     
Outliers - Size 
(45)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(46)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(47)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(13)                     
Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00122 0.00120 0.00122 0.00122 0.00133 0.000975 0.00113 0.00300 0.00559** 0.00157 0.00365 
 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (1.09) (2.01) (0.22) (1.07) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00927 0.00922 0.00889 0.00913 0.00688 0.0127 0.00923 -0.00800* -0.00825* 0.00929 0.00767 
 
(0.89) (0.88) (0.85) (0.88) (0.52) (0.88) (0.86) (-1.78) (-1.83) (0.89) (1.37) 
FCF_TA 1.257*** 1.239*** 1.244*** 1.257*** 1.182*** 1.340** 1.271*** 0.316*** 4.590*** 1.256*** 1.520** 
 
(2.68) (2.63) (2.65) (2.69) (2.74) (2.41) (2.74) (3.61) (33.09) (2.68) (2.54) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00480 0.00656 0.00683 0.00500 0.00362 0.00536 0.00678 -0.00494 -0.0150*** 0.00476 -0.00187 
 
(0.49) (0.67) (0.71) (0.51) (0.29) (0.44) (0.63) (-1.20) (-3.59) (0.48) (-0.30) 
Leverage 0.197** 0.195** 0.193** 0.198** 0.274** 0.219* 0.188* 0.446*** 0.516*** 0.197** 0.219*** 
 
(2.06) (2.04) (2.02) (2.07) (2.45) (1.77) (1.92) (11.42) (12.97) (2.06) (3.06) 
DIV_FCF 0.000513 0.000522 0.000524 0.000533 0.000523 0.000908 0.000596 0.000454 0.00229*** 0.000509 0.0000546 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.44) (0.32) (0.59) (2.98) (0.27) (0.08) 
L.Cash_TA 0.117 0.123 0.129 0.119 0.106 0.0982 0.127 0.241*** 0.132** 0.116 0.123* 
 
(0.95) (1.00) (1.05) (0.97) (0.84) (0.64) (1.00) (4.57) (2.54) (0.94) (1.80) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000512 
 
          
(-0.12) 
 IDV -0.000175 -0.000241 -0.000166 -0.0000762 -0.000539 -0.000407 -0.000189 -0.00358*** 0.00137*** -0.000177 0.000793** 
 
(-0.30) (-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.12) (-0.83) (-0.56) (-0.32) (-18.97) (5.84) (-0.31) (2.49) 
IDV_FCF -0.00624 -0.00599 -0.00613 -0.00623 0.00254 -0.00529 -0.00615 0.0428*** -0.0325*** -0.00624 -0.0216*** 
 
(-0.84) (-0.80) (-0.82) (-0.84) (0.32) (-0.56) (-0.82) (21.66) (-11.23) (-0.84) (-4.94) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0485 
           
(0.83) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-0.557 
           
(-0.69) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.216 
           
(0.96) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-0.983* 
           
(-1.75) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-2.012*** 
           
(-3.80) 
Stock_FCF 
          
-0.00160 
           
(-1.45) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.0129*** 
           
(5.81) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.00553 -0.00549 -0.000512 -0.00715 -0.00776 -0.00459 -0.00533 0.00791* 0.00371 -0.00551 0.000454 
 
(-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.04) (-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.36) (-0.50) (1.75) (0.82) (-0.52) (0.08) 
Credit_GDP 0.000201 0.000162 0.000194 0.000201 0.000296** 0.000234 0.000185 0.0000171 0.000290*** 0.000201 -0.000656*** 
 
(1.52) (1.18) (1.49) (1.54) (2.05) (1.48) (1.37) (0.30) (5.08) (1.53) (-3.96) 
Stock_mkt_GDP -0.0000160 -0.0000156 -0.0000286 -0.00000125 -0.0000147 -0.0000139 -0.0000220 -0.0000563 -0.0000432 -0.0000159 0.0000718 
 
(-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.45) (-0.01) (-0.18) (-0.13) (-0.27) (-1.62) (-1.24) (-0.20) (0.83) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0101 
   
-0.00488 -0.00943 -0.00678 -0.0269* -0.0393*** -0.0102 0.117*** 
 
(-0.29) 
   
(-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.19) (-1.84) (-2.64) (-0.30) (2.83) 
concentration 
 
-0.0253 
         
  
(-0.75) 
         rule_law 
  
-0.00777 
        
   
(-0.55) 
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common_legal 
   
-0.00855 
       
    
(-0.56) 
       2.SIC2 -0.0289 -0.0252 -0.0277 -0.0298 -0.0206 -0.0394 -0.0279 -0.0926* -0.0762 -0.0289 -0.00455 
 
(-0.27) (-0.23) (-0.26) (-0.28) (-0.16) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-1.87) (-1.63) (-0.27) (-0.08) 
8.SIC2 -0.000950 0.00413 0.00179 -0.00223 -0.0283 -0.0282 0.00179 -0.105** -0.0409 -0.00101 0.0109 
 
(-0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (-0.02) (-0.23) (-0.21) (0.02) (-2.13) (-0.87) (-0.01) (0.19) 
10.SIC2 0.00718 0.00541 0.0106 0.00649 -0.00941 -0.00890 0.00395 -0.0814* -0.0444 0.00718 0.0349 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (-0.09) (-0.08) (0.04) (-1.88) (-1.11) (0.08) (0.71) 
12.SIC2 0.0277 0.0344 0.0316 0.0251 -0.00947 0.0181 0.0320 -0.0431 -0.117** 0.0277 0.0532 
 
(0.24) (0.30) (0.27) (0.21) (-0.07) (0.13) (0.27) (-0.82) (-2.33) (0.24) (0.87) 
13.SIC2 0.0405 0.0412 0.0436 0.0399 0.00562 0.0251 0.0431 -0.144*** -0.0807** 0.0405 0.0648 
 
(0.47) (0.48) (0.51) (0.47) (0.05) (0.24) (0.50) (-3.60) (-2.20) (0.47) (1.43) 
14.SIC2 -0.0175 -0.0173 -0.0137 -0.0193 -0.0426 -0.0208 -0.0156 -0.0432 -0.0653 -0.0176 0.00647 
 
(-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.12) (-0.17) (-0.33) (-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.84) (-1.33) (-0.15) (0.11) 
15.SIC2 -0.0538 -0.0535 -0.0503 -0.0551 -0.0696 -0.0788 -0.0538 -0.0867** -0.0899** -0.0538 -0.0316 
 
(-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.59) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-0.57) (-1.98) (-2.14) (-0.57) (-0.64) 
16.SIC2 -0.0174 -0.0135 -0.0140 -0.0193 -0.0303 -0.0268 -0.0152 -0.0443 -0.0637 -0.0174 0.00221 
 
(-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.20) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.16) (-1.01) (-1.53) (-0.18) (0.04) 
17.SIC2 -0.00965 -0.00714 -0.00536 -0.0103 -0.0301 -0.0155 -0.00324 -0.0247 -0.0597 -0.00965 0.00159 
 
(-0.10) (-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.11) (-0.24) (-0.13) (-0.03) (-0.54) (-1.41) (-0.10) (0.03) 
20.SIC2 -0.0135 -0.0104 -0.00962 -0.0145 -0.0318 -0.0222 -0.0117 -0.0580 -0.0741** -0.0135 0.00275 
 
(-0.16) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.17) (-0.33) (-0.22) (-0.14) (-1.47) (-2.07) (-0.16) (0.06) 
22.SIC2 -0.0174 -0.0133 -0.0121 -0.0188 -0.0297 -0.0230 -0.0146 -0.0610 -0.0706* -0.0175 -0.00285 
 
(-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.14) (-0.22) (-0.30) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-1.52) (-1.92) (-0.20) (-0.06) 
23.SIC2 -0.0157 -0.0107 -0.0128 -0.0165 -0.0209 -0.0210 -0.0134 -0.0651 -0.0677* -0.0158 0.000922 
 
(-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.15) (-1.55) (-1.75) (-0.17) (0.02) 
24.SIC2 -0.0153 -0.0122 -0.0122 -0.0157 -0.0247 -0.0261 -0.0169 -0.0726* -0.0719* -0.0154 -0.00325 
 
(-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.18) (-1.70) (-1.82) (-0.17) (-0.07) 
25.SIC2 -0.0262 -0.0230 -0.0228 -0.0273 -0.0303 -0.0320 -0.0240 -0.0744* -0.0738* -0.0262 -0.0161 
 
(-0.29) (-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.26) (-1.75) (-1.89) (-0.29) (-0.33) 
26.SIC2 -0.0145 -0.0110 -0.0107 -0.0164 -0.0302 -0.0242 -0.0126 -0.0584 -0.0660* -0.0146 0.000538 
 
(-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.31) (-0.23) (-0.15) (-1.47) (-1.82) (-0.17) (0.01) 
27.SIC2 -0.0275 -0.0253 -0.0242 -0.0289 -0.0363 -0.0386 -0.0259 -0.0868** -0.0803** -0.0276 -0.00838 
 
(-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.33) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.30) (-2.15) (-2.17) (-0.32) (-0.18) 
28.SIC2 -0.0262 -0.0231 -0.0220 -0.0276 -0.0389 -0.0365 -0.0245 -0.0676* -0.0900** -0.0262 -0.00120 
 
(-0.32) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.41) (-0.36) (-0.29) (-1.73) (-2.53) (-0.32) (-0.03) 
29.SIC2 0.0000358 -0.00261 -0.00313 -0.00157 -0.0161 -0.0176 -0.00599 -0.00358 0.00445 0.0000491 0.0254 
 
(0.00) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.06) (-0.08) (0.11) (0.00) (0.51) 
30.SIC2 -0.00912 -0.00542 -0.00521 -0.0109 -0.0224 -0.0215 -0.00672 -0.0657* -0.0783** -0.00920 0.00839 
 
(-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.13) (-0.23) (-0.21) (-0.08) (-1.65) (-2.15) (-0.11) (0.19) 
31.SIC2 -0.0124 -0.0122 -0.00932 -0.0116 -0.0376 -0.0208 -0.0102 -0.0909 -0.0763 -0.0125 0.00564 
 
(-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.07) (-0.08) (-0.26) (-0.12) (-0.07) (-1.47) (-1.28) (-0.09) (0.08) 
32.SIC2 -0.0211 -0.0177 -0.0184 -0.0227 -0.0410 -0.0331 -0.0200 -0.0752* -0.0944*** -0.0212 -0.00249 
 
(-0.25) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.27) (-0.43) (-0.32) (-0.24) (-1.90) (-2.62) (-0.25) (-0.06) 
33.SIC2 -0.0200 -0.0176 -0.0173 -0.0219 -0.0330 -0.0256 -0.0191 -0.0528 -0.0591* -0.0201 -0.000261 
 
(-0.24) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.26) (-0.34) (-0.25) (-0.23) (-1.34) (-1.65) (-0.24) (-0.01) 
34.SIC2 -0.0183 -0.0151 -0.0142 -0.0200 -0.0333 -0.0250 -0.0162 -0.0574 -0.0756** -0.0183 -0.00129 
 
(-0.22) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.24) (-0.34) (-0.24) (-0.19) (-1.44) (-2.08) (-0.22) (-0.03) 
35.SIC2 0.0585 0.0625 0.0631 0.0570 0.0652 0.0687 0.0619 -0.0597 -0.0803** 0.0588 0.0427 
 
(0.69) (0.74) (0.75) (0.67) (0.67) (0.65) (0.72) (-1.50) (-2.23) (0.69) (0.96) 
36.SIC2 -0.0283 -0.0253 -0.0240 -0.0295 -0.0352 -0.0357 -0.0265 -0.0810** -0.0892** -0.0283 -0.00747 
 
(-0.34) (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-2.06) (-2.51) (-0.34) (-0.17) 
37.SIC2 -0.0150 -0.0129 -0.0120 -0.0169 -0.0358 -0.0273 -0.0129 -0.0687* -0.0749** -0.0150 0.00215 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 241. 
 
 
(-0.18) (-0.16) (-0.14) (-0.20) (-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.15) (-1.75) (-2.10) (-0.18) (0.05) 
38.SIC2 -0.0221 -0.0178 -0.0173 -0.0236 -0.0357 -0.0304 -0.0183 -0.0621 -0.0904** -0.0221 -0.00277 
 
(-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.27) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.21) (-1.51) (-2.40) (-0.25) (-0.06) 
39.SIC2 -0.0377 -0.0333 -0.0336 -0.0387 -0.0439 -0.0499 -0.0354 -0.0993** -0.133*** -0.0377 -0.0159 
 
(-0.41) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.42) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.38) (-2.32) (-3.37) (-0.41) (-0.33) 
40.SIC2 0.0470 0.0518 0.0416 0.0421 0.0392 -0.0150 0.0450 0.0432 -0.0210 0.0470 0.0649 
 
(0.34) (0.37) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (-0.09) (0.32) (0.70) (-0.34) (0.34) (0.88) 
41.SIC2 0.0231 0.0290 0.0282 0.0197 0.00173 0.0134 0.0265 -0.0553 -0.0663 0.0230 0.0290 
 
(0.23) (0.30) (0.29) (0.20) (0.02) (0.11) (0.27) (-1.22) (-1.56) (0.23) (0.56) 
42.SIC2 0.0197 0.0231 0.0248 0.0183 -0.0304 0.0106 0.0240 -0.0629 -0.0575 0.0196 0.0382 
 
(0.23) (0.27) (0.29) (0.21) (-0.30) (0.10) (0.27) (-1.55) (-1.55) (0.23) (0.84) 
44.SIC2 -0.00219 0.000550 0.00153 -0.00354 -0.0292 -0.0216 -0.000276 -0.0864** -0.116*** -0.00217 0.0266 
 
(-0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.04) (-0.29) (-0.20) (-0.00) (-2.13) (-3.11) (-0.02) (0.58) 
45.SIC2 -0.00930 -0.00949 -0.00995 -0.0114 -0.0408 -0.0266 -0.0111 -0.0950** -0.0743* -0.00916 0.0236 
 
(-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.37) (-0.23) (-0.12) (-2.18) (-1.83) (-0.10) (0.47) 
47.SIC2 0.0281 0.0299 0.0315 0.0254 -0.0443 0.0117 -0.00239 -0.0853** -0.103*** 0.0281 0.0535 
 
(0.30) (0.32) (0.34) (0.27) (-0.42) (0.10) (-0.03) (-1.99) (-2.57) (0.30) (1.10) 
48.SIC2 -0.0365 -0.0375 -0.0342 -0.0378 -0.0562 -0.0490 -0.0326 -0.119*** -0.134*** -0.0365 -0.0142 
 
(-0.43) (-0.44) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.57) (-0.46) (-0.38) (-2.98) (-3.66) (-0.43) (-0.31) 
49.SIC2 -0.0315 -0.0315 -0.0288 -0.0329 -0.0611 -0.0487 -0.0306 -0.0926** -0.121*** -0.0316 -0.0173 
 
(-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.34) (-0.39) (-0.62) (-0.46) (-0.36) (-2.33) (-3.32) (-0.37) (-0.38) 
50.SIC2 -0.0293 -0.0264 -0.0254 -0.0311 -0.0452 -0.0340 -0.0281 -0.0593 -0.0882** -0.0293 -0.00618 
 
(-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.37) (-0.47) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-1.50) (-2.46) (-0.35) (-0.14) 
51.SIC2 -0.0168 -0.0138 -0.0130 -0.0183 -0.0263 -0.0267 -0.0149 -0.0494 -0.0551 -0.0168 0.0000647 
 
(-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-1.23) (-1.51) (-0.20) (0.00) 
52.SIC2 -0.0965 -0.0971 -0.0984 -0.100 -0.113 -0.187 -0.107 -0.0897 -0.313*** -0.0959 -0.0374 
 
(-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.42) (-0.49) (-0.39) (-0.77) (-2.69) (-0.35) (-0.32) 
53.SIC2 -0.0258 -0.0248 -0.0256 -0.0278 -0.0402 -0.0318 -0.0260 -0.0735* -0.0459 -0.0258 -0.00643 
 
(-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.36) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-1.68) (-1.13) (-0.27) (-0.13) 
54.SIC2 -0.00940 -0.00809 -0.00658 -0.0115 -0.0223 -0.0212 -0.00819 -0.0491 -0.0375 -0.00942 0.0141 
 
(-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.07) (-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.19) (-0.09) (-1.18) (-0.98) (-0.11) (0.30) 
55.SIC2 -0.0175 -0.0157 -0.0136 -0.0203 -0.0338 -0.0275 -0.0166 -0.0425 -0.0570 -0.0176 0.00411 
 
(-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.14) (-0.20) (-0.30) (-0.22) (-0.16) (-0.92) (-1.31) (-0.17) (0.08) 
56.SIC2 -0.0177 -0.0137 -0.0135 -0.0192 -0.0394 -0.0280 -0.0162 -0.0880** -0.0847** -0.0177 0.00211 
 
(-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.38) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-2.14) (-2.25) (-0.20) (0.05) 
57.SIC2 -0.0376 -0.0353 -0.0338 -0.0387 -0.0809 -0.0435 -0.0359 -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.0375 0.00601 
 
(-0.36) (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.37) (-0.60) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-2.77) (-3.00) (-0.36) (0.11) 
58.SIC2 -0.0109 -0.00551 -0.00572 -0.0115 -0.0274 -0.0274 -0.00731 -0.126*** -0.120*** -0.0110 0.00504 
 
(-0.12) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.12) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.08) (-2.92) (-3.01) (-0.12) (0.10) 
59.SIC2 -0.0284 -0.0270 -0.0252 -0.0296 -0.0529 -0.0429 -0.0273 -0.117*** -0.0894** -0.0285 -0.00780 
 
(-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.33) (-0.51) (-0.39) (-0.30) (-2.80) (-2.33) (-0.32) (-0.16) 
70.SIC2 -0.0143 -0.0113 -0.0108 -0.0140 -0.0400 -0.0338 -0.0117 -0.0900** -0.102*** -0.0144 -0.00187 
 
(-0.16) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.15) (-0.39) (-0.30) (-0.13) (-2.14) (-2.61) (-0.16) (-0.04) 
72.SIC2 -0.0370 -0.0350 -0.0334 -0.0387 -0.0728 -0.0557 -0.0343 -0.163*** -0.152*** -0.0370 -0.00159 
 
(-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.36) (-0.55) (-0.42) (-0.32) (-3.39) (-3.36) (-0.35) (-0.03) 
73.SIC2 -0.0352 -0.0322 -0.0305 -0.0369 -0.0712 -0.0460 -0.0322 -0.108*** -0.128*** -0.0352 -0.0118 
 
(-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.36) (-0.43) (-0.72) (-0.44) (-0.38) (-2.69) (-3.54) (-0.41) (-0.27) 
75.SIC2 0.0262 0.0271 0.0309 0.0246 -0.0248 0.0196 0.0281 -0.128*** -0.0902* 0.0261 0.0638 
 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (0.23) (-0.21) (0.15) (0.26) (-2.66) (-1.95) (0.25) (1.14) 
76.SIC2 -0.0245 -0.0257 -0.0206 -0.0266 -0.0332 -0.0273 -0.0224 -0.0384 -0.0523 -0.0244 -0.00293 
 
(-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.19) (-0.23) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.61) (-0.87) (-0.17) (-0.04) 
78.SIC2 0.0107 0.0148 0.0190 0.00889 -0.0410 -0.00763 0.0118 -0.0955* -0.144*** 0.0106 0.0298 
 
(0.10) (0.14) (0.18) (0.08) (-0.35) (-0.06) (0.11) (-1.92) (-3.12) (0.10) (0.52) 
79.SIC2 -0.0123 -0.00768 -0.00684 -0.0127 -0.0472 -0.0256 -0.00849 -0.101** -0.121*** -0.0124 0.00213 
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(-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.14) (-0.43) (-0.22) (-0.09) (-2.35) (-3.04) (-0.13) (0.04) 
80.SIC2 -0.0274 -0.0224 -0.0226 -0.0275 -0.0175 -0.0392 -0.0212 -0.103** -0.111*** -0.0274 -0.00579 
 
(-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.13) (-0.33) (-0.22) (-2.32) (-2.67) (-0.28) (-0.11) 
82.SIC2 -0.0205 -0.0162 -0.0152 -0.0220 -0.0343 -0.0318 -0.0170 -0.0643 -0.0747 -0.0206 -0.0107 
 
(-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.26) (-0.22) (-0.15) (-1.24) (-1.50) (-0.18) (-0.18) 
87.SIC2 -0.0278 -0.0247 -0.0243 -0.0296 -0.0412 -0.0373 -0.0260 -0.0494 -0.0705* -0.0278 -0.0147 
 
(-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.33) (-0.40) (-0.34) (-0.29) (-1.19) (-1.85) (-0.31) (-0.32) 
96.SIC2 -0.0551 -0.0535 -0.0530 -0.0577 -0.0699 -0.0579 -0.0550 -0.134* -0.137* -0.0548 -0.0325 
 
(-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.32) (-0.38) (-0.26) (-0.30) (-1.68) (-1.75) (-0.30) (-0.34) 
2003.year -0.00127 -0.000249 0.000926 -0.00156 -0.00527 -0.000921 0.000329 -0.0237*** -0.0283*** -0.00133 -0.00440 
 
(-0.06) (-0.01) (0.05) (-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.04) (0.02) (-2.81) (-3.33) (-0.07) (-0.44) 
2004.year 0.00312 0.00391 0.00501 0.00279 0.00112 0.00288 0.00479 -0.00528 -0.0123 0.00307 -0.00132 
 
(0.16) (0.21) (0.27) (0.15) (0.05) (0.14) (0.25) (-0.65) (-1.50) (0.16) (-0.13) 
2005.year 0.0386* 0.0395** 0.0405** 0.0383* 0.0401* 0.0358 0.0403** 0.00381 -0.0155* 0.0386* 0.0196* 
 
(1.95) (2.02) (2.07) (1.93) (1.75) (1.62) (2.00) (0.47) (-1.88) (1.95) (1.90) 
2006.year 0.0126 0.0134 0.0144 0.0121 0.0118 0.0124 0.0137 0.0140* 0.00998 0.0125 0.00959 
 
(0.65) (0.70) (0.76) (0.62) (0.52) (0.57) (0.69) (1.69) (1.19) (0.65) (0.96) 
2007.year 0.00530 0.00593 0.00698 0.00464 0.00765 0.00426 0.00667 0.00703 0.00177 0.00523 0.000712 
 
(0.27) (0.31) (0.37) (0.24) (0.34) (0.20) (0.34) (0.84) (0.21) (0.27) (0.07) 
2008.year 0.00289 0.00317 0.00360 0.00299 -0.000440 
 
0.00288 -0.0190** -0.0152* 0.00283 -0.000327 
 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (-0.02) 
 
(0.15) (-2.42) (-1.92) (0.15) (-0.03) 
2009.year -0.0253 -0.0247 -0.0243 -0.0256 -0.0355* -0.0271 -0.0257 -0.0723*** -0.0753*** -0.0253 -0.0319*** 
 
(-1.32) (-1.29) (-1.27) (-1.33) (-1.65) (-1.25) (-1.31) (-9.08) (-9.44) (-1.32) (-3.20) 
2010.year -0.00907 -0.00877 -0.00824 -0.00941 -0.0115 -0.00885 -0.00908 -0.0225*** -0.0213*** -0.00909 -0.0147 
 
(-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.46) (-0.53) (-0.57) (-0.45) (-0.50) (-2.94) (-2.76) (-0.51) (-1.56) 
_cons -0.0171 -0.0212 -0.0798 -0.00963 0.00814 -0.0250 -0.0328 0.0623 -0.122** -0.0168 -0.0698 
 
(-0.12) (-0.17) (-0.57) (-0.07) (0.05) (-0.15) (-0.23) (1.02) (-2.06) (-0.12) (-0.87) 
number of observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13680 13668 13677 13950 13950 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table A.4. Regression results – Uncertainty Avoidance dimension (Hofstede)  
 (4)                   Base model 
(48)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(49)                     
Rule of Law 
(50)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(51)                        
ex USA 
(52)                       
ex Crisis 
(53)                     
Outliers - Size 
(54)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(55)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(56)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(14)                     
Interaction 
            L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00361 0.00362 0.00362 0.00362 0.00386 0.00354 0.00361 0.00569*** 0.00583*** 0.00424 0.00362 
 
(1.12) (1.11) (1.11) (1.11) (1.37) (1.08) (1.13) (4.63) (4.66) (1.20) (1.08) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00679 0.00587 0.00587 0.00565 0.00735 0.0115* 0.00725 0.00146 0.00285 0.00681 0.00792 
 
(1.32) (1.14) (1.14) (1.11) (1.29) (1.76) (1.39) (0.74) (1.40) (1.33) (1.48) 
FCF_TA -0.684*** -0.681*** -0.684*** -0.681*** -0.645*** -0.635*** -0.678*** -0.486*** -1.275*** -0.685*** -2.158** 
 
(-3.23) (-3.18) (-3.20) (-3.18) (-3.73) (-2.76) (-3.24) (-16.38) (-17.20) (-3.23) (-2.45) 
L.Ln_TA -0.00102 -0.00145 -0.00141 -0.00153 -0.00597 -0.0000320 -0.000640 -0.00708*** -0.0116*** -0.00108 -0.00764 
 
(-0.20) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-1.05) (-0.01) (-0.12) (-3.72) (-5.90) (-0.21) (-1.24) 
Leverage 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.270*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.327*** 0.291*** 0.219*** 0.171** 
 
(4.58) (4.55) (4.57) (4.55) (5.54) (3.78) (4.46) (18.63) (15.64) (4.56) (2.32) 
DIV_FCF 0.00000574 0.000000582 0.00000604 0.0000161 -0.000524 0.000217 0.0000526 0.000351 -0.0000377 3.55e-08 0.000139 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.65) (0.22) (0.06) (0.99) (-0.10) (0.00) (0.19) 
L.Cash_TA 0.0992 0.102 0.105* 0.102 0.0776 0.0727 0.102 0.132*** 0.0926*** 0.0971 0.183*** 
 
(1.60) (1.64) (1.69) (1.64) (1.36) (1.01) (1.62) (5.55) (3.92) (1.56) (2.78) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000896 
 
          
(-0.44) 
 UAI -0.00123*** -0.00135*** -0.00140*** -0.00148*** -0.00167*** -0.00109*** -0.00123*** -0.00171*** -0.00244*** -0.00123*** -0.00127*** 
 
(-4.46) (-5.24) (-5.49) (-5.16) (-7.47) (-3.64) (-4.55) (-26.37) (-29.43) (-4.46) (-2.78) 
UAI_FCF 0.0307*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.0305*** 0.0336*** 0.0317*** 0.0310*** 0.0394*** 0.0488*** 0.0307*** 0.0306*** 
 
(9.03) (8.87) (8.91) (8.86) (13.47) (8.90) (9.32) (102.47) (59.31) (9.03) (5.09) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0928 
           
(1.60) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
0.409 
           
(0.48) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.213 
           
(0.96) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-1.931*** 
           
(-3.75) 
Anti_FCF 
          
0.608 
           
(0.81) 
            Stock_FCF 
          
0.00124 
           
(1.25) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.00265 
           
(1.40) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.00687 -0.00828 -0.00277 -0.00872* -0.00409 -0.00793 -0.00667 -0.00163 -0.000678 -0.00686 -0.00719 
 
(-1.43) (-1.64) (-0.39) (-1.74) (-0.96) (-1.47) (-1.42) (-0.90) (-0.37) (-1.43) (-1.48) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000707 0.000112 0.000104 0.000116* 0.000203*** 0.0000634 0.0000615 0.0000374 0.0000881*** 0.0000713 -0.0000926 
 
(1.05) (1.64) (1.62) (1.68) (2.98) (0.83) (0.91) (1.44) (3.33) (1.06) (-0.60) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000402 0.0000535 0.0000560 0.0000601 0.0000213 0.0000579 0.0000383 0.0000290* 0.0000266 0.0000406 -0.0000268 
 
(1.04) (1.43) (1.54) (1.63) (0.59) (1.22) (0.99) (1.94) (1.75) (1.05) (-0.33) 
Anti_Self_Dealing 0.0303 
   
0.00957 0.0408* 0.0325 0.0216*** 0.00508 0.0302 -0.0189 
 
(1.43) 
   
(0.49) (1.65) (1.53) (2.66) (0.61) (1.42) (-0.32) 
concentration 
 
0.0119 
         
  
(0.68) 
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rule_law 
  
-0.00859 
        
   
(-1.20) 
        common_legal 
   
-0.00665 
       
    
(-0.78) 
       2.SIC2 -0.0118 -0.0179 -0.0193 -0.0183 0.000888 -0.0200 -0.0116 -0.0418** -0.0171 -0.0117 -0.0213 
 
(-0.22) (-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.33) (0.02) (-0.32) (-0.22) (-1.88) (-0.80) (-0.21) (-0.38) 
8.SIC2 -0.0183 -0.0218 -0.0220 -0.0228 -0.0469 -0.0402 -0.0181 -0.0604*** -0.0444** -0.0184 -0.0165 
 
(-0.33) (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.87) (-0.64) (-0.33) (-2.72) (-2.06) (-0.34) (-0.29) 
10.SIC2 0.0115 0.0113 0.0115 0.00970 0.00415 -0.00570 0.00925 -0.0276 0.00321 0.0115 0.00912 
 
(0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.09) (-0.11) (0.19) (-1.41) (0.18) (0.24) (0.19) 
12.SIC2 0.0261 0.0233 0.0226 0.0223 -0.0114 0.0169 0.0264 -0.0299 -0.0109 0.0261 0.0273 
 
(0.45) (0.40) (0.38) (0.38) (-0.19) (0.25) (0.46) (-1.26) (-0.48) (0.45) (0.45) 
13.SIC2 0.0434 0.0414 0.0410 0.0402 0.0255 0.0322 0.0461 -0.0141 0.00754 0.0434 0.0384 
 
(1.01) (0.95) (0.95) (0.92) (0.56) (0.65) (1.08) (-0.79) (0.45) (1.01) (0.87) 
14.SIC2 -0.00876 -0.00977 -0.00966 -0.0114 -0.0256 -0.00644 -0.00843 -0.0342 -0.0124 -0.00887 -0.0170 
 
(-0.15) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.20) (-0.44) (-0.10) (-0.15) (-1.47) (-0.56) (-0.15) (-0.29) 
15.SIC2 -0.0315 -0.0338 -0.0313 -0.0356 -0.0446 -0.0620 -0.0316 -0.0414** -0.0271 -0.0315 -0.0336 
 
(-0.67) (-0.71) (-0.66) (-0.75) (-0.97) (-1.15) (-0.68) (-2.09) (-1.42) (-0.67) (-0.69) 
16.SIC2 -0.00326 -0.00798 -0.00739 -0.00947 -0.0196 -0.00851 -0.00263 -0.0274 -0.00969 -0.00329 -0.0122 
 
(-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.20) (-0.41) (-0.16) (-0.06) (-1.39) (-0.51) (-0.07) (-0.25) 
17.SIC2 -0.0139 -0.0166 -0.0164 -0.0182 -0.0535 -0.0217 -0.0102 -0.0443** -0.0319* -0.0139 -0.0216 
 
(-0.28) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.37) (-0.98) (-0.38) (-0.21) (-2.16) (-1.66) (-0.28) (-0.42) 
20.SIC2 -0.00811 -0.0114 -0.0106 -0.0122 -0.0263 -0.0164 -0.00806 -0.0396** -0.0207 -0.00823 -0.0118 
 
(-0.19) (-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.29) (-0.62) (-0.34) (-0.19) (-2.23) (-1.26) (-0.20) (-0.27) 
22.SIC2 -0.00702 -0.0120 -0.0104 -0.0136 -0.0200 -0.00966 -0.00644 -0.0348** -0.0187 -0.00715 -0.0116 
 
(-0.16) (-0.28) (-0.24) (-0.31) (-0.46) (-0.20) (-0.15) (-1.92) (-1.11) (-0.17) (-0.26) 
23.SIC2 -0.0130 -0.0167 -0.0163 -0.0163 -0.0179 -0.0166 -0.0127 -0.0427** -0.0248 -0.0131 -0.0157 
 
(-0.29) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.39) (-0.32) (-0.28) (-2.25) (-1.40) (-0.29) (-0.33) 
24.SIC2 -0.00539 -0.00756 -0.00714 -0.00800 -0.0139 -0.00955 -0.00551 -0.0349* -0.0190 -0.00544 -0.0107 
 
(-0.12) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.17) (-0.30) (-0.18) (-0.12) (-1.82) (-1.05) (-0.12) (-0.23) 
25.SIC2 -0.0193 -0.0232 -0.0229 -0.0246 -0.0239 -0.0266 -0.0188 -0.0539*** -0.0306* -0.0193 -0.0286 
 
(-0.42) (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.42) (-2.81) (-1.71) (-0.42) (-0.60) 
26.SIC2 -0.00507 -0.00923 -0.00788 -0.0105 -0.0187 -0.0133 -0.00458 -0.0339** -0.0139 -0.00516 -0.0108 
 
(-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.44) (-0.27) (-0.11) (-1.89) (-0.84) (-0.12) (-0.24) 
27.SIC2 -0.0163 -0.0195 -0.0190 -0.0209 -0.0225 -0.0264 -0.0160 -0.0464** -0.0237 -0.0164 -0.0226 
 
(-0.38) (-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.37) (-2.55) (-1.40) (-0.38) (-0.50) 
28.SIC2 -0.00737 -0.0124 -0.0114 -0.0139 -0.0178 -0.0117 -0.00708 -0.0368** -0.0135 -0.00743 -0.0141 
 
(-0.18) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.42) (-0.24) (-0.17) (-2.09) (-0.83) (-0.18) (-0.33) 
29.SIC2 0.0222 0.0211 0.0208 0.0203 0.0152 0.00618 0.0133 0.0104 0.0432** 0.0222 0.0171 
 
(0.47) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.29) (0.11) (0.28) (0.53) (2.33) (0.47) (0.35) 
30.SIC2 -0.00424 -0.00793 -0.00746 -0.00929 -0.0158 -0.0131 -0.00389 -0.0418** -0.0194 -0.00436 -0.00625 
 
(-0.10) (-0.19) (-0.17) (-0.22) (-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.09) (-2.33) (-1.17) (-0.10) (-0.14) 
31.SIC2 -0.0233 -0.0205 -0.0210 -0.0196 -0.0388 -0.0334 -0.0234 -0.0597** -0.0397 -0.0234 -0.0287 
 
(-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.60) (-0.42) (-0.34) (-2.15) (-1.45) (-0.33) (-0.40) 
32.SIC2 -0.0103 -0.0150 -0.0144 -0.0161 -0.0269 -0.0214 -0.0102 -0.0466*** -0.0228 -0.0103 -0.0145 
 
(-0.24) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.38) (-0.64) (-0.44) (-0.24) (-2.62) (-1.39) (-0.25) (-0.33) 
33.SIC2 -0.0107 -0.0150 -0.0143 -0.0164 -0.0211 -0.0156 -0.0106 -0.0357** -0.0160 -0.0108 -0.0160 
 
(-0.26) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.39) (-0.50) (-0.32) (-0.26) (-2.01) (-0.97) (-0.26) (-0.37) 
34.SIC2 -0.00965 -0.0138 -0.0132 -0.0152 -0.0245 -0.0138 -0.00941 -0.0384** -0.0207 -0.00973 -0.0164 
 
(-0.23) (-0.32) (-0.31) (-0.35) (-0.57) (-0.28) (-0.22) (-2.13) (-1.25) (-0.23) (-0.37) 
35.SIC2 0.0354 0.0308 0.0317 0.0292 0.0289 0.0360 0.0358 -0.0358** -0.0126 0.0359 0.0303 
 
(0.83) (0.72) (0.74) (0.68) (0.67) (0.73) (0.85) (-2.00) (-0.77) (0.84) (0.68) 
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36.SIC2 -0.0158 -0.0202 -0.0190 -0.0217 -0.0224 -0.0209 -0.0150 -0.0482*** -0.0277* -0.0158 -0.0182 
 
(-0.38) (-0.48) (-0.46) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.44) (-0.36) (-2.72) (-1.70) (-0.38) (-0.42) 
37.SIC2 -0.0101 -0.0140 -0.0129 -0.0153 -0.0265 -0.0206 -0.0115 -0.0461*** -0.0210 -0.0101 -0.0133 
 
(-0.24) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.36) (-0.63) (-0.43) (-0.28) (-2.61) (-1.29) (-0.24) (-0.31) 
38.SIC2 -0.0176 -0.0215 -0.0213 -0.0228 -0.0268 -0.0247 -0.0148 -0.0497*** -0.0341** -0.0177 -0.0259 
 
(-0.40) (-0.49) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.59) (-0.49) (-0.34) (-2.68) (-1.98) (-0.40) (-0.57) 
39.SIC2 -0.0304 -0.0347 -0.0344 -0.0355 -0.0391 -0.0380 -0.0302 -0.0748*** -0.0497*** -0.0304 -0.0363 
 
(-0.66) (-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.80) (-0.71) (-0.66) (-3.88) (-2.76) (-0.66) (-0.76) 
40.SIC2 0.0823 0.0754 0.0721 0.0728 0.0756 0.0206 0.0818 0.0675** 0.0472* 0.0823 0.0755 
 
(1.18) (1.07) (1.02) (1.03) (1.18) (0.26) (1.19) (2.43) (1.67) (1.18) (1.04) 
41.SIC2 0.0259 0.0204 0.0217 0.0179 0.00487 0.0205 0.0266 -0.0175 0.00250 0.0257 0.0177 
 
(0.52) (0.41) (0.44) (0.36) (0.10) (0.36) (0.54) (-0.86) (0.13) (0.52) (0.35) 
42.SIC2 0.0280 0.0247 0.0254 0.0234 -0.0165 0.0222 0.0310 -0.00859 0.00876 0.0278 0.0223 
 
(0.64) (0.56) (0.58) (0.53) (-0.37) (0.44) (0.72) (-0.47) (0.51) (0.64) (0.50) 
44.SIC2 0.0138 0.00914 0.00970 0.00737 -0.00670 0.00182 0.0144 -0.0342* -0.00954 0.0139 0.0126 
 
(0.32) (0.21) (0.22) (0.17) (-0.15) (0.04) (0.33) (-1.87) (-0.56) (0.32) (0.28) 
45.SIC2 -0.00253 -0.00402 -0.00321 -0.00446 -0.0231 -0.0169 -0.00307 -0.0440** -0.00750 -0.00231 0.000213 
 
(-0.05) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.48) (-0.31) (-0.07) (-2.24) (-0.40) (-0.05) (0.00) 
47.SIC2 0.0316 0.0287 0.0291 0.0259 -0.0314 0.0205 -0.00115 -0.0201 -0.0262 0.0316 0.0297 
 
(0.68) (0.61) (0.62) (0.55) (-0.68) (0.38) (-0.02) (-1.04) (-1.43) (0.68) (0.62) 
48.SIC2 -0.0366 -0.0394 -0.0402 -0.0415 -0.0519 -0.0453 -0.0352 -0.0838*** -0.0551*** -0.0366 -0.0388 
 
(-0.85) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.95) (-1.20) (-0.92) (-0.82) (-4.65) (-3.28) (-0.85) (-0.87) 
49.SIC2 -0.0262 -0.0288 -0.0290 -0.0307 -0.0495 -0.0387 -0.0261 -0.0679*** -0.0412** -0.0262 -0.0286 
 
(-0.61) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-0.71) (-1.15) (-0.79) (-0.62) (-3.79) (-2.48) (-0.61) (-0.65) 
50.SIC2 -0.0145 -0.0185 -0.0176 -0.0201 -0.0274 -0.0182 -0.0146 -0.0423** -0.0226 -0.0145 -0.0210 
 
(-0.35) (-0.44) (-0.42) (-0.47) (-0.65) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-2.38) (-1.38) (-0.35) (-0.48) 
51.SIC2 -0.00418 -0.00776 -0.00693 -0.00936 -0.0139 -0.0123 -0.00389 -0.0283 -0.0108 -0.00424 -0.0114 
 
(-0.10) (-0.18) (-0.16) (-0.22) (-0.32) (-0.25) (-0.09) (-1.57) (-0.65) (-0.10) (-0.26) 
52.SIC2 -0.0346 -0.0325 -0.0326 -0.0349 0.0207 -0.0784 -0.0407 -0.0921* -0.0285 -0.0338 -0.0553 
 
(-0.24) (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.24) (0.17) (-0.43) (-0.29) (-1.70) (-0.52) (-0.24) (-0.46) 
53.SIC2 -0.0125 -0.0154 -0.0157 -0.0169 -0.0188 -0.0161 -0.0125 -0.0345* -0.00938 -0.0125 -0.0169 
 
(-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.29) (-0.27) (-1.75) (-0.50) (-0.26) (-0.34) 
54.SIC2 0.00480 0.00162 0.00227 -0.0000481 -0.00550 -0.00779 0.00523 -0.0238 0.00604 0.00477 -0.00294 
 
(0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (-0.00) (-0.12) (-0.15) (0.12) (-1.27) (0.34) (0.11) (-0.06) 
55.SIC2 -0.00627 -0.0100 -0.00859 -0.0125 -0.0228 -0.0182 -0.00625 -0.0314 -0.00602 -0.00635 -0.0117 
 
(-0.12) (-0.20) (-0.17) (-0.24) (-0.46) (-0.31) (-0.13) (-1.51) (-0.30) (-0.13) (-0.22) 
56.SIC2 -0.00842 -0.0129 -0.0117 -0.0140 -0.0297 -0.0168 -0.00853 -0.0454** -0.0212 -0.00844 -0.0104 
 
(-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.31) (-0.65) (-0.33) (-0.20) (-2.45) (-1.23) (-0.19) (-0.23) 
57.SIC2 -0.0248 -0.0278 -0.0278 -0.0290 -0.0533 -0.0289 -0.0249 -0.0730*** -0.0456** -0.0247 -0.0164 
 
(-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.90) (-0.48) (-0.48) (-3.35) (-2.20) (-0.47) (-0.30) 
58.SIC2 -0.0102 -0.0151 -0.0154 -0.0161 -0.0280 -0.0255 -0.00979 -0.0587*** -0.0407** -0.0103 -0.0117 
 
(-0.22) (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-0.55) (-0.47) (-0.21) (-3.01) (-2.21) (-0.22) (-0.24) 
59.SIC2 -0.0162 -0.0186 -0.0181 -0.0200 -0.0305 -0.0278 -0.0161 -0.0512*** -0.0251 -0.0162 -0.0226 
 
(-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.67) (-0.54) (-0.36) (-2.73) (-1.43) (-0.36) (-0.49) 
70.SIC2 -0.0163 -0.0164 -0.0158 -0.0162 -0.0393 -0.0310 -0.0162 -0.0600*** -0.0359** -0.0164 -0.0172 
 
(-0.36) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.87) (-0.59) (-0.36) (-3.16) (-2.02) (-0.36) (-0.37) 
72.SIC2 -0.0273 -0.0288 -0.0285 -0.0304 -0.0284 -0.0400 -0.0266 -0.0783*** -0.0443** -0.0273 -0.0366 
 
(-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.56) (-0.48) (-0.65) (-0.50) (-3.62) (-2.13) (-0.51) (-0.66) 
73.SIC2 -0.0382 -0.0415 -0.0408 -0.0432 -0.0732* -0.0469 -0.0382 -0.0756*** -0.0624*** -0.0382 -0.0349 
 
(-0.90) (-0.97) (-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.67) (-0.96) (-0.90) (-4.20) (-3.76) (-0.89) (-0.79) 
75.SIC2 0.0319 0.0301 0.0309 0.0286 0.00103 0.0233 0.0320 -0.0198 0.00309 0.0318 0.0183 
 
(0.60) (0.56) (0.58) (0.53) (0.02) (0.38) (0.61) (-0.92) (0.15) (0.60) (0.33) 
76.SIC2 -0.00928 -0.00948 -0.00961 -0.0117 -0.0193 -0.0137 -0.00871 -0.0275 -0.00553 -0.00912 -0.0289 
 
(-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.30) (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.98) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.40) 
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78.SIC2 -0.0241 -0.0268 -0.0251 -0.0286 -0.0615 -0.0432 -0.0279 -0.0638*** -0.0767*** -0.0243 0.00744 
 
(-0.44) (-0.49) (-0.46) (-0.52) (-1.17) (-0.69) (-0.51) (-2.85) (-3.64) (-0.45) (0.13) 
79.SIC2 -0.0217 -0.0250 -0.0244 -0.0257 -0.0585 -0.0329 -0.0213 -0.0718*** -0.0566*** -0.0218 -0.0247 
 
(-0.47) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-1.20) (-0.61) (-0.46) (-3.72) (-3.11) (-0.47) (-0.52) 
80.SIC2 -0.0292 -0.0324 -0.0320 -0.0325 -0.0268 -0.0380 -0.0224 -0.0793*** -0.0425** -0.0293 -0.0262 
 
(-0.60) (-0.66) (-0.66) (-0.66) (-0.46) (-0.68) (-0.46) (-3.95) (-2.24) (-0.60) (-0.52) 
82.SIC2 -0.0216 -0.0261 -0.0255 -0.0275 -0.0375 -0.0274 -0.0209 -0.0532** -0.0374* -0.0216 -0.0257 
 
(-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.47) (-0.64) (-0.41) (-0.37) (-2.27) (-1.64) (-0.37) (-0.43) 
87.SIC2 -0.0235 -0.0271 -0.0261 -0.0289 -0.0372 -0.0294 -0.0232 -0.0492*** -0.0356** -0.0234 -0.0263 
 
(-0.53) (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.64) (-0.83) (-0.58) (-0.53) (-2.63) (-2.05) (-0.53) (-0.57) 
96.SIC2 -0.0587 -0.0630 -0.0631 -0.0647 -0.0734 -0.0489 -0.0591 -0.106*** -0.0816** -0.0584 -0.0502 
 
(-0.64) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.89) (-0.46) (-0.66) (-2.96) (-2.29) (-0.64) (-0.53) 
2003.year -0.00872 -0.00907 -0.00868 -0.00928 -0.0131 -0.00868 -0.00836 -0.0189*** -0.0187*** -0.00882 -0.0101 
 
(-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.88) (-0.93) (-1.30) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-4.96) (-4.81) (-0.88) (-1.02) 
2004.year -0.00448 -0.00462 -0.00443 -0.00479 -0.00848 -0.00573 -0.00391 -0.0116*** -0.0121*** -0.00457 -0.00708 
 
(-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.46) (-0.49) (-0.86) (-0.57) (-0.40) (-3.13) (-3.19) (-0.47) (-0.73) 
2005.year 0.0183* 0.0183* 0.0184* 0.0182* 0.0135 0.0143 0.0185* -0.00499 -0.00419 0.0182* 0.0158 
 
(1.81) (1.81) (1.82) (1.79) (1.31) (1.36) (1.82) (-1.34) (-1.10) (1.80) (1.56) 
2006.year 0.00884 0.00840 0.00843 0.00814 0.00527 0.00698 0.00885 0.00538 0.00532 0.00870 0.00426 
 
(0.90) (0.86) (0.86) (0.83) (0.52) (0.68) (0.90) (1.42) (1.38) (0.89) (0.43) 
2007.year 0.00118 0.000701 0.000658 0.000409 0.000305 -0.00146 0.00158 0.000586 -0.00141 0.00106 -0.00274 
 
(0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (-0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (-0.36) (0.11) (-0.28) 
2008.year 0.0000470 0.000504 0.000526 0.000583 -0.00371 
 
-0.000414 -0.00902** -0.00634* -0.0000278 -0.00134 
 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (-0.40) 
 
(-0.04) (-2.54) (-1.75) (-0.00) (-0.14) 
2009.year -0.0314*** -0.0319*** -0.0317*** -0.0320*** -0.0412*** -0.0326*** -0.0322*** -0.0512*** -0.0445*** -0.0314*** -0.0301*** 
 
(-3.25) (-3.28) (-3.27) (-3.29) (-4.33) (-3.23) (-3.32) (-14.33) (-12.04) (-3.25) (-3.08) 
2010.year -0.0152* -0.0157* -0.0155* -0.0159* -0.0199** -0.0155* -0.0156* -0.0227*** -0.0212*** -0.0153* -0.0156* 
 
(-1.70) (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.75) (-2.22) (-1.69) (-1.74) (-6.57) (-6.04) (-1.70) (-1.68) 
_cons 0.0683 0.105 0.0654 0.125** 0.0984 0.0579 0.0625 0.0792*** 0.143*** 0.0688 0.185** 
 
(0.99) (1.81) (0.95) (2.08) (1.48) (0.74) (0.90) (2.92) (5.28) (1.00) (1.99) 
number of observations 13950 13950 13950 13950 10530 10850 13680 13688 13677 13950 13950 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table A.5. Regression results – Assertiveness dimension (GLOBE)  
 (6)                   Base model 
(57)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(58)                     
Rule of Law 
(59)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(60)                        
ex USA 
(61)                       
ex Crisis 
(62)                     
Outliers - Size 
(63)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(64)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(65)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(15)                     
Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00430 0.00432* 0.00433* 0.00429* 0.00440* 0.00443* 0.00428 0.00571*** 0.00606*** 0.00487* 0.00444* 
 
(1.64) (1.64) (1.65) (1.66) (1.86) (1.85) (1.64) (4.49) (4.74) (1.70) (1.70) 
MV_BV_t1 0.0104** 0.0110** 0.0110** 0.0111** 0.0139*** 0.0150*** 0.0107** 0.0154*** 0.00889*** 0.0104** 0.00655 
 
(2.40) (2.49) (2.50) (2.60) (2.71) (3.03) (2.40) (7.24) (4.12) (2.40) (1.52) 
FCF_TA -5.833*** -5.804*** -5.800*** -5.860*** -5.996*** -6.712*** -5.962*** -10.83*** -8.112*** -5.833*** -2.852*** 
 
(-10.36) (-10.28) (-10.27) (-10.56) (-13.49) (-11.58) (-10.58) (-82.77) (-42.95) (-10.35) (-4.33) 
L.Ln_TA -0.000619 0.000740 0.000944 0.000069 0.00302 -0.000793 0.000636 0.000670 -0.00761*** -0.000665 -0.00212 
 
(-0.15) (0.18) (0.23) (0.02) (0.65) (-0.19) (0.15) (0.34) (-3.83) (-0.16) (-0.43) 
Leverage 0.178*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.209*** 0.173*** 0.164*** 0.109*** 0.215*** 0.177*** 0.229*** 
 
(4.48) (4.41) (4.39) (4.59) (4.89) (4.05) (4.02) (5.79) (10.96) (4.46) (4.07) 
DIV_FCF 0.000615 0.000616 0.000631 0.000626 0.000362 0.00101 0.000636 0.000888** 0.00119*** 0.000608 -0.0000369 
 
(0.75) (0.75) (0.77) (0.78) (0.52) (1.31) (0.79) (2.28) (3.07) (0.74) (-0.07) 
L.Cash_TA 0.108** 0.111** 0.116** 0.107** 0.113** 0.110** 0.110** 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.106** 0.151*** 
 
(2.13) (2.17) (2.27) (2.15) (2.34) (2.08) (2.11) (4.08) (4.37) (2.08) (2.90) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000825 
 
          
(-0.50) 
 ASSE -0.0784*** -0.0780*** -0.0779*** -0.0823*** -0.0871*** -0.0854*** -0.0800*** -0.147*** -0.112*** -0.0783*** -0.0422*** 
 
(-9.20) (-9.13) (-9.03) (-9.69) (-12.82) (-10.05) (-9.42) (-65.62) (-39.34) (-9.19) (-5.32) 
ASSE_FCF 1.484*** 1.478*** 1.477*** 1.491*** 1.554*** 1.677*** 1.508*** 2.505*** 2.047*** 1.484*** 0.937*** 
 
(12.24) (12.15) (12.14) (12.48) (17.03) (13.69) (12.53) (99.21) (59.35) (12.23) (8.26) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0292 
           
(0.64) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-0.815 
           
(-1.26) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.242 
           
(1.40) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-1.253*** 
           
(-3.01) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-1.261*** 
           
(-2.90) 
Stock_FCF 
          
-0.00104 
           
(-1.26) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.00328** 
           
(2.21) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0130*** -0.0109*** -0.0109* -0.0120*** -0.0124*** -0.0137*** -0.0131*** -0.0148*** -0.0112*** -0.0130*** -0.0102*** 
 
(-3.32) (-2.70) (-1.88) (-3.07) (-3.42) (-3.45) (-3.35) (-7.72) (-5.80) (-3.31) (-2.63) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000249 0.00000203 0.00000448 0.0000614 0.000237*** 0.00000810 0.0000172 0.0000685** 0.0000162 0.0000253 -0.000208* 
 
(0.41) (0.03) (0.07) (1.01) (3.75) (0.13) (0.28) (2.30) (0.54) (0.42) (-1.70) 
            Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000212 -0.0000228 -0.0000256 -0.0000237 -0.0000277 0.0000394 0.0000159 0.0000123 0.0000141 0.0000214 0.0000830 
 
(0.67) (-0.83) (-1.02) (0.84) (-0.89) (1.14) (0.50) (0.78) (0.89) (0.67) (1.27) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0359** 
   
-0.00332 -0.0368** -0.0324** -0.0334*** -0.0569*** -0.0361** 0.0501 
 
(-2.38) 
   
(-0.20) (-2.35) (-2.14) (-4.58) (-7.64) (-2.39) (1.48) 
concentration 
 
-0.00299 
         
  
(-0.21) 
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rule_law 
  
0.000130 
        
   
(0.02) 
        common_legal 
   
-0.020319*** 
       
    
(-3.864) 
       2.SIC2 -0.0290 -0.0185 -0.0190 -0.0287 -0.00975 -0.0270 -0.0271 -0.0235 -0.0408* -0.0289 -0.0153 
 
(-0.65) (-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.66) (-0.20) (-0.59) (-0.61) (-1.02) (-1.88) (-0.65) (-0.35) 
8.SIC2 0.0171 0.0221 0.0220 0.0141 0.0129 0.00618 0.0201 0.0404* 0.01000 0.0170 0.0117 
 
(0.39) (0.50) (0.50) (0.32) (0.28) (0.13) (0.45) (1.75) (0.46) (0.38) (0.26) 
10.SIC2 -0.000402 0.00373 0.00411 0.00287 -0.00200 -0.00298 -0.00378 0.00895 -0.0161 -0.000435 0.0117 
 
(-0.01) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (-0.05) (-0.07) (-0.10) (0.44) (-0.85) (-0.01) (0.30) 
12.SIC2 0.0103 0.0172 0.0170 0.0078 -0.0167 -0.000770 0.0142 0.0181 -0.0354 0.0103 0.0322 
 
(0.20) (0.34) (0.33) (0.15) (-0.30) (-0.01) (0.28) (0.69) (-1.40) (0.20) (0.63) 
13.SIC2 0.0487 0.0528 0.0530 0.0497 0.0511 0.0499 0.0554 0.0774*** 0.0207 0.0487 0.0524 
 
(1.40) (1.51) (1.52) (1.45) (1.34) (1.39) (1.59) (4.16) (1.21) (1.39) (1.51) 
14.SIC2 -0.0107 -0.00430 -0.00390 -0.00133 -0.0240 0.00422 -0.00853 -0.00365 -0.0172 -0.0108 -0.00257 
 
(-0.23) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.29) (-0.49) (0.09) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.75) (-0.23) (-0.06) 
15.SIC2 -0.0296 -0.0236 -0.0237 -0.0362 -0.0448 -0.00954 -0.0285 -0.0183 -0.0228 -0.0296 -0.0220 
 
(-0.77) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.96) (-1.15) (-0.24) (-0.74) (-0.88) (-1.14) (-0.76) (-0.57) 
16.SIC2 -0.0179 -0.00969 -0.00986 -0.0213 -0.0267 -0.0158 -0.0158 -0.0187 -0.0208 -0.0179 -0.00440 
 
(-0.47) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.56) (-0.67) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.91) (-1.07) (-0.47) (-0.11) 
17.SIC2 -0.0127 -0.00649 -0.00675 -0.01145 -0.0193 -0.0116 -0.00267 -0.0121 -0.0221 -0.0126 -0.0000222 
 
(-0.30) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.28) (-0.35) (-0.27) (-0.06) (-0.54) (-1.07) (-0.30) (-0.00) 
20.SIC2 -0.00236 0.00588 0.00589 -0.00517 -0.0108 0.000404 -0.000276 0.00354 -0.0124 -0.00245 0.00436 
 
(-0.07) (0.17) (0.17) (-0.15) (-0.30) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.19) (-0.74) (-0.07) (0.13) 
22.SIC2 -0.00593 0.00367 0.00384 -0.01087 -0.00544 -0.00593 -0.00345 -0.00763 -0.0178 -0.00603 0.00355 
 
(-0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (-0.32) (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.10) (-0.41) (-1.04) (-0.17) (0.10) 
23.SIC2 -0.00341 0.00331 0.00319 -0.00458 0.0103 0.000433 -0.00106 0.00222 -0.0110 -0.00345 0.00380 
 
(-0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (-0.13) (0.26) (0.01) (-0.03) (0.11) (-0.61) (-0.09) (0.10) 
24.SIC2 -0.0120 -0.00751 -0.00754 -0.01335 -0.0127 -0.0115 -0.01000 -0.00754 -0.0258 -0.0120 -0.00584 
 
(-0.32) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.36) (-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.38) (-1.39) (-0.32) (-0.16) 
25.SIC2 -0.0308 -0.0246 -0.0246 -0.0319 -0.0279 -0.0312 -0.0289 -0.0386* -0.0425** -0.0308 -0.0230 
 
(-0.83) (-0.66) (-0.66) (-0.88) (-0.70) (-0.82) (-0.78) (-1.95) (-2.33) (-0.83) (-0.62) 
26.SIC2 -0.0105 -0.00194 -0.00192 -0.00152 -0.0158 -0.0101 -0.00823 -0.00826 -0.0225 -0.0106 -0.00142 
 
(-0.30) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.28) (-0.24) (-0.44) (-1.33) (-0.31) (-0.04) 
27.SIC2 -0.0163 -0.00889 -0.00880 -0.01863 -0.0133 -0.0158 -0.0140 -0.00461 -0.0229 -0.0164 -0.0115 
 
(-0.46) (-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.54) (-0.36) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.24) (-1.32) (-0.46) (-0.33) 
28.SIC2 -0.0212 -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0233 -0.0230 -0.0195 -0.0191 -0.0139 -0.0326** -0.0213 -0.00788 
 
(-0.63) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.56) (-0.56) (-0.76) (-1.96) (-0.63) (-0.23) 
29.SIC2 0.00997 0.0114 0.0111 0.0075 -0.0177 -0.00152 0.00458 -0.0000946 0.0166 0.00997 0.0208 
 
(0.26) (0.29) (0.28) (0.20) (-0.39) (-0.04) (0.12) (-0.00) (0.88) (0.26) (0.54) 
30.SIC2 -0.00713 0.00154 0.00159 -0.01063 -0.00570 -0.00726 -0.00460 -0.00211 -0.0204 -0.00722 0.00141 
 
(-0.21) (0.04) (0.05) (-0.31) (-0.16) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-1.20) (-0.21) (0.04) 
31.SIC2 -0.00859 -0.00737 -0.00674 -0.00866 -0.0199 -0.000259 -0.00683 -0.00618 -0.0231 -0.00869 -0.00301 
 
(-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.15) (-0.37) (-0.00) (-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.83) (-0.15) (-0.05) 
32.SIC2 -0.0186 -0.00959 -0.00986 -0.00219 -0.0296 -0.0168 -0.0166 -0.0146 -0.0323* -0.0186 -0.00725 
 
(-0.54) (-0.28) (-0.29) (-0.65) (-0.83) (-0.47) (-0.48) (-0.79) (-1.92) (-0.54) (-0.21) 
33.SIC2 -0.0194 -0.0109 -0.0110 -0.0224 -0.0226 -0.0163 -0.0181 -0.0182 -0.0269 -0.0195 -0.00895 
 
(-0.57) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.67) (-0.63) (-0.46) (-0.53) (-0.99) (-1.61) (-0.57) (-0.26) 
34.SIC2 -0.0115 -0.00245 -0.00247 -0.01501 -0.0164 -0.0102 -0.00931 -0.00496 -0.0224 -0.0116 -0.00334 
 
(-0.33) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.44) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-1.32) (-0.33) (-0.10) 
35.SIC2 0.00815 0.0169 0.0167 0.0052 0.0117 0.00968 0.0109 -0.0221 -0.0354** 0.00869 0.0250 
 
(0.23) (0.49) (0.48) (0.15) (0.32) (0.27) (0.31) (-1.19) (-2.11) (0.25) (0.72) 
36.SIC2 -0.0183 -0.0104 -0.0107 -0.0207 -0.00834 -0.0162 -0.0156 -0.0132 -0.0285* -0.0182 -0.00638 
 
(-0.54) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.62) (-0.23) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.72) (-1.72) (-0.54) (-0.19) 
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37.SIC2 -0.0160 -0.00745 -0.00761 -0.02014 -0.0286 -0.0173 -0.0151 -0.0134 -0.0288* -0.0160 -0.00469 
 
(-0.47) (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.06) (-0.81) (-0.50) (-0.44) (-0.73) (-1.73) (-0.47) (-0.14) 
38.SIC2 -0.0279 -0.0182 -0.0183 -0.02839 -0.0165 -0.0330 -0.0223 -0.0270 -0.0447** -0.0279 -0.0133 
 
(-0.77) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.08) (-0.42) (-0.88) (-0.62) (-1.39) (-2.52) (-0.77) (-0.37) 
39.SIC2 -0.0431 -0.0349 -0.0352 -0.04356 -0.0347 -0.0473 -0.0405 -0.0420** -0.0625*** -0.0430 -0.0251 
 
(-1.14) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.10) (-0.83) (-1.21) (-1.08) (-2.09) (-3.39) (-1.14) (-0.67) 
40.SIC2 0.0284 0.0341 0.0331 0.00185 0.0177 -0.0261 0.0272 0.0118 -0.0196 0.0284 0.0510 
 
(0.50) (0.60) (0.58) (0.33) (0.33) (-0.45) (0.48) (0.41) (-0.69) (0.50) (0.90) 
41.SIC2 0.00682 0.0162 0.0164 0.00009 0.00409 0.0135 0.00974 0.0127 -0.0138 0.00665 0.0153 
 
(0.17) (0.40) (0.40) (0.00) (0.10) (0.32) (0.24) (0.59) (-0.69) (0.16) (0.38) 
42.SIC2 0.0381 0.0465 0.0469 0.03529 0.00748 0.0412 0.0441 0.0604*** 0.0243 0.0379 0.0383 
 
(1.08) (1.33) (1.34) (1.02) (0.20) (1.13) (1.24) (3.19) (1.40) (1.07) (1.09) 
44.SIC2 -0.00260 0.00545 0.00539 -0.00346 -0.0120 -0.00762 0.000870 0.0125 -0.0255 -0.00257 0.0150 
 
(-0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (-0.01) (-0.32) (-0.21) (0.02) (0.66) (-1.46) (-0.07) (0.42) 
45.SIC2 0.00801 0.00971 0.00908 0.00447 -0.0117 0.00849 0.00898 0.0216 0.00411 0.00821 0.0212 
 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.12) (-0.29) (0.21) (0.23) (1.06) (0.22) (0.21) (0.55) 
47.SIC2 0.0387 0.0449 0.0450 0.03483 -0.0283 0.0284 -0.00609 0.0476** -0.0277 0.0386 0.0514 
 
(0.99) (1.15) (1.15) (0.9) (-0.69) (0.70) (-0.15) (2.30) (-1.42) (0.98) (1.32) 
48.SIC2 -0.00885 -0.00170 -0.00143 -0.00924 -0.00330 -0.0101 -0.00529 0.0155 -0.0147 -0.00886 -0.00892 
 
(-0.25) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.27) (-0.09) (-0.28) (-0.15) (0.83) (-0.85) (-0.25) (-0.26) 
49.SIC2 -0.0370 -0.0298 -0.0295 -0.38895 -0.0586 -0.0410 -0.0348 -0.0371** -0.0548*** -0.0370 -0.0238 
 
(-1.06) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-1.13) (-1.61) (-1.14) (-1.00) (-1.99) (-3.21) (-1.06) (-0.69) 
50.SIC2 -0.0268 -0.0183 -0.0184 -0.02989 -0.0328 -0.0242 -0.0246 -0.0231 -0.0372** -0.0268 -0.0133 
 
(-0.78) (-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.69) (-0.72) (-1.25) (-2.22) (-0.78) (-0.39) 
51.SIC2 -0.0143 -0.00702 -0.00712 -0.01770 -0.0155 -0.0164 -0.0124 -0.0144 -0.0241 -0.0144 -0.00338 
 
(-0.41) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.52) (-0.43) (-0.46) (-0.36) (-0.77) (-1.41) (-0.41) (-0.10) 
52.SIC2 -0.166 -0.167 -0.171 -0.16884 -0.0995 -0.334 -0.171 -0.239** -0.311*** -0.164 -0.0168 
 
(-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.51) (-1.25) (-0.77) (-2.22) (-2.92) (-0.73) (-0.10) 
53.SIC2 -0.0215 -0.0160 -0.0162 -0.02470 -0.0227 -0.0136 -0.0206 -0.0171 -0.0216 -0.0215 -0.0180 
 
(-0.55) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.64) (-0.52) (-0.33) (-0.52) (-0.83) (-1.12) (-0.55) (-0.46) 
54.SIC2 0.00342 0.0131 0.0130 -0.00012 0.0000869 0.00112 0.00585 0.00364 -0.000232 0.00338 0.00641 
 
(0.09) (0.36) (0.35) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.16) (0.18) (-0.01) (0.09) (0.17) 
55.SIC2 -0.00422 0.00523 0.00536 -0.00951 -0.0134 -0.0113 -0.00234 0.00174 -0.00909 -0.00432 0.00841 
 
(-0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (-0.23) (-0.31) (-0.26) (-0.06) (0.08) (-0.43) (-0.10) (0.20) 
56.SIC2 -0.0194 -0.0106 -0.0108 -0.02118 -0.0308 -0.0212 -0.0172 -0.0111 -0.0344* -0.0194 -0.00613 
 
(-0.54) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.60) (-0.78) (-0.57) (-0.48) (-0.57) (-1.94) (-0.54) (-0.17) 
57.SIC2 -0.0329 -0.0264 -0.0266 -0.03333 -0.0477 -0.0281 -0.0303 -0.0188 -0.0560*** -0.0328 -0.00794 
 
(-0.77) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.79) (-0.95) (-0.63) (-0.70) (-0.83) (-2.65) (-0.76) (-0.19) 
58.SIC2 -0.0167 -0.00727 -0.00715 -0.01653 -0.0161 -0.0203 -0.0127 -0.00578 -0.0417** -0.0168 -0.00669 
 
(-0.44) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.44) (-0.38) (-0.51) (-0.33) (-0.29) (-2.23) (-0.44) (-0.18) 
59.SIC2 -0.0207 -0.0143 -0.0143 -0.02296 -0.0320 -0.0200 -0.0186 -0.0116 -0.0302* -0.0208 -0.0168 
 
(-0.57) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.64) (-0.83) (-0.53) (-0.51) (-0.59) (-1.68) (-0.57) (-0.46) 
70.SIC2 -0.00119 0.00118 0.00138 -0.00338 -0.0154 -0.00184 0.00169 0.0135 -0.0123 -0.00125 0.00267 
 
(-0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (-0.09) (-0.40) (-0.05) (0.05) (0.68) (-0.67) (-0.03) (0.07) 
72.SIC2 -0.0397 -0.0324 -0.0320 -0.03944 0.00892 -0.0370 -0.0354 -0.0218 -0.0535** -0.0397 -0.0285 
 
(-0.84) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.85) (0.13) (-0.76) (-0.75) (-0.90) (-2.31) (-0.84) (-0.61) 
73.SIC2 -0.0342 -0.0255 -0.0257 -0.03510 -0.0439 -0.0361 -0.0304 -0.0235 -0.0538*** -0.0341 -0.0209 
 
(-0.98) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-1.03) (-1.17) (-1.00) (-0.87) (-1.25) (-3.15) (-0.98) (-0.60) 
75.SIC2 0.0109 0.0190 0.0194 0.01257 -0.00415 0.00507 0.0141 0.0277 -0.00903 0.0108 0.0206 
 
(0.25) (0.43) (0.44) (0.29) (-0.09) (0.11) (0.32) (1.20) (-0.41) (0.24) (0.47) 
76.SIC2 -0.0158 -0.00974 -0.00980 -0.01763 -0.0216 -0.0152 -0.0136 -0.00916 -0.0196 -0.0156 -0.00919 
 
(-0.28) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.31) (-0.39) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.31) (-0.70) (-0.27) (-0.16) 
78.SIC2 0.106** 0.115** 0.116** 0.10410** 0.0973** 0.129*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.105** 0.0599 
 
(2.28) (2.51) (2.52) (2.29) (2.12) (2.64) (2.84) (5.62) (4.99) (2.27) (1.29) 
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79.SIC2 -0.0189 -0.0124 -0.0122 -0.01888 -0.0308 -0.0162 -0.0148 -0.0100 -0.0433** -0.0189 -0.00870 
 
(-0.50) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.51) (-0.75) (-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.50) (-2.34) (-0.50) (-0.23) 
80.SIC2 -0.0298 -0.0241 -0.0239 -0.02897 -0.00526 -0.0256 -0.0223 -0.0266 -0.0394** -0.0298 -0.0116 
 
(-0.76) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.75) (-0.11) (-0.63) (-0.57) (-1.28) (-2.03) (-0.76) (-0.30) 
82.SIC2 -0.0245 -0.0140 -0.0140 -0.02714 -0.0246 -0.0271 -0.0215 -0.0228 -0.0390* -0.0246 -0.0185 
 
(-0.52) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.59) (-0.50) (-0.56) (-0.46) (-0.94) (-1.68) (-0.52) (-0.40) 
87.SIC2 -0.0279 -0.0210 -0.0213 -0.03104 -0.0228 -0.0322 -0.0261 -0.0264 -0.0366** -0.0278 -0.0178 
 
(-0.76) (-0.57) (-0.58) (-0.86) (-0.58) (-0.85) (-0.71) (-1.34) (-2.03) (-0.76) (-0.48) 
96.SIC2 -0.0755 -0.0644 -0.0655 -0.08030 -0.0857 -0.0638 -0.0739 -0.0789** -0.102*** -0.0753 -0.0525 
 
(-1.02) (-0.87) (-0.88) (-1.1) (-1.23) (-0.83) (-1.00) (-2.12) (-2.79) (-1.01) (-0.71) 
2003.year -0.00365 -0.00179 -0.00140 -0.00277 0.00145 -0.00201 -0.00271 0.00519 -0.00982** -0.00374 -0.00670 
 
(-0.44) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.34) (0.16) (-0.25) (-0.32) (1.27) (-2.39) (-0.45) (-0.83) 
2004.year -0.00227 -0.000452 -0.0000860 -0.00172 0.00171 -0.00260 -0.00152 0.00158 -0.00713* -0.00236 -0.00286 
 
(-0.28) (-0.06) (-0.01) (-0.22) (0.20) (-0.34) (-0.19) (0.40) (-1.79) (-0.29) (-0.36) 
2005.year 0.0201** 0.0220*** 0.0223*** 0.02009** 0.0236*** 0.0169** 0.0203** 0.0145*** 0.00268 0.0200** 0.0184** 
 
(2.37) (2.61) (2.65) (2.42) (2.64) (2.13) (2.36) (3.65) (0.67) (2.35) (2.25) 
2006.year 0.00986 0.0123 0.0127 0.00992 0.0128 0.00864 0.00996 0.0115*** 0.00700* 0.00973 0.0102 
 
(1.20) (1.52) (1.57) (1.23) (1.45) (1.12) (1.19) (2.84) (1.72) (1.18) (1.27) 
2007.year 0.00488 0.00762 0.00801 0.00478 0.0110 0.00388 0.00502 0.00752* 0.00260 0.00477 0.00277 
 
(0.59) (0.94) (0.99) (0.59) (1.24) (0.50) (0.60) (1.85) (0.64) (0.58) (0.34) 
2008.year 0.00477 0.00482 0.00505 0.00490 0.00625 
 
0.00506 0.0116*** 0.00233 0.00469 0.00175 
 
(0.61) (0.61) (0.64) (0.64) (0.76) 
 
(0.64) (3.02) (0.60) (0.60) (0.23) 
2009.year -0.0207** -0.0196** -0.0193** -0.02064*** -0.0234*** -0.0181** -0.0208** -0.00566 -0.0257*** -0.0208*** -0.0270*** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.41) (-2.38) (-2.59) (-2.79) (-2.36) (-2.53) (-1.46) (-6.49) (-2.56) (-3.42) 
2010.year -0.0139* -0.0125* -0.0124 -0.01384* -0.0157** -0.0135** -0.0142* -0.0130*** -0.0179*** -0.0139* -0.0151** 
 
(-1.84) (-1.66) (-1.64) (-1.87) (-1.98) (-1.96) (-1.86) (-3.52) (-4.83) (-1.84) (-2.03) 
_cons 0.483*** 0.430*** 0.427*** 0.47065*** 0.444*** 0.520*** 0.483*** 0.821*** 0.675*** 0.484*** 0.251*** 
 
(7.02) (6.84) (6.26) (7.41) (6.85) (7.54) (6.95) (27.62) (22.09) (7.02) (3.53) 
number of observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of observations is lower for models applying GLOBE 
cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, 
Peru, and the United Kingdom. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.6. Regression results – Power Distance dimension (GLOBE)  
 (7)                   Base model 
(66)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(67)                     
Rule of Law 
(68)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(69)                        
ex USA 
(70)                       
ex Crisis 
(71)                     
Outliers - Size 
(72)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(73)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(74)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(16)                     
Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00147 0.00150 0.00148 0.00140 0.00187 0.00140 0.00139 0.00376 0.00579** 0.00176 0.00324 
 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.31) (0.20) (0.21) (1.50) (2.16) (0.24) (0.75) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00624 0.00597 0.00582 0.00720 0.00654 0.00847 0.00583 -0.0117*** -0.0165*** 0.00623 0.00384 
 
(0.57) (0.54) (0.53) (0.66) (0.49) (0.57) (0.52) (-2.81) (-3.71) (0.57) (0.54) 
FCF_TA 2.950 2.929 2.849 3.003 5.937** 4.665 3.302 31.31*** 8.870*** 2.954 -2.196 
 
(0.85) (0.84) (0.82) (0.87) (2.09) (1.09) (0.95) (37.61) (6.59) (0.85) (-1.01) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00119 0.00221 0.00284 0.00241 -0.00214 -0.0000353 0.00253 -0.0191*** -0.0192*** 0.00115 -0.00185 
 
(0.12) (0.21) (0.27) (0.24) (-0.17) (-0.00) (0.23) (-5.05) (-4.66) (0.11) (-0.23) 
Leverage 0.205** 0.200** 0.198** 0.207** 0.325*** 0.247* 0.198* 0.502*** 0.540*** 0.204** 0.252*** 
 
(2.03) (1.98) (1.96) (2.06) (2.95) (1.94) (1.92) (13.60) (13.56) (2.02) (2.72) 
DIV_FCF 0.000240 0.000241 0.000220 0.000230 -0.000181 0.000694 0.000351 0.000812 0.00179** 0.000237 0.0000928 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (-0.10) (0.31) (0.18) (1.08) (2.25) (0.12) (0.10) 
L.Cash_TA 0.112 0.116 0.125 0.113 0.0799 0.101 0.124 0.173*** 0.118** 0.111 0.213** 
 
(0.89) (0.91) (0.99) (0.90) (0.65) (0.65) (0.95) (3.59) (2.35) (0.87) (2.52) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000412 
 
          
(-0.10) 
 PDIN 0.0759 0.0621 0.0624 0.0686 0.132* 0.123 0.0839 0.776*** 0.225*** 0.0761 -0.0626 
 
(0.82) (0.68) (0.69) (0.76) (1.67) (1.10) (0.91) (31.10) (6.20) (0.82) (-0.96) 
PDIN_FCF -0.685 -0.679 -0.652 -0.701 -1.548 -1.223 -0.797 -10.05*** -2.027*** -0.687 1.398 
 
(-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.59) (-1.57) (-0.83) (-0.66) (-35.19) (-4.31) (-0.57) (1.61) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0338 
           
(0.44) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-1.166 
           
(-1.08) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.280 
           
(0.97) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-2.325*** 
           
(-3.57) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-2.376*** 
           
(-3.16) 
Stock_FCF 
          
-0.000370 
           
(-0.26) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.00547** 
           
(2.21) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0138 -0.0134 -0.00212 -0.0135 -0.0102 -0.0151 -0.0137 0.00786** -0.00143 -0.0138 -0.0108 
 
(-1.35) (-1.28) (-0.14) (-1.30) (-1.07) (-1.23) (-1.35) (2.03) (-0.34) (-1.35) (-1.63) 
Credit_GDP 0.000102 0.0000841 0.000111 0.000128 0.000290* 0.000119 0.0000900 -0.000109* -0.000000247 0.000103 -0.000262 
 
(0.68) (0.52) (0.73) (0.84) (1.87) (0.67) (0.59) (-1.90) (-0.00) (0.69) (-1.29) 
            Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000228 0.00000560 -0.00000785 0.0000422 -0.0000184 0.0000247 0.0000176 -0.000109*** -0.0000328 0.0000230 0.0000399 
 
(0.27) (0.07) (-0.11) (0.52) (-0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (-3.42) (-0.96) (0.27) (0.35) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0323 
   
-0.00944 -0.0394 -0.0302 -0.0745*** -0.0824*** -0.0324 0.120** 
 
(-0.80) 
   
(-0.21) (-0.80) (-0.75) (-4.88) (-4.97) (-0.80) (2.10) 
concentration 
 
-0.0156 
         
  
(-0.44) 
         rule_law 
  
-0.0158 
        
   
(-1.05) 
        
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 252. 
 
common_legal 
   
-0.0223* 
       
    
(-1.70) 
       2.SIC2 -0.0308 -0.0209 -0.0260 -0.0331 -0.0174 -0.0470 -0.0306 -0.0921** -0.0797* -0.0307 -0.0128 
 
(-0.28) (-0.19) (-0.23) (-0.30) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-2.04) (-1.76) (-0.28) (-0.17) 
8.SIC2 -0.0114 -0.00506 -0.00791 -0.0151 -0.0402 -0.0484 -0.0102 -0.125*** -0.0711 -0.0115 -0.00370 
 
(-0.10) (-0.05) (-0.07) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.09) (-2.78) (-1.55) (-0.10) (-0.05) 
10.SIC2 -0.00283 -0.00179 0.00519 -0.000989 -0.0204 -0.0275 -0.00655 -0.0899** -0.0679* -0.00284 0.0170 
 
(-0.03) (-0.02) (0.05) (-0.01) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.07) (-2.24) (-1.72) (-0.03) (0.27) 
12.SIC2 0.0189 0.0237 0.0191 0.0153 -0.0414 -0.00181 0.0202 -0.120** -0.113** 0.0189 0.0520 
 
(0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (-0.30) (-0.01) (0.16) (-2.33) (-2.15) (0.15) (0.62) 
13.SIC2 0.0207 0.0239 0.0268 0.0214 -0.0217 -0.00214 0.0239 -0.112*** -0.141*** 0.0207 0.0433 
 
(0.24) (0.27) (0.31) (0.24) (-0.22) (-0.02) (0.27) (-3.09) (-3.97) (0.24) (0.75) 
14.SIC2 -0.0151 -0.0105 -0.00745 -0.0203 -0.0476 -0.0235 -0.0135 -0.0589 -0.0502 -0.0151 0.000206 
 
(-0.13) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-0.17) (-0.39) (-0.17) (-0.12) (-1.26) (-1.06) (-0.13) (0.00) 
15.SIC2 -0.0433 -0.0370 -0.0336 -0.0507 -0.0689 -0.0679 -0.0433 -0.0802** -0.0691* -0.0433 -0.0320 
 
(-0.45) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.52) (-0.70) (-0.58) (-0.45) (-1.98) (-1.66) (-0.44) (-0.50) 
16.SIC2 -0.0142 -0.00714 -0.00790 -0.0198 -0.0317 -0.0281 -0.0126 -0.0456 -0.0479 -0.0142 -0.00130 
 
(-0.15) (-0.07) (-0.08) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.13) (-1.14) (-1.19) (-0.15) (-0.02) 
17.SIC2 -0.00898 -0.00374 -0.00390 -0.00762 -0.0344 -0.0223 -0.00110 -0.0613 -0.0272 -0.00897 0.0000389 
 
(-0.09) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.25) (-0.18) (-0.01) (-1.42) (-0.64) (-0.09) (0.00) 
20.SIC2 -0.0113 -0.00410 -0.00405 -0.0158 -0.0390 -0.0240 -0.0104 -0.0818** -0.0637* -0.0114 0.00403 
 
(-0.13) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.18) (-0.43) (-0.23) (-0.12) (-2.27) (-1.82) (-0.13) (0.07) 
22.SIC2 -0.0187 -0.00963 -0.00810 -0.0235 -0.0361 -0.0298 -0.0170 -0.0786** -0.0737** -0.0188 -0.00458 
 
(-0.21) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.27) (-0.39) (-0.28) (-0.19) (-2.14) (-2.06) (-0.21) (-0.08) 
23.SIC2 -0.0191 -0.0134 -0.0152 -0.0209 -0.0315 -0.0292 -0.0179 -0.0909** -0.0673* -0.0191 -0.00168 
 
(-0.21) (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.32) (-0.26) (-0.19) (-2.37) (-1.79) (-0.21) (-0.03) 
24.SIC2 -0.0176 -0.0133 -0.0138 -0.0195 -0.0305 -0.0331 -0.0164 -0.0720* -0.0672* -0.0176 -0.00926 
 
(-0.19) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.17) (-1.84) (-1.75) (-0.19) (-0.15) 
25.SIC2 -0.0286 -0.0235 -0.0228 -0.0305 -0.0349 -0.0389 -0.0271 -0.0826** -0.0663* -0.0286 -0.0231 
 
(-0.31) (-0.25) (-0.24) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.29) (-2.13) (-1.75) (-0.31) (-0.38) 
26.SIC2 -0.0108 -0.00338 -0.00296 -0.0178 -0.0330 -0.0241 -0.00925 -0.0621* -0.0563 -0.0108 -0.000102 
 
(-0.12) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.21) (-0.36) (-0.23) (-0.11) (-1.71) (-1.59) (-0.12) (-0.00) 
27.SIC2 -0.0287 -0.0227 -0.0221 -0.0333 -0.0414 -0.0433 -0.0277 -0.0927** -0.0795** -0.0287 -0.0133 
 
(-0.32) (-0.26) (-0.25) (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.40) (-0.31) (-2.50) (-2.20) (-0.32) (-0.23) 
28.SIC2 -0.0243 -0.0162 -0.0151 -0.0291 -0.0426 -0.0382 -0.0232 -0.0726** -0.0773** -0.0244 -0.00541 
 
(-0.29) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.34) (-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.27) (-2.03) (-2.24) (-0.29) (-0.10) 
29.SIC2 0.00336 0.00533 0.00396 -0.000165 -0.0190 -0.0166 -0.00241 0.00530 0.00774 0.00339 0.0186 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (-0.00) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-0.02) (0.13) (0.20) (0.03) (0.29) 
30.SIC2 -0.00856 -0.000885 -0.00124 -0.0147 -0.0263 -0.0274 -0.00714 -0.0861** -0.0682** -0.00861 0.00493 
 
(-0.10) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.17) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.08) (-2.36) (-1.92) (-0.10) (0.09) 
31.SIC2 -0.0199 -0.0209 -0.0181 -0.0168 -0.0502 -0.0343 -0.0189 -0.0962* -0.0901 -0.0200 -0.0124 
 
(-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.37) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-1.71) (-1.55) (-0.14) (-0.13) 
32.SIC2 -0.0157 -0.00766 -0.00971 -0.0219 -0.0416 -0.0295 -0.0151 -0.0714** -0.0725** -0.0157 -0.00296 
 
(-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.25) (-0.46) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-1.97) (-2.07) (-0.18) (-0.05) 
33.SIC2 -0.0184 -0.0112 -0.0111 -0.0240 -0.0341 -0.0274 -0.0178 -0.0604* -0.0483 -0.0184 -0.00360 
 
(-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.28) (-0.38) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-1.68) (-1.38) (-0.21) (-0.06) 
34.SIC2 -0.0160 -0.00868 -0.00846 -0.0221 -0.0382 -0.0276 -0.0150 -0.0751** -0.0634* -0.0161 -0.00222 
 
(-0.18) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.26) (-0.42) (-0.26) (-0.17) (-2.06) (-1.80) (-0.19) (-0.04) 
35.SIC2 0.0618 0.0695 0.0703 0.0576 0.0562 0.0652 0.0637 -0.0760** -0.0633* 0.0621 0.0504 
 
(0.71) (0.81) (0.82) (0.67) (0.61) (0.62) (0.73) (-2.10) (-1.81) (0.71) (0.88) 
36.SIC2 -0.0283 -0.0214 -0.0198 -0.0316 -0.0396 -0.0418 -0.0272 -0.0912** -0.0807** -0.0283 -0.0111 
 
(-0.33) (-0.25) (-0.23) (-0.37) (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.32) (-2.54) (-2.33) (-0.33) (-0.20) 
37.SIC2 -0.00998 -0.00234 -0.00197 -0.0173 -0.0379 -0.0264 -0.00921 -0.0741** -0.0624* -0.01000 0.00269 
 
(-0.12) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.20) (-0.42) (-0.26) (-0.11) (-2.07) (-1.80) (-0.12) (0.05) 
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38.SIC2 -0.0249 -0.0172 -0.0171 -0.0268 -0.0334 -0.0422 -0.0209 -0.0814** -0.0767** -0.0250 -0.0111 
 
(-0.27) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.30) (-0.34) (-0.38) (-0.23) (-2.15) (-2.08) (-0.27) (-0.19) 
39.SIC2 -0.0419 -0.0348 -0.0351 -0.0427 -0.0520 -0.0594 -0.0412 -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.0419 -0.0256 
 
(-0.44) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.44) (-2.89) (-3.11) (-0.44) (-0.41) 
40.SIC2 0.0579 0.0652 0.0510 0.0438 0.0506 -0.00662 0.0567 0.0888 -0.00296 0.0579 0.0686 
 
(0.41) (0.46) (0.36) (0.31) (0.37) (-0.04) (0.40) (1.58) (-0.05) (0.41) (0.73) 
41.SIC2 0.0134 0.0230 0.0220 0.00465 -0.0117 0.00156 0.0159 -0.0534 -0.0593 0.0133 0.0181 
 
(0.13) (0.23) (0.22) (0.05) (-0.11) (0.01) (0.16) (-1.27) (-1.41) (0.13) (0.27) 
42.SIC2 0.0163 0.0236 0.0251 0.0115 -0.0404 0.00157 0.0198 -0.0751** -0.0650* 0.0162 0.0293 
 
(0.18) (0.27) (0.28) (0.13) (-0.43) (0.01) (0.22) (-2.03) (-1.80) (0.18) (0.50) 
44.SIC2 -0.000498 0.00644 0.00731 -0.00409 -0.0372 -0.0277 0.000511 -0.0938** -0.107*** -0.000480 0.0233 
 
(-0.01) (0.07) (0.08) (-0.05) (-0.39) (-0.26) (0.01) (-2.53) (-2.96) (-0.01) (0.40) 
45.SIC2 -0.00991 -0.00761 -0.00720 -0.0143 -0.0496 -0.0364 -0.0115 -0.0773* -0.0727* -0.00978 0.0136 
 
(-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.15) (-0.48) (-0.31) (-0.12) (-1.94) (-1.85) (-0.10) (0.21) 
47.SIC2 0.0379 0.0430 0.0443 0.0324 -0.0524 0.0112 -0.00581 -0.0644 -0.102** 0.0379 0.0568 
 
(0.38) (0.44) (0.45) (0.33) (-0.50) (0.09) (-0.06) (-1.59) (-2.50) (0.38) (0.88) 
48.SIC2 -0.0377 -0.0330 -0.0306 -0.0405 -0.0646 -0.0536 -0.0351 -0.145*** -0.127*** -0.0377 -0.0179 
 
(-0.43) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.46) (-0.69) (-0.50) (-0.40) (-3.95) (-3.56) (-0.43) (-0.31) 
49.SIC2 -0.0262 -0.0210 -0.0198 -0.0308 -0.0646 -0.0478 -0.0254 -0.0855** -0.102*** -0.0262 -0.0150 
 
(-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.35) (-0.70) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-2.35) (-2.87) (-0.30) (-0.26) 
50.SIC2 -0.0286 -0.0217 -0.0208 -0.0337 -0.0484 -0.0370 -0.0280 -0.0718** -0.0674* -0.0286 -0.0127 
 
(-0.33) (-0.25) (-0.24) (-0.40) (-0.54) (-0.36) (-0.33) (-1.99) (-1.93) (-0.33) (-0.23) 
51.SIC2 -0.0126 -0.00567 -0.00587 -0.0177 -0.0268 -0.0244 -0.0111 -0.0552 -0.0407 -0.0126 -0.000667 
 
(-0.14) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.20) (-0.29) (-0.23) (-0.13) (-1.50) (-1.14) (-0.14) (-0.01) 
52.SIC2 -0.0758 -0.0743 -0.0744 -0.0729 0.0290 -0.246 -0.104 -0.272 -0.458** -0.0748 -0.0653 
 
(-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.13) (0.06) (-0.32) (-0.19) (-1.31) (-2.08) (-0.13) (-0.24) 
53.SIC2 -0.0255 -0.0203 -0.0228 -0.0321 -0.0347 -0.0333 -0.0256 -0.0562 -0.0440 -0.0255 -0.0172 
 
(-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.28) (-0.26) (-1.39) (-1.10) (-0.26) (-0.26) 
54.SIC2 -0.00700 0.000843 0.00111 -0.0148 -0.0264 -0.0232 -0.00587 -0.0651* -0.0370 -0.00703 0.00834 
 
(-0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (-0.16) (-0.27) (-0.21) (-0.06) (-1.69) (-0.98) (-0.08) (0.14) 
55.SIC2 -0.0140 -0.00664 -0.00374 -0.0211 -0.0339 -0.0246 -0.0130 -0.0544 -0.0512 -0.0141 0.00390 
 
(-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.20) (-0.31) (-0.19) (-0.12) (-1.26) (-1.18) (-0.13) (0.06) 
56.SIC2 -0.0258 -0.0180 -0.0170 -0.0284 -0.0549 -0.0404 -0.0252 -0.107*** -0.0962*** -0.0258 -0.00759 
 
(-0.28) (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.31) (-0.54) (-0.37) (-0.28) (-2.82) (-2.61) (-0.28) (-0.13) 
57.SIC2 -0.0400 -0.0348 -0.0332 -0.0411 -0.0870 -0.0533 -0.0393 -0.116*** -0.125*** -0.0399 -0.00661 
 
(-0.37) (-0.32) (-0.31) (-0.38) (-0.69) (-0.41) (-0.36) (-2.64) (-2.85) (-0.37) (-0.09) 
58.SIC2 -0.0206 -0.0120 -0.0126 -0.0213 -0.0374 -0.0468 -0.0187 -0.133*** -0.140*** -0.0207 -0.00696 
 
(-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.34) (-0.40) (-0.19) (-3.36) (-3.60) (-0.21) (-0.11) 
59.SIC2 -0.0272 -0.0218 -0.0207 -0.0317 -0.0474 -0.0453 -0.0266 -0.0954** -0.0877** -0.0272 -0.0168 
 
(-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.35) (-0.49) (-0.41) (-0.29) (-2.50) (-2.35) (-0.30) (-0.28) 
70.SIC2 -0.0159 -0.0124 -0.0127 -0.0171 -0.0553 -0.0408 -0.0145 -0.122*** -0.105*** -0.0160 -0.00230 
 
(-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.57) (-0.36) (-0.15) (-3.16) (-2.76) (-0.17) (-0.04) 
72.SIC2 -0.0529 -0.0463 -0.0454 -0.0540 -0.0312 -0.0737 -0.0503 -0.148*** -0.153*** -0.0529 -0.0313 
 
(-0.45) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.18) (-0.51) (-0.42) (-3.12) (-3.18) (-0.45) (-0.40) 
73.SIC2 -0.0409 -0.0341 -0.0321 -0.0434 -0.0844 -0.0601 -0.0393 -0.124*** -0.126*** -0.0409 -0.0196 
 
(-0.47) (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.50) (-0.89) (-0.57) (-0.45) (-3.38) (-3.54) (-0.47) (-0.34) 
75.SIC2 0.00879 0.0142 0.0188 0.00751 -0.0265 -0.000559 0.00986 -0.0720 -0.0758* 0.00874 0.0282 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.17) (0.07) (-0.23) (-0.00) (0.09) (-1.59) (-1.66) (0.08) (0.39) 
76.SIC2 -0.0248 -0.0226 -0.0178 -0.0286 -0.0376 -0.0351 -0.0237 -0.0566 -0.0342 -0.0248 -0.0187 
 
(-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.12) (-0.20) (-0.27) (-0.20) (-0.17) (-1.00) (-0.59) (-0.17) (-0.20) 
78.SIC2 -0.0206 -0.0128 -0.00641 -0.0230 -0.0865 -0.0666 -0.0235 -0.149*** -0.223*** -0.0208 -0.00941 
 
(-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.20) (-0.75) (-0.47) (-0.20) (-3.18) (-4.82) (-0.18) (-0.12) 
79.SIC2 -0.0211 -0.0143 -0.0127 -0.0206 -0.0560 -0.0430 -0.0184 -0.0884** -0.135*** -0.0211 -0.0148 
 
(-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.53) (-0.37) (-0.19) (-2.26) (-3.49) (-0.22) (-0.24) 
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80.SIC2 -0.0366 -0.0302 -0.0294 -0.0344 -0.0479 -0.0584 -0.0275 -0.150*** -0.106*** -0.0367 -0.0115 
 
(-0.37) (-0.31) (-0.30) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.49) (-0.28) (-3.68) (-2.63) (-0.37) (-0.18) 
82.SIC2 -0.0208 -0.0118 -0.0116 -0.0263 -0.0426 -0.0359 -0.0190 -0.102** -0.0673 -0.0209 -0.00936 
 
(-0.18) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.22) (-0.34) (-0.25) (-0.16) (-2.14) (-1.39) (-0.18) (-0.12) 
87.SIC2 -0.0340 -0.0270 -0.0267 -0.0375 -0.0510 -0.0501 -0.0332 -0.0995*** -0.0683* -0.0339 -0.0216 
 
(-0.37) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.41) (-0.51) (-0.45) (-0.36) (-2.58) (-1.81) (-0.37) (-0.35) 
96.SIC2 -0.0460 -0.0375 -0.0399 -0.0564 -0.0677 -0.0526 -0.0477 -0.131* -0.114 -0.0458 -0.0250 
 
(-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.23) (-0.26) (-1.80) (-1.51) (-0.25) (-0.20) 
2003.year -0.00734 -0.00635 -0.00442 -0.00653 -0.0126 -0.00856 -0.00620 -0.0305*** -0.0345*** -0.00740 -0.00980 
 
(-0.35) (-0.30) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.56) (-0.37) (-0.29) (-3.83) (-4.05) (-0.35) (-0.74) 
2004.year -0.00104 -0.0000228 0.00158 -0.000761 -0.00487 -0.00209 0.000627 -0.0113 -0.0136 -0.00109 -0.00307 
 
(-0.05) (-0.00) (0.08) (-0.04) (-0.22) (-0.09) (0.03) (-1.46) (-1.64) (-0.05) (-0.24) 
2005.year 0.0382* 0.0394* 0.0408** 0.0380* 0.0329 0.0338 0.0396* -0.00323 -0.0123 0.0382* 0.0255* 
 
(1.82) (1.89) (1.96) (1.82) (1.45) (1.46) (1.86) (-0.42) (-1.48) (1.82) (1.90) 
2006.year 0.0115 0.0129 0.0141 0.0110 0.00876 0.0115 0.0124 0.0137* 0.0174** 0.0115 0.0107 
 
(0.56) (0.63) (0.69) (0.53) (0.39) (0.51) (0.59) (1.73) (2.05) (0.55) (0.81) 
2007.year 0.00296 0.00438 0.00561 0.00199 0.00471 0.00230 0.00440 0.0109 0.00422 0.00290 0.00117 
 
(0.14) (0.21) (0.27) (0.10) (0.21) (0.10) (0.21) (1.37) (0.49) (0.14) (0.09) 
2008.year 0.000276 0.000558 0.00110 0.000307 -0.00572 
 
0.0000728 -0.0220*** -0.0201** 0.000236 0.000913 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (-0.27) 
 
(0.00) (-2.94) (-2.51) (0.01) (0.07) 
2009.year -0.0296 -0.0290 -0.0283 -0.0296 -0.0439** -0.0328 -0.0308 -0.0754*** -0.0836*** -0.0296 -0.0317** 
 
(-1.45) (-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.46) (-2.07) (-1.46) (-1.50) (-10.04) (-10.47) (-1.46) (-2.43) 
2010.year -0.0111 -0.0105 -0.00973 -0.0114 -0.0143 -0.0109 -0.0113 -0.0193*** -0.0228*** -0.0111 -0.0145 
 
(-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.51) (-0.60) (-0.71) (-0.54) (-0.59) (-2.66) (-2.94) (-0.58) (-1.18) 
_cons -0.117 -0.105 -0.214 -0.118 -0.338 -0.231 -0.151 -2.190*** -0.567*** -0.117 0.201 
 
(-0.39) (-0.35) (-0.66) (-0.39) (-1.31) (-0.63) (-0.50) (-24.17) (-4.75) (-0.39) (1.05) 
number of observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of observations is lower for models applying GLOBE 
cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, 
Peru, and the United Kingdom. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.7. Regression results – Institutional Collectivism dimension (GLOBE)  
 (8)                   
Base model 
(75)  
Ownership 
Concentration 
(76)                     
Rule of Law 
(77)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(78)                        
ex USA 
(79)                       
ex Crisis 
(80)                     
Outliers - Size 
(81)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(82)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(83)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(17)                     
Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00307 0.00310 0.00309 0.00300 0.00416 0.00322 0.00316 0.00552*** 0.00604*** 0.00352 0.00358 
 
(0.72) (0.73) (0.73) (0.71) (1.51) (0.78) (0.77) (3.58) (3.76) (0.75) (0.92) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00783 0.00807 0.00808 0.00868 0.0107* 0.0115 0.00762 0.00428* 0.00112 0.00782 0.00396 
 
(1.15) (1.17) (1.17) (1.27) (1.81) (1.38) (1.12) (1.72) (0.43) (1.14) (0.64) 
FCF_TA 12.26*** 12.33*** 12.27*** 12.28*** 16.21*** 14.43*** 12.66*** 23.83*** 21.38*** 12.26*** 7.572*** 
 
(6.39) (6.42) (6.41) (6.45) (15.65) (6.74) (6.89) (85.49) (47.77) (6.39) (3.31) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00226 0.00331 0.00384 0.00336 0.00423 0.000759 0.00359 -0.000923 -0.00812*** 0.00222 -0.00477 
 
(0.33) (0.51) (0.59) (0.53) (0.72) (0.10) (0.51) (-0.38) (-3.17) (0.33) (-0.65) 
Leverage 0.160** 0.156** 0.157** 0.161** 0.172*** 0.173** 0.153** 0.173*** 0.256*** 0.159** 0.254*** 
 
(2.44) (2.40) (2.40) (2.49) (3.41) (2.29) (2.36) (7.60) (10.29) (2.43) (3.03) 
DIV_FCF 0.000216 0.000208 0.000209 0.000212 -0.000205 0.000555 0.000324 0.000745* 0.000495 0.000212 0.0000262 
 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (-0.26) (0.43) (0.26) (1.66) (1.06) (0.16) (0.03) 
L.Cash_TA 0.114 0.117 0.123 0.115 0.101* 0.0953 0.125 0.139*** 0.0995*** 0.113 0.215*** 
 
(1.36) (1.40) (1.48) (1.38) (1.74) (1.02) (1.50) (4.53) (3.20) (1.34) (2.79) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000635 
 
          
(-0.24) 
 COL1 0.139*** 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 0.199*** 0.158*** 0.143*** 0.302*** 0.261*** 0.139*** 0.0565* 
 
(4.49) (4.50) (4.46) (4.65) (11.32) (4.75) (4.83) (49.24) (30.07) (4.49) (1.81) 
COL1_FCF -2.619*** -2.635*** -2.621*** -2.621*** -3.432*** -3.102*** -2.702*** -5.212*** -4.553*** -2.619*** -1.325*** 
 
(-5.90) (-5.93) (-5.92) (-5.95) (-14.26) (-6.23) (-6.36) (-78.36) (-40.90) (-5.90) (-3.02) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0605 
           
(0.89) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-1.184 
           
(-1.23) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.222 
           
(0.85) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-2.243*** 
           
(-3.81) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-1.742*** 
           
(-2.80) 
Stock_FCF 
          
0.000297 
           
(0.25) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.00103 
           
(0.36) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0223*** -0.0215*** -0.0145 -0.0210*** -0.0180*** -0.0247*** -0.0227*** -0.0226*** -0.0195*** -0.0223*** -0.0184*** 
 
(-3.28) (-3.11) (-1.52) (-3.06) (-4.07) (-3.34) (-3.48) (-9.09) (-7.53) (-3.28) (-3.02) 
Credit_GDP 0.0000233 -0.0000165 0.00000657 0.0000537 0.000261*** 0.0000269 0.00000968 0.00000623 0.0000247 0.0000238 -0.0000368 
 
(0.22) (-0.16) (0.06) (0.51) (3.28) (0.23) (0.09) (0.16) (0.61) (0.22) (-0.16) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000389 0.0000247 0.0000106 0.0000572 -0.0000280 0.0000558 0.0000350 0.0000252 0.0000303 0.0000392 0.0000100 
 
(0.75) (0.56) (0.26) (1.25) (-0.76) (0.93) (0.69) (1.32) (1.52) (0.75) (0.11) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0226 
   
0.00877 -0.0274 -0.0202 -0.0283*** -0.0478*** -0.0227 0.0923* 
 
(-0.91) 
   
(0.44) (-0.99) (-0.83) (-3.15) (-5.03) (-0.91) (1.89) 
concentration 
 
-0.0220 
         
  
(-0.92) 
         rule_law 
  
-0.0103 
        
   
(-1.07) 
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common_legal 
   
-0.0209** 
       
    
(-2.42) 
       2.SIC2 -0.0103 -0.00263 -0.00693 -0.0139 0.0247 -0.0148 -0.00966 -0.00266 -0.0153 -0.0102 -0.0100 
 
(-0.14) (-0.04) (-0.10) (-0.20) (0.43) (-0.19) (-0.14) (-0.09) (-0.56) (-0.14) (-0.15) 
8.SIC2 0.00910 0.0146 0.0116 0.00468 0.00463 -0.0114 0.0110 0.00649 -0.00316 0.00905 -0.000257 
 
(0.13) (0.20) (0.16) (0.07) (0.09) (-0.14) (0.16) (0.23) (-0.11) (0.13) (-0.00) 
10.SIC2 0.00783 0.00785 0.0131 0.0104 0.0164 -0.0112 0.00267 0.0121 -0.00760 0.00782 0.00942 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.17) (0.35) (-0.16) (0.04) (0.48) (-0.32) (0.12) (0.16) 
12.SIC2 0.0832 0.0904 0.0852 0.0812 0.104 0.0932 0.0863 0.0965*** 0.0732** 0.0832 0.0522 
 
(0.99) (1.08) (1.02) (0.97) (1.60) (1.01) (1.06) (3.01) (2.28) (0.99) (0.69) 
13.SIC2 0.0294 0.0313 0.0331 0.0299 0.0214 0.0163 0.0337 0.0176 -0.0369* 0.0294 0.0396 
 
(0.52) (0.55) (0.58) (0.53) (0.48) (0.26) (0.61) (0.78) (-1.72) (0.52) (0.76) 
14.SIC2 0.0137 0.0166 0.0187 0.00855 0.00643 0.0161 0.0158 0.0370 0.0203 0.0136 0.00292 
 
(0.18) (0.22) (0.25) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.22) (1.27) (0.71) (0.18) (0.04) 
15.SIC2 -0.00876 -0.00482 -0.00255 -0.0176 -0.0144 0.0133 -0.00793 0.0110 0.0143 -0.00876 -0.0188 
 
(-0.14) (-0.08) (-0.04) (-0.28) (-0.32) (0.19) (-0.13) (0.44) (0.57) (-0.14) (-0.32) 
16.SIC2 0.00436 0.0106 0.00939 -0.00168 0.00479 -0.00343 0.00621 0.0148 0.0158 0.00434 0.00105 
 
(0.07) (0.17) (0.15) (-0.03) (0.10) (-0.05) (0.10) (0.60) (0.65) (0.07) (0.02) 
17.SIC2 0.0168 0.0214 0.0210 0.0175 0.0132 0.00930 0.0249 0.0320 0.0261 0.0168 0.00318 
 
(0.25) (0.32) (0.31) (0.26) (0.21) (0.12) (0.37) (1.19) (1.01) (0.25) (0.05) 
20.SIC2 0.0203 0.0265 0.0258 0.0153 0.0210 0.0129 0.0222 0.0356 0.0199 0.0202 0.0101 
 
(0.36) (0.48) (0.47) (0.28) (0.50) (0.21) (0.41) (1.59) (0.94) (0.36) (0.20) 
22.SIC2 0.00859 0.0154 0.0163 0.00203 0.0155 -0.00200 0.0110 0.0123 -0.0000336 0.00850 0.00453 
 
(0.15) (0.27) (0.29) (0.04) (0.36) (-0.03) (0.20) (0.54) (-0.00) (0.15) (0.09) 
23.SIC2 -0.000929 0.00516 0.00276 -0.00281 0.00768 -0.00782 0.000724 0.00982 -0.0102 -0.000972 -0.00379 
 
(-0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (-0.05) (0.17) (-0.12) (0.01) (0.41) (-0.45) (-0.02) (-0.07) 
24.SIC2 -0.00212 0.00178 0.000820 -0.00432 0.00750 -0.0137 -0.000719 0.000642 -0.0153 -0.00215 -0.00643 
 
(-0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (-0.07) (0.16) (-0.20) (-0.01) (0.03) (-0.66) (-0.04) (-0.12) 
25.SIC2 -0.0119 -0.00748 -0.00743 -0.0142 -0.00132 -0.0206 -0.0103 -0.0111 -0.0183 -0.0120 -0.0200 
 
(-0.20) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.24) (-0.03) (-0.31) (-0.17) (-0.46) (-0.80) (-0.20) (-0.36) 
26.SIC2 0.00941 0.0161 0.0154 0.00207 0.0112 -0.0000784 0.0113 0.0185 0.00200 0.00935 0.00331 
 
(0.17) (0.29) (0.28) (0.04) (0.27) (-0.00) (0.21) (0.82) (0.09) (0.17) (0.06) 
27.SIC2 -0.00381 0.00130 0.00106 -0.00850 0.0129 -0.0120 -0.00227 0.0103 -0.00754 -0.00386 -0.0109 
 
(-0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (-0.15) (0.30) (-0.19) (-0.04) (0.45) (-0.35) (-0.07) (-0.21) 
28.SIC2 0.00393 0.0105 0.0105 -0.00150 0.0125 -0.00229 0.00553 0.0205 0.00200 0.00389 -0.000636 
 
(0.07) (0.19) (0.19) (-0.03) (0.30) (-0.04) (0.10) (0.92) (0.10) (0.07) (-0.01) 
29.SIC2 0.0223 0.0230 0.0215 0.0184 0.00479 0.00458 0.0172 0.0381 0.0422* 0.0223 0.0264 
 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.29) (0.09) (0.07) (0.28) (1.54) (1.77) (0.35) (0.46) 
30.SIC2 0.0143 0.0207 0.0196 0.00786 0.0214 0.00858 0.0161 0.0273 0.00507 0.0142 0.00636 
 
(0.25) (0.37) (0.35) (0.14) (0.50) (0.14) (0.29) (1.20) (0.24) (0.25) (0.12) 
31.SIC2 -0.00134 -0.00214 0.000994 0.00171 -0.0109 -0.00491 0.000189 -0.00179 -0.0202 -0.00145 -0.0112 
 
(-0.01) (-0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.17) (-0.05) (0.00) (-0.05) (-0.58) (-0.02) (-0.13) 
32.SIC2 0.0110 0.0183 0.0159 0.00407 0.00981 0.00375 0.0122 0.0225 0.00489 0.0110 0.00458 
 
(0.20) (0.33) (0.29) (0.07) (0.23) (0.06) (0.22) (1.00) (0.23) (0.20) (0.09) 
33.SIC2 -0.00227 0.00358 0.00287 -0.00840 -0.00150 -0.0107 -0.00138 0.00856 -0.00484 -0.00232 -0.00436 
 
(-0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (-0.15) (-0.04) (-0.18) (-0.03) (0.38) (-0.23) (-0.04) (-0.09) 
34.SIC2 0.0123 0.0185 0.0181 0.00575 0.0154 0.00402 0.0141 0.0305 0.0108 0.0123 0.00244 
 
(0.22) (0.33) (0.32) (0.10) (0.36) (0.06) (0.26) (1.34) (0.50) (0.22) (0.05) 
35.SIC2 0.0548 0.0609 0.0610 0.0499 0.0475 0.0502 0.0559 0.0121 -0.000652 0.0553 0.0467 
 
(0.97) (1.10) (1.10) (0.90) (1.12) (0.81) (1.02) (0.54) (-0.03) (0.98) (0.91) 
36.SIC2 0.000412 0.00588 0.00666 -0.00382 0.0191 -0.00492 0.00236 0.0127 -0.00315 0.000455 -0.00465 
 
(0.01) (0.11) (0.12) (-0.07) (0.46) (-0.08) (0.04) (0.57) (-0.15) (0.01) (-0.09) 
37.SIC2 0.0108 0.0167 0.0161 0.00295 0.00540 0.00294 0.0119 0.0195 0.00530 0.0108 0.00579 
 
(0.20) (0.30) (0.29) (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.22) (0.88) (0.25) (0.19) (0.11) 
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            38.SIC2 0.000218 0.00677 0.00661 -0.00246 0.0170 -0.0164 0.00409 0.0112 -0.00768 0.000214 -0.00919 
 
(0.00) (0.12) (0.11) (-0.04) (0.37) (-0.25) (0.07) (0.47) (-0.34) (0.00) (-0.17) 
39.SIC2 -0.0135 -0.00750 -0.00818 -0.0154 0.00638 -0.0227 -0.0124 -0.0107 -0.0260 -0.0135 -0.0179 
 
(-0.22) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.25) (0.13) (-0.33) (-0.21) (-0.44) (-1.12) (-0.22) (-0.32) 
40.SIC2 0.0606 0.0677 0.0563 0.0461 0.0530 0.0146 0.0590 0.0591* 0.0330 0.0606 0.0767 
 
(0.66) (0.74) (0.61) (0.50) (0.84) (0.14) (0.66) (1.69) (0.92) (0.66) (0.91) 
41.SIC2 0.0221 0.0301 0.0281 0.0127 0.0217 0.0109 0.0244 0.0277 0.0116 0.0219 0.0175 
 
(0.33) (0.46) (0.43) (0.19) (0.45) (0.15) (0.38) (1.06) (0.46) (0.33) (0.29) 
42.SIC2 0.0464 0.0523 0.0527 0.0411 0.0301 0.0386 0.0507 0.0565** 0.0312 0.0463 0.0336 
 
(0.80) (0.92) (0.92) (0.72) (0.69) (0.61) (0.90) (2.46) (1.43) (0.80) (0.64) 
44.SIC2 0.0266 0.0324 0.0319 0.0229 0.0286 0.0127 0.0279 0.0336 -0.00117 0.0267 0.0228 
 
(0.46) (0.56) (0.55) (0.40) (0.65) (0.20) (0.49) (1.45) (-0.05) (0.46) (0.43) 
45.SIC2 0.0119 0.0138 0.0125 0.00833 0.00222 -0.00438 0.0105 0.0213 0.00891 0.0121 0.0145 
 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.20) (0.13) (0.05) (-0.06) (0.17) (0.86) (0.37) (0.19) (0.25) 
47.SIC2 0.0591 0.0631 0.0635 0.0537 0.000805 0.0421 0.0151 0.0604** -0.00608 0.0591 0.0566 
 
(0.92) (0.99) (1.00) (0.84) (0.02) (0.60) (0.24) (2.41) (-0.25) (0.92) (0.97) 
48.SIC2 0.00182 0.00483 0.00649 -0.00116 0.0197 -0.00982 0.00512 0.0215 -0.00555 0.00183 -0.0142 
 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (-0.02) (0.46) (-0.16) (0.09) (0.94) (-0.26) (0.03) (-0.27) 
49.SIC2 -0.00923 -0.00528 -0.00477 -0.0139 -0.0240 -0.0239 -0.00841 -0.00585 -0.0276 -0.00923 -0.0117 
 
(-0.16) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.25) (-0.56) (-0.38) (-0.15) (-0.26) (-1.28) (-0.16) (-0.23) 
50.SIC2 -0.00137 0.00443 0.00446 -0.00690 0.00000952 -0.00454 0.000254 0.0187 0.00161 -0.00138 -0.00845 
 
(-0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (-0.12) (0.00) (-0.07) (0.00) (0.83) (0.08) (-0.02) (-0.17) 
51.SIC2 0.0101 0.0158 0.0150 0.00440 0.0165 0.000254 0.0120 0.0213 0.0124 0.0101 0.00405 
 
(0.18) (0.28) (0.27) (0.08) (0.39) (0.00) (0.22) (0.93) (0.57) (0.18) (0.08) 
52.SIC2 -0.100 -0.0955 -0.101 -0.0993 0.00572 -0.248 -0.128 -0.276** -0.191 -0.0992 -0.0614 
 
(-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.28) (0.03) (-0.55) (-0.38) (-2.21) (-1.47) (-0.28) (-0.26) 
53.SIC2 -0.0134 -0.00910 -0.0118 -0.0199 -0.00907 -0.0149 -0.0133 -0.00544 -0.00962 -0.0133 -0.0147 
 
(-0.21) (-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.31) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.40) (-0.21) (-0.25) 
54.SIC2 0.0233 0.0297 0.0292 0.0153 0.0334 0.0155 0.0253 0.0376 0.0328 0.0233 0.00927 
 
(0.39) (0.50) (0.49) (0.26) (0.74) (0.23) (0.43) (1.56) (1.44) (0.38) (0.17) 
55.SIC2 0.0126 0.0188 0.0200 0.00553 0.0185 0.00722 0.0141 0.0319 0.0166 0.0125 0.00862 
 
(0.18) (0.27) (0.29) (0.08) (0.36) (0.09) (0.21) (1.18) (0.63) (0.18) (0.14) 
56.SIC2 -0.00280 0.00374 0.00383 -0.00642 0.00673 -0.0134 -0.00182 0.00531 -0.0186 -0.00281 -0.00282 
 
(-0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (-0.11) (0.14) (-0.21) (-0.03) (0.23) (-0.83) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
57.SIC2 -0.0106 -0.00676 -0.00569 -0.0122 -0.0212 -0.0169 -0.00964 -0.0104 -0.0275 -0.0105 -0.00261 
 
(-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.18) (-0.36) (-0.22) (-0.14) (-0.38) (-1.03) (-0.15) (-0.04) 
58.SIC2 0.000785 0.00781 0.00678 -0.000960 0.0238 -0.0187 0.00290 -0.00665 -0.0365 0.000717 -0.00363 
 
(0.01) (0.13) (0.11) (-0.02) (0.47) (-0.27) (0.05) (-0.27) (-1.54) (0.01) (-0.06) 
59.SIC2 -0.00710 -0.00300 -0.00268 -0.0118 0.000746 -0.0184 -0.00612 0.00173 -0.0170 -0.00714 -0.0142 
 
(-0.12) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.20) (0.02) (-0.28) (-0.11) (0.07) (-0.75) (-0.12) (-0.26) 
70.SIC2 0.0174 0.0204 0.0195 0.0158 0.0126 0.00837 0.0195 0.0314 0.00531 0.0173 0.00540 
 
(0.28) (0.33) (0.32) (0.26) (0.28) (0.12) (0.33) (1.30) (0.23) (0.28) (0.10) 
72.SIC2 -0.0214 -0.0160 -0.0163 -0.0229 0.0455 -0.0340 -0.0185 -0.00896 -0.0407 -0.0214 -0.0275 
 
(-0.28) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.30) (0.57) (-0.40) (-0.25) (-0.30) (-1.40) (-0.28) (-0.39) 
73.SIC2 -0.0124 -0.00673 -0.00590 -0.0152 -0.0140 -0.0244 -0.00964 -0.00426 -0.0305 -0.0124 -0.0171 
 
(-0.22) (-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.27) (-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.17) (-0.19) (-1.41) (-0.22) (-0.33) 
75.SIC2 0.0278 0.0319 0.0347 0.0268 0.0265 0.0181 0.0290 0.0353 0.00983 0.0277 0.0242 
 
(0.38) (0.44) (0.48) (0.37) (0.49) (0.23) (0.41) (1.25) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) 
76.SIC2 0.00702 0.00795 0.0124 0.00361 0.0190 0.00340 0.00899 0.0351 0.0269 0.00714 -0.0155 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.04) (0.30) (0.03) (0.10) (0.99) (0.76) (0.08) (-0.18) 
78.SIC2 0.0736 0.0798 0.0840 0.0703 0.0675 0.0617 0.0969 0.118*** 0.0588** 0.0735 0.0185 
 
(0.97) (1.07) (1.13) (0.94) (1.25) (0.74) (1.26) (4.04) (2.06) (0.97) (0.27) 
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79.SIC2 -0.0137 -0.00872 -0.00809 -0.0143 -0.0368 -0.0308 -0.0117 -0.0203 -0.0588** -0.0138 -0.0108 
 
(-0.22) (-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.23) (-0.76) (-0.45) (-0.20) (-0.84) (-2.52) (-0.22) (-0.19) 
80.SIC2 -0.00486 0.000203 -0.0000710 -0.00350 0.0409 -0.0168 0.00627 0.00196 -0.00904 -0.00489 -0.00715 
 
(-0.08) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.05) (0.70) (-0.24) (0.10) (0.08) (-0.37) (-0.08) (-0.12) 
82.SIC2 0.00285 0.0102 0.00971 -0.00326 0.0105 -0.00403 0.00540 0.0129 -0.000996 0.00281 -0.00825 
 
(0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (-0.04) (0.18) (-0.05) (0.07) (0.44) (-0.03) (0.04) (-0.12) 
87.SIC2 -0.0101 -0.00466 -0.00504 -0.0146 -0.00581 -0.0172 -0.00880 0.00438 -0.00936 -0.0100 -0.0162 
 
(-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.25) (-0.13) (-0.26) (-0.15) (0.18) (-0.41) (-0.17) (-0.30) 
96.SIC2 -0.0369 -0.0301 -0.0322 -0.0474 -0.0456 -0.0306 -0.0384 -0.0451 -0.0539 -0.0367 -0.0309 
 
(-0.31) (-0.25) (-0.27) (-0.40) (-0.56) (-0.23) (-0.33) (-1.00) (-1.18) (-0.30) (-0.28) 
2003.year -0.00483 -0.00392 -0.00253 -0.00393 -0.000203 -0.00568 -0.00409 -0.00490 -0.0176*** -0.00490 -0.0102 
 
(-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.02) (-0.41) (-0.30) (-0.99) (-3.40) (-0.36) (-0.85) 
2004.year -0.00250 -0.00174 -0.000516 -0.00213 -0.00204 -0.00458 -0.00149 -0.00379 -0.0119** -0.00256 -0.00417 
 
(-0.19) (-0.13) (-0.04) (-0.16) (-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.11) (-0.78) (-2.37) (-0.19) (-0.36) 
2005.year 0.0301** 0.0309** 0.0319** 0.0298** 0.0251** 0.0250* 0.0302** 0.0110** 0.000559 0.0300** 0.0240** 
 
(2.19) (2.29) (2.37) (2.21) (2.39) (1.82) (2.24) (2.27) (0.11) (2.19) (1.98) 
2006.year 0.0123 0.0134 0.0144 0.0118 0.0127 0.0107 0.0125 0.0136*** 0.0109** 0.0122 0.0106 
 
(0.92) (1.02) (1.10) (0.90) (1.22) (0.80) (0.94) (2.76) (2.14) (0.91) (0.89) 
2007.year 0.00692 0.00802 0.00912 0.00601 0.0163 0.00547 0.00780 0.0104** 0.00599 0.00684 0.00396 
 
(0.51) (0.61) (0.69) (0.45) (1.57) (0.40) (0.59) (2.11) (1.16) (0.50) (0.33) 
2008.year 0.00364 0.00364 0.00398 0.00372 0.00509 
 
0.00314 0.00481 -0.00228 0.00359 0.00218 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.53) 
 
(0.25) (1.04) (-0.47) (0.28) (0.19) 
2009.year -0.0189 -0.0182 -0.0177 -0.0190 -0.0169* -0.0183 -0.0205 -0.0211*** -0.0341*** -0.0189 -0.0269** 
 
(-1.42) (-1.38) (-1.34) (-1.44) (-1.71) (-1.36) (-1.57) (-4.54) (-6.85) (-1.42) (-2.26) 
2010.year -0.0126 -0.0121 -0.0114 -0.0129 -0.0147 -0.0130 -0.0135 -0.0172*** -0.0212*** -0.0126 -0.0137 
 
(-1.03) (-0.99) (-0.94) (-1.06) (-1.59) (-1.08) (-1.12) (-3.83) (-4.56) (-1.03) (-1.23) 
_cons -0.433** -0.463*** -0.517*** -0.476*** -0.818*** -0.478*** -0.458*** -1.136*** -0.943*** -0.432** -0.145 
 
(-2.56) (-2.77) (-3.04) (-2.88) (-7.50) (-2.62) (-2.77) (-24.32) (-17.34) (-2.55) (-0.79) 
number of observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 13059 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of observations is lower for models applying GLOBE 
cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, 
Peru, and the United Kingdom. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.8. Regression results – In-group Collectivism dimension (GLOBE)  
 (9)                   
Base model 
(84) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(85)                     
Rule of Law 
(86)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(87)                        
ex USA 
(88)                       
ex Crisis 
(89)                     
Outliers - Size 
(90)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(91)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(92)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(18)                     
Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00247 0.00245 0.00246 0.00246 0.00257 0.00238 0.00245 0.00485*** 0.00535*** 0.00309 0.00362 
 
(0.54) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53) (0.61) (0.50) (0.54) (2.69) (3.04) (0.62) (1.03) 
MV_BV_t1 0.0121 0.0112 0.0112 0.0110 0.0153* 0.0191* 0.0123 0.0192*** 0.00809*** 0.0121 0.00773 
 
(1.62) (1.50) (1.50) (1.47) (1.69) (1.93) (1.59) (6.43) (2.74) (1.61) (1.33) 
FCF_TA 17.36*** 17.25*** 17.30*** 17.24*** 21.73*** 19.87*** 18.00*** 47.03*** 34.18*** 17.37*** 12.36*** 
 
(5.40) (5.34) (5.37) (5.33) (7.54) (5.31) (5.50) (63.52) (41.46) (5.40) (4.93) 
L.Ln_TA 0.000780 -0.0000351 0.000538 0.000421 0.000883 0.00134 0.00292 -0.00396 -0.0104*** 0.000724 0.00213 
 
(0.11) (-0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.38) (-1.44) (-3.81) (0.10) (0.32) 
Leverage 0.174** 0.176** 0.175** 0.175** 0.226*** 0.179** 0.158** 0.0973*** 0.278*** 0.173** 0.192** 
 
(2.50) (2.52) (2.51) (2.49) (2.92) (2.11) (2.19) (3.66) (10.35) (2.49) (2.51) 
DIV_FCF 0.000631 0.000639 0.000619 0.000672 0.000150 0.00115 0.000661 0.000380 0.00140*** 0.000629 0.000102 
 
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.48) (0.13) (0.78) (0.49) (0.73) (2.74) (0.46) (0.13) 
L.Cash_TA 0.0729 0.0735 0.0797 0.0782 0.0815 0.0572 0.0824 0.0438 0.0615* 0.0709 0.151** 
 
(0.83) (0.83) (0.91) (0.88) (0.95) (0.55) (0.91) (1.24) (1.84) (0.80) (2.13) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000894 
 
          
(-0.31) 
 COL2 0.150*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.170*** 0.231*** 0.162*** 0.156*** 0.502*** 0.326*** 0.150*** 0.0925*** 
 
(3.66) (3.87) (3.85) (4.02) (5.72) (3.47) (3.74) (44.71) (26.66) (3.65) (2.88) 
COL2_FCF -2.976*** -2.957*** -2.966*** -2.957*** -3.740*** -3.422*** -3.094*** -8.397*** -5.886*** -2.978*** -2.105*** 
 
(-5.10) (-5.05) (-5.08) (-5.04) (-7.04) (-5.01) (-5.20) (-60.79) (-37.74) (-5.10) (-4.64) 
Size_FCF 
          
-0.0149 
           
(-0.24) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-0.408 
           
(-0.46) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.296 
           
(1.26) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-1.703*** 
           
(-3.09) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-0.476 
           
(-0.72) 
Stock_FCF 
          
-0.00288** 
           
(-2.22) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.00733*** 
           
(3.81) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.0116* -0.0144** -0.00167 -0.0141** -0.0114* -0.0130 -0.0113 -0.00629** -0.00553** -0.0116* -0.00968* 
 
(-1.67) (-2.04) (-0.17) (-2.01) (-1.72) (-1.62) (-1.64) (-2.29) (-2.06) (-1.67) (-1.83) 
Credit_GDP 0.000179* 0.000168 0.000204** 0.000209** 0.000416*** 0.000209* 0.000162 0.000260*** 0.000228*** 0.000179* -0.000337** 
 
(1.84) (1.62) (2.13) (2.12) (3.84) (1.88) (1.62) (6.70) (6.04) (1.84) (-2.16) 
Stock_mkt_GDP -0.0000638 -0.00000334 -0.0000186 0.00000822 -0.0000588 -0.0000649 -0.0000762 -0.000111*** -0.000126*** -0.0000639 0.000127 
 
(-1.00) (-0.07) (-0.42) (0.13) (-0.98) (-0.83) (-1.18) (-4.36) (-5.05) (-1.00) (1.26) 
Anti_Self_Dealing 0.0325 
   
0.0334 0.0414 0.0389 0.0518*** 0.0381*** 0.0326 0.0563 
 
(1.05) 
   
(1.11) (1.13) (1.24) (4.25) (3.14) (1.05) (1.12) 
concentration 
 
-0.0198 
         
  
(-0.78) 
         rule_law 
  
-0.0179* 
        
   
(-1.69) 
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common_legal 
   
-0.00928 
       
    
(-0.74) 
       2.SIC2 0.000520 -0.00596 -0.0119 -0.00919 0.0294 0.00186 0.00350 0.0545* 0.00391 0.000593 0.00597 
 
(0.01) (-0.08) (-0.15) (-0.12) (0.33) (0.02) (0.05) (1.66) (0.13) (0.01) (0.10) 
8.SIC2 0.000894 0.00115 -0.00294 -0.000863 -0.00816 -0.0199 0.00520 0.0326 -0.0183 0.000788 0.00595 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.10) (-0.22) (0.07) (1.00) (-0.61) (0.01) (0.10) 
10.SIC2 0.0202 0.0142 0.0216 0.0186 0.0246 0.0159 0.0197 0.0813*** 0.0107 0.0202 0.0293 
 
(0.30) (0.21) (0.32) (0.27) (0.34) (0.20) (0.29) (2.78) (0.41) (0.30) (0.56) 
12.SIC2 0.0523 0.0491 0.0429 0.0455 0.0398 0.0444 0.0594 0.110*** 0.0123 0.0523 0.0697 
 
(0.58) (0.55) (0.48) (0.51) (0.40) (0.42) (0.66) (2.94) (0.35) (0.58) (1.01) 
13.SIC2 0.0839 0.0792 0.0820 0.0806 0.104 0.0798 0.0914 0.199*** 0.0664*** 0.0839 0.0739 
 
(1.35) (1.27) (1.32) (1.29) (1.48) (1.10) (1.47) (7.45) (2.77) (1.35) (1.55) 
14.SIC2 -0.00112 -0.00551 -0.00282 -0.00438 0.00111 0.00337 0.00242 0.0467 0.000610 -0.00124 0.00685 
 
(-0.01) (-0.07) (-0.03) (-0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (1.37) (0.02) (-0.02) (0.11) 
15.SIC2 -0.0258 -0.0273 -0.0240 -0.0285 -0.0226 -0.0388 -0.0238 0.0564* -0.0148 -0.0258 -0.0227 
 
(-0.38) (-0.40) (-0.35) (-0.42) (-0.32) (-0.49) (-0.35) (1.92) (-0.54) (-0.38) (-0.43) 
16.SIC2 0.00209 -0.00128 -0.00278 -0.00362 0.00407 0.000757 0.00555 0.0446 0.00643 0.00205 0.00923 
 
(0.03) (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.08) (1.54) (0.24) (0.03) (0.18) 
17.SIC2 0.00225 -0.00113 -0.00153 -0.00121 0.0114 0.00227 0.0130 0.0350 0.000490 0.00229 0.0118 
 
(0.03) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.17) (1.11) (0.02) (0.03) (0.21) 
20.SIC2 0.00855 0.00516 0.00425 0.00372 0.0119 0.00626 0.0122 0.0597** 0.00683 0.00843 0.0101 
 
(0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.18) (0.09) (0.20) (2.28) (0.29) (0.14) (0.22) 
22.SIC2 0.00564 0.000944 0.00191 -0.00121 0.0187 0.00701 0.0103 0.0634** 0.00533 0.00551 0.00646 
 
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (-0.02) (0.28) (0.10) (0.17) (2.38) (0.22) (0.09) (0.14) 
23.SIC2 -0.00907 -0.0115 -0.0145 -0.0134 0.00199 -0.00971 -0.00540 0.0236 -0.0219 -0.00914 0.00220 
 
(-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.22) (-0.21) (0.03) (-0.13) (-0.08) (0.85) (-0.88) (-0.14) (0.04) 
24.SIC2 -0.000592 -0.00295 -0.00388 -0.00484 -0.00227 0.000504 0.00284 0.0361 -0.0105 -0.000637 0.00346 
 
(-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (1.27) (-0.41) (-0.01) (0.07) 
25.SIC2 -0.0143 -0.0180 -0.0177 -0.0191 -0.00474 -0.0197 -0.0109 0.0173 -0.0198 -0.0144 -0.0122 
 
(-0.22) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.17) (0.62) (-0.79) (-0.22) (-0.24) 
26.SIC2 0.00322 -0.000412 -0.000965 -0.00342 0.00848 0.000409 0.00699 0.0455* -0.00140 0.00313 0.00767 
 
(0.05) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.06) (0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (1.72) (-0.06) (0.05) (0.16) 
27.SIC2 -0.00302 -0.00679 -0.00690 -0.00763 0.00943 -0.00694 0.000861 0.0617** 0.00206 -0.00311 -0.00212 
 
(-0.05) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.12) (0.14) (-0.10) (0.01) (2.29) (0.09) (-0.05) (-0.04) 
28.SIC2 -0.00595 -0.0104 -0.0101 -0.0113 0.00548 -0.00782 -0.00233 0.0483* -0.00880 -0.00603 0.00313 
 
(-0.10) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.19) (0.09) (-0.11) (-0.04) (1.86) (-0.38) (-0.10) (0.07) 
29.SIC2 0.0202 0.0196 0.0178 0.0190 0.0199 0.00381 0.0163 0.0740** 0.0450* 0.0202 0.0251 
 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.05) (0.23) (2.55) (1.72) (0.30) (0.48) 
30.SIC2 0.0141 0.00999 0.00870 0.00757 0.0279 0.0107 0.0185 0.0707*** 0.0109 0.0140 0.0187 
 
(0.23) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.43) (0.15) (0.30) (2.66) (0.46) (0.23) (0.40) 
31.SIC2 -0.00487 -0.00686 -0.00395 -0.00259 -0.00345 -0.00147 -0.00116 0.0377 -0.0187 -0.00503 -0.00558 
 
(-0.05) (-0.07) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.92) (-0.49) (-0.05) (-0.07) 
32.SIC2 0.00350 0.000116 -0.00323 -0.00315 0.00534 0.000637 0.00663 0.0583** -0.00110 0.00347 0.00799 
 
(0.06) (0.00) (-0.05) (-0.05) (0.08) (0.01) (0.11) (2.22) (-0.05) (0.06) (0.17) 
33.SIC2 -0.000797 -0.00460 -0.00555 -0.00612 0.0142 -0.000830 0.00169 0.0481* 0.00523 -0.000880 0.00438 
 
(-0.01) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.10) (0.22) (-0.01) (0.03) (1.84) (0.23) (-0.01) (0.09) 
34.SIC2 -0.00147 -0.00577 -0.00637 -0.00732 0.00319 -0.0000757 0.00199 0.0391 -0.00744 -0.00156 0.00487 
 
(-0.02) (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.12) (0.05) (-0.00) (0.03) (1.48) (-0.32) (-0.03) (0.10) 
35.SIC2 0.0523 0.0487 0.0488 0.0471 0.0740 0.0592 0.0567 0.0395 -0.00799 0.0528 0.0500 
 
(0.87) (0.80) (0.81) (0.78) (1.13) (0.83) (0.93) (1.50) (-0.34) (0.87) (1.07) 
36.SIC2 -0.0100 -0.0140 -0.0126 -0.0151 0.00448 -0.0120 -0.00658 0.0337 -0.0170 -0.0100 -0.0000772 
 
(-0.17) (-0.24) (-0.21) (-0.25) (0.07) (-0.17) (-0.11) (1.29) (-0.74) (-0.17) (-0.00) 
37.SIC2 0.00459 0.00115 0.000710 -0.000769 0.00698 -0.00113 0.00738 0.0555** -0.000169 0.00453 0.00959 
 
(0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.11) (-0.02) (0.12) (2.13) (-0.01) (0.08) (0.21) 
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38.SIC2 -0.00934 -0.0149 -0.0153 -0.0156 0.0120 -0.0110 -0.00232 0.0262 -0.0196 -0.00936 0.00235 
 
(-0.15) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.25) (0.17) (-0.15) (-0.04) (0.95) (-0.80) (-0.15) (0.05) 
39.SIC2 -0.0283 -0.0324 -0.0333 -0.0332 -0.0137 -0.0362 -0.0241 0.0117 -0.0489* -0.0283 -0.0153 
 
(-0.43) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.18) (-0.47) (-0.37) (0.41) (-1.92) (-0.43) (-0.30) 
40.SIC2 0.0520 0.0554 0.0383 0.0482 0.0609 -0.00942 0.0501 0.0811** 0.0150 0.0520 0.0610 
 
(0.53) (0.55) (0.38) (0.48) (0.63) (-0.08) (0.51) (1.99) (0.38) (0.52) (0.80) 
41.SIC2 0.0165 0.0143 0.0120 0.0108 0.0223 0.0199 0.0211 0.0631** -0.00447 0.0162 0.0218 
 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.30) (0.24) (0.29) (2.07) (-0.16) (0.23) (0.40) 
42.SIC2 0.0435 0.0393 0.0399 0.0386 0.0160 0.0447 0.0514 0.110*** 0.0327 0.0433 0.0433 
 
(0.70) (0.63) (0.64) (0.62) (0.24) (0.61) (0.82) (4.07) (1.36) (0.70) (0.91) 
44.SIC2 0.0205 0.0158 0.0161 0.0147 0.0188 0.0104 0.0254 0.0812*** -0.00496 0.0206 0.0377 
 
(0.33) (0.25) (0.26) (0.23) (0.28) (0.14) (0.41) (3.00) (-0.21) (0.33) (0.79) 
45.SIC2 0.0174 0.0171 0.0173 0.0157 0.0121 0.0110 0.0182 0.0937*** 0.0187 0.0176 0.0285 
 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.17) (0.14) (0.27) (3.23) (0.72) (0.26) (0.55) 
47.SIC2 0.0610 0.0575 0.0582 0.0569 0.00511 0.0468 0.0183 0.124*** -0.00279 0.0609 0.0670 
 
(0.89) (0.83) (0.84) (0.82) (0.07) (0.58) (0.26) (4.22) (-0.10) (0.88) (1.27) 
48.SIC2 -0.0111 -0.0180 -0.0161 -0.0170 -0.00426 -0.0110 -0.00350 0.0576** -0.0203 -0.0111 -0.00315 
 
(-0.18) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.06) (-0.15) (-0.06) (2.16) (-0.86) (-0.18) (-0.07) 
49.SIC2 -0.0130 -0.0177 -0.0174 -0.0173 -0.0164 -0.0219 -0.00939 0.0393 -0.0272 -0.0130 -0.00926 
 
(-0.21) (-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.25) (-0.31) (-0.15) (1.48) (-1.15) (-0.21) (-0.20) 
50.SIC2 -0.0163 -0.0206 -0.0202 -0.0222 -0.0108 -0.0179 -0.0139 0.0288 -0.0216 -0.0163 -0.00327 
 
(-0.27) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.37) (-0.17) (-0.26) (-0.23) (1.10) (-0.93) (-0.27) (-0.07) 
51.SIC2 0.00330 0.00123 0.000251 -0.000273 0.0169 -0.000600 0.00670 0.0498* 0.00777 0.00323 0.00785 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.00) (-0.00) (0.26) (-0.01) (0.11) (1.86) (0.33) (0.05) (0.17) 
52.SIC2 -0.196 -0.194 -0.196 -0.207 -0.0769 -0.420 -0.204 -0.177 -0.413*** -0.195 -0.0667 
 
(-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.23) (-0.82) (-0.55) (-1.23) (-2.91) (-0.51) (-0.30) 
53.SIC2 -0.00190 -0.00406 -0.00754 -0.00647 0.0179 0.00110 -0.000295 0.0609** 0.0166 -0.00189 -0.00640 
 
(-0.03) (-0.06) (-0.11) (-0.09) (0.23) (0.01) (-0.00) (2.07) (0.62) (-0.03) (-0.12) 
54.SIC2 0.0252 0.0205 0.0199 0.0189 0.0370 0.0255 0.0292 0.0748*** 0.0443* 0.0252 0.0231 
 
(0.39) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.53) (0.33) (0.45) (2.66) (1.76) (0.39) (0.46) 
55.SIC2 0.00882 0.00211 0.00477 -0.00125 0.00535 -0.00225 0.0124 0.0586* 0.0159 0.00871 0.0172 
 
(0.12) (0.03) (0.06) (-0.02) (0.07) (-0.03) (0.17) (1.86) (0.55) (0.12) (0.30) 
56.SIC2 -0.00181 -0.00643 -0.00600 -0.00823 -0.0119 -0.00570 0.00217 0.0429 -0.0106 -0.00183 0.00736 
 
(-0.03) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.08) (0.03) (1.56) (-0.43) (-0.03) (0.15) 
57.SIC2 -0.0269 -0.0313 -0.0297 -0.0306 -0.0421 -0.0256 -0.0231 0.0191 -0.0584** -0.0268 0.00283 
 
(-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.47) (-0.29) (-0.31) (0.60) (-2.01) (-0.36) (0.05) 
58.SIC2 0.0113 0.00610 0.00463 0.00526 0.0166 0.00510 0.0181 0.0779*** -0.0116 0.0112 0.0127 
 
(0.17) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.21) (0.06) (0.27) (2.70) (-0.45) (0.17) (0.25) 
59.SIC2 0.00169 -0.00144 -0.000843 -0.00169 0.00228 -0.00151 0.00542 0.0701** 0.00688 0.00161 -0.00229 
 
(0.03) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.02) (0.08) (2.52) (0.28) (0.03) (-0.05) 
70.SIC2 0.00601 0.00726 0.00620 0.00788 0.00350 -0.00243 0.0109 0.0602** -0.00735 0.00590 0.00572 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.05) (-0.03) (0.17) (2.14) (-0.29) (0.09) (0.11) 
72.SIC2 -0.0251 -0.0297 -0.0296 -0.0297 0.0300 -0.0270 -0.0183 0.0427 -0.0392 -0.0251 -0.0161 
 
(-0.30) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.36) (0.24) (-0.28) (-0.22) (1.24) (-1.23) (-0.30) (-0.25) 
73.SIC2 -0.0249 -0.0304 -0.0288 -0.0309 -0.0361 -0.0302 -0.0207 0.0222 -0.0500** -0.0249 -0.0102 
 
(-0.41) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.42) (-0.34) (0.83) (-2.12) (-0.41) (-0.22) 
75.SIC2 0.0334 0.0280 0.0322 0.0308 0.0277 0.0303 0.0385 0.107*** 0.0205 0.0333 0.0371 
 
(0.43) (0.36) (0.41) (0.39) (0.33) (0.33) (0.49) (3.24) (0.68) (0.43) (0.62) 
76.SIC2 -0.00245 -0.00861 -0.00297 -0.00600 0.00181 -0.00172 0.000446 0.0474 0.0118 -0.00230 0.00100 
 
(-0.02) (-0.09) (-0.03) (-0.06) (0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) (1.15) (0.31) (-0.02) (0.01) 
78.SIC2 -0.0216 -0.0284 -0.0226 -0.0272 -0.0339 -0.0310 -0.0387 0.0331 -0.108*** -0.0219 -0.00895 
 
(-0.27) (-0.36) (-0.28) (-0.34) (-0.42) (-0.33) (-0.47) (0.98) (-3.52) (-0.27) (-0.14) 
79.SIC2 0.00553 0.00139 0.00283 0.000615 -0.00357 0.00589 0.0124 0.0503* -0.0221 0.00546 0.00465 
 
(0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (-0.05) (0.08) (0.19) (1.77) (-0.86) (0.08) (0.09) 
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80.SIC2 -0.0159 -0.0190 -0.0186 -0.0192 -0.000502 -0.0172 -0.0103 0.0224 -0.0303 -0.0159 -0.00234 
 
(-0.23) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.01) (-0.21) (-0.15) (0.76) (-1.13) (-0.23) (-0.04) 
82.SIC2 0.00185 -0.00280 -0.00350 -0.00383 0.0186 -0.00482 0.00710 0.0529 0.00143 0.00176 -0.00178 
 
(0.02) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.05) (0.21) (-0.05) (0.09) (1.54) (0.04) (0.02) (-0.03) 
87.SIC2 -0.0185 -0.0210 -0.0212 -0.0227 -0.00198 -0.0301 -0.0155 0.0426 -0.0194 -0.0184 -0.0130 
 
(-0.29) (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.03) (-0.40) (-0.24) (1.52) (-0.78) (-0.29) (-0.26) 
96.SIC2 -0.0344 -0.0394 -0.0423 -0.0423 -0.0352 -0.0252 -0.0333 -0.000470 -0.0546 -0.0341 -0.0200 
 
(-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.28) (-0.17) (-0.26) (-0.01) (-1.09) (-0.26) (-0.20) 
2003.year -0.00893 -0.0109 -0.00890 -0.0103 -0.0134 -0.00775 -0.00695 -0.0130** -0.0240*** -0.00902 -0.00866 
 
(-0.62) (-0.76) (-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.85) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-2.27) (-4.29) (-0.62) (-0.80) 
2004.year -0.00477 -0.00683 -0.00518 -0.00632 -0.00736 -0.00556 -0.00298 -0.0145*** -0.0159** -0.00484 -0.00358 
 
(-0.34) (-0.49) (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.37) (-0.21) (-2.60) (-2.92) (-0.34) (-0.34) 
2005.year 0.0342* 0.0234 0.0247* 0.0237 0.0229 0.0213 0.0267* -0.00379 -0.00939* 0.0251* 0.0207* 
 
(1.71) (1.59) (1.69) (1.60) (1.44) (1.36) (1.79) (-0.68) (-1.72) (1.71) (1.89) 
2006.year 0.0101 0.00722 0.00841 0.00717 0.00976 0.00878 0.0118 0.00280 0.00776 0.00997 0.0110 
 
(0.71) (0.51) (0.60) (0.50) (0.63) (0.58) (0.81) (0.49) (1.40) (0.70) (1.02) 
2007.year 0.00483 0.00147 0.00269 0.00125 0.00542 0.00357 0.00656 -0.000648 0.00427 0.00475 0.00259 
 
(0.34) (0.10) (0.19) (0.09) (0.35) (0.23) (0.45) (-0.11) (0.77) (0.33) (0.24) 
2008.year 0.000151 0.000141 0.000583 0.000733 -0.00225 -0.0256* 0.00110 -0.00169 -0.00924* 0.0000832 -0.00128 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (-0.15) (-1.70) (0.08) (-0.31) (-1.75) (0.01) (-0.12) 
2009.year -0.0269* -0.0281** -0.0275* -0.0281** -0.0386*** 
 
-0.0257* -0.0239*** -0.0461*** -0.0270* -0.0303*** 
 
(-1.91) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-1.99) (-2.60) 
 
(-1.80) (-4.40) (-8.61) (-1.91) (-2.85) 
2010.year -0.0111 -0.0126 -0.0118 -0.0128 -0.0159 -0.0101 -0.0105 -0.0160*** -0.0175*** -0.0111 -0.0137 
 
(-0.84) (-0.96) (-0.90) (-0.97) (-1.12) (-0.74) (-0.79) (-3.06) (-3.42) (-0.84) (-1.36) 
_cons -0.795*** -0.786*** -0.900*** -0.859*** -1.293*** -0.866*** -0.848*** -2.796*** -1.797*** -0.794*** -0.479** 
 
(-3.22) (-3.18) (-3.62) (-3.41) (-5.04) (-3.06) (-3.36) (-39.20) (-23.82) (-3.21) (-2.49) 
number of observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 13059 
            
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of observations is lower for models applying GLOBE 
cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, 
Peru, and the United Kingdom. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 263. 
 
Table A.9. Regression results – Uncertainty Avoidance dimension (GLOBE)  
 (10)                   
Base model 
(93) 
 Ownership 
Concentration 
(94)                     
Rule of Law 
(95)         
Common Legal 
Origin 
(96)                        
ex USA 
(97)                       
ex Crisis 
(98)                     
Outliers - Size 
(99)                     
Outliers - Cash 
Flow 
(100)                     
Outliers - 
CAPEX 
(101)                     
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(19)                     
Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00136 0.00139 0.00140 0.00133 0.00169 0.00132 0.00133 0.00413 0.00559** 0.00161 0.00309 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.27) (0.18) (0.20) (1.34) (2.01) (0.22) (0.69) 
MV_BV_t1 0.00722 0.00691 0.00651 0.00812 0.00853 0.00952 0.00732 0.00345 -0.0151*** 0.00722 0.00424 
 
(0.66) (0.62) (0.59) (0.74) (0.62) (0.64) (0.65) (0.68) (-3.31) (0.66) (0.58) 
FCF_TA -0.576 -0.471 -0.522 -0.674 1.948 -1.414 -0.546 -12.14*** -0.967 -0.574 -0.375 
 
(-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.28) (0.88) (-0.44) (-0.22) (-12.43) (-1.02) (-0.23) (-0.22) 
L.Ln_TA 0.00262 0.00470 0.00457 0.00377 0.00261 0.00236 0.00407 -0.00984** -0.0179*** 0.00259 -0.00444 
 
(0.26) (0.46) (0.45) (0.38) (0.21) (0.19) (0.37) (-2.16) (-4.28) (0.25) (-0.53) 
Leverage 0.195* 0.189* 0.189* 0.198** 0.289*** 0.236* 0.187* 0.380*** 0.533*** 0.195* 0.237** 
 
(1.93) (1.86) (1.86) (1.97) (2.58) (1.85) (1.81) (8.51) (13.09) (1.93) (2.50) 
DIV_FCF 0.000161 0.000173 0.000178 0.000149 0.0000270 0.000555 0.000261 0.000612 0.00145* 0.000158 0.0000565 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02) (0.25) (0.13) (0.68) (1.80) (0.08) (0.06) 
L.Cash_TA 0.127 0.134 0.136 0.128 0.0970 0.128 0.134 0.198*** 0.131** 0.126 0.213** 
 
(0.99) (1.04) (1.06) (1.01) (0.77) (0.81) (1.02) (3.36) (2.52) (0.98) (2.45) 
CF_Vol 
         
-0.000349 
 
          
(-0.08) 
 UAIN -0.00166 -0.00346 -0.0120 -0.0115 0.0325 -0.00905 -0.00194 -0.220*** -0.0260 -0.00157 0.0124 
 
(-0.03) (-0.07) (-0.23) (-0.24) (0.72) (-0.15) (-0.04) (-11.06) (-1.35) (-0.03) (0.47) 
UAIN_FCF 0.358 0.332 0.344 0.383 -0.111 0.593 0.358 3.300*** 0.933*** 0.357 0.278 
 
(0.63) (0.58) (0.60) (0.67) (-0.22) (0.80) (0.63) (14.54) (4.26) (0.63) (0.94) 
Size_FCF 
          
0.0670 
           
(0.86) 
Leverage_FCF 
          
-0.850 
           
(-0.77) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
          
0.292 
           
(0.98) 
Cash_FCF 
          
-2.372*** 
           
(-3.55) 
Anti_FCF 
          
-1.790** 
           
(-2.50) 
Stock_FCF 
          
0.000236 
           
(0.18) 
Credit_FCF 
          
0.00755*** 
           
(3.01) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.00431 -0.00518 -0.00223 -0.00779 -0.000626 -0.00382 -0.00447 -0.00738 0.0107* -0.00428 0.00471 
 
(-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.14) (-0.53) (-0.04) (-0.22) (-0.30) (-1.08) (1.72) (-0.29) (0.47) 
Credit_GDP 0.000130 0.0000877 0.000126 0.000148 0.000317** 0.000162 0.000117 0.0000905 0.000112* 0.000130 -0.000384* 
 
(0.93) (0.58) (0.90) (1.06) (2.14) (0.99) (0.82) (1.40) (1.92) (0.93) (-1.92) 
Stock_mkt_GDP 0.0000375 0.0000102 0.00000478 0.0000537 -0.0000101 0.0000686 0.0000335 0.0000853** 0.0000335 0.0000376 0.00000625 
 
(0.46) (0.15) (0.07) (0.72) (-0.12) (0.66) (0.41) (2.26) (0.99) (0.47) (0.06) 
Anti_Self_Dealing -0.0331 
   
-0.00398 -0.0425 -0.0305 -0.0627*** -0.0759*** -0.0332 0.0775 
 
(-0.83) 
   
(-0.09) (-0.87) (-0.76) (-3.43) (-4.54) (-0.83) (1.40) 
concentration 
 
-0.0182 
         
  
(-0.49) 
         rule_law 
  
-0.00984 
        
   
(-0.58) 
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common_legal 
   
-0.0217 
       
    
(-1.62) 
       2.SIC2 -0.0364 -0.0253 -0.0276 -0.0372 -0.0216 -0.0535 -0.0357 -0.112** -0.0884* -0.0364 -0.0234 
 
(-0.32) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.33) (-0.17) (-0.39) (-0.32) (-2.03) (-1.90) (-0.32) (-0.31) 
8.SIC2 -0.00522 0.00248 -0.0000186 -0.00822 -0.0313 -0.0374 -0.00343 -0.0573 -0.0565 -0.00527 -0.00647 
 
(-0.05) (0.02) (-0.00) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.03) (-1.04) (-1.20) (-0.05) (-0.09) 
10.SIC2 0.000145 0.00194 0.00507 0.000326 -0.0111 -0.0197 -0.00447 -0.108** -0.0702* 0.000150 0.0188 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (-0.11) (-0.17) (-0.05) (-2.20) (-1.73) (0.00) (0.29) 
12.SIC2 0.0117 0.0217 0.0154 0.00778 -0.0244 -0.0145 0.0136 -0.171*** -0.142*** 0.0117 0.0433 
 
(0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.06) (-0.17) (-0.09) (0.10) (-2.71) (-2.62) (0.09) (0.50) 
13.SIC2 0.0270 0.0310 0.0324 0.0275 -0.00682 0.00939 0.0299 -0.0716 -0.129*** 0.0270 0.0361 
 
(0.31) (0.35) (0.37) (0.31) (-0.07) (0.09) (0.34) (-1.62) (-3.55) (0.31) (0.61) 
14.SIC2 -0.0189 -0.0131 -0.0109 -0.0238 -0.0464 -0.0259 -0.0175 -0.104* -0.0614 -0.0190 -0.00472 
 
(-0.16) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.20) (-0.37) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-1.81) (-1.26) (-0.16) (-0.06) 
15.SIC2 -0.0485 -0.0420 -0.0384 -0.0546 -0.0716 -0.0883 -0.0483 -0.0804 -0.0823* -0.0485 -0.0367 
 
(-0.49) (-0.43) (-0.39) (-0.56) (-0.71) (-0.74) (-0.49) (-1.63) (-1.93) (-0.49) (-0.56) 
16.SIC2 -0.0204 -0.0113 -0.0122 -0.0252 -0.0323 -0.0347 -0.0187 -0.100** -0.0612 -0.0204 -0.00722 
 
(-0.21) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.26) (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.19) (-2.05) (-1.47) (-0.21) (-0.11) 
17.SIC2 -0.0137 -0.00640 -0.00731 -0.0126 -0.0250 -0.0262 -0.00492 -0.104** -0.0406 -0.0136 -0.00551 
 
(-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.05) (-1.96) (-0.92) (-0.13) (-0.08) 
20.SIC2 -0.0172 -0.00765 -0.00781 -0.0205 -0.0357 -0.0298 -0.0160 -0.112** -0.0782** -0.0172 -0.00579 
 
(-0.20) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.24) (-0.38) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-2.53) (-2.17) (-0.20) (-0.10) 
22.SIC2 -0.0218 -0.0109 -0.00947 -0.0251 -0.0335 -0.0296 -0.0199 -0.0824* -0.0793** -0.0219 -0.0134 
 
(-0.25) (-0.12) (-0.11) (-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.22) (-1.83) (-2.15) (-0.25) (-0.23) 
23.SIC2 -0.0203 -0.0119 -0.0145 -0.0214 -0.0242 -0.0295 -0.0188 -0.0968** -0.0731* -0.0203 -0.00965 
 
(-0.22) (-0.13) (-0.16) (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.26) (-0.20) (-2.07) (-1.89) (-0.22) (-0.15) 
24.SIC2 -0.0175 -0.0119 -0.0133 -0.0195 -0.0265 -0.0301 -0.0163 -0.0862* -0.0704* -0.0176 -0.0118 
 
(-0.18) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.21) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.17) (-1.81) (-1.78) (-0.18) (-0.19) 
25.SIC2 -0.0314 -0.0246 -0.0251 -0.0333 -0.0313 -0.0410 -0.0299 -0.124*** -0.0764* -0.0314 -0.0263 
 
(-0.33) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.36) (-0.30) (-0.36) (-0.32) (-2.62) (-1.95) (-0.33) (-0.42) 
26.SIC2 -0.0152 -0.00552 -0.00590 -0.0210 -0.0321 -0.0285 -0.0136 -0.0925** -0.0687* -0.0152 -0.00737 
 
(-0.17) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.24) (-0.34) (-0.27) (-0.16) (-2.08) (-1.89) (-0.17) (-0.13) 
27.SIC2 -0.0308 -0.0232 -0.0236 -0.0351 -0.0368 -0.0450 -0.0298 -0.115** -0.0874** -0.0309 -0.0193 
 
(-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.42) (-0.33) (-2.54) (-2.35) (-0.34) (-0.32) 
28.SIC2 -0.0282 -0.0185 -0.0186 -0.0326 -0.0409 -0.0429 -0.0272 -0.119*** -0.0892** -0.0282 -0.00998 
 
(-0.33) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.32) (-2.72) (-2.50) (-0.33) (-0.17) 
29.SIC2 -0.00374 -0.00306 -0.00280 -0.00680 -0.0291 -0.0247 -0.00918 -0.0655 -0.00621 -0.00373 0.0141 
 
(-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.07) (-0.25) (-0.21) (-0.09) (-1.34) (-0.15) (-0.04) (0.21) 
30.SIC2 -0.0122 -0.00245 -0.00321 -0.0174 -0.0229 -0.0308 -0.0106 -0.113** -0.0784** -0.0122 -0.000454 
 
(-0.14) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.20) (-0.24) (-0.29) (-0.12) (-2.54) (-2.15) (-0.14) (-0.01) 
31.SIC2 -0.0229 -0.0213 -0.0179 -0.0179 -0.0506 -0.0353 -0.0217 -0.0863 -0.0985* -0.0230 -0.0208 
 
(-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.36) (-0.20) (-0.15) (-1.26) (-1.65) (-0.16) (-0.22) 
32.SIC2 -0.0228 -0.0126 -0.0144 -0.0276 -0.0444 -0.0379 -0.0221 -0.116*** -0.0907** -0.0228 -0.0103 
 
(-0.26) (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.32) (-0.48) (-0.36) (-0.25) (-2.61) (-2.50) (-0.26) (-0.18) 
33.SIC2 -0.0224 -0.0138 -0.0143 -0.0274 -0.0327 -0.0304 -0.0218 -0.0979** -0.0585 -0.0224 -0.00936 
 
(-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.17) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.25) (-2.23) (-1.63) (-0.26) (-0.16) 
34.SIC2 -0.0199 -0.0106 -0.0109 -0.0253 -0.0353 -0.0304 -0.0186 -0.106** -0.0739** -0.0199 -0.00876 
 
(-0.23) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.37) (-0.29) (-0.21) (-2.39) (-2.03) (-0.23) (-0.15) 
35.SIC2 0.0583 0.0678 0.0678 0.0544 0.0599 0.0619 0.0605 -0.115*** -0.0738** 0.0585 0.0476 
 
(0.66) (0.78) (0.78) (0.62) (0.63) (0.58) (0.69) (-2.60) (-2.05) (0.67) (0.81) 
36.SIC2 -0.0318 -0.0234 -0.0228 -0.0348 -0.0351 -0.0453 -0.0303 -0.123*** -0.0891** -0.0317 -0.0153 
 
(-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.35) (-2.80) (-2.50) (-0.37) (-0.27) 
37.SIC2 -0.0139 -0.00536 -0.00513 -0.0204 -0.0373 -0.0306 -0.0126 -0.103** -0.0712** -0.0139 -0.00225 
 
(-0.16) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.24) (-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.15) (-2.35) (-2.00) (-0.16) (-0.04) 
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38.SIC2 -0.0302 -0.0197 -0.0203 -0.0316 -0.0319 -0.0472 -0.0263 -0.131*** -0.0915** -0.0302 -0.0169 
 
(-0.33) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.35) (-0.31) (-0.43) (-0.29) (-2.83) (-2.40) (-0.33) (-0.28) 
39.SIC2 -0.0488 -0.0394 -0.0399 -0.0490 -0.0556 -0.0691 -0.0478 -0.170*** -0.138*** -0.0488 -0.0321 
 
(-0.51) (-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.60) (-0.50) (-3.53) (-3.47) (-0.51) (-0.50) 
40.SIC2 0.0430 0.0514 0.0431 0.0314 0.0316 -0.0274 0.0413 -0.0169 -0.0276 0.0431 0.0613 
 
(0.30) (0.36) (0.30) (0.22) (0.23) (-0.16) (0.29) (-0.25) (-0.45) (0.30) (0.64) 
41.SIC2 0.0181 0.0288 0.0258 0.00861 -0.00161 0.00872 0.0205 -0.0779 -0.0543 0.0180 0.0181 
 
(0.18) (0.28) (0.25) (0.08) (-0.02) (0.07) (0.20) (-1.52) (-1.26) (0.17) (0.26) 
42.SIC2 0.0161 0.0254 0.0258 0.0120 -0.0333 0.00366 0.0197 -0.0699 -0.0690* 0.0160 0.0222 
 
(0.18) (0.29) (0.29) (0.13) (-0.34) (0.03) (0.22) (-1.55) (-1.86) (0.18) (0.37) 
44.SIC2 -0.00381 0.00474 0.00441 -0.00733 -0.0308 -0.0319 -0.00259 -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.00380 0.0183 
 
(-0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (-0.08) (-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.03) (-2.61) (-3.17) (-0.04) (0.30) 
45.SIC2 -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0115 -0.0179 -0.0474 -0.0373 -0.0145 -0.113** -0.0808** -0.0128 0.0127 
 
(-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.45) (-0.31) (-0.15) (-2.31) (-1.99) (-0.13) (0.19) 
47.SIC2 0.0376 0.0441 0.0443 0.0323 -0.0441 0.0112 -0.00593 -0.0690 -0.105** 0.0376 0.0517 
 
(0.38) (0.44) (0.45) (0.33) (-0.41) (0.09) (-0.06) (-1.40) (-2.51) (0.38) (0.78) 
48.SIC2 -0.0397 -0.0340 -0.0325 -0.0421 -0.0560 -0.0556 -0.0365 -0.152*** -0.135*** -0.0397 -0.0268 
 
(-0.45) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.48) (-0.59) (-0.52) (-0.41) (-3.38) (-3.66) (-0.45) (-0.45) 
49.SIC2 -0.0313 -0.0245 -0.0239 -0.0351 -0.0661 -0.0543 -0.0308 -0.132*** -0.118*** -0.0313 -0.0194 
 
(-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.40) (-0.70) (-0.51) (-0.35) (-2.96) (-3.23) (-0.35) (-0.33) 
50.SIC2 -0.0351 -0.0264 -0.0262 -0.0397 -0.0497 -0.0456 -0.0345 -0.131*** -0.0846** -0.0351 -0.0179 
 
(-0.40) (-0.31) (-0.30) (-0.46) (-0.53) (-0.44) (-0.40) (-2.96) (-2.35) (-0.40) (-0.31) 
51.SIC2 -0.0165 -0.00794 -0.00855 -0.0211 -0.0251 -0.0289 -0.0150 -0.0923** -0.0506 -0.0165 -0.00586 
 
(-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.10) (-0.24) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.17) (-2.06) (-1.38) (-0.19) (-0.10) 
52.SIC2 -0.0484 -0.0491 -0.0543 -0.0442 -0.0208 -0.183 -0.0726 -0.137 -0.347 -0.0477 -0.0582 
 
(-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.04) (-0.23) (-0.13) (-0.55) (-1.56) (-0.09) (-0.21) 
53.SIC2 -0.0285 -0.0229 -0.0245 -0.0343 -0.0369 -0.0357 -0.0287 -0.0803 -0.0506 -0.0285 -0.0203 
 
(-0.29) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-1.62) (-1.22) (-0.29) (-0.30) 
54.SIC2 -0.00952 -0.000107 -0.000281 -0.0166 -0.0209 -0.0241 -0.00792 -0.0994** -0.0431 -0.00954 0.00112 
 
(-0.10) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.08) (-2.10) (-1.11) (-0.10) (0.02) 
55.SIC2 -0.0189 -0.00976 -0.00905 -0.0259 -0.0322 -0.0324 -0.0180 -0.119** -0.0686 -0.0189 -0.00124 
 
(-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-2.24) (-1.53) (-0.18) (-0.02) 
56.SIC2 -0.0278 -0.0182 -0.0187 -0.0303 -0.0476 -0.0431 -0.0272 -0.126*** -0.104*** -0.0278 -0.0127 
 
(-0.30) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.33) (-0.46) (-0.39) (-0.30) (-2.72) (-2.73) (-0.30) (-0.21) 
57.SIC2 -0.0457 -0.0389 -0.0379 -0.0469 -0.0885 -0.0598 -0.0450 -0.169*** -0.142*** -0.0457 -0.00793 
 
(-0.42) (-0.36) (-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.68) (-0.45) (-0.41) (-3.13) (-3.14) (-0.42) (-0.11) 
58.SIC2 -0.0215 -0.0102 -0.0112 -0.0215 -0.0319 -0.0443 -0.0193 -0.136*** -0.145*** -0.0215 -0.0131 
 
(-0.22) (-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.29) (-0.38) (-0.20) (-2.80) (-3.62) (-0.22) (-0.20) 
59.SIC2 -0.0290 -0.0225 -0.0218 -0.0330 -0.0457 -0.0454 -0.0283 -0.112** -0.0931** -0.0290 -0.0223 
 
(-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.36) (-0.46) (-0.41) (-0.31) (-2.39) (-2.42) (-0.31) (-0.36) 
70.SIC2 -0.0200 -0.0144 -0.0143 -0.0202 -0.0505 -0.0461 -0.0184 -0.135*** -0.118*** -0.0200 -0.0122 
 
(-0.21) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.50) (-0.40) (-0.19) (-2.84) (-2.99) (-0.21) (-0.19) 
72.SIC2 -0.0540 -0.0454 -0.0459 -0.0550 -0.0281 -0.0731 -0.0515 -0.165*** -0.162*** -0.0540 -0.0378 
 
(-0.45) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.16) (-0.51) (-0.43) (-2.85) (-3.26) (-0.45) (-0.47) 
73.SIC2 -0.0443 -0.0353 -0.0349 -0.0467 -0.0755 -0.0633 -0.0425 -0.157*** -0.136*** -0.0442 -0.0233 
 
(-0.50) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.53) (-0.77) (-0.59) (-0.48) (-3.51) (-3.72) (-0.50) (-0.40) 
75.SIC2 0.0104 0.0173 0.0189 0.00853 -0.0159 0.00158 0.0116 -0.0853 -0.0814* 0.0104 0.0250 
 
(0.09) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08) (-0.13) (0.01) (0.10) (-1.54) (-1.74) (0.09) (0.33) 
76.SIC2 -0.0306 -0.0271 -0.0234 -0.0346 -0.0349 -0.0413 -0.0289 -0.118* -0.0486 -0.0305 -0.0240 
 
(-0.21) (-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-0.24) (-0.20) (-1.70) (-0.81) (-0.21) (-0.25) 
78.SIC2 -0.00612 0.00375 0.00655 -0.00825 -0.0611 -0.0328 -0.00868 -0.101* -0.193*** -0.00622 0.000183 
 
(-0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (-0.07) (-0.52) (-0.23) (-0.07) (-1.77) (-4.07) (-0.05) (0.00) 
79.SIC2 -0.0200 -0.0117 -0.0119 -0.0203 -0.0523 -0.0393 -0.0176 -0.123*** -0.139*** -0.0201 -0.0116 
 
(-0.21) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.21) (-0.49) (-0.34) (-0.18) (-2.58) (-3.51) (-0.21) (-0.18) 
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80.SIC2 -0.0365 -0.0283 -0.0289 -0.0349 -0.0273 -0.0571 -0.0290 -0.164*** -0.114*** -0.0366 -0.0162 
 
(-0.36) (-0.28) (-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.21) (-0.47) (-0.29) (-3.30) (-2.74) (-0.36) (-0.24) 
82.SIC2 -0.0235 -0.0120 -0.0120 -0.0278 -0.0355 -0.0393 -0.0209 -0.109* -0.0734 -0.0235 -0.0175 
 
(-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.18) (-1.88) (-1.47) (-0.20) (-0.22) 
87.SIC2 -0.0366 -0.0285 -0.0287 -0.0399 -0.0470 -0.0545 -0.0355 -0.108** -0.0734* -0.0366 -0.0250 
 
(-0.39) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.43) (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.38) (-2.28) (-1.89) (-0.39) (-0.40) 
96.SIC2 -0.0549 -0.0451 -0.0454 -0.0639 -0.0704 -0.0652 -0.0551 -0.166* -0.129* -0.0548 -0.0311 
 
(-0.29) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.34) (-0.39) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-1.87) (-1.66) (-0.29) (-0.25) 
2003.year -0.00510 -0.00346 -0.00322 -0.00495 -0.00673 -0.00609 -0.00406 -0.0250*** -0.0338*** -0.00515 -0.00794 
 
(-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-0.30) (-0.26) (-0.19) (-2.59) (-3.88) (-0.24) (-0.58) 
2004.year 0.000222 0.00186 0.00216 0.0000239 -0.000893 -0.00106 0.00155 -0.0132 -0.0146* 0.000179 -0.00214 
 
(0.01) (0.09) (0.11) (0.00) (-0.04) (-0.05) (0.08) (-1.40) (-1.72) (0.01) (-0.16) 
2005.year 0.0386 0.0406* 0.0409* 0.0380* 0.0374 0.0333 0.0397* -0.00797 -0.0157* 0.0386* 0.0261* 
 
(1.82) (1.93) (1.94) (1.81) (1.61) (1.43) (1.85) (-0.84) (-1.84) (1.82) (1.89) 
2006.year 0.0107 0.0130 0.0132 0.0100 0.0107 0.00922 0.0112 -0.00520 0.0118 0.0107 0.0102 
 
(0.52) (0.63) (0.64) (0.49) (0.47) (0.40) (0.53) (-0.54) (1.36) (0.51) (0.75) 
2007.year 0.00152 0.00394 0.00432 0.000552 0.00611 -0.00121 0.00254 -0.00994 -0.00278 0.00147 -0.000250 
 
(0.07) (0.19) (0.21) (0.03) (0.27) (-0.05) (0.12) (-1.03) (-0.32) (0.07) (-0.02) 
2008.year 0.00127 0.00169 0.00200 0.00118 -0.00324 
 
0.000946 -0.0150* -0.0199** 0.00123 -0.000204 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (-0.15) 
 
(0.05) (-1.64) (-2.43) (0.06) (-0.02) 
2009.year -0.0293 -0.0283 -0.0284 -0.0297 -0.0399* -0.0334 -0.0304 -0.0663*** -0.0866*** -0.0294 -0.0323** 
 
(-1.43) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-1.45) (-1.83) (-1.46) (-1.46) (-7.25) (-10.54) (-1.43) (-2.39) 
2010.year -0.0118 -0.0108 -0.0105 -0.0121 -0.0141 -0.0128 -0.0121 -0.0236*** -0.0261*** -0.0118 -0.0143 
 
(-0.62) (-0.56) (-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.69) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-2.67) (-3.29) (-0.62) (-1.13) 
_cons 0.000116 -0.0102 -0.000346 0.0598 -0.237 0.0235 -0.00822 1.084*** 0.0416 -0.000209 -0.120 
 
(0.00) (-0.03) (-0.00) (0.18) (-0.79) (0.06) (-0.03) (7.74) (0.32) (-0.00) (-0.58) 
number of observations 13059 13059 13059 13059 9639 10157 12816 12788 12802 13059 13059 
            
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital 
expenditure divided by total assets as dependent variable. The number of observations is lower for models applying GLOBE 
cultural dimensions than those applying Hofstede dimensions, as GLOBE scores were not available for Belgium, Chile, Norway, 
Peru, and the United Kingdom. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.10. Regression results – All Hofstede dimensions simultaneously included  
 
(5)                           
All Hofstede Basic 
(20)                       
All Hofstede Interaction 
L.CAPEXF_TA 0.00466** 0.00462** 
 
(2.44) (2.33) 
MV_BV_t1 0.0112*** 0.0110*** 
 
(3.63) (3.38) 
FCF_TA -2.197*** -2.762*** 
 
(-2.95) (-3.09) 
L.Ln_TA -0.000654 -0.00587* 
 
(-0.23) (-1.68) 
Leverage 0.149*** 0.141*** 
 
(5.38) (3.46) 
DIV_FCF 0.0000723 0.0000525 
 
(0.23) (0.18) 
L.Cash_TA 0.0782** 0.0891** 
 
(2.34) (2.39) 
MAS -0.00224*** -0.00161*** 
 
(-6.29) (-4.65) 
UAI -0.000259 -0.000338 
 
(-1.06) (-1.12) 
PDI 0.000250 -0.000116 
 
(0.60) (-0.29) 
IDV 0.000337 0.000533 
 
(0.86) (1.39) 
LTO -0.000490 -0.000259 
 
(-1.53) (-0.86) 
IVR -0.000473 -0.000648 
 
(-1.26) (-1.53) 
MAS_FCF 0.0380*** 0.0294*** 
 
(7.68) (6.06) 
UAI_FCF 0.00971*** 0.0108*** 
 
(3.35) (2.77) 
PDI_FCF -0.00436 0.00229 
 
(-0.70) (0.39) 
IDV_FCF -0.00926* -0.0119** 
 
(-1.72) (-2.27) 
LTO_FCF 0.00901** 0.00554 
 
(2.19) (1.41) 
IVR_FCF 0.00489 0.00780 
 
(0.90) (1.27) 
Size_FCF 
 
0.0618* 
  
(1.90) 
Leverage_FCF 
 
0.205 
  
(0.44) 
DIVfcf_FCF 
 
0.182 
  
(1.49) 
Cash_FCF 
 
-0.720** 
  
(-2.36) 
Anti_FCF 
 
-0.212 
  
(-0.45) 
Stock_FCF 
 
-0.000248 
  
(-0.33) 
Credit_FCF 
 
0.00517*** 
  
(3.64) 
Log_GDP_Capita -0.00185 -0.00123 
 
(-0.56) (-0.36) 
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Credit_GDP 0.0000830* -0.000267** 
 
(1.73) (-2.41) 
Stock_mkt_GDP -0.0000317 -0.00000266 
 
(-1.10) (-0.04) 
Anti_Self_Dealing 0.0134 0.0243 
 
(1.00) (0.67) 
2.SIC2 -0.00149 -0.00739 
 
(-0.05) (-0.22) 
8.SIC2 0.00765 0.00467 
 
(0.24) (0.14) 
10.SIC2 0.0278 0.0241 
 
(1.00) (0.83) 
12.SIC2 0.0469 0.0442 
 
(1.35) (1.23) 
13.SIC2 0.0848*** 0.0698*** 
 
(3.31) (2.62) 
14.SIC2 0.000840 -0.00564 
 
(0.02) (-0.16) 
15.SIC2 -0.0315 -0.0318 
 
(-1.12) (-1.09) 
16.SIC2 -0.000459 -0.00560 
 
(-0.02) (-0.19) 
17.SIC2 0.00113 -0.00283 
 
(0.04) (-0.09) 
20.SIC2 0.00387 -0.00149 
 
(0.16) (-0.06) 
22.SIC2 0.0000315 -0.00526 
 
(0.00) (-0.20) 
23.SIC2 -0.00855 -0.00854 
 
(-0.32) (-0.30) 
24.SIC2 0.00195 -0.00301 
 
(0.07) (-0.11) 
25.SIC2 -0.0152 -0.0207 
 
(-0.56) (-0.74) 
26.SIC2 -0.000607 -0.00459 
 
(-0.02) (-0.18) 
27.SIC2 -0.00242 -0.0103 
 
(-0.09) (-0.38) 
28.SIC2 -0.00311 -0.00820 
 
(-0.13) (-0.32) 
29.SIC2 0.0287 0.0265 
 
(1.02) (0.91) 
30.SIC2 0.00738 0.00267 
 
(0.29) (0.10) 
31.SIC2 -0.00989 -0.0128 
 
(-0.24) (-0.30) 
32.SIC2 0.00146 -0.00433 
 
(0.06) (-0.17) 
33.SIC2 -0.00594 -0.0102 
 
(-0.24) (-0.39) 
34.SIC2 -0.00417 -0.00988 
 
(-0.16) (-0.38) 
35.SIC2 0.0176 0.0158 
 
(0.69) (0.60) 
36.SIC2 -0.00748 -0.00966 
 
(-0.30) (-0.38) 
37.SIC2 -0.00768 -0.0107 
 
(-0.31) (-0.41) 
38.SIC2 -0.0115 -0.0161 
 
(-0.44) (-0.59) 
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39.SIC2 -0.0199 -0.0239 
 
(-0.73) (-0.84) 
40.SIC2 0.0621 0.0572 
 
(1.50) (1.32) 
41.SIC2 0.0268 0.0191 
 (0.91) (0.63) 
42.SIC2 0.0484* 0.0390 
 (1.87) (1.46) 
44.SIC2 0.0311 0.0281 
 (1.20) (1.05) 
45.SIC2 0.0219 0.0246 
 (0.77) (0.83) 
47.SIC2 0.0374 0.0366 
 (1.35) (1.27) 
48.SIC2 0.000122 -0.00842 
 (0.00) (-0.32) 
49.SIC2 -0.0189 -0.0231 
 (-0.74) (-0.88) 
50.SIC2 -0.00819 -0.0116 
 (-0.33) (-0.45) 
51.SIC2 -0.000618 -0.00624 
 (-0.02) (-0.24) 
52.SIC2 -0.0432 -0.0378 
 (-0.74) (-0.66) 
53.SIC2 -0.00577 -0.00977 
 (-0.20) (-0.33) 
54.SIC2 0.0155 0.00848 
 (0.58) (0.31) 
55.SIC2 -0.000947 -0.00409 
 (-0.03) (-0.13) 
56.SIC2 0.00479 0.000417 
 (0.18) (0.02) 
57.SIC2 -0.00970 -0.00380 
 (-0.31) (-0.12) 
58.SIC2 0.00696 -0.000491 
 (0.25) (-0.02) 
59.SIC2 -0.00348 -0.0116 
 (-0.13) (-0.42) 
70.SIC2 0.00449 -0.00178 
 (0.16) (-0.06) 
72.SIC2 -0.00536 -0.0136 
 (-0.17) (-0.42) 
73.SIC2 -0.0203 -0.0214 
 (-0.80) (-0.82) 
75.SIC2 0.0514 0.0394 
 (1.63) (1.20) 
76.SIC2 0.00401 -0.00578 
 (0.10) (-0.13) 
78.SIC2 0.0188 0.0299 
 (0.58) (0.89) 
79.SIC2 -0.00910 -0.0128 
 (-0.33) (-0.45) 
80.SIC2 -0.0100 -0.0118 
 (-0.35) (-0.40) 
82.SIC2 -0.0178 -0.0244 
 (-0.52) (-0.69) 
87.SIC2 -0.0173 -0.0192 
 (-0.65) (-0.70) 
96.SIC2 -0.0640 -0.0579 
 (-1.19) (-1.03) 
National Culture and Overinvestment in CAPEX – Zoltan Horvath 270. 
 
   
2003.year -0.00182 -0.00423 
 (-0.32) (-0.72) 
2004.year -0.00108 -0.00346 
 (-0.19) (-0.60) 
2005.year 0.0156*** 0.0125** 
 (2.66) (2.09) 
2006.year 0.0113** 0.00810 
 (1.99) (1.38) 
2007.year 0.00578 0.00132 
 (1.01) (0.22) 
2008.year 0.00529 0.00128 
 (0.98) (0.23) 
2009.year -0.0198*** -0.0244*** 
 (-3.54) (-4.19) 
2010.year -0.0136*** -0.0150*** 
 (-2.59) (-2.73) 
_cons 0.156** 0.194*** 
 (2.30) (2.61) 
number of 
observations 13815 13815 
Each model is one-step system General Method of Moments (system 
GMM) dynamic panel data regression with capital expenditure divided by 
total assets as dependent variable. Israel was excluded from the sample as 
its IVR score was not available. ***,**, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
